A Consideration of the Value of Philosophical Phenomenology for Sociology with Particular Reference to Methodology and the Problem of Intersubjectivity. by Wright, Christopher
Durham E-Theses
A Consideration of the Value of Philosophical
Phenomenology for Sociology with Particular
Reference to Methodology and the Problem of
Intersubjectivity.
Wright, C.
How to cite:
Wright, C. (1975) A Consideration of the Value of Philosophical Phenomenology for Sociology with
Particular Reference to Methodology and the Problem of Intersubjectivity. Doctoral thesis, Durham
University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1887/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
"A CONSIDERATION OF THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
FOR SOCIOLOGY WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO METHODOLOGY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY" 
THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM, by C. WRIGHT B. A. (DUNELn1) 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
4 
EASTER 1975 
ACKNOWLEDGE1ENTS 
I would like to thank Or. R. S. Moore and Prof. P. Abrams for 
their invaluable assistance in supervising the work for this thesis. 
I would also like to thank Mrs. Louise Cresser for being brave enough 
to type out the completed work. My wife, Jean, deserves special 
consideratioh for her, occasional, patience and unfailing sympathy 
on the frequent occasions when depression set in, as does my son, 
Matthew, whose appearance cheerfully destroyed my work-routine. 
SYNOPSIS 
An exposition is nivon of Hussorl's phonomenology. Particular 
attention is drawn to the epistemological and ontological aspects of 
this approach and to the method by which Husserl socks to achieve 
indubitablo knowledge. It is in this cont-,;: t that wo elucidate our crucial 
concepts of horizon and the relationship between ncaninn and significance. 
Thera follows a consideration of aha major objections against 
phenomenology, most of which are soon to be refutcble. In this context 
wo criticise tho adoquccy of ', littconstoin's objoctions to essentialism 
and, implicitly, phenomenology and denonstrrtc hou Uittcenstein has to 
introduce essentialist concepts into his own philosophy. 
From our point of view, the crucial objection against phono. -nenology 
is that it is solipsistic. Us conclude that this chargs is justified in 
the case of Husserl and that his concept of the lebenswelt is a 
mystification of the common-sense concept of culture. However, we 
leave open, at this stage, the possibility of this inadequacy being a 
consequence of Husserl's use of phenomenology rather than as endemic in 
this approach. 
There follows a critique of attempts within sociology to resolve the 
problem of intersubjective understanding. Those arc divided into the 
nominalist tradition, represented by Winch, Weber and Schutz, and the 
realist tradition exemplified by Simmel and Scheler. Although the 
realist tradition is shown to be superior, both are found to be inadequate. 
This is because both fail to establish intersubjcctivo understendinc and 
tend to substitute ego-aggrandisement and effective solipsism. 
Consequently, neither can apprehend the experience of the distinctiveness 
of other subjects or our experience of ourselves as both individual and 
community. Particularly in the nominalist tradition, this leads to the 
fallacious perception of the other as totally passive. This discussion 
involvos a critique of empathic and analogic theories of intersubjcctivo 
understanding. 
Finally, quo, demonstrate that the prcbem of intersubjective 
understanding can be resolved through u revised phenomenology, an 
essential realism. Our discussion places intersubjective knowledge 
within the context of a critique of knowledge as such. Genuine 
intorsubjective knowledge is shown to be synonymous ciith the 
primordial knowledge of universal rationality and therefore inter- 
subjective consciousness is Transcendental consciousnass. Thus 
intersubjectivity is seen to be prior to subjectivity. Je counteract 
the view that knowledge, including knowledge of others, is the product 
of a uniquely active consciousness by arguing a reciprocal orientation 
between consciousness and object which is fulfilled in exporience. 
The establishment of the inter-relationship between inter- 
subjectivity and subjectivity results in the "Person" being identified 
as the object of sociological enquiry. Our idea of the priority of 
sociological knowledge is explained and justified. The critical 
possibilities of phenomenological sociology are clarified. Finally 
we define the role of'essence in sociology, contrasting it with the 
ideal type, showing essence to be both the origin and conclusion of 
enquiry and the means of conveying our knowledge to others. 
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(i) 
INTRODUCTION 
The central concern of this thesis is with tho possibility of 
reliable intersubjective understanding. That is, a consideration of 
the problem of whether such understanding is inevitably limited to 
self-projection or whether there is any sense in which we can achieve 
understanding of others in themselves. 
Although this problem is critical for sociology, particularly 
Verstehende or interpretive sociology, we intend to show in chapters 4, 
5 and 6 that it has not been resolved satisfactorily within sociology. 
It is our contention that we must turn to philosophy in order to 
answer this problem. This is, partly, because the problem has been more 
extensively considered in philosophy than sociology but also, principally, 
because this problem is part of the wider question of the epistemological 
status of knowledge as such and this typically been discussed within 
philosophy. This is not a particularly radical departure because all 
sociological enquiry involves assumptions concerning the possibilities 
and status of our knowledge of others. We are simply seeking to make 
explicit what has previously been largely implicit, in sociological 
discourse, by reference to philosophy, and in doing so we intend to 
offer a rational solution to a problem which has tended to be only naively, 
and indirectly considered. 
We make no apologies for this philosophical consideration of a 
sociological problem . All knowledge is one, and 
it would be a grave 
error to reify convenient or professional demarcations between 
different 
spheres of knowledge to the level of necessary and inviolable distinctions. 
The problem of intersubjective understanding belongs to both philosophy 
and sociology. Thus, sociological problems are not ignored, but 
in our 
view, are clarified and made amenable to resolution by being considered 
within the framework of philosophical, as well as sociological, 
discourse. 
(ii) 
Differences in terminology or the respective quality of the debates 
should not blind us to the fact that the problem is the same for both 
traditions and that the proferred solutions are comparable, involving 
commitment to epistemological and ontological positions. 
The philosophical tradition through which we Leek a solution to the 
problem of intersubjective understanding is phenomenology. The reasons 
for this are partly biographical. The author, a sociologist by training, 
set out to do a conventional piece of research in the sociology of 
religion bringing to bear the traditional apparatus of such research, 
questionnaires, interviews, sample surveys etc. I realised that such 
techniques do not guarantee the adequacy of our understanding of others, 
that they are based on naive assumptions concerning the unproblematic 
nature of such understanding and that the air of intellectual respectability 
and rigour associated with these techniques prevents a thorough 
investigation of the problem of intersubjective understanding. My 
slight familiarity with phenomenology at that time (1968-69) suggested 
that it could offer a solution to this problem. 
Our claim that this view is confirmed by the present work may seem 
perverse in view of the persisting criticism that phenomenology is 
incorrigibly solipsistic; that it cannot account for our experience of 
other subjects, that it cannot validate our knowledge of other subjects 
as-distinctive from knowledge of self etc. However, this weakness is not 
limited to phenomenology for it is to be found in all philosophy. 
Nevertheless we will show, in chapters 3 and 7, that, although this 
charge can be sustained in relation to the major tradition of phenomenology, 
it is possible to devise a phenomenological method which can establish 
intersubjective knowledge, without compromising the phenomenological goal 
* This was just before phenomenology, in its Schutzi©n version, became 
popular in sociology. 
(iii) 
of basing all knowledge on reliable, fundamental data, thus guaranteeing 
the reliability and nature of our understanding of others in themselves. 
This revised phenomenology therefore promises the possibility of a 
sociology which can, by using this method, apprehend others in themselves, 
rather than our own self-projections, and thus a sociology which can fully 
apprehend our social being. At the same time, we will show that our re- 
vised phenomenology is truly phenomenological in that it adheres fully 
to phenomenology's, radical critical programme, Indeed, it will be 
shown that revised phenomenology avoids those naive assumptions which 
have compromised the authenticity of current phenomenology and which 
make it vulnerable to the charge of 'solipsism. 
It is appropriate to begin our enquiry with an exposition of the 
nature of phenomenology, and this will be done by reference to the ideas 
of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. His work forms the 
focus of chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A CONSIDERATION OF HUSSERL'S PROGRAMME FOR PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY 
In this chapter we intend to discuss the origin of Husserl's 
phenomenology, as a means of attaining absolutely valid knowledge, in 
his opposition to the theories of knowledge of relativistic scepticism 
and naive realism. We will also clarify and comment upon the epistemology 
on which the phenomenological method is based. Finally, we will consider 
the phenomenological method itself with a view to clarifying Husserl's 
special terminology and expounding the logic behind the method. 
Although this chapter is largely descriptive and has the principal 
aim of convoying the nature and logic of phenomenology we will also, 
when appropriate, criticise Husserl's procedure and present, in a 
preliminary fashion, our arguments concerning the problems which are 
raised. 
RELATIVISM 
It is important to note that Husserl arrived at his conception of 
phenomenology by reacting against his initial adherence to psychologistic 
and relativistic conceptions of knowledge in that he saw these positions 
as leading to logical absurdities. In particular, that the acceptance 
of relativism requires a further acceptance of absolute knowledge, the 
possibility of which is denied in relativistic theories. That is, 
relativism has to both affirm and deny the possibility of absolute, non- 
relative knowledge. This is so because, in order for relativistic 
arguments to be accepted as binding on others, it is necessary 
for them 
to be regarded as non-relative. Thus, any relativism asserts the 
necessary limitation of all knowledge except, and this is purely 
arbitrary, itself. Therefore, any relativistic conception of 
knowledge, in order to qualify itself as knowledge, has to assert that 
all other knowledge is relative, but that the statement that all 
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knowledge is relative has the privileged position of absolute validity 
and is therOfore non-relative. Thus, statements which claim that all 
knowledge is relative presuppose that the person making the statement 
has achieved a totally reliable and non-relative perspective from which 
the relativistic nature of all other knowledge is clearly and 
necessarily revealed. 
Equally, Husserl saw that relativistic ideas of knowledge resulted 
in a thoroughgoing scepticism towards knowledge in general. Such 
scepticism was ultimately self-defeating for it would lead to doubt 
concerning the origin of the sceptical idea. 
From the point of view of our concern with the relevance of 
Husserlian phenomenology for sociology it is necessary that we take 
account of his criticisms of relativism within the social sciences as 
developed in his discussion of Dilthey's Weltanschauung philosophy. 
Husserl sees this as being based on the idea of history as an ever- 
changing stream of spirit within which there are no enduring entities, 
thus all knowledge is seen as located within an inconstant flux. This 
perception is, in Oilthey's view, reinforced by the existence of 
competing philosophies and the great variety of historical forms, each 
one having its own particular and unassailable truths. Thus, in 
Oilthey's words, "the formation of a historical consciousness destroys 
.... a belief in the universal validity of any of the philosophies 
that 
have undertaken to express in a compelling manner the coherence of the 
world by an ensemble of concepts"('). 
Husserl's response to cultural and historical relativism as 
exemplified by Dilthey is not convincing in all its parts. The main 
objection which he raises against it is, its tendency to relativism 
and sceptical subjectivism but to simply assert as Husserl does the 
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unacceptable consequences of a position does not mean that the view 
opposing that position, in this case the possibility of absolutely 
valid knowledge, is correct. However, Husserl is correct in asserting 
that the possibility of a validity in itself as an object for conscious- 
ness is not denied by the non-realisation of such validity in history 
or culture. Developing his critique, Husserl points to the contradiction 
in historical relativism, which is common to all relativisms, that in 
its own terms its statements are unreliable because, in time, they may 
be rejected. Expanding upon this idea of the self-imposed inadequacies 
of historical relativism, or historicism as he occasionally terms it, 
Husserl criticises this approach for reaching conclusions concerning 
the nature of validity which it cannot justify. This is because, in 
judging the relative validity of an historical form, historicism must 
use non-historical sources of knowledge and judgements, ie. philosophy and, 
furthermore, a philosophy which has the ability to make judgements 
concerning absolute validity and which must therefore possess the idea of 
an absolute validity. A purely factual approach cannot pronounce on 
the relationship between the valid, grasped as a concept, and its historical 
realisations. It cannot decide "whether or not there exists, to speak 
Platonically, between (the valid and its historical realisations) the 
relation between the idea and the dim form in which it appears"(2). 
Thus, in asserting the contingency of historical forms, in denying 
absolute validity, historicism must assume that absolute validity can 
be thought and can be realised in order for its statement that no 
single historical form can be said to possess absolute validity to 
make sense. 
In generalising this argument we realise that if we can refute 
claims to absolute validity we can do so only on the grounds that we 
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know what the absolutely valid would look like and that the object under 
consideration does not fulfill these criteria. In similar fashion the 
judgement that problems have been incorrectly posed presupposes prior 
knowledge of the correct mode of asking questions. This is so because 
relativity, like incorrect procedure and error, is a negative category 
and therefore in itself it is insubstantial. Such categories are 
simply denials of certain states of affairs e. g. absolute validity, 
correct procedure, truth, and are comprehensible only in so far as the 
conditions whose presence they deny are understood. This is not to 
state the illogical conclusion that because relativity can be argued, 
absolute validity exists, but simply that the relativistic argument, 
because relativity is a negative category, presupposes the idea of 
absolute validity and if absolute validity is thinkable then its 
recognition within our experience is a real possibility 
Thus, Husserl advances two objections against relativism; the 
necessary self-contradiction in relativistic statements, that is, the 
fact that they have to assume the possibility of that which they deny, 
and the necessary admission, within the relativist's argument, of the 
possibility of absolute validity. Therefore, even if the first 
objection is overlooked, assertions that knowledge is relative can be 
regarded only as contingent, not necessary, statements that so far the 
idea of absolute validity has not been realised in our experience of this 
sphere of knowledge. As Husserl points out, this tells us nothing 
about the likelihood of the future realisation of absolute validity. 
Husserl further rejects the claim that historicism is able to make 
* The relationship to knowledge of negative categorise such as error, 
can be summed up in the idea that in order to recognise a judgement as 
fade it is necessary to have prior knowledge of the qualities of a true 
judgement, whereas in order to recognise a judgement as true it is not 
necessary to know what an erroneous judgement would look like. 
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comparative judgements through an understanding of a particular form, by 
grasping not only the form's sense but also its relative worth. 
However, every senior science student at school knows as much, if not 
more, about the universe than Newton, but he was great, they are not. 
Situations such as this are taken by Husserl as evidence that the 
principles of even relative evaluation lie in the ideal sphere which is 
presupposed by the historian and that the norms for such evaluations lie 
within the ontology of each region, for the mathematical in mathematics, 
for the artistic in art etc., and are not reducible to other ontologies 
such as history or sociology. 
Dilthey's response to Husserl, that the latter was, "A true Plato 
who first of all fixes in concepts things that come and flow and then 
supplements these fixed concepts with the concepts of "flowing"(3), 
inadvertently reveals some of the weaknesses of the relativist's 
position. The crucial term is "fixed", for the implication of Dilthey's 
criticism is that things come and flow and should not be fixed in 
concepts, yet it is true that "coming and flowing" is a concept with a 
fixed, ie. definitive, meaning otherwise Oilthey would not be able to 
use the expression in the expectancy of being understood. Thus, even 
if Dilthey's statement is an accurate assessment of Husserl's procedure 
the latter can be said to be only making apparent what is-implicit in 
Dilthoy's own acts of conceptualisation. 
It should be noted that although Husserl formally rejected 
historicism, his account of the history of philosophy and his 
teleological justification of phenomenology in "Krisis"(4), with its 
strong undertones of cultural relativism*, tends to follow the historicist's 
Weltanschauungen approach. This is partly because, in "Krisis", Husserl 
* This aspect of Husserl's work will be developed further below in the 
discussion of his concept of the Lebenswelt. 
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attempts to justify phenomenology on grounds of cultural relevance 
rather than on pure logic as had been his previous procedure. In 
seeing the theoretical impulse, which motivates phenomenology's quest 
for absolute data, as peculiar to the history of Western culture, Husserl 
implies its irrelevance to other cultures. It is possible that in an 
attempt to retrieve phenomenology's claim to universal relevance, Husserl 
identifies European culture as occupying a special place, almost a 
leadership, in relation to other cultures, based on the belief that non- 
European cultures have a burning desire to Europeanise. 
However, it is not enough, as Husserl recognised, to expose the 
absurdities of relativism for it could be argued that, due to the 
limitations of our knowledge, relativism may be absurd but inevitable. ' 
In order to demonstrate relativism's redundance as well as its absurdity, 
it is necessary to show that non-rblativistic, je. universally valid, 
knowledge is possible. It is the desire to demonstrate the 
accessibility of absolute knowledge which is the motivating force behind 
the phenomenological programme. 
Before this programme is described it is necessary to clarify 
briefly why Husserl's later work shows a tendency to relativism, in 
particular, cultural relativism, although this discussion will be 
expanded below. Absolutely valid knowledge is knowledge which is 
necessarily true for all cognitive subjects and thus such knowledge is 
universally available. However, in order to establish the community of 
cognitive subjects it is necessary to demonstrate the accessibility of 
other consciousnesses. This is the problem of intersubjectivity which 
Hussorl unsuccessfully spent much time in attempting, to resolve. It 
is noticeable that after his failure to provide an adequate account of 
reliable intersubjective knowledge in the fifth Cartesian meditation, 
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Husserl's work adopted a more idealistic, subjectivist approach, in 
which emphasis was placed on the acts of the isolated consciousness. 
In order to avoid the solipsistic tendencies of this approach, he developed 
the idea of the Lebenswelt or life-world, which when cleared of the 
surrounding verbiage, is seen to be the idea of culture. However 
reference to culture cannot resolve the problem of our knowledge of other 
consciousnesses for. the idea of culture does not establish, but presupposes 
intersubjective knowledge. Thus, having failed to establish inter- 
subjectivity and, as a consequence, falling back on a belief in a 
common-world which is identified with culture, Husserl reveals tendencies 
towards that same cultural relativism which he condemned in Dilthey and 
others. It is indicative of Husserl's failure to realise the extent of 
this weakness that he made his criticisms of Dilthey at the some time that 
he developed his concept of the Lebenswelt, and it is clear that Husserl 
did not realise the extent to which he had compromised his anti-relativism 
in his work subsequent to the Cartesian Meditations. This argument will 
be developed below, but the point we wish to emphasise here is the crucial 
significance of Husserl's failure to establish intersubjectivity in 
relation to the fulfilment of the phenomenological ideal of revealing 
absolutely valid knowledge because such knowledge, necessarily, has to be 
valid for all subjects. 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROGRAMME 
An initial problem in any attempt to define phenomenology is that 
there is no single definition of this philosophy which would be 
acceptable without qualification to all those who consider themselves 
phenomenologists . Even Spiegelberg's(5) contention that although 
phenomenologists disagree over their results they are more or less 
in 
harmony concerning their method is challenged by Edie(6). A comparison 
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of the idea of phenomenology as expressed by Husserl with phenomenology 
understood by van der Leeuw as description of what is seen and 
Heidegger's notion of hermeneutic phenomenology and Sartre's existential 
phenomenology confirms Edie's opinion. The reason for this fluidity of 
( 
approach is expressed by Thevenazttýhus, "Husserl however, and phenomenology 
itself, winds and gropes its way constantly retracing its steps, probing 
the unseen ground before it, continually putting everything in question. 
We can say that phenomenology paradoxically unites two qualifications 
reputedly exclusive of one another, it is methodical and groping. " 
Similarly Spiegelberg(8) prefers to use the term "phenomenological 
movement" rather than "school" because of this lack of consensus. 
The problem of defining phenomenology is not capable of being 
resolved by identifying the similarity in approach of those termed 
phenomenologists for the name has been indiscriminately applied to some 
who would probably not accept it and arbitrarily withheld from some who 
would seem to be close to the movement(9). As a consequence no single 
definition of phenomenology would be uncontroversial, but, if only in 
terms of the status of its proposers, the statement issued jointly by 
Husserl, Geiger, Ponder, Reinach and Schaler is as close as anything 
available to a formal outline of the phenomenological ideal. The 
crucial part of this statement reads, "(Phenomenology) is not a system 
that the editors share. What unites them is the common conviction 
that it is only by a return to the primary sources of direct intuition 
and to insights into essential structures derived from them that we shall 
be able to put to use the great traditions of philosophy with their 
concepts and problems"(lO). This is clearly a declaration of belief in 
the primacy of direct intuition and the possibility of the grasp of essence 
but there is a significant absence of an agreed statement concerning the 
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methods by which these goals are to be realised. 
Thus, this "credo" of the early members of the phenomenological 
movement and can be seen as the establishment of the phenomenological 
tradition, However, there are certain characteristics of phenomenology 
as defined by Husserl which are not included in this statement; notably 
that phenomenology intends a radical departure from the modes of thought 
of commonsense and its idealisations in the various empirical sciences, 
as part of phenomenology's procedure of subjecting all ideas, opinions, 
evaluations and judgements to radical questioning. This is opposed to 
the uncritical perspective of common-sense, or the natural attitude as 
it is often termed. The recognition of this aspect of phenomenology 
reveals its dual function as both epistemology, a theory of the 
acquisition and status of knowledge and dsmethodology, a programme of 
analysis and procedure. These aspects are united in the phenomenological 
aim of utilising a method through which totally reliable knowledge can be 
acquired. Phenomenology's method of abandoning the natural attitude has 
led to it being characterised as mystical, anti-scientific and as 
introspective psychology. Although these criticisms will be considered 
in due course it must be remembered that the aim of this phenomenological 
method is to change "our relation to the world, (to become) more 
acutely aware of it"(") by adopting an attitude such that, "No opinion 
is to be accepted as philosophical knowledge unless it is seen to be 
adequately established by observation of what is seen to be itself given 
'in person' 11 
12)0 
Even these aims of achieving an intuitive grasp of self-given 
phenomena as they are presented to or constituted by consciousness 
The relationship between consciousness and its objects expressed in 
the idea of constitution is unclear in Husserl's work and will be 
discussed below at greater length. 
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through the radical elimination of all unreliable data contained in 
everyday perception do not guarantee extensive common ground among those 
called phenomenologists. Thus Spiegelberg(13) , in addition to the 
minimal definition above of Husserl at al, provides three further 
definitions of the nature of phenomenology which increase in rigour and 
exclusiveness. The first of these is acceptance of the minimal definition 
including conscious adherence to the movement; secondly, the use of a 
method which not only refers to intuition and essence but which also takes 
note of the essential modes of appearance of phenomena in consciousness. 
The third, and most limited, position is the deliberate use of the 
processes known as the reductions. Although the nature of the reductions 
will be clarified below, it is possible that those familiar with the idea 
will be surprised at Spiegelberg's identification of them with the most 
exclusive interpretation of Husserl. However it should be recognised that, 
although the method of reduction is central to Hussorl's phenomenology, 
its use, and the implications of its use, have never been accepted by the 
movement as a whole. 
This discussion has indicated the divergence of ideas concerning 
phenomenology and has introduced briefly some of the concepts associated 
with this branch of philosophy. In order for the investigation to 
proceed it is necessary to specify the idea of phenomenology which will 
be the object of enquiry. This is phenomenology as understood by Husserl 
and is, therefore, the most rigorous of Spiegelberg's definitions of 
phenomenology. The analysis of the potential value of phenomenology 
for sociology will be based upon Husserl's idea of phenomenology because 
he is generally recognised'as the founder of the movement, although he 
became increasingly isolated from his earlier colleagues and almost 
certainly developed his later ideas in near isolation. As phenomenology 
is, deliberately, foreign to our common-sense thought it is necessary 
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to consider its origins and this requires consideration of Husserl's 
work, as has been done in the consideration of Husserl's objections to 
relativism. Finally, Husserl developed the implications of the 
phenomenological method to a far greater extent than did any of his 
disciples, therefore, in order to give the fullest consideration of 
phenomenology's value for sociology it is necessary to consider the 
fullest exposition of the method; this is to be found in Husserl's notion 
of phenomenology. 
ORIGINS OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
It has been seen that Husserl's quest for indubitable knowledge, 
which he saw as fulfilled in the programme of phenomenology, sprang out 
of his hostility to relativism and scepticism. This was something of 
a conversion as Husserl's first major publication, "The Psychology of 
Arithmetic", was a work of psychologistic relativism, a mode of thought 
which became Husserl's prime target in his phenomenological writings. 
The cause of Husserl's change of attitude to relativism and the 
possibilities of absolute knowledge was his recognition of the logical 
absurdities of the relativistic position, and its destructive effects on 
knowledge in general, which he saw as the cause of the "crisis of science", 
the questioning of the relevance 9nd possibility of science in the light 
of relativity and quantum theory*('). Later, Husserl saw the crisis of 
science as merely symptomatic of a wider cultural crisis brought about by 
the abandonment of the origins of Western culture which he located in the 
theoretical attitude of classical Greece. 
Initially the crisis of science meant for Husserl "the unclarified 
* This introduces what is possibly one of three usages of the term science 
in Husserl. The problems and confusions caused by this varying usage will 
be discussed below, chapter 2. 
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status of science and scientific knowledge"(16), 
*(1), hence his 
attempt to establish phenomenology as a rigorous science 
*(2) 
which would 
provide the foundation for particular scientific enquiry. 
PHENOMENOLOGY AS FOUNDATION-BUILDER 
According to Husserl two factors were causing the crisis of science. 
These were the tendency of science to become an unphilosophical study of 
mere facts as a consequence of which it had lost its contbot with 
meaning, and its adoption of naturalism which prevented it from coping 
with problems of ultimate truth and validity. A similar view is 
expressed by Whitehead "If science is not to degenerate into a medley 
of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philosophical and enter upon a 
thorough criticism of its own foundations"(17). It was to this task 
of providing science, and practical knowledge in general, with a 
foundation of unquestionably reliable knowledge, the necessary, a 
priori, truths, that Husserl devoted his life, taking pleasure in 
calling himself a "true beginner". In his later work Husserl identified 
another cause of this crisis which was the estrangement of science from 
the everyday world of experience from which it derived its value and 
meaning. Hence, restoring science to its place within the everyday 
world, showing its dependance on this world, would reveal the meaning of 
science as a purposive activity. Husserl's attitude to science will 
be discussed below in relation to the claim that his phenomenology is 
anti-scientific. However in the present discussion of the relationship 
between science and phenomenology as perceived by Husserl it is sufficient 
*(1) The German term "Wissen" has a wider connotation than the English 
"science", often referring to knowledge in general. Thus it would be 
justifiable to interpret Husserl as seeing the crisis, although acute 
in the particular sciences, as present in all knowledge, hence the case 
of the translation of the crisis of science into a crisis of culture in 
Husserl's later work. 
*(2) The crisis of science was felt less keenly in Britain than in 
Europe which may explain the persistence of positivism in the former. 
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to note Husserl's conviction that science was undergoing a crisis because 
of the attacks of relativism and scepticism and a loss of meaning which 
its own naturalism and anti-philosophical attitude had produced. 
Husserl concluded that it could be preserved against these assaults only 
by being founded on reliable knowledge which was immune to sceptical 
criticism; such knowledge would be provided by the radical method of 
phenomenology. Thus Husserl would clearly reject the "under-labourer" 
conception of philosophy's relationship to science which is established 
as a tenet of most positivist and empiricist philosophies. It would 
be reasonable to claim that Husserl would see the triumph of the "under- 
labourer" conception, in which philosophy is reduced to a supporting 
role for science, tidying up its concepts etc. as not representing a 
recognition of the priority of reliable proof over more speculation, 
but as a disaster for the possibilities of scientific enquiry. This is 
because the questions considered by philosophy, the nature of truth, the 
nature of that which we perceive, the adequacy of our concepts, the 
relationship between our ideas and the objedts to which they refer are an 
inevitable part of any scientific enquiry. If reliable answers to these 
questions are not sought, the consequence is that the scientific 
procedure will base itself on naive and unreliable assumptions concerning 
the status of its procedure which, once revealed, would undermine the 
whole scientific programme. Thus scientific enquiry depends on a rigorous, 
reliable philosophy. 
Thus, the aim of phenomenology is to provide a reliable basis for 
knowledge. This is to be achieved by revealing the immanent nature of 
phenomena in an eidetic intuition which, being ideal and a priori, is not 
subject to the fluctuations and inherent instability of perceptual 
experience. Therefore, phenomenology seeks to reveal the meaning of 
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phenomena and to establish the particular sciences as based on meaning. 
Bochenski(18) , in his discussion of phenomenology cites three 
functions of meaning; firstly, what an expression "manifests"; secondly, 
what an expression "signifies" which can be either the sense or content 
of the concept or what is denoted by the expression. Thus Husserl 
distinguishes between the quality of the act of meaning, (conception, 
doubt etc. ) its matter or content and its object. The third function 
of meaning refers to those acts which bestow and those which fulfill 
meaning, the latter providing the act's intuitional fulfillment. The 
epistemological function of these distinctions is to provide a reliable 
alternative to the contradictions and relativity of naturalism and thus, 
to permit a solution to the problem of the relationship between an act 
of cognition, its meaning and its object. This is to be achieved by 
seeking the essence of cognition in a critique of natural cognition for, 
in Husserl's view, "Only with epistemological reflection do we arrive at 
the distinction between the sciences of the natural sort and philosophy"(19). 
As will become clear Husserl intends by "epistemological reflection" not 
a vague contemplation but a rigorous, methodical questioning of experience. 
PEANING - SIGNIFICANCE 
Husserl's analysis of acts of meaning into quality (noesis , object 
(noema) and matter (hyle) is a description of the components of such acts. 
There is also a need to identify meaning as a quality sui generis and to 
this and we make the distinction between the meaning and the significance 
of a phenomenon. The meaning of a phenomenon is its nature or essence. 
This is immanent to the phenomenon, and is that, without which, the 
phenomenon would be qualitatively different, Therefore it is that which 
is necessary in an adequate perception of the phenomenon by any subject. 
The significance of the phenomenon is its value or practical utility 
for 
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an acting, purposive subject. Meaning is synonymous with quality or 
essence; significance is synonymous with value or utility. The former 
is a product of theoretical apprehension, the latter is located in the 
practical activity of individuals. The importance of this distinction 
will be made apparent in our discussion of a solution to the problem of 
solipsism in phenomenology but at this stage it is important to note that 
the actual or assumed apprehension of the meaning of things precedes our 
identification of these things' significance or utility. That is, the 
idea of quality is necessarily presupposed in ideas of utility but not 
vice versa. 
It may be objected that this argument overlooks the question of why 
we seek the meaning of a phenomenon, and that, in fact, we do so because 
the phenomenon is seen to be significant; therefore the apprehension of 
meaning is a consequence of significant acts. This objection is inadequate 
because it fails to realise that in order for a phenomenon to be seen as 
significant it must be already known. That is, its meaning must be 
known to the subject prior to the judgement that the phenomenon is 
significant. Thus, the realisation that a phenomenon possesses certain 
qualities is implied as prior knowledge in any judgement concerning its 
value. This is because the significance of an object is the application 
of its known qualities to practical activity. 
The objection may be revised so that it is argued that although we 
may beli eve that we perceive the nature of an object prior to judging 
its significance that, in fact, our plans or significant projects shape 
our perception of objects. Thus, if we had different plans, the objects 
would seem to have correspondingly different qualities. That is, our 
significant judgements shape or determine our perception of the supposed 
nature of things and thus the idea that there is an objective quality in 
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things is simply a fiction by which we seek to justify our acts of 
evaluation as being right or proper. This argument fails because it 
is not easy to see how it would account for the common-place phenomenon 
of seeing objects as irrelevant, of knowing what they are and realising 
that they are of no practical utility. If significance shapes meaning 
then only that which is significant will be meaningfully apprehended but 
in recognising a phenomenon to be insignificant we base this judgement 
on our belief that we have grasped the meaning of the thing. This is not 
to deny that our plans or projects may, in practise, determine our 
perception of the quality of a phenomenon and, of course, such perception 
is erroneous because the subject is in the position of believing that he 
has grasped objective reality when in fact he has simply projected his 
wishes -onto the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it would be strange to 
argue that erroneous perception is the norm for all perception. Like 
all such scepticisms, the objection contradicts itself because it is 
based on the belief that the idea that we grasp the nature of phenomena 
is wrong, but if this argument is to demand our assent then it must 
contain the claim to have grasped the nature of our acts of judging the 
nature of things. If the argument that the grasp of objective nature 
is a fiction is accepted then the argument itself must be a fiction and 
cannot demand our agreement. 
The possibility of error in our judgements concerning the nature of 
things was recognised by Husserl and he saw the natural attitude as being 
particularly prone to such errors due to its untheoretical and non- 
radical nature as a consequence of which it could not recognise its 
errors. Thus the fitst step in phenomenology is the abandonment of the 
practical orientation of the natural attitude and the adoption of the 
theoretical attitude. This latter is a constant assumption of, but 
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cannot be guaranteed full clarity in, the natural attitude. The 
sceptical argument, above, therefore simply points to the need of a 
programme'such as that intended by phenomenology, in order to prevent 
practical interests distorting objective perception. Therefore, before 
considering how phenomenology seeks to achieve perception of things-in- 
themselves* it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the idea of the 
natural attitude and why it is pn unsatisfactory basis for achieving 
reliable knowledge. 
THE NATURAL ATTITUDE 
The natural attitude is the perspective of our common-sense under- 
standing of phenomena. It is inadequate because it is naive, that is, 
it is based'on unexamined assumptions concerning the nature of phenomena 
and the adequacy of our understanding of phenomena. To question these 
assumptions e. g. to question whether we can know other minds rather than 
simply projecting our attitudes onto the other's situation and merely 
assume that this is how the other sees his situation, is to threaten 
the stability of the natural attitude. This, in our view, is because 
common-sense or the natural attitude is practical not theoretical; it is 
oriented to the goals and purposes of acting subjects and sees the 
surrounding world in terms of its utility and not as objects sui generis. 
Thus it tends to deny the distinctiveness of meaning in relation to 
significance. The practical orientation of the natural attitude prevents 
us from adopting that attitude of detachment from commitments to the 
everyday interpretation and evaluation of experience which is necessary 
if phenomena are to be perceived in themselves rather than naively 
* Kant's argument that things-in-themselves are unknowable makes the 
similar error in that it, contradictorily, assumes the knowledge of the 
existence of things-in-themselves in order to claim that such things 
cannot be objects of knowledge. If things-in-themselves could not be 
known then it would be impossible to make the distinction between them 
and things-as -they-appear. 
- 18 - 
interpreted as correlates of our interests. This naive approach is 
based on unquestioned assumptions of a theoretical nature which are, 
therefore, unexaminable within the practical orientation of the 
natural attitude. Therefore, the natural attitude results in an 
emptiness of content, vagueness and distance of acts of everyday 
understanding, which prevents their being used to attain reliable, basic 
knowledge. Vague perception, not the perception of vagueness, leads to 
vague and uncertain grasp of phenomena and therefore it is the aim of 
phenomenology as a method to bring the perceived phenomena to full 
clarity, which is the apprehension of the self-givenness of the phenomena. 
This is clearly an act of reflection on experience but, as will be made 
clear below, the rigorous reflection of phenomenology must be sharply 
distinguished from those everyday acts of reflection which are carried 
out within the assumptions of the natural attitude and which, therefore, 
can only reproduce the vagueness of common-sense. Such everyday 
reflection is, therefore, incapable of providing the ground of unquestion- 
able knowledge, the lack of which makes the natural attitude vulnerable 
to the self-destructive assaults of relativism and scepticism. * 
NAIVE REALISM 
This point is noted by Chapman(20), who despite this, and although 
claiming to be a phenomenologist, wishes to achieve reliable reflection 
from within the natural attitude. Thus he supports the position of 
naive realism. A consideration of the weaknesses of Chapman's argument 
will clarify why Husserl believes it necessary to abandon the natural 
attitude, in order to apprehend phenomena, encountered in everyday life. 
* From the point of view of our discussion, the significant weakness of 
the natural attitude is its inability to establish the reliability of 
our knowledge of others, thus, resulting in its practical solipsism 
whereby others are seen as basically the same as self, re below 
chapters 4,5 and 6. 
- . 
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Chapman, as in much inferior phenomenological literature, sees 
the unattended to or taken-for-granted world as the basic theme or problem 
of the process of conscious constitution in which we apprehend phenomena 
as objects of knowledge. It is noteworthy that Chapman admits to 
having jettisoned that aspect of Husserl's work, transcendental conscious- 
nass, through which it was intended to reveal the normally taken-for- 
granted aspects of the world as problems. It must be admitted that a 
phenomenon cannot be, at the same time, taken-for-granted and problematic. 
Although our everyday reflection may recognise what is taken-for- 
granted it can either accept such knowledge as it is or reject it as 
unjustified without being able to justify confidence in the validity of 
this act of rejection. Neither of these responses can provide a rational 
oritique of taken-for-granted knowledge of the world which would be 
grounded in the perception of totally reliable knowledge because all their 
presuppositions originate in the natural attitude which is based on taken- 
for-granted assumptions. Chapman, unsurprisingly, ignores this puzzle 
of how we can raise the taken-for-granted world as a problem without 
questioning taken-for-granted knowledge. Rather he avoids this problem 
by asserting a copy-theory of knowledge, that is, that the world is a 
unity and is perceived as such by consciousness which contains all our 
individual experiences in our one experience of the world. This idea is 
open to all the usual objections to the copy theory of knowledge, in 
particular that it fails to explain how error is possible or recognisable. 
Chapman modifies his position by claiming that whereas a mirror merely 
copies or reflects images, consciousness apprehends the world but the 
specific quality of conscious apprehension and its adequacy is not 
clarified, Chapman contenting himself with the claim that if experience 
* This principle as developed in sociology will be discussed in relation 
to Schutz. 
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is genuine awareness then the common-sense world is the real world. 
This argument is fallacious because common-sense is not experience but 
an interpretation of experience. Thus the confirming eDperience to which 
Chapman refers is experience of the world of the natural attitude is. 
experience as interpreted by the assumptions of the natural attitude. 
Thus the validity of the common-sense world is inevitably confirmed, but 
the adequacy of such interpretation is not demonstrated by this approach 
any more than an argument for the existence of God which contains as a 
basic postulate the idea that, God exists would be regarded as adequate. 
Chapman categorises all those who deny the reliability of common- 
sense as empiricist sensationalists who claim that perception is merely 
a synthesis of external stimulii and that therefore perceiving means 
having. Chapman rejects this argument on the grounds that if we infer 
from our sensations the phenomena which caused them, it is the case that 
the objects of our awareness are phenomena, not sensations, as things 
which I perceive but do not have. That is, things which are perceived 
and are perceived as external. Thus, because we never perceive 
sensations as data but as sensations of something which is the object of 
our attention and that on reflection our sensations are seen as factors 
in a cognitive situation, sensations have a cognitive character. This 
idea of the grasp of the externality of perceived objects is important 
in relation to our consideration of the problem of intersubjectivity 
below. At this stage it is simply necessary to note that Chapman bases 
his argument on the dichotomy that a subject either accepts the real 
contact of his everyday interpretive acts with their objects or accepts 
the sceptical position that the objects of such acts are fictional 
arrangements of sensations from which, Chapman claims, attempts are 
made to construct reliable knowledge by using special methods. 
* 
*This discussion raises the problem of the relationship between 
consciousness and objects which will be further investigated below. 
See specially, chapter 7. 
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Clearly Husserl is implicated in the critique of sensationalism, but 
Chapman's account is unsatisfactory on a number of points, not least 
because it sets up a "straw man" as the opposition to the common-sense 
view of perception which can be criticised on other grounds than empirical 
sensationalism. The refusal to accept the reliability of common-sense 
does not entail a denial of consciousness's cognitive function for the 
aim of Husserlean phenomenology is to ensure a genuine cognitive 
apprehension of objective reality. Phenomenology does not cut itself 
off from objects or phenomena; the only aspects of cognition which are 
de-activated by phenomenology are the inherently unreliable factors in 
everyday cognition, the presence of which leads to doubt concerning 
cognition, such as pre-judgements, presuppositions, an uncritical 
perspective etc. This consideration raises another objection to 
Chapman's account which is his confusion of perception and interpretation. 
He seems to believe that common-sense simply presents us with the real 
object, whereas in fact common-sense is an interpretation of the 
perception as being a perception of such and such. Thus it is a 
judgement of phenomena based on uncritically accepted interpretive 
schemes of the natural attitude, the adequacy of which are nevertheless 
always open to doubt. This leads to our final criticism of Chapman's 
attempt to defend the adequacy of common-sense, which is that a principal 
objection to accepting such adequacy is that common-sense apart from its 
variability, there being innumerable and potentially conflicting common- 
senses, is always open to doubt. Chapman seeks to avoid this problem 
by claiming that the correctness of the inference from consciousness to 
object is irrelevant but this argument is inadequate for Chapman's own 
account constantly assumes, and can make sense only in terms of, the 
reliability of common-sense perception. 
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Despite his confidence in common-sense Chapman accepts the need for 
reflection on experience. This is surprising as common-sense itself is 
not normally reflective and it is a contradiction in Chapman's account 
that although reflection is said to make apparent the contact of common- 
sense with the real, the reflective standpoint in Chapm_a n's view 
initially accepts that perception is in cognitive as well as empirical 
contact with the real. Thus reflection is established as revealing the 
reliable acts of common-sense apprehension because it doeer-not question 
the common-sense claim to reliability. Nor is it clear why, if common- 
sense is reliable, reflection should be necessary. 
The consequences of Chapman's insistence on remaining within the 
natural attitude are shown in his statement that no act can be described 
without specifying its object. Thus, it is wrong to state that "I see 
something", I should say "I see an ink bottle". This latter statement 
is a judgement concerning the nature of the object and it is the meaning 
and adequacy of such judgements which is in doubt, and there is little 
that naive reflection could add to such common-sense judgements. A truly 
radical reflection, that is a reflection which is not based on natural 
attitude assumptions would seek to specify the essential nature of the 
phenomenon without including pre-judgements concerning this nature in the 
initial questioning of the perception. 
The relationship between reflection and common-sense causes severe 
problems for Chapman and in order to preserve the belief both in the 
* The closest approach to this problem by Chapman is his statement 
that intentions and real existence must not be confused since an act 
of intention may be wrong and thus, consciousness would become one with 
its object in an intentional but not a real sense. This seems to be 
re-opening a distinction between things-as-they-are and things-as-they- 
are perceived which makes Chapman's claims in favour of naive realism, 
insupportable. Husserl aimed at removing this distinction by revealing 
a level of consciousness, the Transcendental Ego, at which perception is 
of the thing itself. 
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reliability of the natural attitude and the value of reflection he states 
that in reflection the natural attitude is transcended without leaving it, 
a stepping back in order to survey the world and our experience of it. 
This statement is as nonsensical, as stating that something is wet while 
it is dry. Further, if we step back, we step back from something, and 
this can only be the natural attitude, and towards something else, the 
reflective standpoint which is thereby distinguishable from the natural 
attitude. Thus, Chapman's statement that reflection is simply 
expanding "the horizon of attention so as to include both experience and 
the world"(21) is unacceptable in this context because it is impossible 
to expand the horizon of attention so as to include acts of experience 
and remain within the natural attitude which takes for granted the nature 
of such acts which it presupposes as non-problematic. Clearly, reflection 
cannot succeed in revealing these acts without the prior awareness of 
their being problematic. Thus to accept and remain within the natural 
attitude is to make reflection superfluous. Indeed, Chapman admits a 
major difference between reflection and the natural attitude when he 
states that the former, unlike the latter, is aware of its own activity. 
* 
Chapman concedes this difference in order to avoid the possibility 
of an infinite regress in reflection. This would be the consequence of 
seeing reflection as based on the natural attitude which is itself clarified 
by reflection. Therefore, all acts of reflection require further 
reflective acts in order that they may be clarified. "Thus, reflecting 
on my awareness of the world, I may reflect on this reflection and so on 
without limit, but at no point do I leave the horizon of reflection" 
(22). 
This statement makes it clear that Chapman is avoiding only an infinite 
regression of standpoints but not of problems and thus the act of reflection 
*This statement is also an admission of the naivety of the natural 
attitude. 
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could never be considered complete and therefore nothing reliable or 
basic can be stated as a consequence of this kind of reflection*(l). 
Chapman is unable to finalise reflection, as Husserl does, because he 
sees perception of the real as attained within the natural attitude, 
therefore a completion of reflection in the discovery of reliability, as 
Chapman conceives it, would be in common-sense perception, where the 
process originated, thus making the whole exercise tautologous. 
Chapman finally admits doubt concerning the reliability of the 
natural attitude and his identity of adequate reflection and common-sense. 
He notes that the moments of (everyday) reflection in which we all 
indulge are inadequate because, "they are carried out under the aegis of 
the natural attitude ... and tend accordingly to be unaware of them- 
selves as reflective and as distinct from empirical thought"(23 
2 
Nevertheless, Chapman insists that this reflective or transcendental 
consciousness as he terms it does not mean forsaking the world and, 
although we accept this, Chapman's argument is, as noted above, based on 
a supposed dichotomy between accepting the validity of our naive 
perception of the world, which we have shown to be unsatisfactory and 
rejecting the world which Chapman sees as leading to the position of 
attempting to create knowledge out of nothing. Thus Chapman's argument 
in support of his naive realism amounts, in part, to the assertion that 
the sceptical attitude towards common-sense has unacceptable consequences. 
This consideration of the natural attitude has had the intention of 
demonstrating its inadequacy as a basis for acquiring reliable knowledge. 
*(l) Were Chapman to admit a basic level of knowledge it would undermine 
his belief in the reliability of the pre-reflective natural attitude. It 
is interesting to contrast this with Husserl's radical reflection which 
has the intuition of essence as the goal of a radical reflection. Chapman 
objects to Husserl's idea because he mistakenly believes it to involve 
a denial of the world. 
*(2) my italics. 
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This is also an introduction to Husserl's phenomenology which wo present 
as an alternative to the positions of naive realism as exemplified by 
Chapman, and radical scepticism and relativism which have been found to 
be inadequate. It is firstly necessary to consider Husserl's theory of 
knowledge on which the methodology of phenomenology is based. 
INTENTIONALITY 
Husserl's aim in establishing phenomenology was to devise a method 
of gaining knowledge which would be totally reliable and which would 
remain faithful to the "things themselves", that is, phenomena as they are 
directly given to consciousness. To this end he advocates a procedure 
which would be totally presuppositionless 
*(l), 
and thus independant of 
the natural attitude which is the source of our unquestioned assumptions. 
This raises the problem of how, if phenomenology is to be truly pre- 
suppositionless and to accept nothing at face value, it can ever begin. 
As Husserl saysp "If cognition is in doubt how can a critique of cognition 
t 
(24)' *(2) 
start 0 The solution to this problem reveals a qualification 
to the presuppositionless ideal. This is that only those presuppositions 
which are in principle open to doubt are to be rejected. Therefore the 
aim is to locate a presupposition which is beyond doubt and the denial of 
which would lead to absurdity. Thus any theory of knowledge must have 
concepts concerning the nature of cognitions which are beyond question. 
This is because in order to doubt the possibility of absolute cognitions 
which fulfill their objects, it is necessary to have an idea of what a 
cognition would look like which did attain this goal. Like Descartes and 
St. Augustine, Husserl sees that the statement "I do not know if I think" 
*(1) Husserl's degree of success in realising this presuppositionless 
ideal will be discussed below. 
*(2) It should be clear by now that Husserl's demand that we should 
return to the things themselves is not to be confused with the empiricist's 
identity of thing with object of sense experience. 
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is contradictory, therefore there is without doubt a mental process, there 
is consciousness, the cogitatio*(I) a The objects of conscious acts, 
the cogitationes, are seen by Husserl as being beyond question because 
they aro genuinely immanent and point to nothing outside themselves, 
"The seeing, direct grasping and having of the conitatio is already a 
cognition. The cogitationes are the first absolute data"(25). Clearly 
Husserl is seeking totally reliable, knowledge and although he is anti- 
positivist, in the usual sense of the term, he accepts that his procedure 
is a positivism if by that "we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding 
of all science on what is 'positive' ie. on what can be primordially 
apprehended, then it is we who are the genuine positivists"(26). Thus, 
Husserl is claiming the possibility of a real contact between consciousness 
and its objects; a claim which is based on the doctrine of the intentional- 
ity of consciousness which Husserl adapted from Brentano. 
The doctrine of intentionality states simply that all consciousness 
is consciousness of something. We do not just "look" or "believe" we 
"look at" and "believe in"*(2). 
According to Welch(27) the common-sense world exists for a conscious- 
ness, it is posited by consciousness thus, it is claimed, that for Husserl 
Being is not to be equated with reality as commonly understood for this 
reality is dependant on, recognised through, the Being of consciousness 
and thus reality is intentional. That is, it is only known consciously, 
*(1) For reasons which will be clarified below, Husserl does not accept 
Descartes method of radical doubt as a means of revealing the fact of 
the cogitatio and its acts. 
*(2) This doctrine identifies Husserl as part of the idealistic tradition 
of philosophy, although it could be argued that he transcended the idealistic 
realistic dichotomy by attempting, at least in his earlier work, to 
preserve the objectivity of phenomena within consciousness and it is this 
interpretation of the position of phenomenology which we will develop in 
our description of a genuine phenomenological sociology. 
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represented as an appearance. It is necessary, in terms of our view of 
phenomenology, to qualify this statement which may be seen as tending 
towards the extreme idealism which became pronounced in Husserl's work 
after his failure to establish intersubjectivity and which marked his 
drift towards solipsism. This statement by Welch makes the common 
idealistic error of confusing the dependence of reality on consciousness 
in the sense of reality becoming an object of knowledge with the idea that 
reality depends for its being on conscious acts. This idea, if accepted 
would lead to the contradictory conclusion that the acts of consciousness 
themselves, which Husserl declares to be the reliable source of knowledge, 
would also have the quality of dependence on intentionality, represented 
as an appearance, because they themselves are known in conscious acts*(1). 
A similar attitude to that of Welch is found in Kockelman's inter- 
pretation of phenomenology in which it is equated with intentional 
analysis. He claims that it is possible to make statements about 
consciousness only by paying attention to phenomena given in conscious 
acts and that therefore questions about an objects essence or nature are 
reduced to apprehensions of modes of consciousness. As noted above, 
Husserl distinguished between the object and quality of conscious acts 
whereas Kodkelman's ignores the significance of the fact of consciousness 
having objective correlates*(2), thus losing the possibility of the 
apprehension of the conscious grasp of objects other than consciousness 
which is itself implied in the doctrine of intentionality. Therefore it 
is incorrect to state, as Kockelman's does, that questions about an 
object's essence are resolved in nations of modes of consciousness for 
*(l) Our solution to this aspect of the problem of the consciousness 
object relationship will be discussed below in relation to the later 
relationship of experience and intention re chapter 7. 
*(2) Although it is true that Husserl's later work, suboequent to his 
failure to establish intersubjectivity, shows a similar radical idealism. 
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such notions tell us only about the nature of the act of apprehension in 
memory, sense perception etc. The doctrine of intentionality states 
that consciousness is directed to objects and that we become aware of 
objects in conscious acts. This does not require, as Kockelman's 
thinks that it does, the identity of conscious act and intended object. 
It would be more accurate to refer to the apprehension of objects as a 
necessary function of conscious acts. Certainly objects become objects 
for us through object-oriented conscious acts and, as will be seen below, 
the act of grasping objective essence, that is the essence of an object, 
is a conscious act of intuition. This, however, refers simply to our 
becoming aware of the object as object for us but there is no logical 
justification to claim, on this basis, that the conscious act is or 
creates its object. Indeed the doctrine of intentionality indicates 
the opposite view which is that consciousness is necessarily a reaching 
out to something other than itself which is then apprehended by conscious- 
ness in the form of a concept or idea. The problem therefore is how to 
ensure that the concept is the product of a full and genuine conscious 
apprehension of its object*. 
Kockelman's idealistic interpretation of the doctrine of intentiona- 
lity is probably in part a consequence of his acceptance of the claim by 
Husserl that consciousness "constitutes" its objects, as is indicated in 
his statement that essence can be determined only by looking at the acts 
of consciousness in which the phenomenon is consiituted as this or that. 
The meaning of the idea of constitution in Hussarl's work is unclear but 
if it is understood to mean that consciousness creates its objects then 
it encounters the objections raised above. This view also encounters 
further difficulties in accounting for agreement between conscious 
* The radical idealistic view has the problem of explaining not simply 
how error is possible but how we are able to recognise when our concepts 
are erroneous. 
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subjects or consistency between acts. Thus, a possible consequence of 
this position is the substitution of everyday events by miracles, ie. an 
acknowledged failure to understand such events. 
It is possible that Kockelman's idealistic interpretation of 
intentionality derives from Husserl's statement, noted above, that only 
acts of consciousness have the quality of indubitability, that is, of 
total reliability. However, it should be noted that this indubitability 
applies to all conscious acts only in reference to the existence of the 
conscious act, it does not apply to all conscious acts in respect of the 
adequacy of their conceptual grasp of the intended objects. As will be 
seen below, only those conscious acts of immanent perception of the object 
are accorded full reliability by Husserl. The fact that this quality is 
not found in all conscious acts ie. that some acts grasp objects other 
than the intended object itself, such as the object as assumed, prejudged, 
preferred etc., and that such inadequacies can be recognised by conscious- 
ness, is a further indication that consciousness and object are not to be 
equated as a matter of course and that the adequacy of conscious acts is 
dependant upon their mode of apprehending objects. We thus reject 
Kockelman's view that intentional analysis alone makes explicit the 
meaning of things, as in his statement "(intentional analysis) is the 
method of bringing forward meanings and making them explicit, the method 
of disengaging constituent elements which are implicitly contained in 
certain actually given meanings"(29). Analysis of the intentional acts 
of consciousness will not reveal such meanings unless it is directed to 
the apprehension of the essence of the object of intention. Such an 
essential analysis is presupposed in Kockelman's reference to making 
meanings explicit and the disengaging of constituent elements. These 
*This charge has been implicitly levelled against phenomenology by 
Wittgenstein re below chapter 2. 
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essences, which are not apparent in ordinary contemplation of conscious 
acts, can be made objects of consciousness only by a suitably rigorous 
critique of naive cognition such as that devised by Husserl in the 
reductions. Similarly Brand 
(30) 
notes the need to distinguish between 
genuine self-givenness and that which is co-intended with the phenomenon 
but is distinct from it, but he also adopts an idealistic position similar 
to Kockelmans, although he notes that in uncovering functioning intention- 
ality through reduction we grasp Being intuitively and primordially. 
However he overlooks the nature of apprehended Being and its relation- 
ship to the intended objects. That is, he overlooks the eidetic nature 
of adequately perceived Being, the essence of the intentional object, by 
equating intentionality and the possession of meaning. This is inadequate 
because the intentional acts themselves require clarification in terms of 
meaning. Thus Brand states, "That a being has meaning signifies that we 
understand it" 
(31) 
and that this understanding can be made the object of 
enquiry. Thus a transition is made from the study of the phenomenon to 
a study of our understanding of it but Brand fails to realise that this 
latter aim presupposes the achievement of the former. 
Our view of the preliminary nature of the grasp of the intentional 
nature of consciousness, is supported by Husserl's statement that the 
philosopher grasps the existing world "as intention and treats it as 
problematic. Then in the attitude of the epoche* (which in the present 
undertaking is pre-requisite to the achievement of a critical verification 
of the world) he questions the achievement and range of the naive self- 
presentation of the world"(32). The reference to a critical verification 
of the world demonstrates the belief that phenomenology, through the 
reductions, is able to attain a real contact with phenomena, a view which 
* This term will be clarified in the next section. 
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we support and which we oppose to the idealistic interpretation of 
phenomenology although, for reasons which will become apparent, Husserl, 
consequent on the development of the idea of the Transcendental Ego, 
adopted idealism to an increasing extent. 
We have thus seen the significance of the doctrine of intentionality 
as establishing the other-directedness of consciousness, the relationship 
between consciousness and its objects. However all consciousness is 
intentional, including the inadequate conceptions of the natural attitude 
and it has been seen that it is necessary to establish a critique of 
intentional consciousness so as to enable a distinction between the 
adequate and inadequate conceptual grasp of phenomena. This introduces 
us to the methodology through which such a critique is to be achieved, 
principally, the procedure of the reductions, but before this aspect of 
phenomenology is discussed it is necessary to justify the idea of the 
reduction or disengaging of our everyday conceptualisations in relation 
to one of the criticisms of phenomenology. 
It is stated sometimes that phenomenology is mystical, that is, it is 
unnatural, esoteric and alienated from everyday thought. It is true that 
phenomenology is alienated from everyday thought in the sense that it does 
not accept uncritically the adequacy of that thought but this does not 
mean that it is unconcerned with the everyday, natural attitude. The 
natural attitude is naively realistic, it simply takes for granted that 
its concepts are the product of an adequate grasp of phenomena, but this 
belief is a mere assumption which cannot be defended when questioned by 
scepticism. It is the aim of phenomenology to establish, through a 
rational critique of cognition, a reliable conceptual grasp of phenomena, 
by revealing a priori data of cognition, which, being conceptual, are not 
affected by the volatility of the material world. As such data is 
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totally rational any sceptical denial of it is pre-condemned to absurdity. 
Thus, far from being irrelevant to the attitude of everyday life 
phenomenology is the fulfillment of the over-present intention of the 
natural attitude, which is the conceptual grasp of phenomena as they are 
in themselves; what the natural attitude merely assumes, phenomenology 
seeks to establish in a totally reliable manner. 
This argument may seem to raise a further objection against 
phenomenology which is that although it claims only a foundation-building 
function in relation to other spheres of knowledge 
*(J) 
, such as the 
particular sciences and the natural attitude, the further claim that it 
seeks to provide totally reliable knowledge of phenomena must mean that 
it does, in fact, seek to replace those modes of as quiring knowledge, such 
as the natural attitude, which it regards as unreliable. Although it is 
true that Husserl increasingly came to see phenomenology not just as a 
philosophy but as the philosophical method and in the Vienna Lecture this 
becomes the explicit statement that phenomenology was the goal to which 
all historical philosophy had been moving*(2)' he never attempted to argue 
that phenomenology could replace the natural attitude or the particular 
sciences. We can understand this self-imposed limitation on phenomenology 
in terms of our distinction between meaning and significance. The 
meaning of a thing is its objective nature, its signifibance is the 
value of that nature for a purposive subject. Phenomenology is concerned 
with the adequacy of our concepts, it is, therefore, concerned only with 
the meaning of phenomena, it is theoretical. The natural attitude however 
is practical, it is directed and informed by varying practical interests, 
thus, the criterion by which it judges phenomena is utility. As was 
noted in the original distinction between meaning and significance, 
*(1) re above p. 12. 
*(2) As would be expected, this view is most clearly expressed in 
Husserl's teleological account of European history. 
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judgoments of utility or practical value necessarily involve a consideration 
of the nature of things for a phenomenon is held to be significant because 
it is believed to be of such and such a nature, the apprehension of this 
nature is held to be necessary in order that practical goals may be 
achieved. Thus the practical attitude of everyday life is necessarily 
founded on conceptual assumptions , and therefore phenomenology intends 
to provide the conceptual foundations without which the natural attitude, 
and its idealisations in the particular sciences, are potentially un- 
reliable even in their own terms of achieving desired practical results. 
Thus, the desire by phenomenology for apodictic knowledge is not an 
attempt to replace but to ground everyday interests in reliable concepts. 
It is now necessary to describe how phenomenology seeks to establish 
reliable concepts through a critique of cognition in the procedure of the 
roductiona. 
THE REDUCTIONS 
IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE 
The purpose of the reductions is to provide knowledge-of an unquestion- 
able or a priori nature. Husserl argued that the existence of the act 
of intentional consciousness is the one proposition which cannot be 
questioned and therefore reliable knowledge is that which remains within 
the intentional act. Such knowledge is referred to by Husserl as 
immanent, that is, it points to nothing outside itself, it contains its 
Being totally within itself and therefore is not dependant for the 
validity of its Being on anything outside its self*(2). Statements 
*(l) The distinction between theory and practise to which we refer became 
increasingly pronounced in Husserl's later work, especially in his 
"teleological" reconstruction of European history (Crisis etc. ) which 
attempted to show that the origins of European culture lay in the 
theoretical attitude. This problem of the relationship of theory and 
practise is a current problem in sociological theory; we believe that 
our account of the interdependance of meaning and significance may help 
to clarify this problem. 
*(2) It will be noted that we refer to Being not existence, this is 
because existence, spatio-temporal appearance, is not a necessary quality 
of nnv nthmr nhenomenon. 
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based on immanent perception are valid because of this fact and attempts 
to cast doubt on this validity are necessarily tautological as they depend 
for their own validity on the validity of that which they seek to question *(l 
Those factors included in naive perception which are not apodictic, 
which are not immanent to the phenomenon and which refer to factors other 
than what is contained in immanent consciousness and are thus open to doubt 
are termed transcendencies by Husserl 
*(2). 
One value of immanent perception for Husserl is that it guarantees 
the existence of the conscious subject. The stream of consciousness is, 
immanent evidence of the existence of the "I", cogito. Other conscious- 
nasses, "which I posit in the experience of empathy (may not) exist. But 
MY empathy and my experience in general is given in a primordial and 
absolute sense, not only essentially but existentially ... an essential 
feature of the thing world (is) that no perception ... gives us anything 
absolute within its domain ... every experience ... leaves open the 
possibility that what is given, despite the persistent consciousness of 
its bodily self-presence, does not exist. It is an essentially valid law 
that existence in the form of a thing is never demanded as necessary by 
virtue of its givenness, but in a certain way is always contingent" 
(34). 
Husserl is arguing here for the reliability of immanent consciousness as 
opposed to empirical observation which is always conceivably other than it 
appears, but there are two related problems found in this statement, - 
they are the problem of solipsism and the problem of existence. Although 
these problems will be discussed at greater length below it is appropriate, 
*(l) This is not the same as the claim that reliable data are those things 
true by definition or which experience has shown to be always the case such 
as, "all men are mortal" for the former tend to be tautologous and except- 
ions to cases of the latter can be thought e. g. legends of immortality. The 
strength of immanent data for Husserl is their ideal nature and the impossib- 
ility of contradicting or questioning them. This also indicates Husserl's 
rationalism and his belief in the rationality of Being. 
*(2) This term, referring to the desiderata of perception, leads to a 
confusion of terminology when Husserl refers to the consciousness which is 
totally reliable, whose contents are purely immanent, as Transcendental 
nnnscinttQnnQa_ ThR distinctive meaning of this latter farm mill be 
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at this point, to indicate certain error's in Husserl's statement. He 
claims that immanent perception is a guarantee of existence but, contradict- 
orily, existential propositions are seen as unreliable. Further, Husserl 
claims that attitudes to the existence or non-existence of the phenomenon 
which is the object of the process should be bracketed or de-activated. 
It seems that Husserl is attempting to overcome phenomenology's supposed 
lack of existential relevance by using the term existence to refer to two 
different ideas. Thus, the statement of the unreliability of existence, 
its always possibly being other than it appears, refers to existence in 
the sense of that which is physically present, that which is accessible to 
sensory inspection and which has spatio-temporal extension. On this 
definition it is nonsensical for Husserl to claim that immanent perception 
necessarily guarantees the existence of its object, which as an existent 
is inherently unreliable and cannot be guaranteed. We can make our fan- 
tasies objects of immanent attention but this does not mean that in doing 
so we guarantee their physical existence, nor is it clear why the existence 
of my consciousness is guaranteed but not that of other consciousnesses. 
Husserl seems to be confusing Being and existence, for to have an object 
in immanent perception is to guarantee its true Being, that is both its 
ideal possibility and that it is perceived in the fullness of its being, 
the completeness of its form, ie. we simply see that the phenomenon is 
and that we perceive it as it is. Existence, however, is simply one mode 
of Being, that of spatio-temporal presence and although it is possible 
that Being may be realised in existence it could be equally realised in 
memory, in fantasy, or it could remain the 
idea, which is the form through 
which we grasp any of its realisations. Thus the apprehension of Being 
does not guarantee existence but the possibility of existence, such that 
if the idea were to be realised in the modo of spatio-temporal extension 
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we would be able to recognise and identify its nature. 
Thus, in Husserl's view, the a priori, the category of the totally 
reliable, is only to be found in the sphere of the immanent perception of 
the acts of intentional consciousness. This sphere of absolute immanence 
is the sphere of that which is established absolutely and which, being 
. grasped as an idea, is unaffected by subsequent perceptions or empirical 
evaluation. The world of things is seen by Husserl as having only a 
presumptive reality, whereas the cogito is an absolute unquestionable 
reality. Therefore all things can be understood absolutely only in their 
relationship to the acts of intentional consciousness. All objects of 
knowledge, perception etc. are therefore necessarily reduced to the level 
of the pure Idea, which is their Being and which shapes their relations to 
other phenomena. All genuine understanding of phenomena requires this 
immanent basis. As Husserl says, "The ideal possibility of a reflection 
which has the essential character of a self-evident unshakeable existential 
thesis has its ground in the essential nature of a Pure Ego in general and 
of an experiencing in general"(35). In contrast empirical proofs are 
never absolute because doubt as always thinkable as the possibility of non- 
Being is never, in principle, excluded. Further, the common-sense "real 
world" which is the background of such proofs is always my real world, and 
the failure to realise this leads to the false universalisation of self. 
Similarly, reliance on commonly held assumptions is inadequate for the 
fact that a belief is generally held to be true is no guarantee of its 
reliability or of the idea and opinions with which it is associated. This 
statement clearly indicates the inadequacy of individually held opinions 
and the necessary universality of truly reliable data which in turn makes 
imperative the establishment of intersubjectivity. By this we mean the 
need to establish that there is a universally available world, otherwise 
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there would be no grounds for the distinction between personal opinions 
and necessary, universal truths. As a consequence Husserl's failure to 
establish intersubjectivity, which will be discussed below, undermines his 
claim to have developed the means of establishing necessary truths. 
There is a further weakness in Husserl's account of the nature of 
immanent data which is that he asserts as a consequence of the primary of 
consciousness the fact that consciousness constitutes existence. The 
ambiguities of the idea of conscious constitution have been noted but it 
is clear that as Husserl's work progressed and especially with the develop- 
ment of the idea of the Transcendental Ego, that phenomena are seen as mere 
correlates of consciousness. As will be seen this is a one-sided inter- 
pretation of the object-consciousness relationship ignoring the reciprocal 
relationship between consciousness and an independant but accessible Being. 
In accordance with our later realistic interpretation of phenomenology we 
would revise Husserl so as to mean that things other than consciousness 
have being and possible existence but that things become objects of know- 
ledge, with the resulting grasp of their mode of being and their relation- 
ships to other phenomena and our evaluation of them, as the consequence 
of conscious acts. The problem, therefore is to establish the adequacy 
of these acts so that their real grasp of phenomena cannot be doubted. 
The method devisod by Husserl to achieve this is the method of reduction. 
METHOD OF REDUCTION 
Deriving from the theory of immanence, the intention of the method of 
reduction is to strip perception of its transcendent associations leaving 
only the immanent datum, or essence, of the thing itself. Thus, the 
starting-point of the method is the act of perception understood as the 
act which "presents to us the things perceived in their (apparent) 
authentic reality" 
(36). 
The self-givenness of phenomena was initially 
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regarded as adequate self-evidence by Husserl but on becoming aware of the 
inadequacies of perception he called for a final critique of self-evidence 
or, as we would rather say, of our grasp of self-evidence, which is to be 
achieved in an act of intuition or pure seeing. The status of such 
intuition changed in the course of Husserl's work. His initial position 
was that "We will not attribute any special value to such assertions - 
that this is here etc. - which we make on the basis of pure seeing"(37) 
but with the addition of the theory of immanence to the idea of intuition, 
such a grasp of phenomena was seen by Husserl as apodictic. Such intuition 
is pure seeing by which is meant the mere description of the thing itself, 
"Let one attend to the phenomenon itself, instead of going beyond it to 
talk about it and interpret it... No inclination is more dangerous to the 
'seeing' cognition of origins and absolute data than to think too much and 
from these reflections in thought to create self-evident principles ... 
Thus as little interpretation as possible but as pure an intuition as 
possible"(38). Thus the initial stage of the reductions is the removal 
of all existential propositions and all naive theoretical interpretations 
from our perception in order that the being of the phenomena may be clearly 
grasped. 
Transcendencies are to be stripped from perception by a series of 
acts of radical doubting of perception(39). This may seem similar to 
the method adopted by Descartes and it may suggest that Husserl has 
compromised his opposition to scepticism by adopting systematic doubting 
as the methodology of phenomenology and, therefore, that in the dichotomy 
between naive realism and scepticism Husserl has been forced to opt for 
the sceptical attitude. This interpretation would be a misunderstanding 
* In our view of phenomenology it must be emphasised that in this process 
of reduction it is not phenomena which are being changed but our perception 
of them, re below chapter 7) 
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of the method of the reductions for Husserl notes that doubt entails 
doubting Being of some sort, but such doubt does not effect Being itself, 
but only the constitution, or as we would say, the apprehension of Being. 
*(lý 
Also, the Cartesian radical doubt is contradictory in that the attempt to 
doubt, ittelf is therefore open to doubt. Against such scepticism 
Husserl places the suspension of judgement. That is as an alternative 
to total acceptance (naive realism) or total rejection (radical scepticism) 
of what is perceived, the method of the reductions merely refuses to pass 
judgement one way or the other. Such perceptions which are not immanent 
to the phenomenon, such as whether it exists or not, are bracketed, they 
are not permitted to intrude on our apprehension of the phenomenon; hence 
the alternative name, epoche, which is given sometimes to the method of 
reduction. Such bracketing, as Husserl says, "does not mean that we are 
simply to forget all about our beliefs in the bracketed reality ... only 
... to stop attaching weight to them. We are merely to stop 
identifying 
ourselves with such beliefs in the sense of a definite commitment"(40)*(2). 
In accordance with Husserl's belief that philosophy can grasp the realm of 
the totally reliable only outside common-sense, the first thing to be 
bracketed is our natural attitude perception of the phenomenon, including 
the naive belief that the phenomenon-in-itself is present in our everyday 
perceptions. It would be absurd at one and the some time, to doubt the 
adequacy of naive perception of a thing and to act as if it were adequately 
*(1) This suggests that Husserl saw the reality of Being as beyond question, 
as well as the certainty of the conscious act. Although the reliability 
of Being is not developed in Husserl, again indicating his growing 
idealism, this idea plays a central role in our discussion of the Object, 
consciousness relationship below, and the related problem of inter- 
subjective knowledge, re chapter 7. 
*(2) We interpret this statement as a demand to abandon our existential 
commitment to the assumed priority of our individual being in the world. 
Husserl did not state this specifically as the goal of the reductions 
but, as will be seen below, this understanding of the method is of 
major importance in resolving the problem of the possibility of genuine 
intersubjective understanding. 
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presented in naive perception. As a further part of this bracketing we 
de-activate all scientific theories concerning the nature of the object, 
its utilities and the status of its relationship to other phenomena. Thus, 
only by suspending judgement on our unexamined propositions can we achieve 
a radical, reliable reflection. Any act of reflection which does not do 
this is pointless for it will simply reveal that which is already presupposed 
in the naive judgement of the perception. It is, therefore, contradictory 
to claim that reflection can supplement the natural attitude without 
questioning it. (41) 
The reduction of the everyday world has raised a major objection to 
phenomenology's value for the specialist spheres of knowledge, including 
sociology. This is that these latter are concerned with the world as 
perceived in everyday life, therefore is it not the case that by 
deliberately bracketing this world phenomenology makes itself irrelevant 
to our understanding of it? This argument reflects a misunderstanding 
of the purpose of bracketing which is not to think the world out of 
existence but the refusal to accept as necessarily true our everyday, naive 
conceptualising of our experience of this world. Far from abolishing 
the world, the aim of phenomenology is to reveal the world as phenomenon, 
to achieve a reliable conceptual grasp of the quality of world-phenomena. 
The argument against phenomenology's relevance to mundane science may be 
re-adapted so that phenomenology is claimed to be irrelevant because it 
demands that we ignore the existence or non-existence of phenomena but as 
far as mundane science is concerned, the question of whether or not its 
perceived objects are actually there is a vital one. This argument, of 
course, overlooks what it means to claim that something is really there 
and it makes the mistake of equating reality with spatio-temporal existence. 
The relevance of phenomenology is that whether a phenomenon is bodily 
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present or whether it is believed to be present or whether it is imagined 
or remembered etc., it is apprehended in the form of a concept. The 
adequacy of the investigation of the phenomenon will depend on the 
adequacy of this conceptual grasp and it is, therefore, necessary that all 
such concepts, including the idea that the thing exists should be 
critically examined. As seen above, it would be contradictory to attempt 
to critically examine such concepts while believing in their adequacy or 
inadequacy. The fact that the natural and social sciences examine the 
world as naively perceived does not mean that their concepts have to be 
naive. 
The bracketing of the natural attitude is merely the first step in 
the identification of that indubitable datum, essence, without the per- 
caption of which there would be an infinite regress of acts of reflection. 
The perception of essence is the completion of rigorous reflection. The 
bracketing of the natural attitude is therefore the act of clearing away 
the irrelevancies in our perception so that the next stage, the immanent 
apprehension of the quality of the object may proceed. 
It is crucial to our argument that the reductions are seen to be object- 
orientated in order that we may avoid the solipsistic consequences of the 
idealistic separation between the knower and that which is known. This 
is demonstrated in the consequences of Schmitt's claim that the reductions 
are aimed at achieving a phenomenological description of reflection. 
Schmitt 's(43) statement is inadequate because it fails to note that, 
deriving from the doctrine of intentionality, there is no such thing as 
reflection, but reflection on objects, including the act of reflection 
itself, as the mode of consciousness in which the object is given(44). 
Thus reflection is directed towards objects, the clarification of whose 
nature is the goal of adequate or phenomenological reflection. 
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The second stage of the method of reduction is the grasp of the 
essence of the phenomenon, or its quality. This requires the bracketing 
of the particular appearance of the phenomenon, the reduction of its 
apparent belonging to the "here-and-now", the context in which it appears 
to us in natural perception and which such perception uncritically accepts 
as part of the phenomenon. This involves such things as location, colour, 
sensory accessibility etc., although all these things may themselves become 
objects of phenomenological analysis. This reduction, which effectively 
removes our perception of the phenomenon from the naively perceived world 
of fluid inconstant appearances, reveals the thing-itself in that form 
the being of which cannot be doubted, or effected by empirical change, 
that is, as the idea, the essence of the phenomenon, The mode of grasping 
essence, realising it as a content of knowledge is not totally clear in 
Husserl, but before discussing this point it is necessary to clarify the 
process of reduction as it has been described up to this point by reference 
to our understanding of the concept of horizon. 
HORIZON 
It is necessary to make clear that although this chapter is intended 
principally as a description of Husserl's account of phenomenology the idea 
of horizon which is expounded below is not Husserl's idea but ours. 
Husserl* states that natural attitude perception shows two characteristics. 
These are that all such experienced objects show a typical familiarity and 
that the perception of these objects is permeated by anticipations of 
co-intended features. Thus all natural attitude experience is said to 
bear with it an indeterminate, open, experiential horizon, the "inner 
horizon" which refers to the possibility of further determinations of the 
pbject. Thus the natural attitude is seen to present objects not as such 
and such, that is qualitatively, but as existents of a certain type. 
*Our account of Husserl's notion of horizon is derived from Schutz's(45) 
commentary on Husserl's book "Erfuhrung und Urteil"which was not 
translated into English in time for considerat ion as part of this thesis. 
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These objects are therefore seen as pertaining to further genera and species 
typifications which are structured by pre-ecquaintedness and unacquainted- 
ness; such types are merely presumptive. However, this statement gives 
the impression that notions of typicality are peculiar to the natural 
attitude and we will challenge this idea in our re-construction of 
phenomenology. 
Our conception of horizon and its relationship to the processes of 
reduction originates in Kockelman's(46) statement that the actual perception 
of, for instance, a house "has a greater content than what is effectively 
seen". That is, naive perception places seeing in a wider context than 
that which is immediately available. Dur interest is in the status of 
this contextual data and this will be considered through an initial distinct- 
ion between the eidetic field and the non-eidetic context. The eidetic 
field consists of those objects which are in no way implicated in the 
everyday perception of the phenomenon but which on eidetic apprehension 
are seen to belong to the same intentional act as that which grasped the 
original object because they are all those other possible instances of the 
essence of which the object itself is one instance. That is, the 
eidetic context consists of all those other objects in which the same 
essence as that of the object in question is displayed, it is the species 
-identity of the object. 
By contrast the non-eidetic context of the object consists of those 
phenomena which are associated with the object in everyday perception 
but which are qualitatively distinct from it. Kockelmans, misleadingly 
refers to this context as a necessary quality of the object, "A house 
that is not found in certain surroundings of which it is a part could 
never be a real house and could never be perceived as a house"(47)" We 
reject this idea that the quality of an object is dependant on its 
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surroundings because it is contradictory to, at the same time, recognise 
a qualitative distinction between one thing (phenomenon) and other things 
(surroundings) as two distinct ideas and yet claim that the phenomenon 
could not be itself without the presence of these qualitatively other 
things*(l). 
We wish to develop this enquiry by distinguishing between two types 
of non-eidetic context. The first consists of those contingencies which 
are particularisations of a quality of the object. This may seem 
contradictory for contingencies have been defined as unrequired and 
immanent qualities as required, therefore it is necessary to clarify this 
argument, which we will do using Kockelman's case of "house". "House" 
necessarily involves the idea of building material but bricks, adobe, 
concrete etc. are not required in the idea of'housd. This is because 
the qualities of an object are species definitions and thus necessity 
inheres only in the species. Particular instances of the species are 
not required because the object is compatible with being such and such 
regardless of its particularisation*(2). Thus"spatial extension" 
requires the qualities of size and shape but no particular size or shape 
can be said to be required in the idea of spatial extensitin. Thus, this 
context, the inner horizon, consists of those contingent particularisations 
of necessary qualities and is the object of the second reduction, noted 
above, which is that which removes the here and now facticity of the thing 
which can then be grasped as an idea. 
*(1) Kockelmans shows a recognition of our distinction but fails to realise 
that it cannot be effected on the level of intentionality alone(48). This 
is because it presupposes a recognition of the difference between the 
thing itself and qualitatively distinct phenomena which can be made only 
on the basis of an eidetic reduction of intentionality. 
*(2) The a priori reconstruction of the world is prevented by this opon 
range of possibilities which is a product of necessity being a quality 
only of species. 
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The second context, or outer horizon, is the object of the first 
reduction, which is that which removes the perception of the object from 
the natural attitude, and consists of those objects which have absolutely 
no qualitative relationship to the phenomenon but which are associated 
with it in the act of perception. Thus ideas such as 'street', 'garden', 
'neighbours' have no necessary relationship with the idea of house but 
are merely habitually associated with this idea. Thus the outer horizon 
consists of such things as associated commonplaces, practical evaluations, 
cultural context etc., whose relationship to the phenomenon is totally 
contingent. We therefore identify three contextual relationships between 
phenomena. These are the 'core' of eidetically similar phenomena, the 
inner horizon of particularisations of what is generically required by the 
quality of the phenomenon and thirdly, the outer horizon of naive 
associations which are contingent to the object. 
EIDETIC INTUITION AND FREE VARIATION 
It has been seen that essence is the meaning or quality of an object, 
thus the grasp of essence is the apprehension of the meaning of the 
phenomenon. Thus, it is necessary to consider Husserl's account of the 
mode of the conscious grasp of essence, which he saw initially as being 
achieved in an act of intuition. When consciousness of an object has 
been purified of-all extraneous material, the remaining content can be 
nothing other than the object itself or essence. The act of intuition 
which grasps essence is a purely rational act and it is no more mysterious 
than the act of sense-intuition which is taken for granted by everyday 
perception. 
However, in KRISIS(49), Husserl attempts to supplement the intuition 
by a process of free variation of perceptions. In so far as this is 
seen as an empirical test of the validity of the eidetic idea it undermines 
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Husserl's justification for seeking pure ideas, that is, their independance 
from empirical changes. Also it raises the problem of how empirical 
events can effect our understanding of an idea as such events are 
dependant on the idea for their recognition by consciousness. 
Husserl seems to have two conceptions of the role of free variation. 
The first is that the free variation of our everyday apprehension of 
objects reveals limits to the possible range of such variation. That iss 
we have to recognise that, at a certain point, the variation is no longer 
compatible with the original object. This leads to the realisation that 
things do not occur haphazardly but are a priori bound to a certain style. 
This argument is acceptable in so far as it points to an indication of 
the necessity of essence in everyday perception and, consequently, indicates 
that the grasp of essence is the fulfillment of that which is dimly 
perceived but not understood in everyday life. However, Husserl wishes 
to go beyond this statement to claim that free variation actually reveals 
essence, that it makes thematic the variant generality of the intuitive 
world. Thus, an experienced objectivity is "interpreted as an example 
of the universal and at the same time a prototype for modifications by a 
series of free variations in phantasy"(50). Limits are placed on the 
possible range of variations by the invariant content which identifies all 
the variations as modifications of a prototype. This is, "that element 
without which an objectivity of this kind can neither be thought or 
intuitively phantasised"(50) and it is on these variants that intuition 
of the universal as essence is based. We cannot accept this statement of 
the role of free variation because it implies the contradiction that the 
necessity of eidetic perception is established in contingent variation, 
In fact, the idea of freely varying our perceptions of an object presupposes 
the prior apprehension of the idea of that object as belonging to such and 
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such a unity. Thus, the possibility of a rational free variation is depend- 
ant on an eidetic grasp of the object and therefore cannot be used as a 
means of apprehending the essence. We accept that free variation may 
be used to reveal the range of particularisations of the perceived essence 
and thus it can act as a check on whether the original object is, in fact, 
a case of the intuited essence. Husserl's argument indicates his 
confusion concerning the existential priority, of the natural attitude with the 
epistemic priority of eidetic perception. That is, although natural 
attitude perception is, in a temporal sense, our first perception of an 
objectitdepends on prior taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the 
nature or essence of the object 
*. Thus, while it would be correct to 
state that eidetic perception is derived through ordinary perception it 
would be wrong to hold the view, implied in Husserl, that it is derived 
from everyday perception. 
We also reject the adequacy of the idea advanced by Lauer, 
(52) 
and 
supported by Schutz's presentation of Husserl, that the process of free 
variation replaces the reductions as the method of revealing essence. 
Such a procedure would introduce contingency into a method whose strength 
was supposed to lie in its emancipation from the effects of empirical 
variation. This is because there is always the possibility that the 
next free variation, which we did not perform, would have changed our 
perception of the essence of the object. Also, the method of free 
variation is an inductive process and, therefore, it cannot reveal that 
necessary knowledge which Husserl saw as a quality of the objectively valid. 
Equally, it is impossible to state how many free variations must be 
performed in order to attain reliable knowledge, other than the 
*A similar point is made by Schutz(51) who states that if free variation 
is to be carried out within the natural attitude in order to reveal 
essence, then there is no qualitative distinction between natural attitude 
types and essence. 
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tautological comment, "as many as necessary". 
Lauer denies that this method is inductive, "as it in no way depends 
on a multiplication of actual experimental observations; it is ideal 
through and through"(53). This assertion however establishes free 
variation as an imaginary experimental induction as opposed to the more 
usual empirical experimental induction, but it is still induction. 
Free variation cannot replace the reductions for, as stated above, 
free variation simply reveals that variation cannot be free, in the 
sense of being arbitrary. Thus, a realisation of the limits of free 
variation reveals that essence must be, but it cannot reveal the nature of 
essence because it cannot create those conditions of pure consciousness 
of which alone essence is the content. This can be achieved only by the 
method of the reductions as the deliberate attainment of such consciousness. 
TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO 
The relationship between essence and data of the fact-world requires 
clarification but this will be deferred until our later re-construction 
of phenomenology. It is necessary at this point to discuss the next 
stage in Husserl's account of the reductions which is the development of 
the concepts of transcendental consciousness and the Transcendental Ego. 
In the previous section we referred to the conscious apprehension of 
essence and it is clear that as a consequence of the reductions, this 
consciousness cannot be equated with the consciousness of the natural 
attitude. Thus Husserl seeks to clarify the nature of this reduced, 
or transcendental consciousness and its subject the Transcendental Ego, 
which, equally, cannot be equated with the individual naively living within 
the natural attitude, although, crucially, Husserl fails to clarify the 
relationship of transcendental to mundane consciousness. It is, therefore, 
necessary to reject Brand's assumption that the act by which consciousness 
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becomes an object for itself is the same act by which any phenomenon 
becomes an object for consciousness. The consciousness which is 
capable of apprehending the conscious grasp of objects cannot be the 
same as that consciousness which is not aware of its own acts*. It is 
the failure to realise this distinction which commits Brand to an 
infinite regress of reflective acts, for if we can question the conscious 
grasp of objects we can also question that same consciousness's grasp of 
its own acts ad infinitum. 
The use of the term transcendental is confusing as in the discussion 
of the reductions transcendencies were identified as those things which 
do not belong to a pure consciousness of the phenomenon. The grasp of 
the phenomenon itself is achieved through an act of immanent perception 
that is a perception which depends on nothing outside itself for its 
reliability and is therefore indubitable. However, the consciousness of 
this a prioristic data is said to be transcendental consciousness and thus 
it would appear that Husserl is nonsensically claiming this consciousness 
to be both immanent and transcendent. This problem can be resolved if 
we understand the immanence of this consciousness to refer to the status 
of its contents. That is, the relationship between this consciousness 
and its perceived objects is immanent is. self-contained and independent 
of all other phenomena. The transcendence of this consciousness refers 
to its relationship to mundane apprehension of phenomena. Thus, this 
consciousness "goes beyond" our everyday consciousness. This raises a 
problem associated with the usage of transcendence which is that if 
pure consciousness transcends mundane apprehension does this not 
* Although each new development in Husserl's philosophy was marked by a 
degree of dissension among those who had previously adhered to his ideas, 
the development of the theory of transcendental consciousness and the 
Transcendental Ego was the most controversial of Husserl's innovations. 
- 50 - 
mean that it abandons such apprehension and becomes alien to it? If 
this is the case, does it not follow that these respective consciousnesses 
inhabiting, as it were, different spheres, are irrelevant to each other 
and that the objects of transcendental consciousness, essences, are not 
the objects of everyday consciousness and therefore cannot inform us about 
the nature of or reliability of the objects of mundane apprehension? 
Certain aspects of this objection have been considered above and of 
particular relevance is our argument that mundane apprehension is oriented 
to the attainment of the true being, or essence, of its objects, even 
though it lacks the means to guarantee the reliability of its grasp of 
this being. The objection does, however, raise the crucial problem of 
the apparent alienation between transcendental and mundane consciousness 
and with it the problem of the relationship between pure essence and 
mundane datum. In particular, that as a consequence of this separation, 
other subjects, who are phenomena of the mundane world are rendered 
inaccessible to transcendental consciousness. This is the problem of 
phenomenology's supposed solipsism which will be discussed fully below, 
but, at this juncture, we simply wish to point out that the problem of 
solipsism'is a particular instance of the wider problem of the relationship 
between mundane fact and ideal essence. It does appear that Husserl has, 
like Plato, been able to establish essence only by isolating it from the 
mundane world which, nevertheless, is said to be dependant on essence for 
its meaning. The difference between Husserl and Plato seems to be that 
whereas the latter was vague about the exact location of the realm of 
essence, the former especially in his later work places it firmly in the 
constituting acts of consciousness. However, as Kohler(54) has pointed 
out, the high price of locating tho requiredness of essence outside the 
material world in a realm of agreed reverence is irrelevance to the 
world of everyday life. Despite Husserl's many references in his later 
work to the Lebenswelt or life-world, he never established it as an 
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eidetically grounded or eidetically available world or as the correlate 
of transcendental consciousness. 
Transcendental consciousness is seen by Husserl as inclusive of 
all Being. As Kockelman's(55) states, in peculiar terminology, that 
every form of transcendence "is an immanent characteristic within the 
sphere of pure ego" and as all Being falls within "my" transcendental 
subjectivity, which constitutes all sense and being, therefore there can 
be no outside of consciousness. The radical idealism which is implied 
here, the denial of the possibility of things other than self, is echoed 
in Husseri's(56) statement "I, the transcendental ego am prior to 
everything worldly. I am the I, namely in whose conscious life the 
world is first of all constituted". This conveys the extent of Husserl 's 
later idealism through which he attempted to remove knowledge from all 
empirical contingency but it is clear that in doing so he made such 
knowledge intensely individualistic. The Transcendental Ego is 
Transcendental Ego, and as a consequence it leads to either a recognition 
of the private nature of such knowledge, which therefore can tell us 
nothing about others, or it denies the other-ness of others, seeing them 
simply as modifications of self*. Indeed, Nakhnikian(57) interprets 
Husserl as making the very existence of the world dependent on the 
Transcendental Ego. 
Similarly, Welch argues that reflection on experience convinces us 
of a self which ekperiences. Thus, Husserl(58)"as soon as I look toward 
the flowing life in its real present and with it grasp myself as the 
pure subject of this life ... I affirm plainly and inevitably, I Am ... 
each of us carries in himself the guarantee of his absolute existence as 
*Although Husserl refused to see the situation in these terms, our 
analysis of his attempted resolution of the problem of others will show 
that he opted for the latter position. 
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a fundamental possibility ... My empathy and my consciousness are 
originally and absolutely given, not only essentially but existentially". 
This Ego is not posited as are other selves, it is directly experienced 
and its existence cannot be contradicted without leading to absurdity. 
This pure Ego underlies the constant flux of our empirical selves and 
the idea of the continuity of self is comprehensible only by reference 
to the pure Ego which unites all such varying experiences into one whole 
stream of'experience. Thus Husserl equated Transcendental Ego with Self 
as knower of its own acts, Self-in-itself, and there can be no justifica- 
tion for arguing for an identity or even a mutual comprehension between 
one Transcendental Ego and another and, therefore, solipsism would seem 
to be inevitable. Thus, as stated above, Husserl has sought to enable 
us to achieve totally reliable knowledge about phenomena by a systematic 
withdrawal from the mundane world, as a consequence of which the only 
information which can be derived from this process is of a totally 
isolated Self, outside of which nothing exists or can be known. 
It must be remembered that Husserl always refused to accept that 
phenomenology was solipsistic and spent many years trying to establish 
the phenomenological apprehension of intersubjectivity. We will 
consider both the vulnerability of Husserl's phenomenology to the charge 
of solipsism and the adequacy of his attempts to establish our knowledge 
of others within the phenomenological epoche, attempts which we will 
judge to have failed. 
It would be possible to terminate our consideration of phenomenology's 
relevance for sociology at this point and to agree with Picvecic(60) that 
Husserl's troubles commenced with his idea of transcendental consciousness. 
Thus phenomenology might have value in helping us to perceive the 
*re below chapter 3. 
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prejudices which inform the unexamined concepts which we use to interpret 
the world sociologically, but no more than that; in fact, to give phenomen- 
ology an under-labourer function. In our view this would be mistaken 
and wo wish to argue in the remainder of this work, that phenomenology's 
apparent weaknesses are a product of Husserl's own misunderstandings and 
taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the phenomenological mode of 
apprehending knowledge. Further that far from being irrelevant to sociology 
because of its solipsistic consequences, a properly understood phenomenology 
is the only means of achieving reliable intersubjective knowledge. 
This chapter has been principally a description of the nature of the 
aims, theory and practise of phenomenology. Certain topics have been 
omitted, notably the concept of the Lebenswelt but this will be discussed 
below in the context of Husserl's attempts to resolve the problem of 
intersubjectivity. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the adequacy 
of the various criticisms which have been made against the phenomenological 
programme, culminating in a discussion of the charge of solipsism which is 
of particular relevance to any evaluation of phenomenology's significance 
for sociology. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS TO THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
There is no philosophical method which has universal support and 
this judgement applies equally to phenomenology. Also the novelty of the 
phenomenological method, emerging as it did when positivism and relativism 
were major influences, has ensured that its methods and claims have been 
subjected to close critical scrutiny. It is therefore proposed to 
consider the validity of the major objections to phenomenology which are 
the criticism of the pre-suppositionless ideal, the problem of verifying 
eidetic intuition and the problem of expressing such intuitions in an 
adequate language. Developing from this latter problem we will discuss 
nominalist objections to phenomenology's essentialist programme, 
concentrating in particular on Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism. 
Finally we will consider the justice of the claim that phenomenology is 
anti-scientific. Not least of the objections against phenomenology is 
the claim that in the terms set by Husserl phenomenology has failed to 
live up to its possibilities. Husserl, especially in Krisis and the 
Vienna Lecture, attempted to justify phenomenology in terms of the culture 
and history of Europe. He saw phenomenology as fulfilling and replacing 
all other philosophies and as providing a revitalisation of the 
particular sciences by preserving them from the attacks of relativism to 
which their naive materialism had made them vulnerable and by restoring 
their relationship to meaning. Despite its wide popularity in 
continental Europe phenomenology has not replaced all other philosophies 
and it is a relative newcomer in the world of Anglo-Saxon philosophy which 
is still dominated by the analytic approach . Nor, we believe, can this 
* It is noticeable that, despite this claim, Husserl rarely criticised 
other philosophies except in the widest terms as, for instance, his 
criticisms of relativism and positivism. 
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under-achievement be blamed on entrenched prejudices or the slowness of 
translation for, as will be seen, there are genuine grounds for doubt in 
relation to Husserl's account of phenomenology. Equally, there is no 
evidence that the natural sciences have been influenced by phenomenology. 
The "phenomenology" which is said to have influenced the cultural sciences, 
sociology in particular, is a peculiar animal which bears little or no 
relationship to philosophical phenomenology('). Indeed, the term 
phenomenology has come to mean no more than anti-positivism and subjectivism 
in general in sociology(2) and although Husserl was anti-positivistic this 
was but a minor distinguishing feature of his philosophy. Certainly, 
the generally accepted equation of phenomenology with relativism and the 
denial of universal rationality in sociology would have been incomprehensible 
to Husserl(3), as would the claim that phenomenology is concerned with 
subjective states since the aim of the transcendental reduction was to 
remove the false air of reliability from the conceptualisations of our 
everyday individual consciousnesses. 
Nevertheless, phenomenology's failure to live up to Husserl's 
expectations is only partial. We have noted its decisive influence on 
European philosophy and the list of those who have espoused phenomenology 
in some form is both illustrious and wide-ranging, including Scheler, 
Stein, Sartre, Heidegger, merleau-Ponty etc. Nor is this support 
confined to philosophy for phenomenology has been influential in certain 
scientific fields such as the history of religions (Elffade, Wach ) 
anthropology and, possibly, psychology. It would be naive to claim, as 
does Stegmüller 
(4) 
9 that, although Husserl's philosophy was not 
particularly brilliant, it just happened to attract some of the finest 
minds in Europe. Similarly, although phenomenology has had no influence 
* Although it must be admitted that the phenomenology used by Eliade and Wach is the pre-reduction, purely descriptive phenomenology of Logische Untersuchungen. 
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on the natural sciences as such, the philosophy of'science(5), especially 
since Popper's*(ättempts to establish science as a rational procedure, has 
been concerned with the quality of scientific concepts and has raised 
questions, concerning the reliability and origin of these concepts, 
which are central to a phenomenological critique of science. 
One objection to phenomenology, its alleged mysticism has been 
discussed. It is necessary, at this point, to continue our consideration 
of these objections beginning with alleged defects in the phenomenological 
method. 
THE ADEQUACY OF THE IDEAL OF PRE-SUPPOSITIONLESS PHILOSOPHY 
It has been noted, that Husserl regarded the reliance of cognition 
on unexamined assumptions as both typical of the natural attitude and as 
an inadequate basis for the acquisition of reliable knowledge, hence his 
demand that phenomenology be pre-suppositionless. Husserl's references 
to the presuppositionless ideal are misleading and have been interpreted 
as a demand that philosophising should begin from nothing and the nonsense 
of trying to achieve reliable knowledge out of nothing is obvious. 
However, a close study of Husserl's use of the presuppositionless ideal 
*(2) 
shows that his aim was to criticise our presuppositions with the aim of 
revealing those data, the cogitationes, 
_which 
are impervious to criticism 
and which therefore form the basis or presuppositions of the phenomenolog- 
ical enquiry. Thus, Picvecic's(6) criticism that the aim of achieving 
a presuppositionless perspective in philosophy is doomed to failure and 
that we should, instead, attempt to identify the necessary minimum of 
presuppositions is in fact a demand that philosophy adopt Husserl's aims 
in this rdspect. Significantly, Picvecic, unlike Husserl, fails to 
*(1) We are not claiming that Popper was in any way sympathetic to 
phenomenology, far from it, his total opposition to "essentialism" would 
make him a critic of Husserl but his attempt to make science rational 
has the same aim as Husserl's critique of science. 
*(2) re below, chapter 1. 
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specify how these presuppositions are to be identified and how their 
status as the necessary minimum is to be established. Thus Husserl 
implies a distinction between those inherently rational and therefore 
required presuppositions and purely contingent presuppositions which are 
either uncritically accepted or which reflect our individuäl evaluations 
of desirability utility etc. 
*(l)Expressing this in terms of dichotomy 
noted above, reliable presuppositions are the access to the meaning of 
the object, uncritical presuppositions are a product of the perceived 
significance of the phenomenon which justify the assumption'that our 
identification of the phenomenon is obvious and unproblematic. 
However, the presuppositionless ideal has remained controversial. 
Farber(8) claims that this ideal has itself been called the greatest 
presupposition and Nakhnikian(9) condemns both Husserl's "uncritical" 
assumption that there are epistemologically absolute data and his 
presupposition that the everyday process of acquiring knowledge is 
unclear and indistinct. McGill(lo) claims that the "I think" on which 
Husserl bases his presuppositionless philosophy is no more self-evident 
than the simple propositions' of arithmetic and at the conclusion of his 
analysis Farber(h1) notes five assumptions in phenomenological analysis; 
1) The existence of Consciousness 2) the` validity of essential insight 
3) the uniformity of the constituting-process in consciousness 4) the 
validity of memory and 5) the egos of various types'of construction*(2) 
*(l) This distinction is sharply indicated in the debate(7)between 
Lukes whose 
universal criteria of. rationality is challenged by Hollis in the claim 
that the proposed universal criteria are simply those assumptions which 
the anthropologist has to make in order to present his investigations as 
a possibility. This does not prove the adequacy of such assumptions and 
we would argue that. for as long as they are maintained as adequate they 
prevent the possibility of locating genuine universal criteria, which 
process involves the questioning of the adequacy of our everyday concept 
of rationality which is the aim of phenomenology. 
*(2) Farber, as a phenomenologist,, tries to rescue the procedure. from the 
alleged inadequacies by advocating their subjection to phenomenological 
analysis. This is plainly circular, especially as the acceptance of the first three pre-suppositions would be a pre-condition of carrying out such an analysis. 
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It is, therefore, necessary to examine these criticisms in the light 
of our understanding of the presuppositionless ideal. The criticisms 
made by Nakhnikian, McGill and Farber's first and third points all 
concern the questioning of the being of totally reliable knowledge and of 
consciousness which are precisely those data which Husserl's critique 
of scepticism and relativism has shown can be doubted only at the expense 
of contradiction. Farber's second point may also be taken as an instance 
of this type of erroneous criticism but, alternatively, it could be 
understood not as referring to a presupposition of phenomenology as such 
but as indicating the lack of clarity in Husserl concerning phenomenology's 
verification principle. Equally Farber's fifth point does not refer to 
a presupposition of phenomenology but to its alleged failure to establish 
the status of intersubjective knowledge. The fourth point made by Farber 
is simply wrong as it overlooks Husserl's distinction between apodictic 
retention and non-apodictic memory. 
Thus, our consideration of the criticisms of the presuppositionless 
ideal has not revealed the presence in phenomenology of any presupposition 
which cannot be justified on the grounds of logical necessity that is, 
that the denial of the presupposition necessarily leads to absurdity. 
However we have identified two further objections to phenomenology 
concerning the problem of verification and the establishment of inter- 
subjectivity and it is to the first of these that we now turn. 
VERIFICATION AND ERROR 
The question which is frequently raised in this context is how 
phenomenology can prove the accuracy of essential intuition. We intend 
to show that methods of empirical testing are inappropriate as means of 
proving the accuracy of phenomenological intuition. In so far as proof 
* McGill is unfortunate in that Husserl does, in fact, see mathematics as 
an eidetic science. 
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means the testing of an idea against observations of empirical data the 
question is misleading because phenomenology is deliberately devised so 
as to be independant of empirical events in the sense that no empirical 
observation can prove or disprove the adequacy of eidetic intuition. 
This is because empirical observation presupposes a prior conceptual 
grasp of the data which it cannot confirm and which phenomenology seeks to 
establish. Thus any attempted empirical refutation of phenomenology is 
based on an acceptance of concepts whose adequacy has been cast in doubt 
by phenomenology. Nor is it possible to test the conclusions of 
phenomenology by deducing from them certain empirical events of which the 
occurance or failure to occur determines the truth or falsity of the 
eidetic intuition. This is because, once again, such a procedure is an 
attempt to make supposedly reliable, a priori truths dependant on 
empirical events which necessarily bear the hallmark of unreliability, 
that is, they could be other than they are and it would be absurd to make 
the inherently unreliable the test of claims to reliability. Equally, 
such a process presupposes the adequacy of its conceptual grasp of the 
data and if the eidetic intuition is doubted there must be some other 
concept, whose adequacy is accepted, by which the data is organised, but 
how is this acceptable concept established? This would inevitably lead 
to the contradictory situation of having to accept the adequacy of a 
concept in order that the concept's adequacy can be tested. The 
procedure of testing, outlined here, presupposes adequate concepts and, 
as a test, it is appropriate to existential propositions, that is theor- 
etical statements about the inter-relationship, the processes, between 
already apprehended modes of Being. It is a test of explanatory theories, 
not of ideas which seek to describe the nature of Being*. Finally, this 
* This distinction is frequently overlooked because of the loose usage 
of such terms as idea, concept, theory and hypothesis. 
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test, in its common form of the hypothetico-deductive model, is 
inappropriate to eidetic intuition because empirical events cannot be 
deduced or predicted from such intuition, to claim the opposite would 
be to argue for an a priori construction of the world. This is because, 
as was noted in the previous chapter, essences are necessary, empirical 
events are possibilities and there is a whole range of possible events 
which are compatible with the ontology of each eidetically perceived 
realm of Being. This realisation requires a qualification of our 
previous statement that eidetic intuition does not lead to prediction of 
empirical events. This is true in relation to statements about what will 
happen for a grasp of essence tells us, not what will happen, but what 
cannot happen. That is, from the perspective of essence anything is 
possible except that which contradicts the mode of Being which has been 
apprehended. The purpose of eidetic intuition is not to predict but to 
provide such reliable concepts, that our various acts of prediction will 
be seen to be concerned with real., or actual modes of Being and not simply 
as part of instrumental knowledge or as products of mere agreements or as 
fictions*. That is, the aim of phenomenology is to give us confidence 
in the adequacy of our concepts, by which we grasp and interpret 
empirical events. Husserl's guarantee of the reliability or truth of 
eidetic intuition lies in the rigorous rationality of the method of the 
reductions, not in empirical testing. As Welch 
(12) 
states, "An act of 
positing ... has its justification when it is reasonable; the rational 
character is itself the category of rightness which 'belongs' to it not 
* This raises the'problem of the relevance of phenomenology for it might 
be concluded from the foregoing discussion that by protecting the 
reliability of its conclusions from empirical test phenomenology has 
to be seen as irrelevant to our understanding of empirical events. This is the reality problem of phenomenology and admittedly Husserl has no 
clear answer to the charge. This point will be considered below in our 
revision of phenomenology. 
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contingently as a fact ... but essentially"; for Husserl "rational" is 
gquivalent to eidetic insight. Since eidetic insight tells us about 
Being, that which truly is and that which is rationally demonstrable are 
identical. 
However Welch criticises Husserl's account of error for being 
contradictory on the grounds that, as Husserl believes that experiences 
are neutral, error cannot be located in them and therefore it must be 
found in the act of intuition. However, Husserl also claims that intuition 
cannot deceive since it is not based on a logical process of deduction or 
induction and therefore there is no possibility of error occuring as the 
consequence of a mistaken judgement. Welch's argument overlooks the 
fact'that eidetic intuition is achieved through the reductions and 
therefore the genuineness of an intuition, ie. whether it is in fact an 
intuition or merely a re-affirmation of our naive beliefs, is dependant 
on the adherence to the correct procedure of reduction. However, this 
counter to Welch's argument simply casts the problem of verification in 
phenomenology in a new light, which is, how do we know that correct 
procedures have been used? 
Husserl studiously attempts to avoid the problem by simply asserting 
that'those who think correctly must agree. This is true but the 
problem remains of'how we are to determine who has thought correctly when 
we are confronted by conflicting claims concerning eidetic intuition, or, 
indeed, in such a'situation whether it is possible that the method has 
been correctly used by both protagonists but in relation to differing 
phenomena. A divergence between such results would be proper and the 
supposed disagreement would have to be shown to be based on a mis- 
understanding of each other's intentions. There is also the problem 
that although objectively valid cognitions is. true eidetic intuitions, 
are those with which everyone must agree, this relationship cannot be 
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reversed into the claim that agreement is evidence for the adequacy of 
intuition. 
Husserl(14) uses a further device for escaping from, rather than 
resolving, the problem of error and this is his claim that what has been 
grasped from the intuitive perspective can be understood and verified 
from an intuitive point of view. This is equally inadequate, not only 
because it fails to resolve the problem of disagreements between 
phenomenologists but also because it implies a similar, and ultimately 
self-destructive, justification as that claimed by psycho-analysis, that 
only those committed to psycho-analysis are in a position to criticise 
its adequacy. Such an argument, although it renders the method impervious 
to outside criticism, does so at the price of exposing the irrelevance 
of the method for non-practitioners. This is particularly apposite 
in the case of phenomenology for Husserl constantly asserts the value of 
phenomenology for those who stand outside it in the particular sciences. 
Similarly, Husserl 
(15) 
asserts that as the aim of phenomenology is 
to bring perception to full clarity, by which is meant the apprehension 
of the self-givenness of experience, it would seem that only such clear 
perception can be intuited. This however simply raises the question 
of how we are to distinguish between the perfect and imperfect perception 
of self-givenness. Nor does Husserl justify the claim that only 
perfectly perceived self-evidence can be intuited when on the basis of 
his argument it would be more reasonable to state that only such perception 
can be fully or adequately intuitod. To express the situation in these 
terms would be to raise the problem of error in phenomenology in an 
unavoidable fashion, that is, how can we distinguish between adequate 
and inadequate intuition? Husserl claims that the unclear phenomenon 
"does not pass into the circle of light reserved for that which is given 
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pure"(16) but this once again assumes that the reductions by which the "pure" 
is identified and separated from the "impure" have been properly carried 
out and this apparent inability to distinguish, in practise, between the 
distinguishing and necessary consequences of proper and improper 
procedure is the heart of the problem of error in phenomenology. 
Husserl does distinguish, in theory, between genuine and false degrees 
of clarity and obscurity, the former being that which belongs to the mode 
of being given and the latter being that which is a product of inadequate 
"seeing". Indeed, in this whole discussion Husserl(17) asserts the 
importance of clarity and non-contradiction in distinguishing between 
adequate and inadequate perception, but as these terms themselves remain 
unclarified they are no more than slogans, especially as Husserl refers 
to the need to destroy the merely apparent harmony between natural 
perceptions. How, then, are we to distinguish between a genuine and an 
apparent harmony? 
It is noticeable that Husserl employs a constant tactic to avoid 
confronting this problem and that is to turn problems of phenomenology 
into problems for phenomenology. Thus the problem of establishing the 
reasonableness of claims made in the name of phenomenology becomes a 
phenomenology of reason; the problem of how to distinguish between 
adequate and inadequate grasp of self-evidence becomes the phenomenology 
of self-evidence that is, the consideration of vagueness and clarity as 
qualities of phenomena. This approach could be justified if the aim was, 
for instance, to clarify the necessary characteristics of the erroneous 
perception of self-evidence such that the presence of these characteristics 
would reveal the presence of error. Husserl does not attempt to do this 
and it could be argued that such a project is impossible because it is 
circular in that before such an enquiry can commence we must be able to 
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identify its object ie. error. That is before we can discover the nature 
of error we must know what an erroneous judgement is. This argument 
clearly assumes that error is empirically established. It could be 
argued by nominalists that we should analyse what people mean when they 
use the term error, but this assumes that something definite and definable 
is meant, but what is to be done if there are conflicting uses of the 
term in everyday language; whose everyday language do we accept as 
definitive? Would it then be reasonable to state that we know what 
error is, or rather would we have to say that we think we know what 
certain people mean when they use the term error? We therefore propose 
to resolve the problem of error in phenomenology by identifying the 
necessary characteristics of genuine intuitions. We intend to avoid 
the circularity which this implies, which was noted above, by basing the 
argument on rational necessity and not on empirical observation of supposed 
erroneous judgements. In order to place the problem of error in its 
proper perspective in relation to eidetic intuition it must be recognised 
that the statement that an intuition is wrong is potentially misleading. 
This is because, such a statement implies that the intuition, the idea, 
is necessarily incorrect, that error is its quality as would be the case 
in relation to a statement about a square triangle. Intuitions are 
ideas and rightness or wrongness is not a quality of the idea itself but 
of our judgements identifying a given phenomenon as a particularisation 
of the idea. Therefore our problem is not that of locating correct 
ideas but of correctly locating the idea in the phenomenon in terms of 
which the phenomenon is-adequately known and this is the purpose of the 
reductions*. 
* This argument refers back to the inapplicability of conventional illustra- tions of proof to phenomenology for all these presuppose that the phenomenon is known. Thus the questions, "what is the essence of religion" or "is X the 
essence of religion" is, to the phenomenologist, nonsensical for it presumes that the phenomena indicated by the term "religion" are particularisations 
of the, one idea, that is, such a procedure attempts to establish a category before it establishes that the category exists or that it contains the intend- Hoen enome on. The phenomenao ist od seek to 1ocate the essen Q of a ph nm ay thýa b fr e aria ion n cats hg ether p Women wý ch re e 
ýn 
61 ete tge ss nce us as lashing 
ýa 
par icuýar on oýggicai 
- 68 - 
In fact the argument concerning the circularity involved in having 
to define error in order to find out what error is, which was noted above, 
offers a possible solution to this problem, for Husserl insisted that 
enquiry originate in phenomena not judgements and, further, as noted 
previously 
1Irror is merely a negative category, it is non-truth. 
Therefore we must ask what are the necessary characteristics of reliably 
apprehended data. This does not break the injunction on refraining from 
judgement for we are not saying "X is a reliable datum, what are its 
characteristics" for this clearly presupposes what has yet to be establi- 
shed, that X is a reliable datum. We are saying "if a datum is reliable 
as an eidetic datum what qualities must it possess? " ie. what 
is the idea 
of reliability; and, as noted in the previous chapter, the possibility of 
reliability is beyond doubt. 
Certain qualities of the adequately intuited have been noted above*02) 
Firstly, adequate intuition is immanent, that is, it makes no claims or 
assumptions concerning other phenomena and thus in order to accept 
the 
reliability of the adequate intuition it is not necessary to 
introduce ideas 
or assumptions concerning the reliability of other judgements. A 
further 
quality of the adequate intuition is its non-contradictory nature, or 
expressed differently, the idea contained in the adequate intuition must 
be seen as capable of realisation for only the inherently contradictory 
cannot be realised. It should be realised that the idea of contradiction 
is eidetic, that in asserting that the idea of a square triangle is 
contradictory-we'are claiming knowledge concerning the nature or quality 
of squares in general and triangles in general. Further, we know that 
the idea of a square triangle is contradictory because it demands the 
simultaneous and identical realisation of two modes of one general species, 
*(1) re below chapter 1. 
*(2) re, in particular, chapter one. 
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that of shape, for a mode of being can be particularised, in a single idea, 
in relation to only one of its possibilities. This is because the 
various aspects of a mode of being are alternatives to each other. 
Thus contradiction is the situation where one idea is composed of 
alternative possibilities. The eidetic status of contradiction is shown 
in this realisation that alternatives necessarily refer to the same 
essence, as being particularisations of that essence or, expressed in the 
language of the Wittgensteinian attempt to avoid using "essence", they 
belong to the same familyl, 
l änd that we recognise contradiction as such 
by, however unclearly, recognising the status of the contradictory elements 
as instances of the one idea. If we may be forgiven the Platonic 
language, we could express this idea by stating that an essence can be 
realised in only one of its aspects at a time, contradiction is the 
necessary error involved in the attempt-to realise the idea in more than 
one of its modes at any one time. That is, it is impossible to identify 
one phenomenon with multiple particularisations of the same generic essence. 
Thus the term "square triangle" is contradictory and as a consequence it 
cannot be conceptually grasped other than by separating its elements, that 
is, by destroying the term. That is, a square triangle cannot be known. 
The idea of a hot triangle, however, while it may be regarded as peculiar 
or puzzling is not contradictory because the terms in the concept refer 
to different essences. ie. heat and shape, and it is therefore possible to 
entertain this concept and, by free (variation, to identify phenomena to 
which this description would be appropriate e. g. toast, a heating element etc. 
Thus that which is contradictory, that is, necessarily inconceivable, cannot 
be based on a genuine eidetic intuition for essences, as real, as modes 
of being, can give themselves only in a singular and non-contradictory 
manner*(2) Equally no essence necessarily contradicts another essence, 
*(l) This could be further expressed in the slogan that contradiction is 
conceptual incest. 
*(2) This does not preclude the idea of phenomena being essential complexes. 
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therefore any essential complex is conceivable. In order to take 
account of the obvious objection to this statement that the idea of error 
contradicts the idea of truth we simply point out, again, that categories 
such as error are negative categories, error is-non-truth, it is the 
absence of truth and is known by reference to the essence or idea of truth. 
The same will be seen to hold for all other supposed instances of 
contradictoriness between essences. 
A further distinctive feature of adequate intuition is its non- 
derivability. - That is, as opposed to naturalistic conclusions which 
posit the reliability of prior data, adequate intuition cannot be derived 
from other data. That is, it is impossible for us to posit the existence 
of knowledge from which the intuition is seen to follow. Thus if the 
intuition is seen to be non-derivable it must-also be seen as basic, as 
a priori. In order to clarify this idea it is necessary to distinguish 
between the non-deducible or non-inducible and the wrongly deduced or 
induced. The latter is that which is a product of the deductive or 
inductive process but which is inadequate because the rules which govern 
the process have, in this instance, been wrongly applied. To take an 
instance of incorrect deduction: - All amen are dark-haired; This is a 
dark-haired being; Therefore This is a man. Thus the data of the wrongly 
deduced has the quality, nevertheless, of that which is open to deduction. 
Such data are derivations not definitions, they posit contingent knowledge 
about the phenomenon in question which, therefore, could in theory be 
otherwise, hence theýneed for proof , or testing. Alternatively, 
genuinely intuited data, that which grasps the a priori, shows itself to 
be unamenable to procedures of proving and therefore they present themselves 
to a cognitive subject as absolute data. 
* Although'it should be noted that the deductive method cannot guarantee the adequacy of its definitions or that the minor proposition is in fact 
a case of the'major proposition. 
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This reference to the inevitable inadequacy of attempts to justify 
intuition by a logical process may give rise to the conclusion that 
judgements concerning essence are arbitrary and that, if an intuition can 
be shown to be non-contradictory, not dependant on other knowledge and 
non-derivable, it is acceptable. This would be a hasty conclusion for 
the discussion has, so far, considered only the qualities of genuine 
eidetic intuition as such; it is also necessary to apprehend the nature 
of the genuine eidetic grasp of phenomena. This introduces the complex 
problem of the relationship between fact and essence and the nature of 
necessity both of which will be discussed'below . At this juncture we 
can anticipate some of the conclusions in that section and point out that 
what is achieved in the genuine eidetic grasp of phenomena is an involve- 
ment in the being of the object, of no longer remaining on the outside of 
the phenomenon but, instead, undergoing the experience of an ever-widening 
grasp of the nuances and implications of the phenomenon, seeing 
it 
develop, being led inevitably by the experience of the phenomenon. The 
genuine grasp of the phenomenon leads to the development of 
discourse 
concerning the nature of the phenomenon, whereas an inadequate grasp 
does 
not permit the development of knowledge immanent to the phenomenon, 
but, 
instead, can develop only by admitting contingency through having to 
develop by the addition of knowledge concerning other phenomena. This 
is because ideas concerning the nature of phenomena are the source of all 
our acts of positing directed to phenomena; apprehensions of essence, 
whether adequate or inadequate, are the origin of all our derivative acts. 
The nature and limitations of these acts therefore reveal whether we can 
achieve, in terms of knowledge, what we should be able to achieve if our 
original eidetic grasp of the phenomenon had been genuine. That is, if 
we had located the correct essence. 
* re chapter 7. 
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Admittedly many of these terms are unclear and require further 
justification but the point which we wish to make here is that, although 
the presence of the conditions outlined above would not constitute proof, 
in the usual sense of the term, of the adequacy of the intuition, they 
would remove any grounds on which to base a doubt of such adequacy. 
That is, although we cannot prove the adequacy of a claimed eidetic 
intuition we have established those conditions in which doubt of the 
genuiness of the intuition as an eidetic intuition and as a grasp of the 
essence of the phenomenon in question becomes unreasonable. 
There remains the relatively minor problem of how phenomenology can 
account for error in everyday judgements. The only such judgements 
which are of concern to phenomenology are those which concern 
the 
supposed nature of phenomena. Mistakes in such judgements are accounted 
for by phenomenology in terms of the unclarity and naivety of 
the natural 
attitude and the intrusion of practical interests which deflect 
the 
theoretical enquiry. The important point here for phenomenology 
is 
that doubt is always possible in relation to natural cognitions and 
therefore every act of positing within the natural attitude bears with 
it-the possibility of being wrong. It is this possibility of doubt 
which permits the perception of error although such perception 
implies 
the removal of error and therefore the attainment of absolutely reliable 
data. Thus phenomenology fulfills the intentions of everyday acts of 
positing. Therefore, the error of everyday perception to which 
phenomenology is relevant is category error, the incorrect identification 
of phenomena. As an instance it has been complained that identifying 
Christianity and the-Essen es_ is like identifying a man and a fish because 
they are both wet when they come out of the sea. We are not concerned 
with the correctness of the statement but with the fact that it involves 
an appeal to essence, that is, it is held that Christianity and the 
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Essenes can be identified only by reference to contingent non-essential 
aspects of these phenomena, and therefore such identity is false. 
It may be objected by nominalists that this assumption is itself 
erroneous and that the adequacy of identity is based simply on rules 
governing the use of the words Christianity, Essen eS, man and fish. 
The statement referred to above indicates merely that the rules governing 
the use of these words are not clear and unambiguous and therefore cannot 
function as rules and that the statement, itself, is an attempt to define 
the rules. Further it would seem that it is believed that such rules can 
be defined only by a prior grasp of the nature of the phenomena fe. it is 
wrong to identify Christianity and the Essenes (rule) because they are 
qualitatively distinct (essence). Further the statement is implying an 
imperative, the idea that such an identification must be wrong. The 
concept of rule-following cannot account for this idea of an imperative. 
In asserting that a statement is erroneous the rule-following theory 
claims a status of total reliability for its judgement despite its denial 
of such reliability because even the rules are seen as arbitrary, having 
no inner necessity and as vulnerable to change. Phenomenology, however, 
takes account of the idea of the imperative for it recognises that in 
order for conceptualisation to be seen as reliable it must merit the 
imperative. That iss we must be able to say of our identification of 
phenomena "it has to be so", and as seen above, the aim of phenomenology 
is to clarify and ground this idea, changing it from assumption into 
certainty. The presence of the imperative reveals a further weakness in 
the rule-following idea for it is not clear why we should follow the rules 
nor why breaking the rules should be considered as error if it cannot be 
shown that the rules are necessary and as such are derived from reliable 
knowledge. It is also not clear how we justify the claim that a rule has 
been broken, unless it is by reference to a further rule which defines the 
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first rule and this tends towards the prospect of an infinite regress. 
LANGUAGE AND PHENOMENOLOGY 
The claim that phenomenology could not take into account the 
possibility of error in the use of the phenomenological method was 
based partly on the idea that phenomenology's removal from the everyday 
world had made its procedures untestable in relation to that world. 
This idea is also advanced in the criticism that by removing itself from 
the everyday world, seeing the concepts in which this world is known as 
unreliable and by seeking essences not perceived in that world, 
phenomenology cannot use the language of the everyday world. Therefore, 
it cannot express itself to the holders of that naive knowledge which it 
seeks to correct. Thus phenomenology, even if true, is irrelevant because 
it is inexpressible in relation to those who would be expected to benefit 
from it. Thus phenomenology would at best become a closed circle of 
initiates which could not be extended to the whole of humanity as an 
alternative to the natural attitude because the outlook of phenomenology 
is purely theoretical and therefore could not replace the practical 
oriented natural attitude. At worst, it is possible that, as ddetic 
intuition is achieved by individuals, it cannot be expressed to other 
phenomenologist's or even for as long as the phenomenologist has only 
everyday language at his disposal, to himself. 
It must be admitted that Husserl avoided direct contact with this 
problem by dedicating his working life to an exposition and justification 
of the phenomenological method. Particular phenomenological analyses 
were carried out by his students or co-workers and it is probable that 
Husserl did not therefore recognise the existence and gravity of this 
problem. His simplistic assertion that "we can make our speech conform 
in a pure measure to what is seen in its full clarity"(19) has been 
* This topic will be developed further in the discussion of Winch re 
chapter 4. 
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justifiably termed naive by Nakhinikian(20) "as if language were the sort 
of thing that the phenomenologist could create at will in the image of 
ultimate facts". Similarly the significance of this problem is 
accidentally revealed by Barger(21) who tries to explain away the 
dichotomy between realism and idealism in Husserl's work by claiming that 
it is merely an apparent problem because Husserl had to use language 
appropriate to the natural attitude which itself reflects this ambiguity. 
If this is so, and the discoveries achieved in eidetic intuition are 
expressible only in terms of natural attitude language then on Berger's 
account the expression of such discoveries is bound to be distorted . 
Nevertheless, Husserl(22) feels, able to criticise natural science's 
shifting concepts and constantly re-defined language, seeing this as a 
consequence of its-groundlessness, but he simply asserts that a definitive 
scientific language can follow from the analysis of phenomena. Thus, if 
phenomenology is to provide an answerto this problem it must look else- 
where than to Husserl. 
Santayana(23) accepts that essences can be identified only by being 
placed in a natural context through language borrowed from the material 
or everyday world and a consideration of this claim will enable us 
to 
* This contention raises the distinction between things as they are and 
things as they appear in a peculiar form. This distinction is usually 
understood as referring to the perception of things whereas the implication 
of Berger's statement is that this distinction is based on the 
communicability of knowledge, transcendental knowledge being, implicitly, 
seen as private, natural attitude knowledge as public. As a consequence 
utterances which can convey transcendental knowledge are impossible. It 
may be inferred that this inadequacy justifies the nominalist's view that 
our concepts deal with words not essences and that we can only grasp an 
idea as a word which is already part of our vocabulary and whose usage 
we have learnt. It is possible that this does happen but we deny that 
it must happen because such an account cannot comprehend the acquisition 
of novel ideas. To say that the acquisition of novel ideas is simply a 
process of learning new words does not tell us why the idea is accepted 
or why the idea contained in the word is seen as an appropriate expression 
of a particular experience, such that when a person is introduced to the 
word and its definition he can say "Yes, that is what I meant". 
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offer a solution to the problem of phenomenology's language. Even if a 
specialised language were possible it would be contradictory for it to be 
used by phenomenology because phenomenology defines itself as relevant to 
the everyday world and by using a specialised language it would separate 
itself from this world in much the same way as, in Husserl's opinion, 
science had done. In such a situation there would be a need to translate 
the specialised language into the terms of everyday apprehension* and, 
therefore, the problem would remain of how to achieve this without 
distortion. Thüs, phenomenology, in order to achieve its foundation- 
building aim, cannot afford the luxury of creating for itself a kingdom 
not of this world through use of a language for initiates only. It 
should elso. be understood that the term "specialised language" does not 
refer simply to the use of terms not found in everyday speech but also to 
the particular and "un-natural" relevance structures and models which 
inform these languages. It is therefore not enough to use ordinary 
words while re-defining their meaning as does the psychologist who tells 
us that what he means by "intelligence" is not what the non-specialist 
means by this term. If the non-specialist asks how his understanding 
of his experiences relate to these scientific terms, why scientists 
cannot tell him about intelligence as he understands, he is told that 
he is using such terms in a non-scientific fashion and therefore his 
question is meaningless. This is true but it does not make the sciences 
any more relevant or comprehensible to the outsider. If phenomenology 
is to succeed in clarifying and founding everyday knowledge it cannot 
build linguistic barriers between it and those who hold this knowledge. 
An apparent contradiction emerges here because phenomenology also 
declares that the natural attitude is partial and obscure therefore how 
can phenomenology express its reliable knowledge in a manner which is 
understandable to those in the natural attitude without partialising and 
* By translation into everyday apprehebsion we do not mean popularisation of the"sociology made easy" type. 
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obscuring this reliable datum. The answer to this problem requires a 
clarification of the function of language in phenomenology. The previous 
discussion of the problem of error showed that intuition cannot be proved, 
nor as the natural attitude is unreliable, is it possible to assert a 
direct identity between the intuition and everyday conceptualisation. 
Our alternative to these positions is in accordance with our realistic 
understanding'of essence and this is that language is indicative, it 
points to ideas'and their realisations. Further, the essence is not alien 
to the person in the natural attitude for it is that which his acts intend, 
the grasp of essence would be the fulfillment of the intention. Thus our 
aim'would be to use language so as to lead or guide the person in the 
natural attitude to a recognition of the essence, as that which is intended 
by his conscious acts within the natural attitude. Thus, the language 
used by phenomenology to express its eidetic intuitions would be 
evocative or poetic. It should re-express the eidetic intuition in terms 
of its various, possible particularisations so as to "strike a chord" in 
the experience of the audience 
*, The aim of this procedure is to persuade 
the audience to perceive the essence within their own actual or imaginery 
experience. Such grasp of essence is self-validating in that it is not 
imposed on the audience by an extErnal logic but is a personal achievement 
of the audience. Thus the phenomenologist guides his audience but 
the 
actual grasp of eidetic content is an act of the audience itself. 
The possibility of this process depends on the adequacy of a large 
number'of assumptions concerning the relationship between essence and 
object and the nature of intersubjectivity. In particular it requires 
that essences can be shown to be located in phenomena and are not distinct 
from phenomena and further that essence is the being of phenomena so that 
the act of indicating a phenomenon is necessarily an adequate or inadequate 
*Such a process is to be found in the phenomenological work of Schaler 
re below Chapter 6. 
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invoking of essence. This to be acceptable would require the 
demonstration of the falsity of the fact/essence distinction, or, at 
least, the demonstration that this distinction is analytic not real. 
This argument also entails the view that the phenomenological reductions 
simply give us clear perception of what is already there in the 
phenomenon; they do not create an essence which is then incorporated 
in the object. In other words, it is necessary to justify a realistic 
as opposed to idealistic interpretation of essence. The second major 
assumption in our account of the communicability of eidetic intuition 
is that such knowledge is not private but is necessarily universal; 
that, it does not belong to a particular consciousness but to all 
consciousnesses. That is, this knowledge can be grasped by any 
cognitive subject. The final assumption is that in order to convey the 
eidetic intuition in the manner outlined above to one who has not 
experienced it, it is necessary for us to express it in terms such that 
they can know the experience even without undergoing it. This requires 
that we establish the possibility of genuine intersubjective understanding. 
This is the first indication that intersubjectivity is not simply a 
problem for phenomenology to clarify but is the problem of phenomenology. 
That is, phenomenology must be able to establish intersubjective knowledge 
as a reliable datum if it is. to achieve its goal of making eidetic 
intuition generally available as the means of grounding the particular 
sciences and everyday conceptual acts. If these possibilities can 
be-established as truths then the general availability and communicability 
of eidetic intuition within the natural attitude is possible. These two 
basic problems which are unrdsolved in Husserl, the clarification of the 
relationship between fact and essence and the possibility of establishing 
intersubjectivity within the phenomenological epochs, will form the 
programme of our revision of phenomenology* " Before this is undertaken 
* re below chapter 7. 
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it is necessary, to continue the investigation of phenomenology's 
alleged weaknesses and then to consider how the problem of intersubject- 
ivity, which is as crucial for an adequate interpretive sociology as it 
is for phenomenology, has or has not been resolved by Husserl or sociology. 
It is, however, relevant at this point following the discussion of 
language in phenomenology to advance an initial justification of our 
realistic interpretation of essence by contrasting it with the nominalistic 
position, that is with the idea that only the particular is real and that 
supposed essences are merely words or names by which a chaotic experience 
is organised. The nominalistic view, therefore, sees the use of general 
terms as not being a matter of necessity but of habit or rule-following, 
Thus, rationality for the nominalist means adherence to rules, not 
conformity to the nature of things. Undoubtedly if the nominalistic 
position was accepted phenomenology's language problem would disappear and 
it would be seen as just one language game among others. We intend to 
show that such a-conclusion would involve the adoption of an unacceptable 
position. Indeed the very existence of a language problem in the form 
which it takes for phenomenology indicates that phenomenology is attempt- 
ing to communicate a reality which is not adequately named. That is, if 
reality and acts of naming were equivalent it is difficult to see how 
phenomenology's language problem could arise. Thus the fact that 
phenomenology finds existing language inadequate implies that the 
adequacy of this language is being judged by non-linguistic criteria ie. 
eidetic intuition, which is seen to confirm or deny language's rationality 
and on which language therefore depends for its sense. This leads us to 
ask why existing language is inadequate for the phenomenologist. We would 
argue that reliance on everyday language is inadequate because it conveys 
significance, that is, individual interests and perspectives not meaning, 
that is, the indubitable nature of being. Everyday use of language 
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tends to confuse significance and meaning, and therefore naively accepts 
that its particular perspective is universally acceptable and accessible. 
This situation has been recognised by nominalists, such as 
Wittgenstein, but the Wittgensteinian recognition of this common-sense 
fallacy leads not to the positing of an indubitability which transcends 
particular perspectives but to an, acceptance of the relativistic status 
of these perspectives or language games each with its own proper and 
limited sphere. However, like all relativisms this argument contradicts 
itself for, in the terms of its own argument the Wittgensteinian analysis 
is merely another language game which is no more able than any other 
language game to claim priority. Therefore the recognition of language- 
games has to be seen by the Wittgensteinian as itself part of a language- 
game and if someone else wishes to play the language-game of indubitable 
philosophy any attempt by the Wittgensteinian to deny its validity and 
assert the accuracy of his account of knowledge is, in his own terms, an 
illegitimate interference in someone else's game*. That is, the relativ- 
istic conception of knowledge implied in the idea of language-games 
if 
applied to the idea that there are language games results in the removal 
of any reason for the non-Wittgensteinian to accept that the idea is 
binding. Thus this approach is led into the nonsensical position of 
all relativisms of having to assert that all knowledge is relative 
except the knowledge that all knowledge is relative, which knowledge 
must then have an absolute status and thus the initial relativistic 
proposition is denied. 
The solipsism and egocentrism implied in nominalism as a consequence 
of its confusion of meaning and significance is shown in that it only 
grants clear being to things according to our ability to name them and 
* It is also not clear how the Wittgensteinian is able to assert the 
necessity of rules without also undermining his relativism re above 
chapter 1. 
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thus it implies that things are real only if we choose to see them as 
such and there is no conception of our responding to an objective reality 
and consequently modifying our language. 
Thus, we would argue, naming is not knowing where this latter term 
implies a disclosure of the phenomenon's nature. The act of naming for 
the nominalist does not even require prior knowledge of the phenomenon in 
itself for such naming simply refers a thing to its immediate context 
through its significance for the namer. It is not apprdciated that in 
order to name a phenomenon rationally it is necessary to have prior 
knowledge of the thing in itself. Naturalistic naming, being a product 
of significance not meaning, is in constant flux, thus the nominalist's 
idea of the non-existence of necessity in naming, is a product of the 
naive acceptance of naturalistic naming. This then forms part of a self- 
fulfilling prophecy in which inadequate knowledge is used to demonstrate 
the impossibility of adequate, or necessary, knowledge. 
In claiming that in rational discourse the name of a phenomenon is 
integral to the phenomenon we are not referring to the sound of the word 
or its status as part of language, we are stating the idea that in 
meaningful, intersubjectively grounded discourse the name of a thing is 
seen to indicate its nature or essence. This raises the problem that if 
this is so, how is it possible that we can give a single phenomenon a range 
of names e. g. dog, mammal, animal, pet etc* are we to say one name is the 
true one and all others are false? This objection assumes that a 
phenomenon is composed of a single'essence, and as our clarification of 
the inner horizon * shows, this is not necessarily so. Thus an object can 
be a particularisation of more than one essence, it can express a potentiall 
unlimited range of qualities, that is, perceived objects can be essential 
complexes. In identifying and naming the phenomenon we would, in 
rational insight, identify a quality expressed in that phenomenon, -holding 
* re below chapter 1. 
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other qualities in abbeyance as the inner horizon, which qualities can 
themselves be the object of a subsequent eidetic intuition. The 
identification of one particular quality does not compromise the other 
qualities of the object, but permits us to identify the class of phenomena 
to which the object belongs in respect of this particular quality. Thus, 
in answer to the objection above, we would say that all the names given 
to a phenomenon could be true, in so far as they indicated qualities 
contained in the object; that the object can be identified with all these 
qualities without contradiction. 
ALTERNATIVISM 
The recognition that appearances are eidetic complexes is the basis 
of our response to the challenge of relativism. Certain thinkers such 
as Weber have claimed that the fact that a phenomenon can be studied in 
relation to varying aspects justifies the relativistic position. For 
instance, capitalism can be seen as an economic system, an attitude to 
life etc. and therefore one cannot study capitalism as s uch, only 
particular aspects of capitalism. Our discovery that phenomena are 
eidetic complexes reveals the inadequacy of this claim. Weber's belief 
that the variety of aspects of a phenomenon which can be studied entails 
relativism is based on a confusion of meaning and significance. That is, 
in terming a phenomenon capitalism he, and we in the natural attitude, ignor 
certain revealed essences and concentrate our attention on other essences, 
but we mistakenly identify the whole appearance with that one aspect which 
is of significance to us. Thus, we violate the self-givenness of other 
essences within the phenomenon. We therefore propose in opposition to 
relativism the notion of alternativism by which we mean the recognition 
that any appearance being composed of independant, non-contradictory 
essences, provides alternative possibilities of eidetic intuition. This 
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differs from relativism in that it does not say that, for instance, one 
can study capitalism as either an attitude to life or as an economic 
system but that the complex appearance which we naively term capitalism 
can be studied in relation to varying qualities which it reveals. We 
may restrict the term capitalism to one of these qualities e. g. a type 
of economic system but this is independant of and does not compromise the 
decision to discuss the phenomenon in terms of its status as a belief 
system. 
ESSENCE AND GENERAL TERMS 
The reference to the role of qualities in discourse leads us to 
recognise that essences are not to be equated with general terms but 
that general terms, if they are to be used in rational discourse pre- 
suppose and indicate the essence as that on which their sense depends. 
Thus, Santayana(24) "had a term no individual essence there could be no 
meaning in predicating it and it could not be predicated of two things 
in the same sense since it would have no sense". 
It could however be maintained that concepts or general terms are 
products of agreement between subjects and therefore there is no need to 
posit essence in order to comprehend the consistent usage of terms. In 
order to examine the adequacy of this idea it is necessary to consider 
the act of agreeing. In order for this act to have the status claimed 
for it, that is, for the act of agreeing to be the basis of discourse it 
must have a necessity denied to other conscious acts in order for it to 
be seen as the inevitable origin of all discourse. That is, the act of 
agreeing has to be placed outside the circle of arbitrariness which is 
seen to apply to discourse in general in order to avoid the contradictory 
assertion that the act of agreeing is simply a name which we have agreed 
to give to the act of agreeing (which came first, the agreement or the 
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agreeing). Thus, if the act of agreeing and the agreement itself are 
to make sense they must be seen as non-arbitrary, as based on necessity. 
It must be understood that we are not asserting the necessity of all 
acts of agreement, such as agreement concerning the use of names, but 
that the nominalist is forced to admit the existence of necessity, and 
a limitation to the adequacy of his explanation of discourse as based on 
agreement, in respect of the general act of agreeing. Thus, the statement 
"We agree to make arbitrary or convenient choices" is contradictory for 
although the content of the particular agreement may be arbitrary the 
agreement to agree must be seen as binding and as having a universal 
meshing, We cannot say that the decision as to what constitutes agree- 
ment can itself be a consequence of arbitrary or convenient choice for 
this would make it impossible to state definitively when an agreement had 
been reached. Thus, the nominalist's claim that the usage of terms is 
based on agreement implies the possession of knowledge concerning the 
meaning of agreement for others which in the nominalist's own terms, he 
could not possess in a reliable fashion. Thus in order for the 
nominalist's position to be sensible he has to admit the existence of 
necessity in relation to the act of agreement. Since there is no 
justification for seeing this act as alone being necessary, this admission 
undermines the nominalist's whole position and introduces the possibility 
of necessity as opposed to simple agreement into our use of general terms. 
Thus, the possibility is raised within nominalism that our agreements 
concerning the use of terms can be criticised as being right or wrong in 
relation to the being of the phenomena to which they refer as the only 
possible origin of necessity, that is, essence. 
Our consideration of the problem posed by language for phenomenology 
has been wide-ranging but we can summarise its conclusions in the 
* This does not mean that it must be arbitrary. 
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following points. We have demonstrated that Husserl fails to recognise 
this problem but we have also sought to justify the claim that, despite 
this, eidetic intuitions can be expressed to those in the natural 
attitude through the use of evocative imagery. We also noted various 
assumptions contained in this solution which will be discussed below, 
rurther we argued that in order for language to be rationally grounded it 
must be based on an apprehension of the qualities of the objects which it 
invokes. Finally, as part of this argument, we criticised the nominalistic 
view that language is not based on the belief in the necessity of concepts 
but on acts of agreement by showing the contradictory nature of this 
position. 
The discussion of naming and the inadequacies of the nominalist 
position requires us to consider a particularly strong and influential 
nominalist objection directed against phenomenology's essentialism which 
was made by Wittgenstein*. 
WITTGENSTEIN AND PHENOMENOLOGY 
Although Wittgenstein does not refer directly to phenomenology, 
it is clearly implicated in his general critique of essentialism in 
philosophy(26), in which he uses the situation of reading as a test for 
the method and his argument can be summarised as follows. The essence 
of reading is said to be that which different kinds of reading have in 
common. Essentialism assumes that essence is hidden and needs a 
special effort to make it apparent but if we read with the intention 
of finding out what happens when we read then we are performing a special 
case of reading which is different from reading in the ordinary sense. 
* Although Husserl never referred directly to Wittgenstein, his 
attitude to linguistic analysis in general is expressed in his statement, 
"Away with empty word analyses! We must question things themselves. 
Back to experience, to seeing which alone can give our words sense and 
rational justification"(25). 
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Thus, a description based on such an examination is not adequate for a 
general description of. reading. If we say that the phenomenon comes 
into pure sight on close inspection, and we are describing how it looks 
from far off, the description is not made more accurate by describing 
the object on close inspection. This argument had in fact been considered 
by Husserl who admitted that a change of perspective is involved in 
phenomenological reflection but denied the relevance of the change, 
"We convince ourselves that these experiences retain their meaning and 
their right even in their reduced form and in a general and essentially 
universal way we grasp the right of such kinds of experiences generally 
just as parallel therewith we grasp the right of essential insights 
relating to experiences in general" 
(27). 
This is no more than a blank 
denial of the problem but Husserl makes a more important point when he 
states that this type of argument used against phenomenology is self- 
defeating for if it is true, "We should be maintaining too much when, 
in self-observation, we set it down that we had just been attending here 
to his book and are continuing to do so. That held good, no doubt, 
prior to reflexion. Reflexion however changed the attentive 'experience 
to be described' and indeed ... in respect of the objective relation". 
Thus this argument against phenomenology, presupposes as valid in its own 
case what it attempts to show is invalid in phenomenology. If reading 
and looking at reading in-order to understand reading are two such distinct 
acts that statements about the former which are based on the latter are 
invalid then, equally, the difference between the act of using the 
phenomenological method and the act. of reflecting critically on it must 
be such that any such criticisms are also invalid. If Wittgenstein 
believes that he can reflect on and derive relevant conclusions from this 
reflection upon phenomenology he cannot criticise phenomenology for 
believing that it can reflect on objects. 
Wittgenstein's second criticism, that a change of perspective is 
involved in reflection on essence which destroys the validity of our 
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perception of the original phenomenon, is wrongly placed because it is 
dependant on a misleading spatial analogy. To state that the seeing 
of a thing from afar is distorted when it is subjected to close inspection 
assumes that "close" is being used spatially. This is not so for by 
close inspection the phenomenologist would not understand physical 
proximity but a rigorous, exhaustive and reliable investigation of either 
the act or what is given in the act. Nor would it be reasonable to state 
that a rigorous, exhaustive and reliable investigation of a vague percep- 
tion must destroy the original vagueness, for such an inspection would 
have only' the aim of revealing what vagueness is. That is, it does 
not follow that our conceptualisation of vagueness must itself be vague 
or, to develop this point, that our conceptualisation of error must 
itself be wrong. An alternative reformulation of Wittgenstein's objec- 
tion would be that if we attempt to achieve a reliable, definitive grasp 
of what was given vaguely or from afar we must add things to it that were 
not included in the original perception and therefore our understanding 
will be relevant only to cases of perfect, not vague or removed 
perception. This argument overlooks the distinction between noesis and 
noema for, as seen above, if the object of enquiry is the nature of the 
intentional act then a clear conception does not compromise the nature 
of the act. However, the objection may seem to be of greater relevance 
in relation to the situation where the enquiry is directed towards the 
object of the intentional act because it would seem that if a thing is 
given fleetingly or indistinctly or vaguely we cannot achieve a clear 
perception of it without repeating the perception so that it is seen 
clearly and distinctly. Thus, any subsequent reflection will be 
irrelevant to the original vague, indistinct perception. This argument 
raises considerations concerning the problem of perspective in 
phenomenology which will be considered further below but we can, at this 
point, demonstrate that this argument is based on a fallacious identity 
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of the appearing object and essence. That is, it assumes that the 
resulting eidetic intuition applies to the object in all its aspects. 
As we have shown above objects are complexes of essence and thus in 
reflection we consider one of the alternative particularisations of 
essence which are present in the object, placing the other appearing 
qualities in the phenomenon's internal horizon of those qualities with 
which it was given on this occasion. Thus, even in fleeting or vague 
perception something is given and this something is the object of 
phenomenological reflection. This is so because the idea of vagueness 
refers not to the thing given but to the uncertainty concerning the 
attendant qualities of the phenomenon, but the thing which is given can 
be clearly apprehended. Thus I may see a red ball but my perception of 
it may be such that I see only its colour and movement. In which case 
my reflection can reveal either the nature of redness or in general, of 
movement. in general. a 
If a subsequent perception shows that my initial 
perception was of a red bell, this merely opens up a wider range of 
possible objects for eidetic analysis but it in no way compromises the 
adequacy of my, initial intuitions. Qualities do not give themselves 
vaguely or distinctly, they simply give themselves. If we state that a 
perception is vague or unclear that is not a statement about the phenomena 
which are, given or even about the adequacy of our perception for it 
refers simply to. a judgement of the object's significance for us. To 
state that a perception is vague is to claim that a quality which is of 
value for us as practical creatures has not been revealed or that the 
presumed relevant features of the object have not become apparent. 
The objection to phenomenology which has just been considered is 
closely related to Wittgenstein's third argument against essentialism. 
This is that states of mind intervene in our perception of things and 
therefore what we see as a phenomenon's essence when we are tired will not 
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be the same as when we are awake and alert1l) It must be admitted that, 
at times, ' Husserl made himself vulnerable to this charge by referring to 
optimum conditions for the perception of phenomena. However, we are 
convinced that Wittgenstein's objection is invalid and that there is no 
need for phenomenology to make potentially damaging concessions towards 
it. Wittgenstein's objections are appropriate to naive contemplation 
but not to phenomenology because the latter uses a rigorous method in 
order to grasp essences or a priori data. Our criteria of adequate 
eidetic intuition described above*(2), permits us to check our intuition 
so that if states of mind have not been reduced and have prevented us 
from achieving an adequate grasp of essence this can be recognised. 
Equally, the method of free variation allows us to determine whether the 
intuited essence is the quality of the intended object.. Thus, we accept 
that there is a possibility of states of mind thwarting eidetic intuition 
but Wittgenstein's arguments on this point would undermine phenomenology 
only if it could be shown that such distortion is not detectable and we 
have shown above that there are procedures through which inadequate 
intuition can be recognised as such. The remainder of Wittgenstein's 
criticisms of essentialism are not applicable to phenomenology. They 
either assume that essence is grasped in mystical contemplation(29), 
whereas the purpose of phenomenology for Husserl was to enable the grasp 
pf essence in a totally rational intuition the validity of which could 
not be reasonably doubted, or they concern questions previously considered, 
such as why intuition should be trusted. Thus, we cannot accept 
Wittgenstein's conclusion that essentialism, at least in so far as this 
applies to phenomenology, substitutes "miracles for everyday events", 
*(1) It should also be noted that this argument is also self-destructive 
- in what state of mind was Wittgenstein when he contemplated essentialism? 
*(2) re page 68 ff. 
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if this is taken to mean that everyday events are made inaccessible to 
human reason since Husserl's intention was to rationalise experience, 
and Wittgenstein has failed to demonstrate phenomenology's inadequacy 
in this respect. We will show below that this aim of Husserl can be 
attained within phenomenology. 
It is now necessary to complete our discussion of Wittgenstein's 
critique of essentialism by considering the adequacy of his attempts to 
avoid using the concept of essence. 
Wittgenstein wished to substitute the idea of family resemblances 
for essence, but his idea of essence is a straw man and his critique of 
the idea of essence is irrelevant to phenomenology. Thus Wittgenstein 
criticises a weak concept of essence when he claims that although we 
assume that all games have something in common if we try to identify this 
common aspect we find that it is totally elusive, Thus, some games are 
ball games, others are cord games, some are played by teams and others 
by individuals, therefore there is no game-ness which can be located in 
all these different events. Apart from the obvious objection that 
Wittgenstein has not looked particularly hard to find the "essence" of 
games, his approach to this problem is open to the phenomenological 
criticism in that he naively accepts the adequacy of the everyday use of 
the term "game". That is, he accepts that the everyday understanding 
of "game" is adequate in that he derives all his instances of game from 
this category, in order to show that the category of game is not 
reducible to a'single'essence. This'idea is in fact the starting point 
of phenomenology for Husserl also recognises the ambiguity and lack of 
clarity in everyday categorisations although he does not commit Wittgen- 
stein's nonsense of assuming the adequacy of everyday perception in order 
to demonstrate its inadequacy. Thus, this objection by Wittgenstein to 
essentialism is really a justification of Husserl's objection to reliance 
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on naive, uncritical, everyday conceptualisation. As we would say, 
developing Husserl's ideas, the things which everyday perception terms 
games, are like all phenomena, essential complexes, that is, they are 
particularisations of a potentially infinite series of (non-contradictory) 
essences. Thus, if we accept for the moment that there is a quality 
common to all games which is the intended object of all game-oriented 
everyday conscious acts, our naive perceptions of games involves the wider 
context of other qualities which form the context of each particular game 
e. g. games plus competition, or co-operation, games plus teamsness or 
individuality, games plus physical or mental effort etc. These, as we 
have stated above constitute the inner horizon of the intended quality 
which is, in this case game-nass. As we also noted, the naive attitude 
typically ignores the existence of this inner horizon, that is it confuses 
meaning and significance. It overlooks the complex nature of the 
appearance and identifies it with one quality which is of significance 
to the naive individual and which may or may not be present, but almost 
certainly is not the only quality present. Thus the naive conceptualisa- 
tion is a statement that a parti cular quality is of interest or 
significance to the subject, therefore the other qualities of the 
phenomenon are ignored and the phenomenon is acted towards as if it 
consisted solely of this one quality. This is significant as opposed to 
meaningful identification of phenomena. Thus Wittgenstein is correct in 
claiming that those things termed games cannot be reduced to one quality 
but this is not as Wittgenstein believes because quality cannot be 
identified but because the naive categorisation of phenomena does not 
distinguish adequately between differing qualities given in the one 
perception. Thus any attempt to discover the quality of gameness by 
inductive analysis, that is, by looking at those things usually called 
games will discover that there are many and even contradictory aspects 
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to games. This is a consequence of the inadequacy of naive, significant, 
conceptualisation not proof that game-ness does not exist. Thus, again 
Wittgenstein's critique simply reveals the necessity of Husserl's denial 
of the adequacy of the natural attitude. 
A third error is also present in Wittgenstein's critique and this is 
his grasp of the idea of essence which he confuses with generality, hence 
the inductivist nature of his attempt to discover the essence of games. 
It is true that essence is common to all those things which belong to 
the essentially defined category; that is, it is true that all phenomena 
which are correctly designated as red possess the quality of redness. 
However our account of the eidetically complex nature of appearances 
means that we cannot identify essence with all those features common to 
phenomena which are said to express the essence in question. For instance 
if we wish to grasp the idea of redness, assuming the adequacy of the 
everyday conceptualisation of red, and identified this essence with 
that which all red objects have in common, this would lead to the 
conclusion that spatial extension is a quality of redness. The non- 
sensical nature of this conclusion is shown by the fact that if the same 
process is performed in respect to the quality of green-ness we would 
again reach the conclusion that spatial extension is a quality of green- 
ness. Thus we would be faced with the contradictory assertion that 
spatial extension is essential to, i. e. is immanent and peculiar 
to, both 
red-ness and green-ness. Thus, essence is not just generality 
but also 
exclusivity, that. is red-tress belongs to all red objects and to them alone. 
It cannot be predicated of non-red phenomena, even though they may share 
other common features with red objects. Thus the statement that essence 
is that which is common to all objects belonging to a particular category, 
cannot be reversed, as Wittgenstein does, into the claim that all things 
which are common to members of a category constitute the essence of that 
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category. This was noted by Husserl early in his career when he 
distinguished between all A's; A's in general; essential A. The 
exclusivity of essence, as well as establishing the inappropriateness 
of the inductive method as a means of revealing essence, has a further 
important consequence in that it demonstrates the inappropriateness of 
any attempt to reveal essence by a simple inspection of objects. This 
is so because it is not possible to set about looking at objects in order 
to find out what is not there, so as to exclude such objects from the 
essential category without first grasping the essence or idea itself. 
This reveals the correctness of Husserl's claim that essences are first 
grasped as ideas, that the idea is the pure realisation of essence and 
that only when this has been achieved can we recognise the essence in its 
various realisations. That is, we must know the essence before we can 
expect to recognise it. Hence Wittgenstein's procedure by which he 
denies the existence of an essence of game-ness would not be possible 
unless he had an idea of what game-ness was in order to identify 
particular games as being games, on which identification rests the 
appropriateness of his argument. 
It may have been this consideration which prevented Wittgenstein 
from jettisoning the idea of essence completely for he is unwilling to 
admit that our group concepts are arbitrary. Such a position would in 
fact undermine his argument against essentialism which isLnsed on the 
claim that a study of the nature of games reveals the non-existence or 
unknowability of essence. If group concepts were arbitrary then 
conclusions derived from their use would be equally arbitrary and 
Wittgenstein could therefore not claim a definitive or binding status for 
his denial of essentialism which would have to be recognised as based on 
arbitrary concepts. At this point the essentialist could refute 
Wittgenstein's argument by claiming that his failure to grasp the 
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essence of games is a consequence of his admittedly inadequate conceptual- 
isation of the idea of games. Thus Wittgenstein claims that although 
there are no essences that there are family resemblances between phenomena, 
"series of similarities and relationships" 
(3g) 
. This is supposed to 
indicate the absence of one trait linking members of a conceptual group 
and to advance the idea that there are a series of overlapping similarities. 
Expanding the analogy Stegmuller states that "Some members of (a human 
family) resemble each other in figure, others in the shape of the nose or 
the colour of the eyes, others in gait, temperament and so forth 
* 11 
(31) 
This clearly reveals, if unintentionally, the weaknesses of Wittgenstein's 
position for we do not identify Sally and Billy Jones as being members of 
the same family because they are both cross-eyed but because we believe 
them to have an origin which is not shared by non-members of the family, 
that they are, in this sense, exclusive. Therefore, if family resemblances 
are asserted to exist between the members of a concept group, these 
resemblances being similarities, then the resemblances must be peculiar 
to members of that group. If we find a phenomenon which is placed outside 
the group which possesses these resemblances then we must include it 
within the family. The admission of this poiht reveals that there is 
no difference between the ideas of essence and family resemblances, except 
for clarity. That, like essence, family resemblance is the means of 
identifying phenomena and of placing the boundaries between one type of 
phenomenon and another. Indeed, the only major difference would appear 
to be that Husserl identifies single essences whereas Wittgenstein sees 
family resemblances as multiple, but our conception of phenomena as 
eidetic complexes would indicate that Wittgenstein simply lacks the 
clarity of vision to distinguish between independent qualities given in 
* This indicates Wittgenstein's equation of essence with perceptual 
traits, not ideal qualities as Husserl insists. 
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the one appearance, and thus he tends to confuse qualities given in this 
way. Further there is clearly an assumption of single essence or 
definitive quality in Wittgenstein's account for the family does not 
in fact consist of all phenomena which share the resemblances. Thus 
Wittgenstein distinguishes between card-games, ball games, board-games 
etc. as part of his argument that games are various and cannot be reduced 
to one quality. This argument depends on the presence of differing 
characteristics within games e. g. balls, cards, boards. However, a 
workman clocking-on uses a card, is he playing a game? A demolisher 
may use a ball to knock down a house, is he really playing bowls? A 
butcher cuts meat on a board are we to say that this is a game, like 
someone playing monopoly? We'would suggest that these activities would 
not be included in the common-sense notion of games nor does Wittgenstein 
himself include such acts but on Wittgenstein's account there is no 
justification for omitting them. If concept groups are made up of 
family resemblances, then these activities should be included because 
they do resemble games, they use balls, cards and boards. It may be 
argued that these activities are excluded because they do not use the 
right sort of equipment that is, they do not use game-balls, game-cards, 
game-boards. This reversal of the Wittgensteinian mode of expression 
("card-game" to "game-card") reveals that his argument is based on the 
implicit assumption that "card" etc. qualify "game", that is, reveal 
alternative aspects of games. However, the postulated answer to our 
criticism has to explain the exclusion of certain uses of cards, boards 
and balls by recognising that 'game' qualifies all these terms. That is, 
the idea' of game determines whether or not certain cards or uses of cards 
can be included in the family of games and thus we are brought back to 
the idea of essence. That is, it is not the card-ness of cards that 
identifies them as belonging to games but the game-ness of certain cards. 
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It may be argued that we have erected a feeble counter-argument to our 
position but it is difficult to see how Wittgenstein could justify the 
exclusion of the cases cited above from the family of games without 
invoking the idea of the quality or essence of games. Thus, we conclude 
that Wittgenstein destroyed a straw-man idea of essence, only to re-admit 
the idea of essence into his theory but under a different name, that of 
"family resemblance". We would also see Wittgenstein's lack of clarity 
concerning essences, even in their re-admitted disguise, as the product 
of the inadequate, groping nature of eidetic perception typical of the 
naive attitude which thus points towards the rigorous clarity of the 
phenomenological method. The argument that this unclear perception is 
a more genuine perception repeats the fallacy of confusing vague perception 
with the perception of vagueness which was noted above. Thus 
Wittgenstein's denials of essentialism are shown, on critical analysis, 
to be indicators for the need, even within Wittgenstein's argument, of 
the phenomenological method. 
There remains one objection to phenomenology to consider before the 
discussion of the problem of intersubjectivity. Like so many others 
this problem originates in phenomenology's supposed mysticism and 
alienation from. the real world; this problem is the alleged anti-scientific 
nature of phenomenology. 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE 
Husserl's anti-psychologism has been noted but this was principally 
a logical contradiction of epistemological theories derived from 
psychology and should not be interpreted as a denial of the validity 
of psychology, if properly constituted. This qualification refers to 
Husserl's opposition not to science as such, but to its naturalistic 
prejudices, although North American phenomenology has tended to adopt 
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a less critical attitude to naturalistic science(32). Thus it is 
necessary to distinguish between science as an ideal for Husserl, the 
quest for reliable knowledge, and naturalistic science as currently 
practised and understood. Husserl criticised naturalistic science 
because of its inability to reflect on its procedures by its own methods, 
its acceptance of the adequacy of sense perceptions and its taking for 
granted the availability of the phenomenal world, and its lack of 
relevance for everyday understanding*(33). Husserl recognised that these 
problems are not unique to science but apply also to common sense. 
However, so great was the cultural value of natural science, in Husserl's 
view, that the crisis in the reliability of the sciences, which he saw as 
caused by relativistic attacks, engendered a crisis in the whole of 
culture, particularly in relation to the creation of doubts concerning 
the reliability of knowledge and the adequacy of reason. Husserl 
believed that the crisis of confidence in science was a product of its 
own methods which while producing impressive results rested on insecure 
foundations chiefly due to its total reliance on sense experience, 
because the very concepts used by science e. g. causality and law, are not 
sensory phenomena and are therefore inaccessible to the method of 
natural science. As opposed to this type of science Husserl proposes 
the idea of eidetically grounded science, that is science rooted in 
reliable concepts achieved through the intellectual intuition of the 
epoche. This eidetic method is applicable to all experience not just that 
acquired through the senses. If positive science should attempt to 
deny the accessibility of non-sensory experience, in particular that of 
the world of concepts and meanings, it undermines its own procedure which 
relies upon concepts. Husserl sees the reliable eidetic procedure as 
restoring meaning to science by showing it to be rooted in meaning both 
* As has been seen this last is a criticism made of phenomenology itself. 
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in its use, of concepts and in its status as a cultural activity. Thus 
to attempt to, reduce cultural phenomena to natural events, as naturalism 
does, is to rob of-science of that which gives it meaning, in our 
terminology, significance, and which makes it accessible to human 
understanding 
(34). Thus, Husserl criticises natural science for its 
failure to reflect upon itself as a cultural activity, and the failure 
to appreciate its status as an act of human achievement involving co-oper- 
ation and interaction with other subjects. That is, the natural 
scientist never regards himself-as part of his scientific problem. 
In asserting the inadequacy of natural science and its need to be 
grounded in eidetic knowledge Husserl is not advocating that phenomenology 
replace science, but merely that phenomenology can establish adequate 
concepts for the use of the sciences and can also reveal the range of 
possibilities, or the ontology, of the phenomena which science studies. 
Phenomenology does this by establishing the area of non-contradiction in 
the being of the phenomena in terms of which the science classifies 
itself as the. study of such and such. Thus empirical or natural science 
would be seen as the investigation of a particular mode of the realisa- 
tion of the pure possibilities of a general realm of being, that of space 
and time and, we would add, thereby it is not divorced from the studies 
of different modes of realisation within the same realm. Thus Husserl 
claims that "nothing can occur within the existential sphere that is 
essentially excluded by the structure of the essences particularised 
therein and ... that everything happening within 
the empirical sphere 
must happen as postulated by the structure of these essences as its 
necessary consequences"(35)" It must be understood that, as the 
reference to pure possibilities shows, this is not an attempt to construct 
the world a priori but rather it is an attempt to clarify what is, what 
is possible and what is impossible, is. contradictory. The function of 
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empirical science is to investigate the realisation of these possibilities 
through appropriate procedures by relying upon the eidetic grasp of the 
phenomena in question. Thus empiricism is not the method of all science, 
only of those sciences which deal with that which is given in spatial 
extension. Thus Husserl denies the unity of science in the sense of 
uniformity of method, claiming that different phenomena must be apprehended 
by methods appropriate to each. Husserl does accept the unity of science 
in the sense of the common goal of all methodologically distinct 
sciences which is the absolute apprehension of phenomena. Thus the unity 
of science is the ideal or goal of the quest for and utilisation of 
reliable knowledge and as, in Husserl's view, only phenomenology can 
provide reliable knowledge, the unity of science, the truly scientific .a 
method in general is the method of phenomenology. However, we have noted 
previously that this is not an argument that science be replaced by 
phenomenology but that its initial grasp of its subject-matter be grounded 
in phenomenology. It is on the basis of this argument that Husserl iden- 
tifies phenomenology as scientific philosophy ie. as that philosophy 
which realises the scientific ideal. Thus, in Husserl's view natural 
science is not scientific enough because it is content to rest on 
unquestioned assumptions'whose reliability it cannot guarantee. This 
indicates Husserl's occasionally confusing use of the term "science" 
*. 
Possibly in order to win respect for phenomenology Husserl defines its goals 
as the goals of science and then criticises the empirical sciences for 
failing to live up to the scientific ideal of phenomenology. That iss 
Husserl wishes to establish a scientific philosophy and thus terms the 
philosophy which he develops, "scientific". In so far as empirical 
science has reliable knowledge as its ideal Husserl's word-juggling is 
confusing but does not compromise his argument. However it is unclear 
Husserl, at one point, goes so for as to describe the empirical sciences 
as "rigorous sciences" PHILOSOPHY AS STRICT SCIENCE op. cit. p. 144. 
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whether Husserl is asserting that empirical sciences do have reliable 
indubitable knowledge as an ideal or whether they should have it as an 
ideal. In his early works, especially philosophy as Strict Science 
(36) 
Husserl is concerned with establishing the non-universality of naturalist 
methods and the possibility of reliable knowledge, At this stage he 
attempts little more than to remove psychology from the sphere of 
naturalism and re-establish it as a genuine study of consciousness. Thus, 
in what was the immature or undeveloped stage of his philosophy, Husserl 
seems to see phenomenology as only an adequate psychology. However, by 
the end of Husserl's career in It Crisis"(37), phenomenology has been 
established as providing reliable knowledge as such about the nature of 
phenomena in all spheres, not just psychology. Naturalism, in so far 
as it involves assumptions about the nature of reality, is no longer 
seen as appropriate to physics but not psychology, it is simply wrong, and 
the quest for reliable knowledge has been elevated to the status of a 
cultural imperative. Thus, whether natural science has the ideal of 
reliable knowledge or not, in the view of the later Husserl it should 
adopt this ideal and the method of realising it, which is phenomenology, 
in order to fulfill its cultural-historical role and in order to preserve 
it from relativistic assaults. 
Husserl opposes the scientific ideal to the pursuit of wisdom or 
practical knowledge declaring them to be irreconcilable and a similar 
development to that noted above in relation to the idea of science is 
shown in Husserl's thought in this respect. Thus in "Philosophy as 
Strict Science" he sees wisdom and the scientific ideal as equally valid 
aspects of culture which imply each other and therefore neither should be 
excluded from culture. Thus the choice as to which of these the 
individual follows is free and a matter of temperament. However, 
Husserl also claims that the absence of a scientific philosophy in our 
culture has led to the devaluation of theory, the scientific ideal of 
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truth in itself. Therefore, the choice between wisdom and science is 
said to be free but only adherence to the scientific ideal is justifiable. 
This is shown in Husserl's assertion-that we must not sacrifice the future 
to a specious solution of the problem of knowledge in the here and now 
because this problem is rooted in science and can only be overcome by 
science which alone "bears the stamp of eternity"(38). The priority of 
theory over practical wisdom becomes more pronounced in Husserl's later 
works such as "Cr isis"( 
) 
and the Vienna Lecture(40) in which theory is 
asserted as the value of our European culture, Europe's major contribution 
to mankind, the content, unifying feature of European history. The loss 
of the theoretical impulse is said to be responsible for the loss of 
direction in our culture and the emergence of aberrant destructive forces. 
The loss of faith in science, that is, the loss of faith in the possibility 
of true knowledge, and the victory of relativism would be fatal for 
European culture. It is therefore necessary in Husserl's view to pursue 
the scientific quest with utmost vigour. 
We are not primarily interested in the adequacy of Husserl's 
teleological account of European culture but in his separation of theory 
and practise which although initially seen as complementary are increasingly 
viewed as oppositions. 'It is noticeable that the gravity of this 
separation developed in step with the increasing idealism of Husserl's 
philosophy indicating his difficulty in coming to terms with the everyday 
world despite his use of the concept of Lebenswelt*. This has serious 
implications for Husserl's idea of the role"of phenomenology for if practise 
and theory are so distinct 'it is difficult to see how phenomenology, as 
theory, can ground the particular sciences which, despite Husserl's 
sleight of hand re-definition of the science, are frequently concerned with 
the solution of practicality defined problems. It should also be noticed 
re below chapter three. 
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that Husserl contradicts himself in his claims for the priority of theory 
for these claims bra justified on practical grounds, in particular the 
need to preserve the value of European culture. Thus, Husserl's message 
is clearly, commit oneself to eternal truths and not immediate practical 
problems, seek absolute not merely useful, knowledge; adopt the theoretical 
scientific attitude because our present practical interests require it. 
Thus, Husserl cannot avoid assuming the harmony of theory and practise but 
his increasing idealistic separation of theory and practise, essence and 
fact, prevented him from being able to establish their inter-dependance 
and this failure undermines phenomenology's claim to ground the particular 
sciences. Our revision of phenomenology will seek to show how this 
inadequacy derives from the failure to clarify the relationship between 
object and essence and will also suggest how this dichotomy can be over- 
come. 
Husserl recognises the objection that his idea of science and 
philosophy makes it irrelevant to everyday life, that it is an appeal to 
the ivory tower(39). However, he avoids rather than answers this 
objection by claiming that it is appropriate to false rationalism which 
absolutises its imperfect approximation of the ideal of absolute 
knowledge, adopts a'naive objectivism and which accepts the naturalis- 
ation of the human spirit. As is clear from our criticisms of Husserl's 
idea of science his account is more vulnerable to the charge of 
irrelevance than he is willing to admit. Again we see Husserl's tactic 
of avoiding difficult. problems in his philosophy by deflecting the 
criticism onto another target. Thus a criticism against phenomenology 
is not considered but is turned into a problem requiring a 
phenomenological solution. 
The reference to naive objectivism and the naturalisation of the 
human spirit raises a further criticism which Husserl levels against 
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natural science and this is its inability, consequent on these 
inadequacies, to account for the subjectivity which achieves science and 
which is based in the taking for granted of its surrounding world; "In 
so far as the intuitive environiig world, purely subjective as it is, is 
forgotten in the scientificthematic, the working subject is also forgotten 
and the scientist is not studied"(40). Thus, Husserl is pointing to the 
importance, in any attempt to understand science, of the realisation 
that although it may believe itself to be objective and d©-personalised, 
it is really an intersubjective achievement. Further, science is carried 
out within the background of the taken-for-granted assumptions of the 
wider culture and thus Husserl ssees science as incomplete due to its 
unexplored horizons and unclear theories. However, in Husserl's view, 
science is distinguished by the existence of a doctrinal core for each 
science to which all must adhere without room for private opinions and to 
the extent that such opinions exist the science in question is not 
established as such but is in the process of becoming a science* 
(41) 
This raises the problem of the nature of science as a cultural 
phenomenon which Husserl discussed at greatest length in "Crisis". In 
Husserl's view natural science derives its hypotheses from the Lebenswelt. 
that is, the world of everyday life which is the "horizon of all meaning- 
ful induction"(44) and is, therefore, always an approximation to an 
unrealised ideal. In the course of its development natural science has 
forgotten its dependence on the Lebenswelt or life-world and substituted 
for it the mathematical idealisations of science and this has caused 
science to lose its meaning both for itself and for everyday life, 
including the everyday life of the scientist. Being thus divorced from 
the source of their meaning, we would say significance, the value of 
Husserl's anticipation of Kuhn(42) is very noticeable in this idea. 
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scientific accomplishments become opaque and thus we use science without 
really knowing why we do so. 
* Thus, "(Natural) scientists do not see 
that from the very beginning they necessarily presuppose themselves as a 
group of men belonging to their own environing world and historical 
period ... they do not see that in pursuing their aims they are seeking 
a truth in itself, universally valid for everyone"(45). Several import- 
ant points emerge from this statement. Firstly, Husserl criticises 
natural science for not being sufficiently rigorous, for not being 
scientific enough in questioning the source of its ideas and thus it is 
found to be in the contradictory situation of being a culturally specific 
activity which nevertheless claims a universal, or cross-cultural, 
adequacy for its conclusions. Secondly, that as Husserl accepts the 
possibility of truth in itself it follows from his statement above that 
this truth cannot be equated with any one particular cultural formation 
as of right; that truth in itself must transcend cultural boundaries. 
Finally, the idea is proposed that natural science cannot become a genuine 
science until it is able to reflect on its own procedures in an adequate 
fashion, that is, until it is able to grasp itself as an intersubjective 
process. It therefore follows that if phenomenology is to ground the 
particular sciences it must be able to provide a means of achieving this 
reflective grasp and that, therefore, it must be able to establish inter- 
subjectivity. If it cannot do this; if, like all previous idealisms, 
phenomenology is locked in the individual subject, then, in its own terms 
of what is necessary for an adequate grasp of knowledge, phenomenology 
will have to be judged as a failure. This reveals that the resolution 
* It could be argued that Husserl's attempt to establish science on 
totally reliable conceptions of being is equally divorced from the life- 
world but a full consideration of this criticism requires a clarification 
of Husserl's varying use of the idea of the Lebenswelt and this will be 
carried out in relation to the discussion of the problem of inter- 
subjectivity in the next chapter . 
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of the problem of intersubjectivity, the establishment of knowledge 
which is seen to be knowledge for all subjects and not just for the 
reflecting ego, is the critical test of phenomenology's adequacy. This 
test is engendered from within phenomenology as a necessary consequence 
of its claim to ground all knowledge for all subjects in indubitable 
reliability. If it cannot establish intersubjectivity then, in its own 
terms, phenomenology is as naive as the naturalism which it criticises in 
contemporary science. 
Before considering the crucial problem of intersubjectivity it is 
necessary to summarise Husserl's view of science. It is clear that 
phenomenology makes no attempt to usurp science but sees its function as 
enabling science to attain the goal of reliable knowledge by providing it 
with adequate concepts which express the nature of the objects of scient- 
ific enquiry. Phenomenology thus aims at enabling particular science to 
conform its procedures to the nature of its subject matter, that is, its 
mode of being given to consciousness, rather than forcing all phenomena 
into the strait-jacket of naturalism. Nevertheless Husserl maintains 
the ideal of the unity of science but bases this unity not on the 
procedures of naturalism but on the scientific idea of rigorous knowledge 
which he sees as achieved through the phenomenological method which 
reliably establishes the nature of all data. This considerably widens 
the scope of science which, in its phenomenological form would no longer 
mean the study of objective, quantifiable nature but would refer to any 
enquiry directed towards the acquisition of reliable knowledge. The 
procedures used by such enquiries would not be right or wrong according 
to their conformity to naturalistic methods but would be appropriate or 
inappropriate in terms of the nature of their subject matter and thus 
no single procedure could claim to be the only one compatible with the 
idea of science. Further Husserl demands that as part of its scientific 
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role, science should reflect upon its own status as a culturally 
defined, intersubjective activity, and the implication of this in our 
view, is that science should attain such awareness in order to transcend 
its cultural limitations so as to establish genuine universal truths in 
which all cultures could participate in terms of their particular 
perspectives. Thus, Husserl is anti-scientific only in the sense that 
he believes that contemporary empirical science cannot realise the 
scientific ideal but he asserts this ideal as a prime cultural value. 
However we reject completely the idealistic conception of knowledge 
which some commentators and perhaps Husserl himself have supported as 
this leads to a denial of the independence of objects and to a loss of 
that very objectivity. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the 
effect of Husserl's idealism on the possibility of realising the scientific 
ideal which Husserl seeks by divorcing ideas from objects. 
HUSSERL'S IDEALISM AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL 
Lauer(cllarly states the idealistic view that as objects only become 
objects through acts of consciousness that the natural sciences are 
dependant on the psychical world. We reject this idea because it confuses 
empiricial and transcendental consciousness and it also implies a 
psychologistic reduction of knowledge which Husserl rejected totally as 
contradictory and destructive of all knowledge. Equally such a position. 
commits the error of which Husserl accused naturalism, that of violating 
the self-nature of phenomena by imposing one procedure on all enquiry 
regardless of its adequacy as judged by the nature of the object of enquiry. 
The statement that everything is "spirit" is just as cavalier in its 
attitude to the nature of the self-givenness of phenomena as the state- 
ment that everything is "nature". It is judicious to emphasise Husserl's 
own statement that "a thing is what it is and it remains in its identity 
for ever; nature is eternal"(47). Nevertheless, Husserl's later 
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philosophy is increasingly idealistic and having realised that to know 
a thing is to possess it in consciousness he made the illogical jump to 
the idea that things have their being only in consciousness. Thus, 
pure consciousness is said to constitute its objects, thus Husserl ignores 
the self-evidence of objects which is their being other than consciousness. 
This idealism has two sources in Husserl's work. Firstly his failure to 
clarify the relationship between ideas and objects while still retaining 
the objective quality is. the being other than consciousness, of objects 
and his concentration on acts of consciousness to the exclusion of objects 
of consciousness. Secondly, he never broke completely with his early 
allegiance to psychology. In Philosophy as Strict Science, he presents 
phenomenology as a means of purifying psychology, turning it into a genuine 
study of consciousness by purging it of its dependance on physics. 
Therefore he presents the psychical world as radically different from 
that of nature, tending to see the latter as fixed, objective and as 
consisting of intersubjectively available phenomena as opposed to the 
privacy of the world of consciousness. This would limit phenomenology's 
relevance to psychology because of the latter's peculiar problems e. g. the 
presence of intentional phenomena in consciousness but not in nature. 
Thus in this early pronouncement of psychology's independence of physics, 
Husserl also declares physics independence of phenomenology; contradictorily 
Husserl wishes to see phenomenology as the ground of all sciences. It 
would seem that the only way Husserl believed he could redeem this 
situation was to declare that in so far as the natural sciences deal in 
ideas and concepts their activities are "spiritual" but in Husserl's 
hands this tends to overcome the naturalisation of spirit by spiritualising 
nature. Despite the perpetual concern with the problems of intersubject- 
ivity, culture and history from "Ideas" onwards, the failure of Husserl 
as we shall see, to establish intersubjectivity led him into further 
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idealism, despite the use of a vague notion of culture or Lebenswelt, 
and with it further one-sided concentration on conscious acts. Thus, 
although in "Philosophy as Strict Science" Husserl uses contemporary 
psychology as an instance of inappropriate naturalism, in his later work, 
"Crisis", he attempts to-ground the study of consciousness as the basic 
science. Although Husserl is in this context referring to the pure 
consciousness of the Transcendental Ego his failure to clarify this idea 
leads to an easy confusion with empirical consciousness and thus implies 
the kind of psychologistic reduction of knowledge which he himself 
deplored. It must be clearly recognised that Husserl remained 
implacably hostile to psychologism and totally dedicated to the ideal 
of absolute knowledge throughout his intellectual career in phenomenology. 
The point which we are making is that principally through his failure to 
establish intersubjectivity as a datum of pure consciousness, Husserl was 
not able to ground the idea of intersubjective achievement which he saw 
as a necessary part of an adequate grasp of the attainment of knowledge. 
As a consequence the cognitive subject in Husserl is effectively isolated, 
the Lebenswelt or culture is simply a host of identical subjects, ego 
writ large. This coupled with the ambiguities of Husserl's idea of 
conscious constitution and lack of clarity concerning the distinction 
between empirical and transcendental consciousness means that his later 
work in particular* is open to psychologistic interpretation although it 
is certain that Husserl would not have accepted the ualidity of an 
understanding of his work as psychologism. Thus Husserl fails to 
establish within phenomenology that which he sees as necessary for the 
development of true science, that is intersubjectivity as a reliable 
*It should be noted that the book in which Husserl discussed science at 
greatest length, "Crisis", was incomplete and unrevised at the time of his 
death and was never intended by Husserl to be published in its present 
form. It is therefore possible that the ambiguities and problems to 
which we have referred would have been clarified by him in the final 
version of the book. 
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datum. This failure results in a growing idealism in his work and a 
concommitant separation between fact and essence, phenomena and ideas. 
In our discussion of the major criticisms levelled against 
phenomenology it has been found that most of these are misplaced and 
reflect an inadequate grasp of phenomenology. However, in the course of 
the consideration of these criticisms, three major problems were located 
in Husserl's philosophy. These are, the need to clarify the relation- 
ship between object and consciousness and the devising of a language 
which can convey phenomenology's insights into the nature of being. The 
need to clarify the nature of transcendental consciousness and its 
relationship to empirical consciousness and finally the problem of 
acquiring intersubjective knowledge in the sense of knowledge about other 
subjects and knowledge which is seen to be for other subjects and is not 
private knowledge restricted to ego. 
The first two have been discussed as problems in phenomenology 
and our solutions to these problems will be advanced in our revision of 
phenomenology. It is therefore necessary to consider the adequacy of 
the criticism concerning intersubjectivity, which is that phenomenology is 
solipsistic and cannot establish intersubjectivity and, in relation to our 
principal interest, this means that phenomenology is irrelevant to 
sociology(48)0 
* re the discussion of transcendental consciousness in chapter one. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIUITY IN PHENOMENOLOGY 
This chapter is concerned with the problem of intersubjectivity in 
phenomenology and will examine this problem in the context of the 
following issues; 
1. A consideration of the vulnerability of phenomenology to the 
charge of-solipsism which will be found to be justified. Throughout 
these discussions solipsism will be seen as a special case of the problem 
of the relationship between consciousness and objects. The origins of 
phenomenology's solipsism will be located in its idealism and in 
particular in the inadequate notion of conscious constitution. 
2. This will be concerned with Husserl's understanding of the 
problem of solipsism, his implicit recognition of the inadequacy of 
transcendental idealism and a critique of his conception of intersubject- 
ivity and of certain sociological uses of this conception. 
3. An account and critique of Husserl's attempts to realise 
transcendental intersubjectivity within the solipsism of the epoche. 
Arguments will be advanced as to why this attempt fails and it will be 
shown that Husserl's "phenomenological" constitution of intersubjectivity 
is in fact based on naive assumptions originating in the natural attitude. 
4. Husserl's final attempt to resolve this problem was through the 
concept of the Lebenswelt or life-world. This idea will be considered 
and found to be inadequate on the grounds that Husserl is not consistent 
in what he intends by the idea of Lebenswelt; that the idea is a mystified 
conception of culture, and that it presumes but cannot establish inter- 
subjective understanding. It will be seen that Husserl's idea of the 
Lebenswelt is not phenomenological but naive. 
Thus, we conclude that Husserlian phenomenology is solipsistic, that 
it cannot establish intersubjectivity but that this inadequacy reflects 
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not on the phenomenological method but on the naive attitude which 
informs Husserl's solutions. We will also note the assumption of a 
common world which is seen by Husserl as a necessary requirement in 
establishing. intersubjectivity. Therefore, Husserl's failure is not a 
failure for phenomenology and leaves open the possibility of a genuine 
phenomenological grasp of intersubjectivity. 
5. We will conclude. this chapter by developing the idea that 
Husserl's attempt to establish intersubjectivity within the epochs is 
naive in a discussion of the inadequacies of naive methods of gaining 
knowledge of others. This will lead to a consideration of the 
inadequacies involved in basing sociology on such methods. This will 
point to the contents of the next chapter which is concerned with a 
critique of extant attempts to establish intersubjectivity in the specific 
context of it being a problem for sociology. 
The intellectual point of contact between phenomenology and sociology 
is to be found in the problem of intersubjectivity. This is so because 
it is the basic problem for them both. It has been seen that 
phenomenology must establish intersubjectivity in order to justify its 
claims to universal and not just personal adequacy. Sociology, at least 
that aspect of sociology variously termed Verstehende or interpretive, 
which seeks to understand social action, must be able to claim reliable 
status for its statements concerning others in order to demonstrate, 
firstly, that when a claim is made concerning reasons for acting this 
can be seen to be the actor's reason and not the sociologist's reason 
and secondly, that the conclusions of interpretation must be communicable 
to the sociologist's audience in such a way that the Content of this 
communication is not distorted. Thus two stages of communication are 
involved, between the actor and the sociologist and between the 
sociologist and his audience. The adequacy, and indeed possibility of 
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such communication is dependent on the establishment of the possibility 
of adequate intersubjective understanding. This chapter will limit 
itself to a consideration of the adequacy of Husserl's phenomenology to 
establish intersubjectivity for if intersubjectivity can be established 
as a reliable datum within the phenomenological epochs, interpretive 
sociology can achieve the adequate intersubjective knowledge which it 
presumes by basing itself on the procedures of phenomenology. 
Our enquiry into phenomenology's ability to establish intersubject- 
ivity as a reliable datum will be an examination of the commonly held 
view that it fails in this respect and that the phenomenological method 
is necessarily solipsistic and has no relevance for sociology(1). 
1. PHENOMENOLOGY AS SOLIPSISM 
Phenomenology's vulnerability to solipsism is said to be a 
consequence of the method of reduction 
knowledge, taking it out of the public 
is declared absolute within the sphere 
knowledge is impervious to contradictii 
but the price of this immunity is that 
valid for the self alone and therefore 
which increasingly privatises 
sphere. This means that knowledge 
of the isolated ego. Thus this 
on or dissent from other subjects 
all knowledge refers to and is 
it is inaccessible to others in 
that it is not their knowledge nor can such knowledge tell us about 
others in themselves, it can only inform the ego how he perceives others. 
Even this limitation is generous to phenomenology for it has to be 
recognised that the only consciousness of which the phenomenologist can 
be aware of within the reductions is self-perceiving or Transcendental 
consciousness from which other empirical consciousness are excluded and 
therefore he cannot conclude that others are conscious subjects. Thus 
Husserl asserts that pure consciousness is not open to scientific inter- 
subjective verification(2). This may refer simply to the inappropriateness 
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of naturalistic methods but the reference to intersub. jective verification 
indicates Husserl's belief that the grasp of reliable data is a private 
matter, that only the individual is implicated in the apprehension of such 
knowledge. According to Nakhinikian(3) Husserl seems to have reasoned 
as follows, the world can only be thought of as being constituted by the 
Transcendental Ego's intentional acts, therefore nothing can exist unless 
it is independant for its existence on the transcendental self. A 
similar point is made by McSweeney 
(4) 
who-states that Husserl "moved to 
idealism by making things relative to consciousness. If nothing can be 
conceived except as an object of consciousness, the object itself must be 
constituted by consciousness". The isolation of the Transcendental Ego 
would appear to be confirmed in Husserl's(5) claim that "I, the Transcen- 
dental Ego, am prior to everything worldly. I am the It namely, in whose 
conscious life the world is first of all constituted ... as Transcendental 
Ego I constitute the world, myself and other selves". * Thus, Husserl and 
his interpreters oscillate between two apparently opposed positions, that 
the Ego is isolated and that Ego is inclusive of all phenomena including 
other selves. The opposition is merely apparent for the consequence of 
is the same; 
both positions/ that the Ego knows only itself and thus solipsism is 
inevitable whether it be of the modest form which admits the unknowability 
of other selves or the grandiose version which denies the otherness of 
other selves, seeing them as expressions of ego's self. It is therefore 
necessary to clarify the idealism at the origin of these positions and in 
particular the idea of constitution. This occurs in an unclarified form 
in all the cited references to the isolation of the Transcendental Ego. 
Thus Lauer6gwho espouses the radical idealistic interpretation of 
phenomenology dismisses the possibility of arbitrariness in the isolated 
Transcendental Ego's grasp of objects, including other selves, as a mere 
feeling, but he has to admit the existence of a problem concerning the 
* Our Italics. 
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constitution of other selves. He argues that objectively valid 
cognitions are compelling for any subject and therefore transcendental 
subjects whose cognitions are necessarily objectively valid, must agree. 
This argument does not follow from Lauer's idealistic account of 
subjective constitution which, like that of Husserl, can establish only 
the'subjective necessity of cognition. Lauer identifies proper thought 
with rational thought but if such knowledge is to ground intersubjectivity 
it is necessary to demonstrate that proper thought is universal 
rationality and Lauer cannot do this without abandoning the subjectivism 
which derives from his idealistic interpretation of phenomenology. Lauer 
in fact does abandon his position, without admitting it, by a subtle 
change in his use of the term objective which in his account of the 
relationship between thought and object means that which is constituted 
in consciousness. In the discussion of intersubjectivity, however, 
Lauer adopts a more usual understanding of objectivity as meaning that 
which originates outside consciousness and is equally available to all 
subjects. The contradictory nature of these alternative usages indicates 
Lauer's failure to resolve the idealist's problem of how to explain the 
possibility of perceiving other selves, by definition outside our 
consciousness, if all things have their being only in consciousness 
*. 
Thus, his statement that Husserl's later philosophy is more radically 
subjective but also more radically objective is meaningless due to 
Lauer's varying use of"objective". Indeed, Lauer admits that 
phenomenology, as he understands` it, began as a search for objectivity 
and has simply defined as'objectivity that which it found and, as a 
consequence, expresses fears that phenomenology may have lost a genuine 
*A traditional idealist's solution is to posit a Transcendental Subject, 
God, who has all things permanently in consciousness and, therefore, 
all things exist as objects in the mind of God, but this does not help 
us to understand how we, as mundane creatures, can perceive selves 
outside our consciousness, as being outside our consciousness. 
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contact with reality and thus "essential" may mean nothing more than 
hypothetical. 
A similar solipsistic idealism is expressed by another phenomenologist, 
Kockelmanh?; who terms questions implying the resolution of the apparent 
gulf between self and its objects as transcendental questions which can 
be asked only after the performance of the reductions in which we become 
aware of the pure ego which constitutes all Being in itself, every Being 
having its own mode of constitution. Therefore every form of transcend- 
ence is an immanent characteristic within the sphere of pure ego and 
therefore every Being falls within my transcendental subjectivity which 
constitutes all Being in itself. There is, therefore, no realm of 
Being outside consciousness and therefore an outside of consciousness is 
nonsensical. 
This re-introduces the concept of constitution which in all its noted 
usages is involved in a logical fallacy out of which the idealistic 
position develops. The lack of clarity in the idea of constitution 
means that statements such as those by Nakhnikian, McSweeney, Husserl and 
Kockelmans can be understood in two ways. Firstly as assertions that 
objects depend for their existence on consciousness. This idea, which 
is particularly marked in Nakhinikian is fallacious in that it confuses 
knowledge of Being and knowledge of existence for the Being of a thing is 
its nature, existence is an accident of Being that is, it is a possible 
mode of particularised Being. To assert that things have their Being 
constituted by consciousness or'are known in consciousness in no way 
requires that their existence or non-existence be dependant on conscious- 
ness. Thus Nakhninikian et al make an illogical inference from Being to 
existence in asserting the existential dependence of objects on 
constituting consciousness. However it is possible to challenge the 
claim that the Being or nature of phenomena is constituted by consciousness, 
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in the sense of being dependent on it if alternatively we understand by 
constitution the apprehension of objects by consciousness. To argue 
that the Being of objects is constituted by consciousness ie. created by 
it involves the denial of that which is assumed in the statement that 
objects are objective, that is are other than consciousness. If objects 
were constituted in consciousness, in this sense, there could be no 
possibility, as Kockelman's notes, of perceiving things other than 
consciousness but all these arguments assume that there are such objects. 
That is, they accept that there are objects as part of an argument that 
there cannot be objects. Thus, Husserl's assertion that the I, the 
Transcendental Ego constitutes other selves, if constitution is understood 
in this idealistic sense, is nonsense for if it were true there could be 
no idea of other selves and if the being of other selves is admitted then 
they cannot be constituted by "I". An alternative understanding of 
constitutive consciousness is that consciousness which apprehends objects 
as they are through being in direct contact with its objects. Indeed, 
if this were not the state of constitutive consciousness it is difficult 
to see why Husserl repeatedly insists on the sharp division between it 
and the empirical consciousness of the natural attitude*. Similarly 
Kockelmans in the statement above, compromises his idealistic position by 
admitting, after claiming that consciousness constitutes all Being in 
itself, that every Being has its own mode of constitution. 
' That is, 
conscious constitution conforms to the nature of Being, therefore it would 
be contradictory to claim the dependence of Being on coonsciousness. The 
contradictions of idealism can be avoided if we perceive that 
"constituted by consciousness" should be replaced by the idea of objects 
apprehended in consciousness-and that pure consciousness is the reliable 
* As will be shown below the idealistic position criticised here develops 
out of the inadequacies of natural attitude perception and is, therefore, 
naive. 
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apprehension of objects including the acts of mundane consciousness that 
every mode of Being is constituted by, that is consists of, its peculiar 
qualities. Admittedly this argument re-opens the problem of the 
relationship between objects and consciousness which will be considered 
below, but it is clear that the idealistic solution, increasingly 
favoured by Husserl, which resolves the problem by abolishing objects 
makes solipsism inevitable, that is, the denial of other selves. 
There is a final argument deriving from the idealistic position; if 
idealism is wrong how can we account for the apparent dependence of 
objects on consciousness for their meaning? That is, the meaning of 
objects is peculiar to their relationship to consciousness, and thus it 
would seem that objects have no meaning other than as conscious objects. 
This problem can be resolved by reference to our distinction between 
meaning and significance and a clarification of the act of knowing. 
The meaning of a thing is its nature which is the object of all positing 
acts of consciousness and thus the act of knowing is the act of grasping 
this nature. That is, meaning is not imposed on objects by consciousness 
but is immanent to the object. The apparent dependance of objects on 
consciousness is a product of judgements of the significance of objects, 
the value of the object for the conscious subject. The failure to 
appreciate the distinction between meaning and significance which results 
in the denial of meaning, leads to the impression that objects are what 
consciousness makes them to be, hence the idealist position. The 
inadequacy of such a position is shown by the fact that all judgements 
concerning the significance of objects assume meaning ie. they assume 
that the object has a quality which is of value and that the judgement of 
significance is thereby justified. Thus ideas concerning meaning, the 
nature of things, are a pre-condition of significant judging and once 
this distinction is grasped the idealist's perception of objects as 
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dependant for their sense on consciousness is seen to rest on an 
inadequate understanding of the act of coming to know objects as distinct 
from grasping their value. This error is typical of the naivo, natural 
attitude which, as has been seen, is oriented to practicality, which class- 
ifies things according to their value and which takes their meaning of 
phenomena for granted. This kind of criticism is indicated in Kohler's 
statement that the view which sees the epistemological subject as the 
sole substantive being, which is therefore responsible for the existence 
of all objects and all others, is mistaken because, phenomenally, there 
is no such entity since, "the phenomenal self is decidedly not felt to 
be responsible for the existence of its objects"(8). The significance 
of this feeling in resolving the problem of intersubjectivity will be 
considered below but it is necessary to consider the objection that our 
criticism of Husserl's supposed solipsism is misplaced because the subject 
of the knowing act in Husserl's analysis is certainly not the phenomenal 
self, nor is it everyday consciousness, it is the Transcendental Ego. 
It must be recognised that Husserl's notion of the Transcendental Ego is 
unclear and certainly as Husserl discusses it it seems to be no more than 
a purified version of individual empirical consciousness. As such it 
seems as incapable of explaining how we can step outside the island of 
consciousness and thus is unable to account for the beliefs that our 
positing acts can have objective significance and that we can grasp the 
existence and nature of other conscious subjects Similarly Schmitt 
(9) 
declares that the Transcendental Ego is rooted in the discovery that 
whatever has sense or meaning has it for me and that the reduction is 
called. transcendental "because it uncovers the ego for which everything 
has meaning and existence". This brief statement reveals not only the 
solipsism associated with the Transcendental Ego but also the confusion 
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of meaning and significance, being and existence noted above. The 
privacy of the Transcendental Ego is perhaps inadvertently asserted by 
Welch(lo) indicating once again the idea that the reductions especially the 
transcendental reduction, are an increasing retrebt within the isolated 
subject, a retreat into solipsistic subjectivity. A novel feature of 
Welch's account is his claim that transcendencies are public and do not 
belong to any particular ego but this indicates that immanence is private. 
We would argue that as a consequence of this assertion essences, the immanent 
contents of phenomena and the basis of all reliable knowledge, must be seen 
as private matters and thus the isolation of the ego is made inevitable - 
for we would not be justified in assuming that our eidetic perception is 
shared by other selves. The adequacy of Welch's account of the claimed 
publicity of transcendencies will be discussed later but the crucial point 
deriving from his argument at this stage is that because phenomenology sees 
eidetic perception as solely and totally reliable, that if it is to establish 
intersubjectivity as a reliable datum it must first establish the publicity 
of essence, that is, that there is not my eidetic intuition and your 
eidetic intuition but our eidetic intuition. This would also require a 
similar revision of the idea of the Transcendental Ego which, as will be 
seen, Husserl perceives as a purified empirical consciousness. Thus there 
are for Husserl as many Transcendental Ego's as there are individuals. If 
essences are public or universal and are the contents of transcendental 
consciousness, it is necessary to establish the universality, as opposed to 
individuality, of transcendental consciousness and it cannot therefore be 
regarded as merely a purer empirical consciousness. 
'Schmitt, in fact, refuses to accept the solipsistic implications of this 
view but he` merely asserts that the "critical detachment" of the 
Transcendental Ego involves taking the other's point of view and he seems 
to be supporting an empathic interpretation of our knowledge of others 
which will be discussed below, re chapters 4,5 and 6, 
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2. A CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY'S INTERSUBJECTIVE NATURE 
Husserl seems to have recognised this need for in Crisis(h1)he states 
that the accomplishment of the intentional grasp of an object is inter- 
subjective, the syntheses of accomplishment overlap intentionally and are 
"interwoven to form a universal unity of syntheses". Similarly he states 
that "every entity that is valid for me and every conceivable subject as 
existing: in actuality is thus correlatively - and with essential necessity - 
an index of its systematic multiplicities"(12). These statements are opaque 
although the suggested inter-relationship between validity and intersubjectivity 
will be a central feature of our phenomenological establishment of inter- 
subjectivity. It is clear however that Husserl is claiming intersubjective 
validity for eidetic perception, although it is not clear whether by inter- 
subjectivity Husserl means a shared accomplishment, the product of agreement 
between subjects or that which is universally and consistently available to 
all subjects . Whatever interpretation is put on Husserl's idea of inter- 
subjective constitution it fits uneasily with. his previous idea of subjective 
constitution and the tension between these two ideas is clearly revealed in 
Husserl's subsequent discussion. Thus, he states on the one hand the 
solipsistic position of transcendental phenomenology to the world, "whose 
(13) 
true being I know through my own cognitive structures". Alternatively, 
in an ambiguous statement, he claims that through the eidetic method alone, 
"the great task can and must be undertaken of investigating the essential 
form of the transcendental accomplishments, that is, the total essential 
form of transcendentally accomplishing subjectivity in all its social forms 
It should be noted that here also Husserl asserts rather than establishes 
intersubjectivity and he freely admits that a consequence of the epoche is 
to transform all objectivities into subjectivity. 
* Our Italics. 
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Nevertheless Husserl claims that in the transcendental attitude the 
world, and we understand this to include other selves, is seen only as 
correlate of those subjective acts through which it attains its changeable 
but unitary sense but, further, the subjective acts in which the world 
is constituted can themselves become the subject of eidetic enquiry. This 
latter claim raises a serious problem for the subjectivist idealistic view 
of knowledge which Husserl is clearly supporting at. this point; how can such 
a conception of cognition meet the demand to make subjectivity itself the 
object of knowledge? In advancing this goal Husserl is positing the 
possibility of going beyond subjectivity but then what is it that is prior 
to subjectivity? In Husserl's view this beyond is "Universal subjectivity 
(which is) nothing other than mankind"(15). This statement is significant 
in showing Husserl's recognition of the necessity of intersubjectivity as 
a requirement to make sensible his account of subjective knowledge. It 
should also be noted that this statement achieves the required intersubject- 
ivity only by an illogical leap from a purely subjective consciousness from 
which all attitudes concerning other selves should have been eliminated. 
Indeed, Luckman(16) criticises Husserl for attempting to maintain ideas of 
human-ness within the epochs, these being in Luckman's view mere socio- 
historical constructs, although as will be seen Husserl does exclude 'human 
being' from the realm of pure consciousness. 
Husserl considers this paradox in the idealistic position but only in 
relation to the problem noted above of how consciousness can be both subject 
and object in relation to the world. Husserl responds to this problem in 
two different ways in Crisis, Firstly by claiming that the epoche transcends 
the subject-object distinction by revealing the transcendental subject-object 
correlation which leads to our awareness that the world takes its meaningful 
being from our intentional life through a priori acts of accomplishment. 
This argument persists in the idealist framework and simply repeats the 
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problem and reveals the confusion of meaning and significance by simply 
asserting but not demonstrating a subject-object correlation in transcendental 
consciousness. Husserl's second approach to this problem clearly identifies 
it as the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity, who are "we" 
who constitute the world but are not ourselves constituted phenomena? Thus 
Husserl recognises the need to raise constitutive acts to the level of a 
problem by identifying a pre-constitutive being and this effectively denies 
the total adequacy of his idealistic position because he is attempting to 
uncover a realm of being'which is not ideally constituted, which is prior to 
all acts of conscious constitution in order to question and grasp such acts. 
As Husserl wishes to claim reliability for certain constituting acts, those 
carried out within the transcendental epoche, this pre-constitutive realm 
must also be unquestionably reliable. In so far as Husserl suggests, as 
above, that this is an intersubjective realm we agree with him as will be 
made clear below. However, Husserl encounters a number of difficulties in 
this respect for he asserts, pace Luckmann, that "human being" is a 
constituted phenomenon which as such acquires meaning only by reference to 
correlative intentionality and therefore has no place within the epoche and 
therefore nothing human is to be found within pure consciousness. This 
argument is a non sequitur because even if it is accepted that "human being" 
is a constituted idea it would be incorrect to infer without further 
question that this was all that could be intended in the notion of human-ness 
for it is possible that our ideas of human being are particularisations of 
a quality of human-ness which possesses being independently of our ideas. 
In other words Husserl should not have stopped at the particular idea of 
human being but should have considered further what is meant by being human, 
by human-ness in general, but his persistence with the idealist framework, 
even when attempting to transcend it, prevents him from conceiving of a 
category of humanity which although available to knowledge does not depend 
for its sense and meaning on conscious acts. 
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Thus Husserl, despite his affirmation of intersubjectivity, is 
forced to see world-phenomena within the epochs as exclusively mine, 
disregarding the contradiction that this implies a me who is human although 
everything human has been excluded. Therefore Husserl states that the 
epochs "creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the 
(fundamental 
methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy" 
This may seem like an attempt to make a virtue out of necessity and it 
would be accurate to term Husserl's approach to phenomena as methodological 
solipsism. This reveals a contradiction between Husserl's methodology and 
epistemology for as we have seen Husserl claims intersubjective validity 
for reliable knowledge although the method used to acquire such knowledge 
is solipsistic. 
THE NECESSITY OF GENUINE INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL's PHENOMENOLOGY 
It was possibly the awareness of this problem in his philosophy which 
resulted in Husserl's claim that although the residue of the transcendental 
epoche is the "I" for which the world has meaning this does not deny the 
notion of transcendental intersubjectivity as constituting the world for 
all, such that the Transcendental Ego, "starting from itself and in itself ... 
constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity to which it then adds itself 
as a merely privileged member, namely as 'I' among the transcendental 
others"(18). This statement is merely a glib assertion which, transforms 
'I' as central subject into 'I' as peripheral subject through the acts of 
the same II'. This formula simply assumes that which it should demonstrate, 
namely, the accessibility of others, which given its isolation is something 
which the Transcendental Ego cannot achieve. However, the situation 
described by Husserl, that of the perception of 'I' as one among a community 
of other 'I's, is, once established, the situation in which intersubjectivity 
can be perceived as a possibility. 
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Husserl attempts to justify his argument by analogically relating 
the process of constituting other *I's to the act of constituting a past 
"I" in memory, despite the fact that Husserl frequently asserts the non- 
apodictic nature of memory and that he wishes to establish transcendental 
intersubjectivity a priori. In fact the phenomenon of perceiving self as 
object or as an other can be interpreted as an argument against Husserl's 
belief in the inevitability of methodological solipsism since such an act 
implies a stepping out of the "I" perspective. That is we assume our 
ability to regard critically our ego's acts as it were from outside, which 
raises the question that if what we step into in such acts is not "I", what 
is it? However Husserl's failure to overcome the solipsism of his method 
renders nonsensical his assertion that "Only by starting from the ago and 
the system of its transcendental functions and accomplishments can we 
methodically exhibit transcendental intersubjectivity and its transcendental 
communalisation ... 
(and) the correlation between the world and transcendental 
subjectivity as objectified in mankind"(19). However, we note again 
Husserl's recognition of the need to establish transcendental inter- 
subjectivity as a community, a harmony or inter-relatedness of "I's". 
Further, Husserl recognises a problem in his use of the term mankind. 
Does it, he asks, include children and lunatics? Once again it is 
possible to discern the consequence of attempts to derive the world from 
self-rknowledge which is the portrayal of the world and its subjects as an 
expansion of self and its objects*. Why should Husserl select children 
and lunatics as being beyond the pale of mankind if not because it is these 
two groups which he as an individual living in the everyday world finds 
most difficulty in understanding, that is, difficulty in seeing their 
behaviour as basically similar to his behaviour. Despite his recognition 
of the need to establish intersubjective communality Husserl is prevented 
* This consequence is particularly clear in Schutz, re below chapter 5. 
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from achieving a clarification of this idea, other than as constitutions 
of ego-consciousness, due to his assertion that the self-evidence of ego 
is such as to make absurd any attempt to enquire beyond it, It should 
be noted that the claimed priority of ego in relation to intersubjectivity 
is a mere unexamined assumption which will be challenged in our attempt to 
establish intersubjectivity as a phenomenological datum. 
The extent'of Husserl's commitment to the ego-perspective can be 
judged in his statement that "I conceive of the world as it has meaning 
for me ... To consider the world, that is this one which with its concrete 
meaning has value for me, in a purely subjective way, means indeed to go 
back on my subjectivity" 
(20) 
. Husserl further makes it clear that he is 
not only asserting that the "I" is real but that knowledge of things out- 
side "I", including other "I's" is unreliable. Thus the realisation of a 
reliable foundation for knowledge which is the goal of phenomenology, refers 
only to "I"-consciousness. Husserl is aware of this solipsistic tendency 
which he attempts to counter by completing the statement above, thus, 
"I ask how all these manifold experiences of our consciousness of the world 
meld into the unity of a common achievement by which, across multiple 
subjective (elements) a unity of one supposedly objective thing is found and 
by which, universally speaking, a unity of one objective universe 
continuously manifests itself"(21). Husserl is advancing here a slightly 
different notion of the nature of intersubjectivity to those considered 
above and namely this is that intersubjective unity is created out of sub- 
jective awareness, and that intersubjectivity is an achievement of 
individual subjects. Thus Husserl sees subjectivity as preceding inter- 
subjectivity. This may seem an obvious and uncontroversial idea but our 
clarification of intersubjectivity will be based on a direct challenge to 
the adequacy of this assumption. It is also noticeable that Husserl 
grants only a supposed objectivity to the contents of intersubjectivity 
and this raises a problem in that the higher epistemological status granted 
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to objectivity as opposed to subjectivity is not based properly on the belief 
that objectivities are more reliable because they are "out there". In order 
that things out there be known it is necessary that they become things "in 
here", that is, contents of consciousness. The claim to the greater 
reliability of objectivity is based on the idea that these phenomena are 
available to others in the same mode as they are available to I, that is, 
such phenomena are intersubjectively accessible. The co-relation between 
objectivity and intersubjectivity will be developed below but our criticism 
of Husserl's denial at this point of full objectivity to the contents of 
intersubjectivity shows that his stbtement would make sense only if a 
distinction can be made between a true intersubjectivity, that which unites 
all subjects into a community of ego's, and contingent intersubjectivity 
which is either the generalisation of ego, or the accidental coincidence 
of separate subjectivities. As will be seen Husserl understood inter- 
subjectivity in the second sense, in which case our taken-for-granted 
confidence in the adequacy of our knowledge of others is simply irrational. 
This idea results in the precarious view of intersubjectivity and social 
action which has been seized upon by some social phenomenologists and 
ethnomethodologists(22) as the distinctive feature of our knowledge of 
others. We do not deny that there is risk-taking and unpredictability in 
everyday interaction but this raises a problem concerning the statements of 
those who accept the inevitability of the precarious vision for it is clear 
that they present such statements for others edification and that such 
statements are presented as an account of "how it is" or at least "how it 
is for me". Indeed it is difficult to visualise statements which did not 
presume that the audience will understand them as intended by the speaker, 
* We are not arguing that intersubjective agreement is equivalent to truth 
but that the true should be intersubjectively accessible in our first sense 
of the idea of intersubjectivity. 
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but how are we to explain such naive faith concerning the possibility of 
understanding in the behaviour of those who assert the precariousness of 
interation? *- If interaction is necessarily risky and if our knowledge of 
others is unreliable what is the purpose of creating semblances of order, 
comprehensibility and reliability in our statements about the nature of 
precarious social life; would not gobbledygook, the random election of words, 
be just as adequate? Indeed would not the necessary consequence of such 
belief be silence, an admission of the unreliability of our attempts to be 
comprehensible-to others? Thus the very activity of the upholders of this 
view presupposes that precariousness is expressible in a non-precarious 
fashion and we see that this view falls prey to the contradictoriness of all 
relativisms, that of having to assert what it ostensibly denies. However, 
it is not enough to criticise the adequacy of the perception of social 
life as precarious for risk-taking, mistakes unfounded assumptions are 
part of this life. It is therefore necessary to ask how, if St U19 the 
naive faith of the upholder of this view in the adequacy and comprehensibility 
of his utterances can be justified and this is the major task of our 
revision of phenomenology below. 
The final point on this subject must be considered and that is the 
argument that reliability in social life is a product of that life itself, 
that in the process of interaction, interaction itself is made reliable. 
This, of course raises the problem of how such interaction originates, 
what is the philosopher's stone which takes the dross of isolated 
individuals and turns them into the gold of persisting communities? If 
interaction is unreliable how can it create reliable interaction? One of 
* The argument that intersubjectivity is possible because we simply learn 
about other people in interaction, or that we learn the rules of interaction 
is inadequate because we are able to learn in the first place only because 
intersubjectivity is possible ie. learning is based on the existence of 
intersubjectivity, therefore learning processes cannot be seen as the 
genesis of intersubjectivity, although it could be argued that inter- 
subjectivity is fulfilled in social learning. 
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the few theorists to attempt to resolve this problem was Schütz who 
postulated that certain assumptions are held by all social actors which 
permit action to take place and this argument will be considered below, 
although to anticipate certain of our conclusions, the existence of these 
assumptions does not explain their effectiveness. That is, there must be 
conditions-as a consequence of which the naive assumptions of everyday life 
may have the effect of furthering rather than preventing the continuity of 
interaction. 
The discussion has, up to this point, been a consideration of the 
tendency to solipsism in Husserl's philosophy which we identified as a 
consequence of his idealism, -and ä further consideration of the necessity of 
the establishment of intersubjectivity in this philosophy. We also 
noted the conflict between Husserl's methodology and epistemology as 
resulting from this solipsism. Finally there was a preliminary consideration 
of Husserl's understanding of intersubjectivity from which conclusions were 
drawn towards critique of certain. trends in contemporary sociology. It is 
therefore necessary to complete this section by an enquiry into Husserl's 
attempts to overcome solipsism through the establishment of intersubjectivity 
as a phenomenological datum in which particular attention will be paid to 
his concept of the Lebenswelt. 
3. THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL's PHENOMENOLOGY 
The problem of the establishment of intersubjectivity is particularly 
acute for Husserl since he perceives a multiplicity of Transcendental Ego's, 
each "human being bears within himself a transcendental "I"(23) and this 
raises the problem of how one Transcendental Ego can constitute other self- 
contained Transcendental Ego's. It should also be noted that Husserl's use 
of the term Transcendental Ego makes it equivalent to "self" and thus is a 
mystifying term which hides the probability that Husserl's account of the 
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epistemological relationship between subjects is based on common-sense 
conceptions. The importance of the problem of intersubjectivity for 
Husserl is indicated by Lauer(25) who points out that in Husserl's later 
work he sees intersubjective constitution as the ultimate foundation of 
universal objectivity. It is noticeable that in the discussion of natural 
science in the Vienna Lecture Husserl uses intersubjective and objective as 
synonymous terms such that our intersubjective being is the ever present 
horizon of all our perceptions. This is in marked contrast to Husserl's 
earlier position, noted above, where intersubjectivity was denied the 
status of full objectivity. There is a clear tension between this idea of 
the role of intersubjective constitution and Husserl's practise of regarding 
the isolated cognitive subject as the locus of reliable knowledge. This 
can be attributed to Husserl's failure to establish inters u: bjectivity. 
The initial major attempt by Husserl to resolve the problem of inter- 
subjectivity was contained in the second and third volumes of Ideas and a 
measure of his discontent with the outcome of this work can be judged by the 
fact that these volumes were not published during Husserl's life-time. 
However these volumes and the relatively brief, fifth Cartesian meditation 
are the sum total of Husserl's attempts to establish the reliability of 
intersubjective knowledge. After the Cartesian Meditations Husserl took 
for granted the possibility of an intersubjective world, the Lebenswelt, 
which became the leading concept of the socio-historic studies of Crisis 
and the Vienna Lecture. However, as will be seen, Husserl's failure to 
establish intersubjectivity as a reliable datum had the result that the 
idea of Lebenswelt was equivalent to common-sense naive, ideas of culture, 
an assumed common world in which others are believed to be the same as I. 
This latter idea is seen by Schütz as the basis of Husserl's grasp of 
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the process of intersubjective understanding*. Husserl's position is 
inadequate because it does not tell us why we recognise others as being 
like "I" when in many respects they are not, for example we can see the 
differing physical attributes and readily discern the differing attitudes 
of others. It could be argued that this is so because we could imagine our- 
selves behaving in the same way as these others but this does not explain 
how we justify the denial of the status of self to a moving tree a running 
dog etc., especially as in some animistic cultures the idea of self-hood 
is attached to such phenomena. 
However a more interesting idea advanced by Husserl is that of the 
communicative common environment which is established in the "personalistic 
attitude" to others. This means that intentionality is seen as bestowing 
meaning bn environmental objects thus what is seen as causal in the 
naturalist scheme is replaced by a system of motivations. Ego finds other 
subjects in its environment who are referred to the same objects as ego. 
Nevertheless this idea does not help to resolve the problem of inter- 
subjectivity for it is clear that Husserl, as presented by Schütz, is 
claiming that the common communicative environment is the product of the 
reciprocal motivation and intentional acts of subjects who thus see each 
other not as objects but as consociates. Therefore in their interaction 
they achieve a community but this begs the question of how interaction is 
initally possible. Nor is it'clear at this point how Ego grasps the other 
as another self rather than as an object and there is an illogical jump 
from Ego's perception of the other as another self to Ego and alter being 
consociates for each other which latter uniquely implies the grasping of 
the other's conscious life. 
* It must be realised that the following consideration of Husserl's 
attempts to account for intersubjectivity with the exception of references 
to the 5th Cartesian meditation are based on Schutz's commentary on Ideas 
Vol. II and III because these latter books which contain Husserl's major 
enquiries on this subject have not been translated into English. 
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Certain assumptions contained in Husserl's argument must also be 
noted. Firstly he sees intentionality as bestowing meaning on objects 
thus overlooking the distinction between meaning and significance. The 
consequence of Husserl's view is, as has been seen, the perception of 
objects as dependant on consciousness from which position solipsism 
becomes inevitable. Also it will be noted that Husserl unquestioningly 
accepts that ego-consciousness precedes intersubjective awareness and 
although this belief may appear obvious it is our contention, and the 
basis of our attempt to establish intersubjectivity phenomenologically, 
that a reliable knowledge of others is possible only if we challenge this 
common-sense idea. Finally, it is necessary to note that the common-ness 
of the communicative environment is simply asserted and indeed Husserl's 
attempt to establish intersubjectivity is fallacious because intersubject- 
ivity is assumed as part of the argument. 
If it is asserted that our grasp of others cannot be denied it is 
only necessary to point out the possibility that we interact with our 
idea of others, our self-projected image. It is sionificant that in 
common with many theorists Husserl assumes that in order for our 
perception of others to be seen to be genuine it is necessary that we 
admit the existence of an environment shared by self and other. Further- 
more if this environment is to permit the genuine grasp of the other self 
then it must be the necessary condition and foundation of intersubjectivity. 
This is where Husserl and other theorists as diverse as Minch and Schutz 
fail, because they, accepting the primacy of ego-consciousness, see this 
environment as derived from interaction and located in everyday experience. 
As the status of interaction and our everyday belief in intersubjectivity 
is problematic such a derived, shared world must be equally problematic 
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and therefore cannot found reliable intersubjective understanding. Thus 
it is necessary to locate a common environment which is epistemologically 
prior to ego-consciousness. 
That this common environment is essentially assumed is recognised by 
Schutz(27) who states, "Nevertheless, the comprehension of the other person 
occurs merely by appresentation, everyone having only his own experiences 
given in originary presence (and each person sees the common communicative 
environment from his particular private world for) ... within the common 
environment any subject has ... his private world originally given to him 
alone". Thus our knowledge of others is indirect and this leads to 
effective solipsism for if it is claimed that I only have originary knowledge 
of myself and I therefore only know others as mediated by myself, and 
therefore I do not know others but only my mediation of them and thus my 
perception of others is a construct of self-recognition. This account 
also reveals the distinction between knowing that others exist and knowing 
the others as selves in their own right. 
Schutz's reconstruction of Husserl's argument in Ideas Vol. 2 emphasises 
this dilemma which inheres in any attitude, including common-sense, which 
sees ego-consciousness as primary. Thus the statement that relationships 
between the person and the environmental object (ie. other) is not a real 
but an intentional relationship is followed by the claim that the other is 
capable of motivating the subject of the private world. Therefore 
Husserl 
would seem to see motivation as a reaching out of one subject to another 
and the common environment contains the intended objects of a subject's 
social acts but the perception of the'act as social implies the prior 
apprehension of the other as a self and this account avoids the problem of. 
whether this environment is or could be actually shared with others. 
However this idea of the reaching out of subjects to each other is seen by 
us as containing evidence, that is a self-givenness, of the act of apprehending 
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other selves. This argument will be developed below in our notion of 
intrusion*. 
(l ) 
The apprehension of others is seen by Husserl as a process of 
empathy which "is nothing else but that form of apprehension which grasps 
(the others motivational) meaning"(28). It should be realised that this 
establishes empathy as a goal, the grasping of the other's mode of 
understanding whereas what is required of Husserl's account of inter- 
subjectivity. is a description of the method for achieving this goal. 
Husserl fails to do this for the methods which he expounds, and which are 
basically accounts of analogical inference, can tell us how we as naive 
individuals in the everyday world construct our ideas of others but not 
whether these ideas can grasp the other in himself or how it is possible 
that they could do so. Thus Husserl states that cultural objects, 
including others, are distinctive because they are perceived as things 
containing meaning but his failure to realise the distinction between 
meaning and significance results in his overlooking the crucial question 
of "what. meaning and for whom"? Do we see others as they have meaning for 
us, that is,, significance; or as they are in themselves, that is as quality 
or-true meaning? The uncritical nature of Husserl's notion of empathy is 
indicated when, after accepting that we grasp others as types, an idea to 
which we will return, he is said to state, "In terms of these typifications 
I comprehend the behaviour of my fellow. man and its motives. When I 
co-perform his acts in phantasy his motives become my quasi-motives and 
thus comprehensible. The Other's comprehensibly motivated spiritual life 
and its individual typical course, is, thus, apprehended as a variation of 
'29' 
my own spiritual life 41 Overlooking the peculiar idea of individual 
*(1) re below Chapter 7. 
*(2) Anyone surprised by the Schutzian turn of phrase must remember that 
this is Schutz's account of Husserl's theories of intersubjectivity. 
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typicality, this statement reveals the problematic consequences of relying 
upon an unmethodical idea of empathy. The crucial terms in this statement 
are "fellow man" and "co-perform"-because their use would be justifiable only 
if the problem of gaining knowledge of others in themselves had been 
resolved. Again, Husserl assumes what is to be demonstrated as part of 
the demonstration and thus overlooks the problem of how or if the other can 
become my fellow in such a way that I can co-perform his acts. The final 
sentence of the statement clearly reveals the solipsistic consequences of 
this procedure which solipsism takes the form of ego-aggrandisement. That 
is, the situation in which the other is seen as a variation of self which 
is, in effect, a denial of his distinctiveness, his other-ness. This 
results in the perception of the social world as being composed of nothing 
but "I" in various locations. 
There is however, one particular idea in Husserl's account which is 
an important pointer to our conception of a phenomenologically based grasp 
of intersubjectivity. This is the recognition that it is possible for us 
to step outside our self-identity as in situations when we imagine committing 
an act and yet not be able to imagine that we would, in fact, commit it. 
This is not a contradictory assertion for the first statement refers to the 
imaginative act and the second to the idea that the act contradicts my 
personal nature. This in effect contradicts Husserl's previous assumption 
that the other is seen as a variation of self for this phenomenon introduces 
the possibility of being other than myself in imagination. It is this 
facility of the natural attitude which we wish to clarify and make rigorous 
by asking why it is possible. Developing out of this enquiry we will need 
to ask into what perspective we step if-we succeed in abandoning the ego- 
perspective. Finally it will be necessary to describe the evidence, self- 
givenness, of this novel perspective and to show how it can be achieved. 
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The effect of this enquiry will be the establishment of the realm of 
intersubjectivity. * 
In Schutz's view, Husserl believes that the empathic perception of 
others, which we see as typical of the natural attitude, is not reliable, 
but he also claims that the sense of the world as determined by inter- 
subjectivity is preserved after the reduction. This could be so if we 
regard this intersubjective sense only as an object of attention, that is, 
we should recognise that the possession of this sense, in itself, does not 
justify an inference to the correctness of our intersubjective understanding. 
Thus, in terms of Husserl's egological understanding of the process of 
reduction, the only thing which could be preserved within the epoche is the 
conscious act of belief in intersubjectivity as the object of phenomenological 
clarification. But Husserl wishes to go further than the logic of his 
position will allow, for the idea of transcendental intersubjectivity means 
for him the post-reduction state in which; "the fellow-subjects who present 
themselves as transcendental in my transcendental life can be reached as 
transcendental fellow-subjects belonging to a transcendental We-community 
which also presents itself to me ... Transcendental intersubjectivity 
is 
thus the one in which the real world is constituted as objective, as 
existing for everyone"(30). It is noticeable that Husserl reverts to the 
usage of intersubjective as equivalent to objective but all that Husserl has 
achieved is a description of what a transcendental intersubjectivity would 
have to look like-and the account is unsatisfactory in that it contains certain 
unexamined assumptions, such as; the other is assumed to be my fellow and 
that he and I belong to a common community the existence of which is taken 
for granted. Husserl's reference to,, transcendental intersubjectivity 
suggests that this is a grasp of others which is achieved within the 
* This enquiry will be carried out below re chapter 7. 
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transcendental reduction and which is therefore an apodictic and reliable 
datum and undoubtedly this should be the aim of any phenomenological account 
of intersubjectivity. However, the use of the term does not make knowledge 
transcendental and the unreliability of Husserl's analogical method of 
apprehending the other and his acceptance of common-sense assumptions casts 
doubt on the transcendental status of his conclusions. Indeed, Hussarl's 
account of intersubjectivity is clearly rooted in natural attitude assumptions 
and thus he is unable to establish a genuine intersubjective knowledge and 
this also reveals that Husserl's failure is a reflection of the failure of 
common-sense to establish knowledge of others in themselves. 
Thus, Husserl cannot offer an adequate solution to "the painfully 
puzzling question of how another psychophysical ego comes to be constituted 
in my ego since it is, essentially impossible to experience mental contents 
pertaining to other persons in actual originarity"(31). It is important 
to note that even this basic question is framed on the naive assumption of 
the epistemological priority of the isolated ego in which grasping the other 
is seen as the incorporation of the other into my ego. There is never the 
thought that it is the maintenance of the idea of the priority of my ego 
which creates this painful puzzle. A critique of this idea will form 
the basis of our phenomenological constitution of intersubjectivity. Thus 
in both Ideas Vol. 2 and the fifth Cartesian Meditation Husserl seeks to 
establish intersubjectivity in the radical transcendental reduction which 
distinguishes between the empirical ego and the Transcendental Ego and 
which involves a, greater isolation of self from things external to it. 
The aim is to discover intersubjectivity within this egological sphere. 
The lack of clarity in Hussorl's notion of transcendental consciousness 
has been noted above as has the tendency to see it as merely a purified 
empirical consciousness but the significant aspect of this process in view 
of the present discussion is that Husserl seeks the transcendental grasp 
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of others by further retreat into the "I", "an abstractive suspension of 
other minds and of all those experiential levels of my world which originate 
from the belief in the existence of other minds"(32). It is almost 
inevitable from this that, as has been seen, others are perceived simply 
as variations of "I" despite Husserl's claim that this process leads to the 
expansion of transcendental subjectivity into transcendental intersubjectivity, 
the world for all of us prior to philosophising. We do not deny totally 
the value of Husserl's procedure for it is our conviction that transcendental 
consciousness, if properly understood, can provide the basis of reliable 
intersubjective knowledge and, as Husserl recognises as necessary, the 
establishment of the intersubjective world as prior to and the basis of 
adequate conceptualisation. 
The fifth Cartesian Meditation 
(33) 
offerslittle that is new compared to 
Ideas Vol 29 although unlike the latter it was published during Husserl's 
lifetime, The only major novelty in the Cartesian meditations that there 
is an expanded description of how the other is grasped in transcendental 
consciousness through the act of appresentation, apperceptive transfer or 
empathy; these terms being used intbrchangeably. Although Lauer 
(33) 
recognises that Husserl simply postulates the existence of such an 
experience and calls it empathy. That is, Husserl attempts to resolve 
this problem by giving it a name and calling it a solution because he 
needs to demonstrate an intentional experience oriented to the other's 
experiences. 
In the fifth Cartesian meditation the sphere of the pure ego is 
claimed to consist of awareness of my living body and its fields of 
sensation but that by an apperceptive transfer other objects are seen 
Within this fiold a other living bodies. This is said to be pairing 
between my primordially given living body and the non-primordially given 
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other in the unity of one consciousness. On the basis of this similarity 
there is a transference of sense in which the sense of my body is transferred 
to the other body. The basis of this argument is an identity between my 
experience of my own living body and my experience of another's living body 
but it is clear that my awareness of my living body is totally distinctive 
from my awareness of the other's living body. For instance I see the other's 
facial expressions but I do not see my own face, I can know what my bodily 
movements and expressions intend, I can only infer the other's intentions 
from his bodily movements. Despite his claim that this is an investigation 
of empathy, Husserl's argument is simply inference by analogy although as 
we will clarify below the empathy 
analogical inference*(') in terms 
other's experiences. Husserl's 
Evans-Pritchard(34) criticised as 
argument is no more satisfactory than 
of giving us reliable knowledge of the 
argument is fundamentally the idea that 
the "if-I-were-a-horse" type of 
anthropology and which, far from revealing the distinctiveness of the 
*(2) 
other, denies it, seeing the other self or as "self-over-there". 
Husserl's attempted solution thus reproduces the natural attitude assumption 
that for all significant purposes other is likeself. The use of the term 
significance indicates that the intention. of other-apprehension in this 
attitude is the realisation of a practical goal desired by self and not the 
reliable grasping of the other's experiences. The adequacy of other 
apprehension is therefore judged by its facility in aiding attainment of the 
desired goal and thus cannot guarantee the accuracy of our apprehension of 
the other in himself. It would also appear that Husserl's argument is 
contradictory for it accepts the established primacy of ego-experience and 
*(1) Although these positions are similar analogical inference is the 
belief that we identify similar movements to our own in the other and from 
this infer similar self-activity to ours by the other. Empathic 
projection is somewhat more sophisticated, the imaginative placing of self 
in what is seen to be the other's situation. 
*(2) Husserl denies that his argument is a case of analogical inference but 
there seem to be no grounds. for his objection. 
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then denies this view in accounting for our knowledge of others, by 
asserting that the non-primal experiences of the other's living body and my 
own living body are given in the same way. 
It could also be argued that Husserl's account does not explain why 
this transference of sense is denied to animals etc. and it could be in 
anticipation of this objection that Husserl states that for the appresentation 
to endure it must be confirmed by further appresentations provided in 
congruent behaviour. This however seriously undermines Husserl's case 
for it reveals the supposedly transcendental constitution of the other to 
be a mere hypothesis. Thus Husserl has simply discovered the naive belief 
that the other is self-if-I-were-in-the-other's-position but is totally 
unable to establish this belief as anything other than a hypothesis. In 
view of the fact that this idea, termed by Schutz the "reciprocity of 
perspectives", plays such a large part in Schutz's analysis of social 
understanding, it is significant that he describes this process as "neither 
explained nor intelligible"(35). This is particularly important as he seems 
to adopt this idea from Husserl's work in a concentrated but unmodified form 
with the exception that Schutz recognises what Husserl does not, that this 
idea is naive not transcendental and apodictic. However, as will be seen, 
Schutz proves as incapable as Husserl of progressing beyond this point to 
the attainment of reliable intersubjoctive knowledge. 
Husserl's account of the process of apprehending others' experiences 
can be criticised on the grounds that the inclusion of such assumptions as 
congruence implies pretypification according to social standards which 
should have been bracketed. Husserl also makes a further unjustified 
assumption that all other correlates of the other are given with the 
appresentation of his body. The existence of these assumptions, the 
arbitrary limitation of the apperceptive transfer, the use of arguments 
based on empathy or analogical inference and, finally, the failure of 
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Husserl to establish intersubjectivity as an epodictic datum indicate 
that his account of intersubjectivity is not phenomenological but naive, 
that is, is based on natural attitude assumptions in particular the primacy 
of ego and the idea that other's are variations of self. 
There is one aspect of Husserl's account of intersubjective 
constitution which remains to be considered and this is his notion of a 
world common for all transcendental subjects. This notion eventually 
crystallised in the idea of the Lebenswelt or life-world but we intend to 
show this concept is simply an assumption of the existence of an 
homogeneous culture and it cannot be regarded as the level of transcendental 
intersubjectivity which is the necessary precondition of the possibility 
of culture. Further a quality of transcendental data or essences is 
their timelessness and unchanging nature. Cultural worlds are constantly 
changing and come into and fade out of existence and thus culture cannot be 
identified with the indubitable realm of essence. 
4. THE LEBENSWELT 
Husserl initially develops this notion in the context of his account 
of the personalistic attitude which constantly recreates the surrounding 
world by transformation 
subjects who are related 
Husserl avoids the probl 
not as another object. 
common surrounding world 
It-is at this point that 
of sense and in which world we encounter other 
to the same objects as ego, although once again 
em of why we see the other subject as a person and 
Thus Husserl claims that the existence of a 
leads to the existence of personal associations. 
we encounter a contradiction in Husserl common to 
all who attempt to ground intersubjective knowledge in culture; Husserl 
claims that this common surrounding world is based on "relations of mutual 
agreement" 
(36) 
and is relative to those who share it. Firstly it should 
be noted that the existence of a common surrounding world is simply asserted. 
If the presence and nature of such a world could be demonstrated as basic 
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then the problem of intersubjectivity might be open to resolution but 
Husserl's assertion of such a world and this inability to establish that 
it is (let alone what it is), is like solving a personal balance of 
payments crisis by forging money. Secondly, Husserl's account of the 
relationship of this world to subjects is contradictory because he asserts 
that the prior existence of such a world permits intersubjectivity and 
that this world is based on mutual agreement between subjects. That is, 
this common world is contradictorily claimed to be the prior condition of 
intersubjectivity and the product of intersubjectivity. Equally Husserl's 
attempts to ground communality on subjects' acts of reciprocal orientation 
suffers from the same defect, namely that it presumes prior identification 
of the other as another subject, which identification is, in Husserl's 
terms, possible only if communality has been previously established *. 
Finally, Husserl's account shows indications of cultural relativism which 
would undermine his insistence on the quality of universal truth as the 
hallmark of reliable data. After all these objections there remains the 
problem of establishing the boundaries of this common world. It is clear 
that this world itself is solipsistic. This is best demonstrated by 
considering a problem raised by Schütz, namely whether the epoche 
performing subject is isolated from other subjects in the performance of 
this act. He cites two comments by Husserl, separated by a number of 
years, in the earlier of which the epoche performer is said to be isolated 
but in the later version he is said to be involved in community with 
others. However this contradiction is merely apparent for it is clear that 
Husserl's community is solipsistic, thus he states "There belongs also, of 
course, the constitution of a philosophy common to 'all of us' who meditate 
* It will be noted that Husserl tends to confuse the problem of how we know 
the other to be a subject with the related but more intractable problem of 
how we know the subject's experiences. 
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together - ideally a single philosophic perennis(37). Thus the community 
which is 9chieved in this situation is merely the community of 
phenomenologists, that is, those who see as Husserl sees; those who are, 
in terms of the purposes at hand, indistinguishable from Husserl. Thus 
community means those who are similar to ego and only in so far as they 
are similar to ego. Thus the concept of community or common communicative 
environment which is supposed to ground intersubjectivity is itself 
solipsistic and cannot, therefore, contain within itself the possibility of 
intersubjectivity. 
Husserl's idea of the Lebenswelt or life-world develops out of this 
notion of community, although an earlier term used by Husserl Kulturwelt 
or cultural world gives a more accurate impression of the nature of this 
community. The change in terminology may be significant as the idea of a 
cultural world reveals problems of relativism and boundary-setting which are 
avoided although not resolved in the innocuous term life-world. Unfortun- 
ately Husserl's most extensive consideration of the nature of the life- 
world is contained in the fragmentary "Crisis" in which Husserl states as 
his aim the formulation of "a radical reflection on the great task of a 
pure theory of essence of the life-world"(38). In the introduction to 
this work Carr notes that Husserl's use of the idea of the life-world 
oscillates between identifying it with culture or with a pre-culture which 
is not merely pre-theoretical but also pre-predicative. However Husserl's 
frequent references to scientific discoveries becoming integrated into the 
life-world are not consistent with the idea of its pre-theoretical status. 
Neither of the ideas is fully acceptable within Husserl's philosophy 
because the identification of lebenswelt and culture opens the possibility 
of cultural relativism, whereas the idea of a pre-predicative life-world 
suggests that it precedes conscious life and this conflicts with Husserl's 
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idealistic notion of consciousness constituting all phenomena. Thus 
Husserls claim that the lebenswelt is "pre-given as existing for all in 
common" 
(39) 
could be understood as a description of a naive assumption or 
as an assertion of the actual nature of the life-world, 
In a direct reference to the epistemological status of the life- 
world Husserl states that it is "the constant ground of validity, an ever- 
available source of what is taken for granted to which we, whether as 
practical men or as scientists lay claim as a matter of course" 
(40). 
Here Husserl equates "valid" with "taken-for-granted" and thus would seem 
to be referring to naive everyday validitK in which case the adequacy or 
total reliability of the life-world is thrown into question. This 
interpretation is supported by Husserl's statements concerning the need to 
make the life-world a subject of investigation, which requires that there 
be a stance prior to the life-world in terms of which this world is made 
problematic. Husserl's contradictory position is indicated in his 
statement that the life-world is investigated by placing oneself in it 
which insofar as this implies commitment to the life-world would seem to 
make impossible the perception of the life-world as a problem. This also 
implies the abandonment of Husserl's previous injunction to be a disinterested 
spectator in relation to the life-world. 
Further Husserl implies an identity between the lebenswelt and the 
realm of essence when he claims that the lebenswelt furnishes, through its 
invariant essential types, all possible scientific topics(41). A 
consideration of the claimed relationship between science and the lebenswelt 
reveals clearly the contradictions in this concept. Thus Husserl declares 
that the life-world cannot be revealed by natural science but that it is 
verified in experience* for "is not the life-world as such what we know 
* This experience is said to be subjective-relative which would seem to 
undermine the universal applicability of the lebenswelt as world for all 
which Husserl claims for it. 
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best, what is always taken-for-granted in all human life, always familiar 
to us in its typology through experience"(42). If this is so it is not 
clear why phenomenology is needed to reveal this world. However, when 
Husserl identifies the life-world with pragmatic interests and claims that 
its assessment of adequate verification is in terms of these interests, 
it would seem that the life-world is the practical, naively understood 
world of everyday life or culture. Thus, if Husserl is to be consistent 
with his demand for reliable knowledge he must regard the clarity and 
obviousness of the life-world as merely apparent, but there is no statement 
by him to this effect. Indeed, in developing the idea that the lebenswelt 
is subjective because it is experienceable, Husserl states it to be the realm 
of original self-givenness, the thing itself given in intuition to which 
primary intuition all modes of verification lead back, which would identify 
the lebenswelt, not with the taken-for-granted world, but with the apodictic 
basis of all knowledge, the realm of essence or transcendental consciousness. 
It is clear that Husserl never intended transcendental consciousness and the 
naive attitude of everyday life to be identified with each other as is 
testified by his persistent criticism of naivety. Thus in order to 
contrive consistency in Husserl's idea of the life-world both in its usage 
and in relation to his philosophy as a whole, it would be necessary to see 
the life-world as the world of everyday experience and as the world wherein 
we encounter phenomena but do not grasp them in themselves and thus it is 
outside the phenomenological epoche. Therefore, this world, which is the 
ever present horizon of everyday perception, is naive in that it consists 
of taken-for-granted, unquestioned assumptions concerning the nature of the 
phenomena and the relationship of the cognitive subject to the contents 
of the Lebenswelt. 
Attention has been drawn to the problem of the relationship of the 
Lebenswelt to the everyday conception of culture, whether it is equivalent 
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merely to an unexamined idea of culture or whether it refers to something 
which precedes culture. The latter view is indicated in Husserl's 
critique of science as practised by people who belong to a particular 
culture and time and yet believe that they seek universal truths 
(43) 
6 
This implies the distinction between cultural and universal truths and the 
accessibility of these latter. The idea of a universal life-world or 
culture of mankind is indicated in Husserl's statement that we can trace 
history back in a never ending process to all peoples, eras and conditions 
"To an investigation of this type mankind manifests itself as a single life 
of men and of peoples bound together by spiritual relationships alone, 
filled with all types of human beings and of cultures, but constantly 
flowing into each other*". However it is clear that Husserl sees this 
universal culture in a purely temporal sense as merely a primitive 
historicity, the first "primitively natural form of cultures" 
(45) 
9 'a seed- 
bed out of which historical cultures have developed and from which derive 
their individual norms. Husserl does not demonstrate the actual historical 
existence of such a common culture and, more importantly, he does not 
explain how, granting that in our present condition the common-culture has 
been superceded, it is possible to explain cross-cultural understanding. 
Husserl does not doubt that we can enter sympathetically into alien cultures 
and that on achieving such entry we nevertheless perceive other cultures as 
being strange to us(46). It is not made clear how we can both sympathise 
with another culture and still see it as strange, nor does Husserl state 
how we are to distinguish between this genuine strangeness of the other 
culture and our failure to achieve sympathetic entry into it which would 
also result in the alien culture appearing to us as something strange. 
* The depiction of flowing of the universal culture is very similar to 
Husserl's account of the flowing of the conscious du ree 
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There is also a sense in which a universal life-world which 
permanently exists and is not limited to any historical epoch, is required 
in Husserl's philosophy because, as part of his critique of science, noted 
above, he demands that science be founded on the life-world, As has 
been shown, Husserl demands that science, in order to achieve its objectives, 
must be founded on essential, reliable knowledge, that is knowledge which 
is necessarily for everyone. If Husserl is to avoid making contradictory 
demands of science, for example that it be culturally specific and 
universally valid, and if he is to maintain, as he does, his belief in 
science as the quest for reliable, universal truths, then he must establish 
the lebenswelt as a world for all possible rational subjects. Expressed 
slightly differently the Lebenswelt must be established as the objective 
correlate of transcendental consciousness. 
The extent of Husserl's failure, to do this can be judged by the ease 
with which he identifies the lebenswelt with the idea of particular cultures 
or taken for granted worlds*. Thus, he terms this primitive historicity 
itself as a universal natural attitude, and therefore clearly perceives it 
as naive. This historicity, it is said, can be transformed into either 
higher level practicality, such as communal interests, or into the 
theoretical attitude, which is the quest for truth in itself. The idea of 
historicity being transformed into the theoretical attitude means that it 
is, in itself, distinct from the theoretical attitude and thus cannot be 
regarded as fundamental, for Husserl sees basic knowledge as the goal of 
theoria. Further evidence of Husserl's identification of the Lebenswelt 
with particular, non-fundamental, naive and changing cultures is to be 
found in his assertion that we perceive geometrical straight lines, "on the 
*A similar fault is to be found in Luckmann(48) who takes Husserl's 
argument to its conclusion and sees the apperceptive transfer applied to 
all ego's objects but then has to admit his inability to account for 
modifications of this transfer in varying cultures, that is why some 
phenomena are believed to be inappropriate objects for the apperceptive 
transfer. 
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basis of the life-world self-evidence of straight table edges and the like". 
In fact, Husserl could hardly have chosen a worse example for straight table 
edges are the product not the antecedent of the idea of straightness. The 
crucial point is that in this example Husserl is identifying the life- 
world with culture and its objects e. g. straight table-edges and the 
pursuit of this identity would result in cultural relativism. This, like 
all relativisms, would be subject to Husserl's own criticisms and as shown 
above would be an effective solipsism because accepting the sole knowability 
of his own life-world, ego could know others only in so far as they share 
that life-world. This is especially serious as it could be argued that 
we all inhabit uniquely individual life-worlds or cultures; that is, I could 
be said to belong to the Western European, British or academically mobile, 
Lancastrian ex-working class, Protestant culture. Further evidence of 
Husserl's occasional identity of lebenswelt and culture is shown by his 
admission that life-worlds vary and that our established fixed truths are 
not the same as those of Negroes, Congolese or Chinamen. 
(49 ) 
Although 
Husserl does not question either the adequacy of these categories or the 
problem of understanding other life-worlds if their established truths are 
not ours. It is important to realise that Husserl, is here using a device 
which is common to cultural relativists who wish to preserve the impression 
of reliability, albeit of limited scope. This is the presentation of 
the 
idea that there is "us" and then there are "others" like Chinamen etc. who 
are different to us. However, if we attempt to clarify the notion of "us" 
or cultural consociates, we find that it breaks up into, for instance, 
Protestants and Catholics, town-dwellers and countrymen, middle-class and 
working-class, male and female, young and old etc. and even these 
categories can be sub-divided, each category having its own established 
truths. This illustrates once more the effective solipsism of this 
position, "us" means "I" and those who in this respect are like "I". 
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Clearly the idea of lebenswelt as everyday culture does not require 
the epoche to reveal it nor is it necessary to undergo the "religious conversion 
of the transcendental reduction in order to grasp it. Indeed, the Lebenswelt 
as described here by Husserl is the world of common-sense, the world 
naively perceived before phenomenological analysis, the world of a taken- 
for-granted homogeneous culture in which it is assumed that "I" is the model 
for others. This is significant because, as has been seen, Husserl's idea 
of the lebenswelt arises out of his attempts to establish intersubjectivity 
within the epoche; the common-sense status of the lebenswelt indicates 
another failure in this respect by Husserl. 
However it has been noted above that Husserl seems unwilling to leave 
the notion of the lebenswelt at this culturally relative level and he does 
refer to a "universal life-world"(50) or life-world a priori but the nature 
of'this life-world is not clarified. Nor is it possible to see how it can 
be realised as Husserl advocates the same method for revealing this a priori 
life-world as for the particular life-worlds or cultures, as we have seen 
them to be. Thus there are two ideas of the life-world in Husserl, one 
universal and a priori the other identified with culture, and which is there- 
fore relative. It is clear that Husserl realised that in order to ground 
intersubjectivity phenomenologically he had to establish an a priori 
community of all possible subjects. However, every attempt which he makes 
to achieve this, results in the identification of this supposedly a priori 
world with an unquestioningly assumed homogeneous culture which is 
constantly changing, is relative, is not universal and presupposes but 
cannot create intersubjectivity. Thus the idea of the lebenswelt which 
Husserl develops contradicts all those features which must be demonstrable 
in an eidetic intersubjectivity which is'the necessary precondition of a 
reliable knowledge of others in themselves, It would be possible to 
regard Husserl's account of intersubjectivity as a description of the 
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perception of others within the natural attitude but this should be no more 
than a prologue to a phenomenological critique of the natural attitude 
which would result in the transcending of its limitations and the 
establishment of universally valid knowledge of others. However, Husserl's 
acceptance of the natural attitude perception of others, in particular its 
ego-centrism, prevents him from achieving this goal even though he recognised 
that the establishment of intersubjectivity as a universal a --Priori was 
necessary. It is possible that Husserl was misled by the fact that the 
universality of the common-sense life-world is an assumption of that world, 
although this is an assumption which common-sense cannot justify. Thus 
the possibility of the lebenswelt assumes what it cannot establish, that is, 
intersubjectivity and universality, and if genuine intersubjectivity that 
is, a real grasp of other consciousness is to be revealed, it must be based 
on a critique of the common-sense assumption that intersubjectivity is an 
unproblematic extension of "my" subjectivity. Thus the perspective of 
such a critique must be other than the common-sense world for something 
cannot be at the same time taken for granted and critically understood*. 
That is, we must first identify the "universal a priori of the life-world"(50). 
A superficial understanding of our criticisms of Husserl's attempts to 
avoid solipsism and establish intersubjectivity within phenomenology would 
lead to the conclusion that we have merely confirmed the general opinion 
that phenomenology is solipsistic, cannot account for intersubjectivity and 
is therefore irrelevant to sociology as the study of others as social 
actors. We reject this interpretation of our findings for two reasons. 
Firstly we have noted that Husserl's attempts to establish intersubjectivity 
were not genuinely phenomenological, being based on a number of unquestioned 
*A similar problem is encountered in Kuhn's(51) idea of scientific 
paradigms as culturally approved assumptions which inform scientific 
procedure, but similarly, his account of these paradigous claims to be a 
description of them as they are, that is, the account if it is to be 
generally acceptable must be presented as undistorted by paradigmatic 
assumptions. 
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assumptions such as the primacy of ego-consciousness, the existence of an 
homogeneous culture. As a consequence the solipsism in Husserl's 
phenomenology derives from an uncritical egocentrism. Thus Husserl's 
failure should not be taken as a failure of phenomenology. Indeed we have 
seen that Husserl's enquiry points towards a possible solution of this 
problem, namely the establishment of a priori intersubjectivity or the 
essence of intersubjectivity as correlateeof transcendental consciousness. 
It is the establishment of such intersubjectivity which will be the goal 
of our revision of phenomenology. Secondly, to condemn Husserl's attempt 
to 
to establish intersubjectivity does not remove the problem of how we can 
guarantee our knowledge of others. Common-sense accepts that there are 
others and that we can know them but all this is the merest assumption 
because common-sense cannot tell us whether our understanding of another, 
even though it makes sense to us, is a genuine grasp of the other or self- 
projection, either by analogy or empathy, onto the other's situation as we 
perceive it. Indeed our clarification of Husserl showed the rootedness of 
his analysis of intersubjectivity in common-sense assumptions and that his 
failure is a failure of common-sense knowledge of others and not of a true 
phenomenology. It is therefore necessary to develop further the idea of 
the natural attitude. 
5. THE NATURAL ATTITUDE AND SOLIPSISM 
It must be understood that the solipsism of the natural attitude is 
not theoretical but practical. This means that it does not involve the 
denial that others exist or that they are knowable but that the egocentric 
assumptions on which naive apprehension of others is based* cannot 
establish knowledge of others. Thus these assumptions result in the 
perception of others as being the same as "I" if "I" were there and not 
here. Further indications of this solipsism in relation to the world of 
* re below "reciprocity of perspectives" and assumptions of everyday life 
chapter 5. 
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objects in general are found in the naive confusion of meaning and 
significance, the unquestioned idea that a thing is its value for me and 
the ease with which the definite article, which denotes the uniqueness and 
totality of essence, e. g. the triangle, is used to denote particular 
significance e. g. "the triangle" in the sense of that triangle which has 
relevance for me. Thus both the natural attitude and Husserl's arguments 
which are based on naive assumptions can establish only significance, 
the 'I'-relatedness of others, and presuppose a unity of significance and 
meaning as all statements of significance involve assumptions about the 
nature or meaning of objects. Thus such naive understandings of inter- 
subjectivity are based on the contrary assumptions that self-knowledge is 
primary and yet that we can learn from and be effected by others who thus 
modify our "selves", i. e. genuine interaction with others as others is 
possible. The principle, if unintended, value in Husserl's account is 
that he reveals some of the unfounded assumptions, of everyday life without 
realising them as such for instance, the assumption that 'I' is the model 
for others' actions. He does not resolve the problem created by the 
inadequacy of these methods which is how to establish genuine inter- 
subjectivity as opposed to interaction with self as if it were other, 
especially as the naive attitude and everyday life are based on the unques- 
tioned belief in the accessibility of other subjects. 
* 
* Those who accept accounts such as are offered by Husserl and Schutz as the final word on the limits of our knowledge of others are placed in 
the same dilemma as Durkheim who believed that he had shown that the 
continuance of society depended on a false belief in the existence of God. 
Should people realise the truth which Durkheim revealed, society of which 
he was very fond, would disintegrate. Equally, were we to realise that 
our belief in the availability of others and the adequacy of our perception 
of others is a groundless assumption social action would be impossible for 
it depends on our belief in such assumptions. However it is not enough to twit those who share the Schutzian view for acting in everyday life as 
if they did not accept their own conclusions, such straw men are easily 
destroyed and little is achieved by it. The crucial task in our view is 
to question whether this is the last word on intersubjectivity or whether 
there are grounds on which we can establish our knowledge of others. 
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SOCIOLOGY AND THE NATURAL ATTITUDE 
It may be asked why a sociologist should be dissatisfied with such 
accounts and see them as inadequate. Why not accept that these methods 
of everyday life do in fact work because interaction does take place on 
the basis of presumed mutual understanding, therefore why not recognise 
that these methods are appropriate in sociology? Such an argument is 
unsatisfactory for a number of reasons; firstly, the critique of these 
accounts of everyday understanding reveals contradictions and unquestioned 
assumptions and no investigation of our social experiences can be regarded 
as rational which countenances such shortcomings. Also, such a method 
cannot account for its attitude to itself because it perceived our everyday 
interaction as a personal achievement. As a consequence, there is no 
requirement for others to accept our construction of reality nor can there 
be any justification in our claiming other realities to be wrong, for all 
our social knowledge is based on taken-for-granted assumptions and makes 
sense only within the framework of such assumptions. However, the 
sociologist's perception of these assumptions and his accounts of social 
action are presented as reliable knowledge, not as personal achievements. 
If they were seen as personal achievements there could be no sense of 
having understood them adequately nor would the addition of the qualification 
"sociological" convey any real difference between such accounts and those 
of naivety. As a consequence such an approach, which is found in some 
versions of ethnomethodology and social phenomenology, is methodologically 
naive for it claims to present and clarify the methods of everyday life 
but the methods by which such knowledge is gained and on the adequacy of 
which the reliability of the presented knowledge is to be judged, remain 
vague for it offers no alternative to the unfounded methods of everyday 
* This indicates how solipsism leads to relativism. 
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life through which that life can be apprehended reliably. Thus, a 
critique of such an approach would reveal it to be as unreliable as the 
naive attitude which it purports to examine, criticise and explain. Put 
in an alternative form, a method which holds a relativistic view of 
knowledge cannot, if it is to be consistent, regard itself as other than 
partial and not totally reliable. 
* 
Also, the argument that the fact that methods of everyday lifework 
should remove any doubt concerning their use as the inevitable basis of 
sociology, because sociology itself is social action, an achievement by 
social actors, overlooks the basic difference between the aims of under- 
standing in everyday life and sociology. Everyday life is practical and 
in this lies the origin of its solipsism, for other people are comprehended, 
(not understood) by an actor only in so far as it is necessary to achieve 
the actor's ends. Thus we "understand" in the natural attitude for a 
reason other than the attainment of understanding itself and the adequacy 
of our understanding is judged according to its effectiveness in attaining 
a particular goal of value to us. 
Sociology, at least that sociology which sees understanding action as 
its goal, has the unique task of understanding in order to understand. Thus 
the practical, partial and limited understanding of the natural attitude is 
inadequate, for the goal of sociology is to understand the moaning of the 
action in itself not its value for a person other than the actor. The 
goal of sociology is therefore conceptual, the goals of the natural attitude 
are practical and it is therefore incorrect to advocate the use of the 
methods appropriate to one in the other. In arguing that sociology is 
conceptual we do not wish to espouse the idea that it is irrelevant to 
practical life for the difference between a genuine interpretive sociology 
* It should not be necessary to repeat the argument that unreliability, 
as a negative category, presupposes prior apprehension of the quality of 
reliability. 
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and the natural attitude is an aspect of the difference between meaning 
and significance and it has been shown that a grasp of significance, 
as achievod in the natural attitude, presupposes prior grasp of meaning, 
that is the nature of the action in itself, as in genuine interpretive 
sociology. Thus a sociology directed to conceptual ends, understanding 
for its own sake, clarifies the world of the natural attitude by 
questioning that which cannot be questioned from within the natural 
attitude without undermining that attitude, such as the problem how do 
we know that we understand others? Thus the natural attitude and all 
idealisations based upon it are unself-critical, not in the sense that we 
as naive actors cannot became aware of its assumptions as assumptions or 
take note of its unreliability but that even this awareness cannot prevent 
us from erroneously regarding these assumptions and unreliability as 
inevitable because being in and committed to the natural attitude we 
can sea no alternative to them. It is our intention to show that a 
sociology which is not committed to the natural attitude, a phenomenological 
sociology, can create a critical attitude to our private common-sense worlds 
and in so doing enable us to escape the prison of ego and achieve genuine 
intersubjective understanding of other acts and their worlds. 
The distinction between the different goals and the requirement of 
different procedures between common-sense and sociology indicates a 
further cause of dissatisfaction with the naive approach. This is that 
it maintains the major assumption of the natural attitude, that the 
everyday comprehension of experience is the only possible mode of 
understanding. Hence even those who recognise the partiality of naive 
sociology and insist that the sociologist's world view not be imposed 
on that of the actor accept this position as final because they cannot 
conceive of any other mode of intersubjective understanding than 
common-sense. However, the recognition that we have made certain 
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assumptions in our perception of the action does not permit us, in 
itself, to overcome these assumptions, hence the idea of their inevitabil- 
ity. Thus a critique of natural attitude assumptions which is itself 
methodologically naive cannot provide reliable alternatives to such 
common-sense, ego-oriented, assumptions; it can recognise them but it 
cannot transcend them. 
This discussion raises further problems concerning the status of 
claims that the natural attitude perception of others is based on taken- 
for-granted assumptions even though the common-sense individual does not 
regard these assumptions as assumptions but as self-evident facts. This 
means that those who perceive the assumed basis of the natural attitude 
are claiming that they shave discarded their epistemological dependence 
*l) 
on the natural attitude. To state that this is achieved by making the 
natural attitude anthropologically strange 
*(2) 
simply begs the question 
of how we make it strange but not alien, that is, how we see it as other 
but as not being outside the possibility of our adequate understanding. 
Thus, such analyses claim to achieve knowledge which is not available in 
the natural attitude, even in the reflective natural attitude, and 
therefore it is necessary to ask, what is the nature of this alternative 
perspective which can provide such knowledge? Here also we have an 
indication within the natural attitude, of the need for a perspective 
other than that of the natural attitude if this attitude itself is to be 
understandable. 
*(l) To say, as Schutz does, that this is due to reflection on the 
natural attitude is not an adequate solution for there is no reason why 
acts of reflection should not be based on naive assumptions. It is 
important to remember in this context that Husserl did not call for 
reflection but for radical, rigorous reflection. The difference between 
the natural attitude and adequate understanding is not that one is 
reflective and the other is not, but that adequate understanding employs 
a different type of reflection. 
*(2) This view also demonstrates a naive faith in the superiority of 
anthropological perceptions. 
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The realisation of the unproblematic status of intersubjectivity based 
on naive assumptions for those living in the common-sense world raises 
the problem of why such naivety persists(l). One answer, derived 
principally from Schutz would be that everyday life is based on assumptions, 
belief in which makes intersubjectivity possible. Leaving aside the 
question of how the existence of a generally held belief can be asserted 
without the prior assumption of intersubjectivity as the source of our 
knowledge of these general assumptions, this answer is unsatisfactory 
because it can account only for the belief that others are available. 
It cannot account for our faith in the confirmation of that belief, or 
our confidence that we have achieved an understanding of others. These 
beliefs or methods, such as the reciprocity of perspectives, 
*(2) 
would 
permit interaction in the sense that atoms interact, but their presence 
cannot account for the persistence of the everyday belief in the adequacy 
of intersubjectivity, that we do know what others are like. 
Those who hold this critical attitude towards intersubjectivity 
correctly realise that the natural attitude can lead only to solipsistic 
knowledge but they are placed in a quandary by the persisting belief in 
the adequacy of intersubjectivity held by everyday actors, because the 
solipsistic natural attitude itself cannot confirm'such a belief. Such 
sociologists, including Schütz, fail to question whether the natural 
attitude is the sole source of our social being As pointed out above, 
they accept the major assumption of the natural attitude, that is, the idea 
that the natural attitude is inevitable. It is thus our contention 
that concentration on the natural attitude based on an uncritical 
acceptance of the idea that "natural" means normal and exclusive necessarily 
leads to the failure to establish intersubjectivity because the natural 
*(l) The question could be reversed and expressed in the form why, when 
everyone else sees intersubjectivity as obvious, do some sociologists, 
principally ethnomethodologists and social phenomenologists, see it as 
a problem. 
*(2) re below chapter S. 
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attitude is solipsistic. This does not mean that intersubjectivity cannot 
be established, merely that the natural attitude is an inappropriate 
means of achieving this goal because it is concerned only with the indivi- 
dual's practical interests and it therefore cannot encompass the social 
aspect of our being which it nevertheless accepts. Thus, it could be 
argued that genuine intersubjective knowledge is impossible, that our 
critique of the natural attitude has established that there is no guarantee 
of experiencing an otherfs self within the natural attitude and that we 
simply project ourselves onto the other's situation by empathy and 
analogy and thus we interact with our own ego's. Thus there is only 
a self-here and a self-if-it-were-there. This argument involves a 
contradiction in that while claiming our limitation to self it admits 
the possibility of self recognising a "there" as distinct from the present 
ego location. If we were truly locked in our own egos, there could be 
no "there", only a continuous "here". Again we note an experience 
within the natural attitude, "there" as opposed to "here" regardless of 
the adequacy of the judgement concerning "there", which points to an 
intersubjective reality which cannot be established by the natural 
attitude. 
Thus a critique of the natural attitude reveals not only the 
inadequacy of that attitude in relation to establishing genuine inter- 
subjective knowledge but also that it is posited on the possibility of 
such a reliability in our knowledge of others. That iss the natural 
attitude is unable to establish genuine intersubjectivity, even though 
such intersubjectivity is a necessary assumption of the natural attitude. 
This, of course, is not proof of the real existence of such reliability 
but it is an indication that the quest for such reliability is implied in 
the natural attitude and that the natural attitude is unfulfilled in the 
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absence of adequate intersubjective knowledge. It has also been 
established that the natural attitude, being solipsistic, cannot provide 
indubitable intersubjective knowledge and it is therefore reasonable to 
enquire into the adequacy of phenomenology in this area as it deliberately 
refuses to base itself on naive conceptualisations. It will be the 
aim of our revision of phenomenology to expound its potential as a means 
of providing that reliable knowledge of others without which the 
programme of sociology, especially interpretive sociology, cannot be 
fulfilled. In order to clarify the centrality of the problematic status 
of our knowledge of others in sociology it is necessary to consider 
various methods to overcome this problem which have been advanced by 
sociologists and philosophers. Although none of these methods will be 
found to be satisfactory, the purpose of such an investigation is not 
simply to reveal the shortcomings of these approaches but through this 
criticism to identify indications as to where a solution to this problem 
may be found. 
Thus, our enquiry has established the vulnerability of Husserl's 
phenomenology to solipsism and the inadequacy of his attempts to establish 
intersubjectivity within the epoche. Nevertheless, Husserl's work in 
this field has a negative value in that it demonstrates many of the 
inadequate proposed solutions to this argument. In particular the ideas 
that we can account for our knowledge of others as others by either 
analogical inference or projective empathy or that this problem can be 
resolved by assuming the existence of a common culture*, have been found 
to be unsatisfactory. We noted also Husserl's failure to distinguish 
between genuine and taken-for-granted or naiue intersubjective understanding. 
Developing this theme, we demonstrated that Husserls proposed solutions 
* Similar attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjective knowledge 
will be found in our consideration of sociological approaches to this 
problem below, chapters 4 and 5. 
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to this problem were not, in fact, phenomenological but were based on 
naive, common-sense assumptions. In particular, Husserl uncritically 
accepts that subjectivity precedes intersubjectivity and that our 
knowledge is ego-centric. Thus, although Husserl is properly criticised 
for his failure to avoid solipsism this failure is a consequence of his 
reliance on the natural attitude and therefore does not justify the claim 
that phenomenology itself is necessarily solipsistic. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to enquire further into the possibility of a phenomenologically 
based genuine intersubjective understanding. This discussion revealed 
also that the problem of solipsism is a case of the more general problem 
of the relationship between consciousness and its objects and it is in 
this context that our attempt to establish intersubjectivity as a 
phenomenological datum will take place. 
Following on from the discovery that Husserl's failure is a failure 
of the natural attitude, we considered in greater detail the reasons for 
the natural attitude's inability to establish intersubjectivity which we 
located in its essentially practical attitude. That is, the natural 
attitude fails to establish genuine knowledge of other minds because it is 
oriented around the practical problems of the individual ego even though 
it assumes its capability to achieve such knowledge. From this point 
we demonstrated the inadequacy of the natural attitude as a means of 
establishing sociology and considered the detrimental consequences arising 
from a sociology dependent on the natural attitude. It is therefore 
necessary to consider various attempts, both phenomenological and non- 
phenomenological, to confront this problem within sociology and which 
have attempted to account for our knowledge of others as a means of 
establishing sociology as the understanding of other conscious selves. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN SOCIOLOGY. 
WINCH AND WEBER. 
THE VERSTEHENDE TRADITION: 
The principal concern of this and the two following chapters is a 
critical discussion of various solutions to the problem of gaining 
reliable knowledge of other minds in sociology. These solutions fall 
into two types the first of which is the nominalist approach of Winch, 
Weber and Schutz as opposed to the realistic theories of Simmel and Scheler. 
The nominalist-realist distinction between these groups refers to the 
former's denial and the latter's affirmation of the existence of objectivily 
real correlates of our concepts in which our apprehension of other mind's 
is expressed. The nominalist position typically limits reliable knowledge 
to ego and tends to positivism(). The realistic approach is typically 
anti-positivistic and argues that a grasp of objective reality including 
other minds is possible. 
This distinction may be said to be misleading because it could be 
argued that Winch, Weber and Schutz do not deny intersubjective knowledge 
and that Simmel, being a neo-Kantian, adopts a nominalistic attitude to 
knowledge, that is he bases knowledge on a priori structures of knowing 
not on objects. We intend to justify our distinctions by showing that, 
although the members of the first group accept the existence of inter- 
subjective knowledge, that in their attempts to establish the means by 
which sociologists should arrive at conclusions concerning other subjects 
experiences they succeed either in isolating ego from otheraibjects or 
they effectively deny the distinctiveness of others from ego. In either 
case the idea of intersubjective knowledge as the reliable apprehension 
of a mind and experiences other than one's own is destroyed. We accept 
that Simmel was a neo-Kantian but we intend to show that if his theory. of 
our knowledge of others, of the nature and origin of sociation, is stripped 
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of its Kantian elements, which are shown to be untenable, in particular 
the form-content distinction, he can be interpreted in such a way as to 
indicate a realistic interpretation of intersubjective knowledge. This 
points the way to a genuine grasp of other minds. The aim of this enquiry 
is to show the superiority, although not the totalsatisfactoriness, of the 
realistic over the nominalistic approach. 
HUSSERL AND SOCIOLOGY * 
Before this enquiry is undertaken it is necessary to complete our 
consideration of Husserl's phenomenology by giving a brief account of his 
attitude to the nature of the social sciences. Husserl's interest in 
the social sciences emerged in his later work as a consequence of the 
centrality of the problem of intersubjectivity and his attempts to define 
a crucial cultural role für phenomenology. This is in sharp distinction 
to the attitude of his earlier work, prior to Ideas, in which psychology 
was his principal concern among the sciences. Nevertheless, Husserl's 
understanding of the social sciences, including sociology, reveals the 
inadequacy of his attempts to establish intersubjectivity. He states 
that after the world of nature has been abstracted there remains individual 
psychology as the foundation of human science including, "sociology and 
likewise ... a science of objectified spirit which after all refers, in 
its own way, to the human being as a person"(2). Thus Husserl's approach 
to the social sciences is one of psychological reductionism despite his 
total opposition to such a process in epistemology. Although it is 
possible to argue that all socio-cultural products point to the conscious 
acts of those who created, used, knew and lived within them, the recognition 
that such products are consequences of intersubjectivity, that they have 
the existence of others as part of their inner horizon, identifies them 
as belonging to a different ontological realm to that of individual 
subjectivity and therefore they cannot be reduced to the subjective level. 
re also Husserl's comments on historicism and Weltanschauung philosophy 
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Even if we accept, which we do not, Husserl's claim that intersubjectivity 
is a product of subjectivity this would not justify the denial of the 
self-evidence of intersubjectivity in itself, as a distinct category. 
Although there is an implied body-mind dualism in this account by 
Husserl of the distinctiveness of the social sciences he claims this to 
be an analytic not an essential separation. Further Husserl states that 
as corporeality and conscious life are not real in the same sense, that 
is are ontologically and epistemologically distinct, that it is not 
possible to reduce consciousness to the physical and that therefore it is 
erroneous to equate psychological data experience with the experience of 
bodies. Thus we cannot identify the person as such with corporeal 
existence because the abstraction of the physical leaves, as distinctive, 
intentional acts which have the characteristic of "real relations between 
the person and other realities"(3). Nevertheless it must be recognised 
that Husserl's attempt to establish our recognition of other conscious 
subjects by acts of appresentation , is based on the derivation of 
knowledge concerning consciousness from prior knowledge of corporeal 
existence and is thus a contradiction of his assertion that consciousness 
is sui generis. However, this account of Husserl's conception of the 
social sciences reveals his rejection of naturalistic methods and of all 
attempts to reduce personal being to corporeality in these studies as 
being inappropriate in terms of the nature of the subject matter of 
social scientific investigation. In so doing he asserts the independent 
being of intentional acts of consciousness and their objects, although it 
is clear that Husserl avoids naturalistic reductionism only by adopting 
the equally inappropriate psychologistic reductionism. 
Husserl's rejection of naturalism in the social sciences is a crucial 
aspect of his perception of the cultural role of these sciences which is 
* re below Chapter three. 
- 170 - 
their therapeutic function in relation to society's sickness(4). In 
Husserl's view social science has been prevented from fulfilling its 
cultural destiny through its acceptance of naturalistic methods the 
failure of which is not to be attributed to the complexity of the 
required research but should be seen as inevitable. This is because 
nature for the social scientist is not nature as comprehended in the 
natural sciences, but is nature as it is lived and experienced, it is 
the environing world, our representation of the world. In accordance 
with his criticism of natural science for overlooking its own status as 
an intersubjective achievement, Husserl argues that far from the 
cultural or social sciences being reducible to natural science, the 
natural sciences are themselves a cultural activity based on the community 
of scientists and as such natural science is part of the problem of 
culture. Thus the socio-historical phenomenon of natural science cannot 
be explained by natural science but by a genuine social science of spirit. 
Therefore, Husserl sees the acceptance of the naturalisation of spirit, 
the denial of a self-contained science of spirit, as resulting in a 
distortion of spiritual life and this distortion is partly responsible 
for the current cultural sickness. This implies that such distortions 
have become part of the natural attitude of everyday life. A genuine 
social science, that is a science of the human spirit as expressed in 
social, historical and cultural formations, is essential if our culture 
is to realise its true nature. Thus, in this later stage of his work, 
Husserl defines a similar role for social science as he does for 
philosophy, indicating that he did not see the resolution of the crisis 
of European culture, as simply a matter of arriving at adequate concepts , 
as suggested by Hindess(5), but as requiring also a reliable apprehension, 
through a non-naturalistic social science, of the teleology of our society 
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and culture as an achievement of the human spirit. This is the programme 
which he attempted to carry out in the unfinished "Crisis". Nevertheless, 
as this programme involves the study of culture as an intersubjective 
achievement it requires that the possibility of intersubjective understandin 
be established. As has been seen Husserl fails to do this but in an 
attempt to make a virtue out of necessity, he claims that phenomenology 
overcomes the groundless objectivisations of natural science by "beginning 
one's philosophy from one's own ego"(6). This implies that philosophy 
begins in one's own ego but is not limited to it but the inevitability of 
solipsism in his philosophy makes it impossible for Husserl to go beyond 
the ego to intersubjectivity. Thus, although Husserl condemns naturalism 
for its false objectivism his approach seems equally doomed to a false 
subjectivism. 
Apart from his extensive discussion of Dilthey and Weltanschauung 
philosophy*, this is almost the sum of Husserl's ideas concerning the 
nature of the social sciences and it is readily seen that his consideration 
of these sciences is very limited and generalised. There is almost 
nothing on the precise methodology of the social sciences with the 
exception of the argument that, as our immediate experience goes beyond 
what essentially is proper to the object, awareness of what is proper can 
be obtained only within the epoche(7). Husserl claims that as a consequenc 
of this requirement it is necessary that we do not enter ipto the validity 
which the person gives his experiences and he concludes from this that 
the social scientist should be a disinterested spectator of the person's 
experiences. However, it is not made clear how a disinterested spectator 
can understand the other when the other is committed to his actions. 
That is, would not a disinterested spectator be unable to comprehend the 
crucial aspect of social action, that is that the actor is personally 
* re chapter one. 
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involved in, is committed to his action? Further, it does not follow 
necessarily that disinterestedness is the only way of avoiding the naive 
acceptance of the adequacy of the actor's viewpoint. Nevertheless 
Husserl would rightly insist on the error of an unquestioning acceptance 
of the validity of the actor's viewpoint for the idea that this viewpoint 
cannot be questioned and is as good as anyone elee's implies an 
untenable conception of knowledge. The inevitable relativistic 
absurdity is made apparent when it is realised that the statement that 
actor's viewpoints or accounts are inviolate claims an absolute status 
for itself. Thus, any sociologist, who is merely an actor of a special 
type, who dares to claim that a certain actor's account of events is wrong, 
will himself be told that he is wrong to make such a statement. That is, 
the idea that it is wrong to impose our accounts onto actor's viewpoints 
is itself imposed on those sociologists whose viewpoints lead them to 
conclude that other actor's accounts are wrong. This is not to argue 
that sociologists can criticise or find fault with actor's accounts at 
will for the accounts of the sociologists must themselves be submitted to 
critical scrutiny. That is, it is neither necessarily permissible or 
impermissible for sociologist's to criticise actor's accounts and to present 
their own accounts as adequate. Such a procedure is permissible only 
when the sociologist's account is a statement of what is, based on the 
indubitable perception of the epochs, it is impermissible when it is 
based on judgements and unquestioned assumptions which reflect not the 
necessary and universal meaning of the phenomenon but its arbitrary 
significance for the sociologist as an individual. 
The paucity or lack of precision in Husserl's understanding of the 
social sciences. has resulted in misleading statements concerning the 
nature of a phenomenological sociology. Thus Natanson(8) defines 
phenomenology in sociology as "a generic term to include all positions 
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which stress the primacy of consciousness and subjective meaning in the 
interpretation of social action". This view is an inadequate grasp of 
the nature of a phenomenological sociology for although subjectivism is 
part of Husserl's idea of the social sciences, the crucial feature of this 
idea is the use of the epoche which Natanson fails to mention. Thus, his 
definition of phenomenological sociology would include the anti-essentialism 
and nominalism, and therefore non-phenomenological, approach of Weber. 
Equally Tiryakian's(9)*ettempt to establish a respectable sociological 
pedigree for phenomenology succeeds ohly by re-defining phenomenology 
almost out of existence. Thus, he ignores Weber's nominalism in 
asserting a relationship between the latter's Verstehende sociology and 
phenomenology. He claims that Simmel's form-content distinction parallels 
Husserl's distinction between noesis and noema, the quality and object of 
intentional acts. Not only is such a claim a gross distortion of these 
ideas but we intend to show that Simmel's sociology can be phenomenologically 
reconstructed only by abandoning his form-content distinction. Finally, 
Tiryakian's claim that Durkheim's assertion that social facts are things 
is similar-, to Husserl's war-cry of "back to the things themselves", 
shows a mis-understanding of the totally different meaning of "things" for 
these two thinkers. For Durkheim "thing" is a sensorily perceptible 
quantifiable object, for Husserl it is mere phenomenon. Nor does 
Tiryakian have any qualms about combining such radically different 
ideas of sociology as those held by Mannheim, who was a relativist, 
Scheler, who denied the adequacy of relativism, Simmel, Weber, Durkheim*(2) 
*(l) The main burden of Tiryakian's argument is that the great, and not 
so great, sociologists were phenomenologist's if they but knew it. 
It is our intention to show that this is not so, that a genuine phenomen- 
ological sociology cannot be said to exist, but that all the past 
sociologists, especially those who sought to interpret action, should have 
been phenomenologists. 
*(2) Marx is the only major theorist not defined as a phenomenologist 
by Tiryakian. 
- 174 - 
at al, under the rubric of phenomenology. The inevitable consequence 
of such syncretism, the attempted combination of opposed views, is that 
in order to avoid contradiction phenomenology has to be defined so as to 
signify everything and therefore mean nothing, thus effectively denying 
the value of phenomenology for sociology. Nevertheless it must be 
admitted that Neisser's(10) criticism that philosophical phenomenology has 
contributed little to sociology is correct, and that extant so-called 
phenomenological investigations of the social world are inadequate in 
that the claimed eidetic intuitions of social action are in fact based 
(ll) 
on empirical induction or deduction. However, this should not be 
taken as a justification for the claim that phenomenology is necessarily 
irrelevant to sociology, especially, as has been seen, the idea of 
phenomenology, which-'is:. pre§eoted in sociology is inadequate, despite the 
occasional deference to philosophical phenomenology made by leading 
theorists such as Parsons(12) who claims a phenomenological status for 
the action frame of reference*. 
Despite the brevity of Husserl's consideration of the social sciences 
it is clear that these sciences raise the theoretical problem of inter- 
subjectivity on a practical level. That is they raise the problem of 
the status of the social scientist's knowledge of others. Thus Husserl 
states that in the epoche the psychologist has "his own life, in primal 
originality, but also, proceeding from his own life, those others who also 
live and their life, whereby each life with its own intentionality reaches 
intentionally into the life of every other and all are interwoven in 
different, closer or more distant ways in an association of lifell(13)' 
and thus in the epoche every intentional life and every community of 
subjects is thematically accessible. This is a reference to Husserl's 
belief that subjectivity precedes intersubjectivity, although the latter 
* This is significant in terms of our discussion of the relationship between Simmel and Weber, below. 
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part of the quotation implies that the universal life or association of 
life pre-exists subjective consciousness and is not created by sich 
consciousness*. However, as has been seen, Husserl fails in the 
attempt to establish such a common world on this basis. If such an 
association of life exists it would seem unreasonable and unnecessary 
to demand, as Husserl does, that the investigator remain disinterested 
rather than become a participant or co-partner with the other through 
the common world. Despite his claim that the idea that subjects are 
inaccessible to each other is naive Husserl fails to establish the 
grounds which would justify the acceptance of any other view. 
Thus, Husserl's idea of the social sciences stresses the qualities 
of anti-naturalism, subjectivism, the dis-interested position of the 
observer, its dependance on the method of the epoche and the practical 
goal of social science of providing a therapy for society's ills. 
Although these ideas can be criticised because of their vagueness and 
over-generality, the main weakness in Husserl's account of the social 
sciences in his failure to establish the accessibility of genuine inter- 
subjective knowledge which is the fundamental social phenomenon, in the 
absence of which, sociology, as a study of other subjects, cannot claim 
reliability for its methods or conclusions. It is therefore necessary 
to consider the attempts to establish intersubjectivity as a reliable 
datum in various extant ideas of sociology to see if they succeed where 
Husserl fails. 
The theories of Schutz and Scheler who claim their separate approaches 
to the problem of intersubjective knowledge to be phenomenological will 
be considered in this survey. It will be seen that their theories have 
little in common and it will be necessary to decide which of them indicates 
* This (possible) reversal of the ontological status of universal and 
individual consciousness is novel in Husserl but it lies at the heart of 
our attempt below to constitute intersubjectivity within phenomenology). 
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the correct path to a genuine phenomenological sociology. However, it 
is necessary, firstly, to consider major non-phenomenological approaches 
to the problem of the epistemological status of intersubjective knowledge*(l) 
in order to see whether in order to be made adequate they require the 
apodictic knowledge which phenomenology claims to provide. 
The opposition between Wittgenstein and phenomenology has been noted 
previously and therefore it is proposed to begin this investigation with 
a consideration of a major and influential attempt to devise a sociology 
based on Wittgensteinian principles by Winch.. 
THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AS PERCEIVED IN WINCH'S "IDEA OF 
A SOCIAL SCIENCE" 
(14) 
Winch, like Huaarl, rejects naturalism in the social sciences but 
whereas Husserl bases his argument in this respect on the intentional 
nature of social action, Winch places greater emphasis on its rule- 
boundedness, He claims to derive this concept from Wittgenstein's 
notion of rule-defined language games. However Winch does not define 
what he intends by the term rule and as will be seen this results in 
uncertainty in his argument, although he does make it clear that social 
rules are not to be confused with the laws of natural science because the 
former alone are normative; that is there is always a right and a wrong 
way of following a rule but this does not apply to natural science laws. 
Thus, if a social rule is not followed the fault lies with the social 
actor for misunderstanding the rule but if a natural law is not followed 
by an appropriate phenomenon, the fault lies with the law for not being 
sufficiently comprehensive*(2). Therefore, the possibility of rule- 
*(l) It is surprising that despite the fact-that all sociology makes 
assumptions concerning the validity of intersubjective knowledge very 
few sociologists have attempted a critical examination of these assumptions. 
*(2) Winch's notion of a social rule is very similar to Ourkheim's idea 
of social norms although Durkheim is more explicit concerning the 
ontological status of norms. 
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breaking is part of social behaviour whereas the possibility of law- 
breaking is not part of the behaviour of natural phenomena. This raises 
a further difference between rule and law; the rule is part of the actor's 
behaviour, a law is not part of the behaviour of natural phenomena. 
Rules can be reflected upon by actors, laws cannot be reflected upon by 
natural phenomena. In Winch's view the world is the world as presented 
in our concepts and thus any attempt to discuss reality, including social 
reality, must take account of these ideas. We identify our experiences 
of the world by using the name given to past experience of the same 
experience and what is to count as the same is decided by reference to a 
rule which we follow. However, Winch's statement that the world is 
world as presented in our concepts would be more accurately formulated 
as "the known world is the world as presented in our concepts". That is, 
"the known world is the world which is known", revealing the statement to 
be tautologous. To identify knowing and naming, as Winch does, ignores 
the fact that the act of naming is based upon and is the completion of, 
the cognitive grasp of the phenomenon. Naming, being based on this 
prior grasp, is the seal on apprehension. The fact that a word is not 
in our vocabulary does not mean that we cannot experience the world- 
equivalent of that word but that we cannot attribute significance to the 
word as used by another person. It should also be noted that the 
establishment of the rule-centredness of social life does not explain 
that life for it is further necessary that we know why a particular rule 
is followed. This point will be developed in relation to Winch's ideas 
concerning the publicity and context-boundedness of rules. 
In order to argue that the apprehension of rules fulfills the aim of 
sociology, which in Winch's view is the understanding of others, is. that 
knowing the rule gives intersubjective understanding, it is necessary 
that rules should be established as public and not as private. In his 
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attempts to establish the publicity of rules Winch relies heavily on 
Wittgenstein's arguments denying the possibility of a private language. 
In particular Winch argues that if rules were private there would be no 
difference between applying a rule correctly and merely thinking that 
one has done so. Also, as we use the same means to make sense of our 
own actions to ourselves as we do in making them sensible to others, 
others can judge equally as well as me whether I am following my rule. 
This however simply makes rules accessible to others, it does not make 
them social. This aspect is covered by Winch in his argument that rules 
are originally social, that they are learnt within and as part of a 
social context. Thus rules belong to a given social context and can 
only be said to be followed by a subject when others within that context 
are able to grasp the rule and ascertain whether or not it is being 
followed correctly. Further it is stated that our idea of rules is 
derived from our experience of their use within society*. At this 
essentially descriptive phase it is necessary only to indicate an 
ambiguity in Winch's statement that rules have a social setting, for are 
we to understand by this that particular rules, as opposed to learning 
the meaning of rules in general, are the possession of individuals but 
are, by reason of their nature, open to others' understanding or does it 
mean that rules belong to social contexts and are simply used by the 
individuals in that context? The consequences of Winch's failure to 
appreciate this ambiguity will be clarified in the consideration of his 
cultural relativism. Thus Winch sees rules as normative in that they 
control behaviour and as public, within a given social context, so that 
understanding another's behaviour is no more problematic than understanding 
one's own behaviour. It is the consequences for sociology of these 
characteristics which we will consider. 
* This implies an acceptance of our view that experience precedes 
conceptualisation ie. that we experience rules before we know what the 
term "rule" means. 
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RULES AS BASIC ELEMENTS IN SOCIAL ACTION 
Our principle concern at this stage is the claim that, due to the 
normative status of rules, knowledge of the rule being followed is 
equivalent to understanding action, thus Winch seems to see rules as the 
origin or source of action*. We object to this argument on the grounds 
that, even if we can show that in a particular situation a certain rule 
was being followed, the claim that we have understood the action is not 
justified unless we can show why that rule was being followed. Winch's 
claim that rules belong to social contexts implies that within these 
contexts action must follow the rule, more or less adequately, but a brief 
consideration of Winch's examples of rule-following in social life show 
this not to be so. Thus he states, "Suppose that it is said of a certain 
person, No that he voted Labour at the last General Election because he 
thought that a Labour government would be the most likely to preserve 
industrial peace. What kind of explanation is this? The clearest case 
is that in which No prior to voting, has discussed the pros and cons of 
voting Labour and has explicitly come to the conclusion, "I will vote 
Labour because that is the best way to preserve industrial peace". That 
is a paradigm case of someone performing an action for a reason". This 
account of the action of voting in terms of following this rule does not 
give us full understanding of the action. The account is not simply a 
description of a rule and behaviour appropriate to that rule because it 
includes the claim that the actor has made the value-judgement that 
industrial peace is worth preserving. Further there is the assumption 
in this account that the actor believes this value-judgement to be 
relevant in reaching his decision. Thus the rule itself, "vote for the 
* The rightness or wrongness of rules refers only to the adequacy of rule- following behaviour, it does not involve the judgement that the rule is 
the right one to follow, although as will be seen in the discussion of 
the publicity of rules Winch unjustifiably introduces this latter view. 
- 180 - 
party which preserves industrial peace", is seen as being appropriate 
to the situation by reference to the value-judgements of the actor 
Nor can it be argued that the rule is necessary to, or inevitable in the 
context of voting for it is possible to conceive of voters applying 
other rules in reaching their voting decision or of even deciding that 
the question of industrial peace is irrelevant to that decision. This 
simply reveals the ever-present possibility that in a given situation it 
is conceivable that actors could have acted differently than they did, 
or to put it in Winch's terminology, they could have acted according to 
different rules. Therefore it is necessary to ask why they followed one 
rule rather than another. Nor is it possible to argue that we have 
identified the wrong social context, that the rule governing voting 
belongs to the social context of politically significant others. Such 
an argument implies that the social community existed before the rule, 
that rules are a consequence not the cause of sociation and therefore 
rules cannot be claimed to be the basic elements in social action, as Winch 
would have it, but are derived from pre-existing communality. 
Winch's claim that to know the rule on which action is based is to 
understand the action is further undermined by his reference to Wittgensteint 
instance of a society where wood is piled in heaps of arbitrary height 
and then sold according to the area of ground covered by the timber(16) 
We could predict the wood-selling behaviour of this society by reference 
to the rule as outlined above but Winch correctly notes that we could not 
claim to understand the situation because we have not grasped the "point 
* It is important to note that Winch cites this example in the context of 
his discussion of Weber for both he and Weber, as will be seen below, 
attempt to avoid considering values as part of social action. Thus the 
kind of action envisaged in the example would be classified by Weber as 
goal-rational action; that is action concerned with the selection of 
efficient means to given ends but we have argued that in order to under- 
stand this action fully it is necessary to know why certain ends and not 
others are being pursued. 
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or meaning" of this practise. We would say that we do not understand 
the action because we do not know why this rule is being followed rather 
than another. Thus, in order to understand action it is necessary to 
know why the rules being followed are acceptable to the actors. Although 
Winch does not realise it; his criticism of Wittgenstein's example 
undermines his own reliance on the apprehension of rules as the source of 
sociological knowledge. 
Winch would probably claim this criticism to be misplaced because 
rules are not separable from meaning in the way we have suggested because 
they belong to the social context from which the actor also derives his 
relevance systems and structures of meaning. In support of this we can 
note Winch's criticism of Weber for attempting to distinguish between 
"meaning" and "social", although he does not realise that Weber uses the 
term social in a more restricted sense than does Winch himself. Although 
this defence of Winch's position has been considered above, this argument 
introduces a crucial aspect of his case which is the claim that rules are 
public. 
THE PUBLICITY OF RULES 
Winch's argument that rules are public is based on his understanding 
of what it means to follow a rule. He sees this as not just doing what 
one has been told but as involving the idea of continuing in the same way 
and what is to count as continuing in the same way is derived from the 
social context in which the rule was learnt. Thus, "continuing in the 
same way" is seen as a matter of course by all members of that context. 
Private rules, inaccessible to others, are not regarded as true rules by 
Winch for the idea of continuing in the same way, which he sees as essential 
to rules, necessitates judgements as to whether the action is the same. 
Thus rule-following involves the possibility of making a mistake and only 
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by asking whether the action has been correctly carried out can we under- 
stand it. Mistakes must be seen as a contravention of an established 
notion of what is correct, thus others are able to point out my mistake 
to me. In the case of a private rule it is impossible for others to 
judge if a mistake has been made in the rule-governed action. If I can 
express the rule to myself and thus understand it, it can be understood 
by others. That iss a private rule cannot be understood either by the 
rule-follower or an observer. The notion of establishing standards is 
seen by Winch as social otherwise we could not have the necessary 
external checks on rule-defined action. 
In order to evaluate this argument it is necessary to consider what 
is meant by the private rule which is not a rule. Does it refer to 
arbitrary behaviour which does not make sense to the actor, although it 
is difficult to conceive what conscious behaviour of this nature would 
look like, or is it rule-governed behaviour where the rule is invented 
by the actor alone? It is possible to argue that private rules in this 
latter sense are in principle capable of being shared and are therefore 
potentially social but this does not mean that such rules are socially 
derived nor does it justify the claim that we cannot recognise mistakes 
in the way we follow such private rules. 
It is possible to claim that Winch pre-empts the discussion by 
defining rules in such a way that they must be social, but his argument 
does not rest solely on definitional sleights of hand but on the claim 
that rules are learnt within a social context and are therefore socially 
established. However, even if Winch's account of rule-learning as the 
* In the Wittgenstein example cited by Winch p. 31-32, the imaginary compass 
user is said to be indulging in behaviour which shows no regularity. 
Although Wittgenstein is unclear as to whether this means that the action 
is not rule governed or whether we as observers cannot grasp the rule, 
Winch has previously shown that one does not see regularities unless one 
presumes a rule and we would add, a rule of a certain kind with which we 
are familiar. It could therefore be the case that the'use of the compasses 
is rule-bound but is so different from our rule in the same situation that 
we cannot identify it. 
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basis of intersubjective knowledge is accepted, it has to be recognised 
that, rules being general, in order to be applicable to all relevant 
cases have to be operationalised in relation to particular situations. 
This implies an interpretation, if not re-definition, of rules in terms 
of individual goals and interests. The recognition that the application 
of the rule to individual situations is itself rule-governed is to open 
up the possibility of an infinite regress, and it undermines Winch's claim 
to locate our understanding of others in shared rules for the rule which 
particularises the general rule must be peculiar to the individual's 
situation being, like all rules, context bound. Therefore it cannot 
be shared by others not in that situation. Also Winch's emphasis that 
rules are learnt casts doubt on his thesis because we cannot learn if we 
have no concepts through which sense is made of the words which wo hear 
in the learning context, and thus rules concerning learning must precede 
social relations of learning. Winch seems to recognise this problem when 
he claims that ideas and social relations are interchangeable terms(17), 
the only difference between them being one of perspective. However, 
it would be contradictory to hold this view and at the same time persist, 
as Winch does, in claiming that ideas such as rule concepts are derived 
from social relationq, unless such a claim is admitted to be tautologous 
and therefore pointless. 
RULES AND GAMES 
It is noticeable that, like Wittgenstein, Winch constantly exemplifies, 
if not justifies, his argument and attempts to make it plausible by 
reference to games 
*. It is therefore necessary to investigate the validity 
of this analogy between knowing the rules of a game and knowing the reasons 
for social action which is based on the assumption that social interaction 
is game-like. This analogy is difficult to sustain as games exist solely 
* re below chapter 2. 
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through their rules which define the game situation and which are intended 
to prevent individual innovation. The rules of the game are publicly 
known and anyone wishing to play the game agrees to abide by the official 
rules, and if there is a dispute over game behaviour it is settled by an 
appeal to the source of official rules, the rule-book, but there is 
rarely a rule-book to resolve conflict in social life. Most social 
interaction is governed by expectations rather than clearly defined rules 
and it is noticeable that Winch and Ryan 
(18) 
, in his commentary on Winch, 
derive many of their exemplars of social action from judicial or procedural 
action, such as voting, which are among the few areas of social life 
(l) 
defined by official written rules . To assert as Winch does that because 
the rules of interaction are social that the significance of my action is 
the same for me and others assumes that, either, others know my rule and 
accept its validity, which is largely true only of games, or that social 
context determines my rules which makes it impossible to explain surprise 
and deviance. For these reasons we would expect that an insistence on 
the game-like, rule-following nature of social interaction would result 
in an emphasis on harmony rather than conflict and an uncritical acceptance 
of official or dominant rules and definitions of the situation. 
Such an official bias can be seen in Winch and his adherents. Thus 
Ryan%monstrates his claim that action can take place only where rules 
exist which frame the action, by citing the case of U. S. citizenship 
which can be acquired, but not renounced, because there are rules for 
becoming a citizen but there are no rules for ceasing to be a citizen. 
This argument is clearly based on the uncritical acceptance of official, 
that is State Department, rules concerning citizenship. There is no 
reason why individuals should not act on the basis of what renunciation 
*(1) This emphasises the need for critical scrutiny of the purpose of 
choosing particular examples in an argument. 
*(2) Although Ryan is marginally critical of Winch he accepts the latter's 
understanding of the dependence of action on public rules. 
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of citizenship means to them by e. g. refusing to pay taxes, denying their 
obligations to the state, refusing to accept the legitimacy of state 
authority. It is true that such action is a consequence of the absence 
of appropriate official rules, and it is necessary that an observer wishing 
to understand the renouncers' behaviour grasps their attitude to official 
rules but this does not mean that their action must follow such rules. 
There is a crucial difference, which Winchians fail to recognise, between 
recognising that official rules constitute an important element in the 
horizon of social action and claiming that action can take place only 
within the officially defined context. 
The same official bias can be found in Winch's reference to the case 
of a pupil making a mistake in following a rule expressed by a teacher, but 
Winch completely overlooks the possibility that the wrong behaviour is 
rule defined in that it seems reasonable to the pupil. It is therefore 
proper to ask why it makes sense rather than to dismiss it as mistaken. 
It may be objected that this argument misinterprets Winch who is using 
this example simply to clarify what it means to make a mistake, although 
his failure to enquire into the rationality or rule-directedness of 
mistakes is significant. There is, however, a clearer instance of 
official bias in Winch which cannot be defended in this way. This is 
the claim that motive statements are statements of rules governing 
behaviour but Winch then proceeds to make a distinction between reasonable 
and intelligible behaviour, between reason and motive. Thus, "To say, 
for example, that N murdered his wife from jealousy is certainly not to 
say that he acted reasonably. But it is to say that his act was intelligible 
in terms of the modes of behaviour which are familiar in our society and 
that it was governed by considerations appropriate to its context. These 
two aspects of the matter are interwoven; one can act 'from considerations' 
only where there are accepted standards of what it is appropriate to appeal 
to. "* (19) It is possible that the vagueness of this statement results 
It is possible that in this statement Winch is seeking to avoid the 
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from the possibility that if this argument was developed Winch would have 
to ask how his model of action can explain the breaking of rules (deviance) 
and the belief that such behaviour can be understood. It appears that 
"reasonable" behaviour means socially acceptable behaviour as in Winch's 
reference to "accepted standards of reasonable behaviour current in his 
society" 
(20), 
but this is an arbitrary and dubious judgement that only 
officially or dominantly approved action can be understood as reasonable. 
Similarly Ryan's statement that "it is not sensible to vote for an obvious 
incompetent or a crook"(21), involves an uncritical reification of the 
official rule that the purpose of elections is to choose honest persons 
who can be relied upon to fulfill their duties competently. It would be 
sensible to vote for an incompetent if one believed the party label to be 
more important than I. Q. or if one wished to limit the effectiveness of 
government, or for a crook if one expected to benefit from his dishonesty . 
All these possibilities are based on various evaluations of the political 
system and the meaning of the act of voting and are sensible as means to 
achieving desired ends and cannot be dismissed as mere mistakes. The 
effect of defining official rules as proper rules is to maintain the appear- 
gnce of a general agreement or an acceptable social standard concerning 
rules and it is necessary to ask why the belief in such agreement is 
necessary in Winch's sociology. A consideration of this point will 
clarify the nature of and possibility of intersubjective understanding 
as perceived by Winch. 
RULES AND CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY 
A consequence of Winch's claim that rules are learnt within a social 
context, if one ignores the ambiguities in this statement which have been 
unproblematic 
noted above, is to make understanding/for we all within a given context 
* Such instances can be multiplied almost indefinitely. 
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learn the same rules and therefore understanding the other is no more 
difficult than understanding oneself. Indeed the claim that self and 
other understanding are essentially the same is a crucial feature of 
Winch's argument. This argument is based on the taken-for-granted 
assumption of such over-arching social contexts, that is, on the assumption 
of an homogeneous culture in which, by definition, there is no conflict or 
variance concerning rules and as a consequence deviance and failure to 
understand are impossible. Nevertheless Winch's own work is necessitated 
by the difficulty of reliability in intersubjective understanding for in 
a situation of cultural homogeneity an interpretive sociology and social 
philosophy, which arises out of our surprise at others' actions, would not 
In such a situation the problem arises of how we are to * be needed 
ýlý 
recognise that I and other do in fact share a common social context as 
distinct from merely assuming that this is the case. This also relates 
to our previous discussion of the difficulties of setting the boundaries 
of cultures or social contexts and of avoiding the conclusion that each 
one of us occupies a unique social context. Thus the idea of sociology 
advanced by Winch, the understanding of action by reference to common 
rules, is possible only in situations where it is irrelevant, where the 
understanding of others is non-problematic*(2). 
The inadequacy of Winch's assumptions concerning the culturally 
shared nature of rules can be demonstrated by reference to that area of 
social life which seems most susceptible to Winch's argument, that is, 
games. The game to be considered here is the "odd-man-out" question, 
where a player is presented with a list of words and asked to nominate the 
*(1) This argument can be related to the frequent claim that sociology was 
a consequence of the break-up of the harmony of pre-industrial Europe. 
Similarly Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity 
is posited on the idea of the non-homogeneity of industrial society. 
*(2) It is possible that it was an awareness of the self-defeating nature 
of this ideal in relation to understanding which made Winch see evaluation 
as a further goal of sociology) 
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one that does not fit, that is, the player is asked to guess the rule 
which has been broken by the odd man out. Thus the player could be 
presented with the following list, '1London", "Canberra", "New York", 
"Lisbon", New York could be seen as odd because it is the only non- 
capital city in the list, or Lisbon because it is the only non-English 
speaking city, or Canberra because it is the only inland city. Thus 
the identification of the initial rule is ambiguous and depends on the 
assumption that both questioner and player use the same relevance systems 
in identifying the significance of place-names. 
It has been claimed 
(22) 
that Winch limits sociology to an ethnocentric 
role, that sociology is relative to a given society's rules, but our 
challenge to Winch's assumptions concerning a homogeneous culture, social 
context or way of life indicates that he is supporting a more radical 
limitation of the possibilities of sociological understanding to the 
"moral community", that is those actors who share the same rule. There 
is no limitation to how small this group can be. Indeed, in view of 
the existence of individual perspectives and the mutual inter-penetration 
of the various social contexts inhabited by an actor, a particular 
interpretation of a rule or a particular hierarchy of rules may be 
peculiar to a single actor. The naive assumption of a common community 
based on shared rules justifies the belief that my rules are accepted by 
everyone else as members of the same social context. This is a restatement 
of Schutz's notion of the reciprocity of perspectives, that I understand 
the other by assuming that for all relevant purposes he and I are alike, 
and thus the other's actions are reduced to my perspective. That is, the 
unclarity in the idea of a shared social context results in a situation 
* It is interesting that this type of question is being increasingly 
omitted from intelligence tests because of the ambiguous relationship 
between question and answer. 
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of ego-aggrandisement, whereby the other is seen as a special case of I 
for, as it is believed that he and I belong to the same context, his reasons 
for acting must be same as my reasons if I were in his situation. Thus 
Winch's idea of sociology is revealed as not merely ethnocentric, limiting 
genuine understanding to our own culture, but as egocentric, restricting 
1 
such understanding to self and those indistinguishable from self 
* 
although 
the naive belief in cultural homogeneity permits the extension of self to 
all those defined by self as belonging to the same culture as self. 
WINCH ON SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 
We have described and criticised Winch's attempt to base sociological 
understanding of others on the rule-boundedness of social action. It is 
appropriate to consider at this point Winch's prescriptions concerning 
sociological methodology in so far as they illiminate further the adequacy 
of his ideas concerning social action and intersubjective understanding. 
Of particular relevance to such a discussion is Winch's surprising 
rejection of the claim that predictability is a requirement of the social 
(23) 
sciences, for if social action is based on rules learnt within and 
belonging to a social context then it would seem that identifying the 
context should permit us to know the rule which informs the action and 
thus enable us to predict the action, Winch denies this conclusion on 
the grounds that rules can be followed in different ways and in the examples 
which he gives it is clear that this means that rules can be variously 
interpreted. This admission seriously undermines Winch's claim that 
rules are the basic data of social action for it makes rules dependant on 
interpretation, that is dependant on actors' relevance and meaning 
contexts. 
*(2)Winch 
effectively concedes this point when he defines 
*(1) re below chapter three, the discussion of natural attitude solipsism. 
(2) re above p. 179. 
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voluntary behaviour, on the existence of which he bases his objection 
to the appropriateness of predictability in the social sciences, as 
behaviour to which there is an alternative. Thus understanding action 
involves understanding its contradictory and the notions (rules ) which we 
use to predict others' actions are compatible with action other than that 
predicted taking place. It is not clear whether by the term alternative 
Winch is referring to an alternative rule or to -, alternative ways of 
acting in accordance with the rule. In either case, Winch's argument is 
compromised because in order to claim understanding we would still need 
to know either why that particular rule was followed rather than another 
or why the rule was interpreted in that particular manner. In order to 
answer such questions it is necessary to refer to the actor's perception 
of the situation and his judgements of the significance of the situation. 
Thus in order to maintain the idea of the voluntariness and non- 
predictability of social action Winch must admit that social rules are 
translated into action subject to the actor's judgements. Winch's 
argument also undermines his conception of the distinctive nature of a 
social rule for he sees as a crucial aspect of a rule the fact that 
it is 
open to others' judgements in terms of what it means to follow a 
particular rule, so that mistakes can be identified by persons other 
than the actor. However, if what it means to follow a particular rule 
is, as Winch states, composed of various alternatives, the claim 
that a 
mistake has been made may mean no more than that the actor and 
the 
observer have identified different alternatives of the rule. 
In which 
case the adequacy of the claim that a mistake has been made 
is always 
open to doubt, especially as Winch does not tell us how we may distinguish 
between a mistake in applying a rule and an alternative application 
of the rule. 
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DEVIANCE AND ERROR 
Consideration of the indeterminateness in the idea of following a 
rule raises further questions concerning the adequacy of Winch's model 
of social action as rule-following. It is noticeable that Winch refers 
only to mistakes in rule-following, and never to error or deviance. 
Thus Winch states that mistakes can be named only within the context of 
the category of activity within which the mistake occurs, so that magic is 
not a mistake but wrongly performed magical ritual is a mistakeý4ý Thus, 
again, our understanding and judgements are limited to the purely 
utilitarian level of what Weber termed goal-rationality, the choosing of 
appropriate means to given ends. 
* Therefore, there is no possibility 
of discussing values as components of social action, as these are neither 
rules nor applications of rules. This omission is crucial in Winch's 
argument for to admit the relevance to understanding of values would be 
to admit the possibility of value-conflict between actors and between 
actors and sociologists, thus challenging Winch's assumption of a 
homogeneous culture. Thus one can understand a religious ritual as rule- 
governed behaviour and there may even be a book of rules concerning 
ritual practises but one cannot understand, in the same way, the beliefs 
held by those performing the ritual. Even if there were a book listing 
the articles of faith, no one who simply knew these articles could claim 
to understand what it means to believe and to have one's experiences made 
comprehensable by the faith. To know the rules of football does not 
enable one to grasp the fervour of the Kop. Concentration on the rules 
to the exclusion of the values and significance of social life, makes 
the sociologist an outsider in social action, one who knows what is going 
* It is important to note that Winch's argument is sustained by an arbitrary 
definition of context, thus if we were to no less arbitrarily define 
the context not as magic but as healing or knowledge it would be correct, 
within Winch's argument, to criticise magic for using incorrect healing 
or learning techniques. 
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on but not why, one who cannot grasp what it means to live in the action 
as opposed to observing it. Ideas and values are the taken-for-granted 
assumptions in Winch's model of social action for they define the social 
context in which action occurs but Winch cannot make them objects of 
sociological enquiry. Thus the idea of making a mistake applies only 
to acts never to ideas. Therefore one cannot ask within Winch's frame- 
work whether an idea or rule itself is mistaken. Winch justifies this 
view by claiming that logic is context bound but as Winch has implicitly 
defined context in terms of ideasi values etc., this statement is 
tautologous, logic and context are defined in terms of each other. A 
more substantial defence of Winch! s position would be the claim that as 
the sociologist's aim is to understand action, action must be perceived 
within the actor's frame of reference. Thus one can refer to mistakes 
for this is how the actor would perceive the action. Condemning the 
actor's beliefs and ideas as error by criteria not accepted by the actor 
may reflect the sociologist's prejudices and most certainly would not 
help us to understand the action. This is an important point and will 
be discussed below in relation to Winch's ideas concerning the role of 
evaluation in sociology. 
4 
There is one final point to be considered in relation to Winch's 
notion of making a mistake which is related to his acceptance of official 
rules and this is his failure to consider the possibility of the 
deliberate rejection of rules because Winch sees rules as the givens of 
social action which actors follow more or less adequately. He does not 
consider the possibility that rules are chosen and that deviance is not 
mistaken rule-following but the rejection of one set of rules in favour 
of others, for to do so would undermine his idea of an homogeneous culture. 
The reference to the situation of deviance as opposed to mistaken-ness 
* We recognise that not all sociologist's do in fact accept this as the 
purpose of sociology. 
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reveals a further assumption in Winch's account which is that the rules 
form a coherent, non-contradictory structure, that following one rule 
does not necessitate the rejection of another rule. Simple reflection 
on everyday life reveals the existence of contradictory rules as in the 
case of the worker faced by an official rule telling him to work fast 
and an unofficial rule telling him to work at the same pace as his mates. 
It may be argued that such conflicts are only apparent, that they are 
resolved by appeal to a more general rule which tells the actor which 
rule to follow. However this defence raises the possibility of an 
infinite regress of locating rules of ever increasing generality with an 
ever growing horizon of alternative modes of action. Also it would have 
to be shown that the actor accepted that the particular rule is dependant 
on or is a case of the more general rule*. 
UNDERSTANDING IN SOCIOLOGY 
Winch's insistence that action makes sense only within the given 
context means that in order for the sociologist to achieve the goal of 
understanding he must be socialised into the community of actors, and it 
is for this reason that Winch sees Verstehen as the care of sociological 
procedure and not just a useful hearistic device. This merely raises 
the question of how such understanding is to be achieved. To state that 
this is to be done. by grasping actors' rules reveals the paradox at the 
heart of Winch's work, for we must belong to the social context before 
we can learn its rules but we cannot enter the context until we know the 
rules. This paradox is a direct result of Winch defining rules and 
social context in terms of each other 
*(2) 
and makes understanding 
impossible unless one has always belonged to that particular context. 
*(l) Winch refers to this point in Carroll's story of Achilles and the 
tortoise, but fails to see its relevance for his argument. 
*(2) re above p. 183. 
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This criticism reveals again the necessity of the idea of cultural 
homogeneity in Winch's work and the serious consequences which result 
from the realisation of the inadequacy of this idea. On Winch's account, 
sociology is possible only if the sociologist can claim a common social 
context with his subjects, and the refutation of the idea of cultural 
homogeneity indicates that such a context may consist of very few people 
and further, that as sociologist the observer belongs to the sociological 
social context which is probably alien to his subjects. 
The existence of a distinctive sociological social context creates 
problems concerning the possibility of adequate understanding of actors' 
in their distinctive social contexts. The sociologist belongs to the 
community of social scientists and therefore the Winchian sociologist 
would have to recast his understanding of actors in order to make it 
conform to the rules of the social scientific community, and this could 
possibly result in distortion. Winch answers this objection by demanding 
that the concepts used by the sociologist must be available to the actors 
as part of their discourse, but this overlooks the possibility of a term 
having different significance for the two communities as in the distinction 
between the psychologist's and the layman's meaning of "intelligence", 
or the sociologist's and the layman's use of "class". Further it is 
clear that Winch is not confronting this problem for, in view of his 
definition of contexts in terms of language games, the demand that the 
sociologist and the actor should possess the same concepts is a demand 
that they should belong to the same context, This simply avoids the 
problem of how the sociologist is to gain entry to the actors' social 
contexts without ceasing to be a sociologist and how he is to express 
* Winch tends to refer to "ways of life" rather than social contexts at 
this point in his argument but there seems to be no difference between 
these two ideas and our objection to Winch's use of the idea of social 
context apply equally to his use of the idea of ways of life. 
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this context to other sociologists without having to falsify the actor's 
community by making it appear to be a variation of the sociological 
community. This criticism reveals, once again, the ego-centrism of 
Winch's account of sociology, the idea that we can understand others 
only if they are similar to us or by presenting them as if they were similar 
to us. 
It is not completely clear why Winch insists that the concepts 
which the sociologist uses to describe and explain action must be familiar 
to the actor. It may be in order that the sociologist can be confident 
of describing action as the actor sees it but how do we know that actors 
would use these terms to describe the action? The term "deceit" is 
part of the vocabulary of most actors but this would not justify the 
sociologist in describing all action as deceitful, Winch refers to the 
need to use concepts familiar to the actbr in the context of a discussion 
of the sociologist's evaluation of the correctness of the action and 
this suggests that the demand that sociologist's use actors' concepts 
is advanced in order that the actor may comment on the adequacy of the 
sociologist's evaluation. However, the actor's response to the 
sociologist's evaluation may be based not on the adequacy or inadequacy 
of the evaluation but on whether it presents a favourable or unfavourable 
image of the actor. Therefore, how is the sociologist to distinguish 
between genuine end "ideological" or tactical objections? 
Winch's demand that sociologists use concepts available to actors 
indicates the possibility of dual understanding in sociology, that is the 
sociologist understands the actor and the actor can understand the 
sociologist. The idea of the problem of understanding in sociology has 
tended to concentrate solely on the problem of the adequacy of sociological 
understanding of actors whereas Winch seems to be pointing towards the 
possibility of dialogue between sociologists and actors. This is an 
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intriguing point and clearly has implications for ideas concerning the 
objectivity of the social scientist. Such a dialogue presumes that the 
problem of bridging the different social contexts of actors and sociologists 
has been overcome but, as has been seen, Winch fails to establish how it 
is possible to enter into social contexts other than our own. 
Adherents of sociological approaches such as Marxism would object to 
Winch's demand that we use concepts available to the 
that this requires the acceptance of the validity of 
whereas one of the aims of such approaches is to rev 
thinking. Winch's relativism would probably result 
these approaches are appropriate only in relation to 
familiar with such ideas. Thus, a Marxist critique 
actor on the grounds 
such concepts, 
sal the error in actors' 
in his arguing that 
those actors who are 
of the actions of 
someone who does not know the meaning of terms such as alienation and false 
consciousness, is an imposition of the sociologist's perspective onto that 
of the actor, and that such an approach avoids the need to understand 
actors on which basis alone can a rational evaluation of the action be 
founded. That iss it is senseless to criticise someone for not following 
a certain rule in their action when that rule is not available to them. 
We do not intend to comment on the respective merits of these arguments 
but to point out the significance of the distinction between understanding 
and evaluating action. Winch sees no tension between these aims, 
advocating them both as legitimate ends of sociology. It is clear that 
he sees understanding as appropriate to correct 
as appropriate to mistakes. That is, we under: 
following of a rule and explain or evaluate his 
of the rules are those which are appropriate to 
The claim that the rules by which the action is 
the rules of the actor's social context reveals 
behaviour and evaluation 
stand the actor's correct 
mistakes in rule-following 
the actor's social context. 
Judged are supposed to be 
the weakness in Winch's 
distinction between understanding and evaluation for this requires that 
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the sociologist apprehend the actor's rules and, as has been seen, 
Winch fails to establish that this is possible except in situations where 
the actor and sociologist already share the same context or way of life. 
This refers back to our critique of Winch's sociology as egocentric. 
Therefore, in this situation the sociologist would judge an action to 
be understandable only if he could see himself performing the action in 
that situation whereas explanation is reserved for strange action, action 
which the sociologist would not perform, that is action which does not 
conform to the sociologist's rules. Thus as a consequence of egocentrism, 
the sociologist establishes his behaviour as the yardstick by which to 
assess the correctness of others' actions. "Strange" behaviour is 
redifined as a mistaken form of other phenomena comprehensible to the 
observer, thus preserving the centrality of his perspective. Winch 
recognises the dangers of such projection in his statement that judgements 
appropriate to one context should not be used to evaluate action within 
another context and in this respect shows more insight than some of his 
critics. 
(25) 
Winch, however, sees these contexts as whole cultures in 
the sense of European culture or Azande culture. Our criticism of 
Winch's belief in cultural homogeneity reveals that there is a similar 
problem of misplaced self-projection within cultures. That is if the 
sociologist must refrain from judging Azande beliefs and action 
he must 
equally refrain from judging those whom he naively believes to be 
his 
cultural consociates, for the inadequacy of the idea of cultural homogeneity 
reveals the possibility that such consociates inhabit different social 
contexts and accept different rules as compared tothe sociologist. 
We do not deny that social actors follow rules that social action is, 
in this sense, rational but our critique of Winch has revealed that this 
alone is not sufficient to guarantee intersubjective understanding. In 
particular it is important that Winch falls back on an unclarified 
idea of 
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homogeneous culture in order to explain how it is possible for the 
sociologist to understand other actors' rules, and we shall see that this 
is a common assumption in that type of sociology which has understanding 
as its goal. This unclarified belief will be developed as an indication 
of our resolution of the problem of intersubjective understanding. It 
is also important to note that understanding the rules of social action 
does not moan just knowing of what they consist for the understanding 
which such knowledge can provide is merely that of the "if-I-were-a-horse- 
type". *(1 ? enuine understanding, that is understanding the other in himself, 
achieving an understanding which is not distorted by the perspective of 
the observer requires a grasp of actor's meaning. That iss a grasp of 
what it means to accept the rules as binding on action, to apprehend the 
value of the rules for an actor and to understand why they are seen as 
proper guides to action. Following from this, it should be noted that 
Winch defines social action in such a way as to make it conform to his 
rule-paradigm of action. That is he. perceives action in purely goal- 
rational terms. A further critique of this idea will be developed 
below2) Winch places himself within the Verstehen tradition of 
sociology and we intend to continue our consideration of nominalist 
solutions to the problem of gaining adequate intersubjective understanding 
in sociology by a critique of the founder of this tradition, Max Weber. 
WEBER AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING 
The critique of Winch's idea of sociology has shown that, despite 
its inadequacies, it is an attempt to conf%nt directly the problems of 
acquiring knowledge of other selves and of the epistemological status 
of such knowledge. It could be argued that although Weber based his 
sociology on the need to understand actors and declared that sociology 
*(1) re above p. 141, 
*(2) re below p. 203 ff. 
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should be meaningfully adequate as well as causally adequate he failed 
to consider the precise nature and epistemological status of such 
understanding. This is because Weber failed to specify whether the 
significance which is apprehended in understanding is that of actor or 
observer . 
(1) 
That is, although Weber defines social action as behaviour 
to which the actor attaches subjective meaning and which is oriented in' 
its course by reference to the behaviour of others, he does not make 
it clear whether the apprehended meaning is the meaning of the action for 
the actor himself or for the sociologist. *(2) 
It is true that Weber fails to recognise this objection and that 
the resulting ambiguity between the significant judgements of actor 
and observer persists throughout his work. However, it would be 
incorrect to conclude that Weber fails to consider the epistemological 
status of understanding. It is our contention that much of Weber's 
methodological enquiries consist of indirect considerations of this 
problem, and aim at conferring reliability on the sociologist's 
interpretive judgements. Weber's attempts to achieve such reliability 
fall under two headings, the rational and the empirical. This is 
noteworthy as considerations of this problem tend to be either one- 
sidedly rational, that is establishing common concepts as does Winch, = 
or one-sidedly empirical, establishing common experience as in Husserl's 
Lebenswelt. Weber's approach is intriguing in that he tries to establish 
reliability in our understanding of others in both rational and empirical 
terms. However, as will be shown below, Weber does not attempt to show 
how these approaches can be combined in one overall solution and thus it 
is unclear whether they are to be seen as complementary or as alternatives 
*(1) This is the central theme of Schutz's critique of Weber, re below 
Chapter 5. 
*(2) It is clear that Weber is using the term "meaning" as we would use 
the term "significance". 
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It is necessary to make clear that we are not equating Weber's two 
4 
approaches to this problem with his demand that sociological conclusions 
should be meaningfully and causally adequate. It is possible that 
Lleber's distinction between meaningful and causal adequacy arose out of 
a 
his use of both rational and empirical approaches to understanding, but 
we are here principally concerned with how Weber attempted to establish 
the adequacy of these appro ches in themselves. 
A similar reticence is not shown by Rex and his argument reveals why 
Weber avoided this problem . Rex 
(26) 
defines meaningful adequacy, 
that is plausible statements concerning actors' perceptions, motivations 
etc., as hypotheses to be tested by prediction *. Causal adequacy is the 
state of a meaningful hypotheses which has passed sucha test. The 
problem with this account is that what is to constitute a proper test of 
the meaningful hypothesis is defined by the hypothesis. That iss the 
categories which define the appropriate test found in a future state of 
aff9irs are contained within the hypothesis and should therefore be 
subjected to test. One way to adoid this is to argue as Weber did that 
there is no objective reality, that the categories by which the idea of 
0 
reality is*constructed are arbitrary and are based on personal interests 
and values. However, such a view makes the idea of testing nonsensical 
because the future event which is the test of the hypothesis ©s an 
arbitrary construct of the tester and Therefore cannot claim any necessary 
validity in relation to the hypothesis, that is it does not have to be 
accepted as a valid test. This raises the second problem connected 
with Rex's idea of testing meaningful adequacy and this is that the 
6 
. objective event which is used as a test must be interpreted in terms of 
its meaning before its relevance as a test can be ascertained. That is, 
00 
Although it could be argued that Weber's reference to the negative and 
control experiments re below, do imply such a test. 
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the nature of the objective event has to be determined as a prior 
condition to the judgement that the existence of this event confirms or 
denies the meaningful hypothesis. In so far as this event is a test of 
the meaningful hypothesis then the objective event itself has to be 
defined in terms of its meaning. Thus the identification of the 
objective event as proving or disproving the meaningful hypothesis is 
itself based on decisions concerning the meaning of the event. Thus, 
the idea and use of the event as a test implies a definition of the 
situation by the tester. Thus the identification of the event as an 
adequate test is based upon a meaningful hypothesis adopted by the 
tester which should itself be tested. For instance, if we conclude 
that a person joined a strike out of feelings of class solidarity we could 
predict that if this was the case he would be closely involved in 
the trades union or similar movement. Such a prediction is based on 
the assumption that trade unioh activity is an expression of class solid- 
arity. The fact that the person in question is not involved in such 
movements may mean that the initial hypothesis was wrong or it could 
mean that the person does not share the tester's definition of the 
trade union movement which he may see as a self-interested bureaucracy 
which is irrelevant to the interests of the workers. Thus, such tests 
are clearly based on the assumption that if the tester were in the 
actor's situation he would define that situation in the following way, 
but in so far as this is supposed to give us information about the 
actor, the assumption itself is an untested hypothesis. It is therefore 
simply another way in which the actor's perceptions can be criticised 
for not conforming to the perceptions of the sociologist. 
* It is noteworthy that Rex constantly refers to an objective reality or 
or objective facts. We do not oppose the idea of an objective reality 
but Rex does not propose any method of demonstrating the existence and 
nature of such a reality. Indeed, his notion of an objective reality 
would appear to refer to any phenomenon external to the individual and 
this wnuld resemble Durkheim's idea of social facts. 
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In similar fashion Rex's consideration of the ideal type treats 
this as a hypothesis to be tested. It therefore overlooks the problems 
of how such hypotheses are generated, their relationship to the actor's 
perception and their status as constructs of the sociologist. Rex does 
refer to sociologist's making constructs of actor's constructs, but his 
notion of the sociologist's testing the actor's constructs suggests that 
those of the sociologist have a higher degree of reliability. As has 
been seen there are no necessary grounds for this conclusion. The fact 
that the sociologist's conclusions are acceptable to other sociologists 
tells us nothing about their adequacy as means of telling us about the 
behaviour of non-sociologists. Even if Rex is correct about the general 
consensus concerning the means of resolving disputes among sociologists, 
the conclusion that an actor's definition of the situation is incorrect 
as judged by these procedures tells us only that the actor does not see 
things in the same way as does the sociological community. 
THE RATIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN WEBER'S mETHDDOLOGY. 
The meaning of the term rationality has different meanings in Weber's 
substantive and methodological work. In the former, for instance in his 
discussion of the distinctive ethos of modern capitalism, the term rational 
means, variously, the use of planning in the selection of the most efficient 
means to ends and the growth of concern with short-term mundane interests. 
However, in Weber's methodological considerations the idea of 
rationality is never fully clarified and probably has a different meaning 
to those listed above. The idea of rationality in this context is 
intimately bound up with the problem of understanding, thus Weber 
distinguishes between four types of rational action(27) in terms of 
increasing rationality and a parallel increasing possibility of understanding; 
*It is noticeable that Rex assumes a coherent, homogeneous sociological 
community. 
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these are: - 
1) Affective Rational Action - action motivated by emotion or 
feeling. This is the least rational type, 
2) Traditional Rational Action - action motivated by habit or 
respect for tradition, 
3) Value-Rational Action (Vert-Rationalitat) - action motivated 
by unquestioned values pursued for theirrown sake. 
4) Goal-Rational Action ( Zwerk-Rationalitat) - action motivated 
by the selection of the most rational means to a given end; by "rational 
means" Weber refers to the most efficient means, the means most likely to 
bring about the desired result. This according to Weber is the most 
rational action and the one which is most readily understood by an 
observer. This idea of rationality as the common ground between actor 
and sociologist is fruitful and will be developed below. However, it 
should be noted that Weber does not define clearly the term rational as 
used in this context and his argument concerning the relationship between 
rationality and understanding is tautological in that we are said to 
understand action which is rational, rational action is that action which 
can - be understood. Such an argument which identifies two unknowns does 
not help us to grasp what is meant by rational or what is involved in 
understanding action. 
It is also necessary to consider why Weber sees goal-rational action 
as the most rational form of action and therefore the most understandable. 
We initially pointed out that the idea of rationality is used by Weber in 
the distinctive contexts of substantive enquiry and methodology; that is, 
rationality is for Weber an object of research and a tool of research. 
However, there is a major interpenetration of these usages of the term 
because the action which Weber declares to be the most rational and most 
readily understood that is, goal-rational action, is precisely that which 
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he identifies with the spirit of capitalism(28) which was the permanent 
object of all his research. 
We are not claiming that Weber is attempting to offer a crude 
justification of capitalism by claiming it to be the peak of rationality 
but the identity of the spirit of capitalism and that means end type of 
action which Weber sees as the most rational and the most understandable 
raises other problems concerning the adequacy of the equation of rationality 
and understanding. Weber sees the spirit of capitalism as being the 
distinctive and dominant feature in our culture; it constitutes our 
everyday world. Thus in claiming it to be an instance of the most 
rational form of action, Weber is doing nothing more than stating that 
it is the most familiar kind of action. That is, it is the action 
which is typical in our everyday world. Thus, we understand the 
Calvinists, the exemplars of goal-rational action, simply because we are 
like them. Thus Weber's use of the term rational is misleading. There 
is nothing inherently more rational about goal-oriented behaviour and thus, 
instead of rational, Weber should use the term familiar. That is, his 
argument concerning the greater possibility of understanding goal-rational 
behaviour, results in the conclusion that we understand best that which 
is familiar to us. Once again our understanding of others in this 
tradition is seen to be based on their similarity to us. Thus this 
approach means that we only understand others in so far as they are like 
us. 
It may be argued that we have done Weber an injustice. We are 
claiming that Weber seeks to establish the rationality of understanding 
but that he has simply defined as rational that which we can understand 
and this is that with which we are most familiar. It may be claimed that 
we are merely assuming that because the rational is familiar we may ignore 
its rational character and perceive it as merely that which is familiar. 
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That is, we live in a rational culture and thus are familiar with it, 
but this does not make it any the less rational. In defence of our 
position, we would argue that the meaning of rationality is unclear. 
Weber's use of the term in relation to the types of action identifies it 
with the selection of efficient means to a given end. It would be 
grotesque to argue that only in our culture are means selected as being 
appropriate to ends, given the available knowledge, and equally, it is 
not clear why traditional, affective or value-rationality should be seen 
as less amenable to rational calculation than goal-rationality. This 
realisation requires us to consider further the nature of the distinctions 
which are drawn between Weber's types of rational action. 
We would argue that there is not a gradual change in the degree of 
rationality among these types but that the types themselves fall into two 
qualitatively distinct blocks. Affective, traditional and value- 
rationality are all concerned with the nature of the ends of action, in 
terms of which, particular acts are justified as being right, that is, 
with values in its broadest sense. That is, affective action is based 
on the belief that our feelings are an. imperative to action e. g. action 
which is aimed at helping someone we love because we love them; it 
reflects a value-orientation to experience. Traditional action, is 
based on the belief that custom should be respected, that continuity with 
the past should be preserved. Value-rationality is founded on the 
belief that one goal has precedence over all others and can never be 
sacrificed to lesser goals e. g. the belief that universal brotherhood is 
an absolute goal. All these types of action, display the characteristic 
of being oriented to values, of implying a critique of the goals of 
action and of containing an imperative to action. Indeed it could be 
* Weber does introduce a sparious argument concerning unthinking emotional 
reaction and mere habit as reasons for denying full rational status 
to 
affective and traditional action, but these are clearly qualitatively 
distinct categories composed with traditional and affective action. Ih- 
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claimed that there is only one type of action displayed here and that is 
value-rationality. . Affective and traditional action are thus particular 
instance s of value-rationality. 
The second action type is goal-rationality, action based on the 
selection of appropriate means to a given end. Unlike the previous 
action-types this is not concerned with values or justification or 
imperatives; it is simply a pragmatic orientation to action regardless 
of the nature of the goal and of considerations of value. Nevertheless 
these two action types are not alternatives nor do they represent opposed 
ends of a scale of rationality but are complementary. That is, in 
seeking to realise a value in action the actor 
will choose what seem to him the most appropriate available means. 
Equally, the means by which an action is carried out are selected as 
being appropriate to achieving a goal which is chosen as being valued by 
the actor. Thus value-rationality refers to the justification of ends 
as desirable, goal-rationality refers to the selection of means as 
appropriate. The extent to which these two action types are intermeshed 
can be illustrated by the fact that any one act can be perceived as being 
a case of goal-rationality, that is it is a means to a further end, and 
an instance of value-rationality in that it is valued because it is seen 
as achieving a desirable state of affairs. We can express this idea 
slightly differently by saying that a deliberate act, that is an act which 
is a consequence of the actor's contemplation of his situation*, is a 
synthesis of goal and value rationality. It is necessary therefore to 
consider why Weber chose to separate them and, critically, why he saw 
goal rationality as more rational and understandable than value-rationality. 
* We introduce this qualification for a sociologist can understand, as 
opposed to comprehend, only that which is understandable to the actor. 
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WEBER AND VALUES 
An immediate reason for Weber's granting rational priority to goal- 
rationality can be found in his political theory in which he distinguished 
between two alternative approaches to political behaviour. The first of 
these is the ethic of responsibility or pragmatic attitude which is 
equivalent to goal rationality. The second is the ethic of ultimate ends 
which sees one value as solely desirable and refuses to accept compromise 
in relation to this value and is thus clearly equivalent to value- 
rationality. Weber himself favoured the ethic of responsibility, 
although he rejected the machiavellianism which this attitude implies. 
He justified this decision on the grounds that the ethic of ultimate ends 
always leads to the acceptance of'hehaviour which is contradictory to the 
end as a short term expedient e. g. the pacifist in refusing to take up 
arms at time of war must accept that by this decision he may be causing 
the death of his fellow-countrymen. That is his decision not to kill 
the enemy means that the enemy has a greater ability to kill the pacifist's 
countrymen. We are not primarily interested in the acceptability of 
this argument although it must be pointed out that the decision to adopt 
the ethic of responsibility is itself a value decision which identifies 
this attitude as the highest value. That is, the ethic of responsibility 
is itself an instance of the ethic of ultimate ends, indicating again 
the implausibility of anything other than an analytic separation of means 
and values. Our interest is in the relation of Weber's distinction to 
the problem and nature of understanding in sociology. We contend that 
the effect, if not the purpose of this distinction, is to eliminate 
certain values from sociological discourse, That by defining the means 
of action as more rational than the values of action sociology is 
encouraged to consider means rather than ends. However, we have seen 
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that values cannot be separated from moans and it is therefore 
instructive to enquire as to which values are maintained within Weber's 
sociology. 
The claim that Weber's rational understanding in sociology is 
achieved only by an elimination of values from the subject matter of 
sociology may be seen as nonsensical and as indicating that we have 
misunderstood Weber's notion of ethical neutrality, which affirms no more 
than that the sociologist should not seek to evaluate actioh as part of 
the sociological enterprise. It could be argued that Weber's sociological 
investigations are concerned above all with values, as in the study of 
the Protestant Ethic. However it has been seen that the values which are 
clarified in the Protestant Ethic are precisely those of goal-ration9lity, 
which values are favoured by Weber himself. The limitation' of this 
enquiry is revealed if we consider the comparative studies of religion 
which developed out of the enquiry into the emergence of capitalism. 
These studies culminate in the classification of religion into four 
groups based on the permutations of the opposed qualities of mysticism 
and asceticism, inner-world and other-world orientations thus: - 
1) Inner-Worldly Asceticism exemplified by Calvinism 
2) Inner-Worldly mysticism exemplified by Hinduism 
3) Other-worldly Asceticism exemplified by Confucianism 
4) Other-Worldly mysticism exemplified by 8huddism 
The adequacy of these categories, with the exception of the first, 
has been sharply criticised an the grounds that they are not appropriate 
to the particular religions. That the categories of inner-worldly, other- 
worldly, mysticism and asceticism, are appropriate in relation to the 
Calvinistic world-view only. Thus, non-Calvinistic religi1ons are discussed 
only in so far as they represent a frustrated or inhibited Calvinism. 
- 209 - 
Similarly, in the Sociology of Religion, Weber discusses various 
manifestations of the elective affinity between social being and 
religious belief, principally in terms of their relationship to the 
development of economic rationality as exemplified in the spirit of 
capitalism. We are not simply claiming that the Protestant ethic was 
the dominant influence in the whole of Weber's work but that all Weber's 
understanding was limited to the goal-rationality as exemplified in his 
apprehension of Calvinism. That is Weber understood everything in 
terms of the Protestant ethic or goal-rationality . Thus, although he 
described orientations other than inner-worldly asceticism, he under- 
stood such orientations and their effect on action only in the terms set 
by inner-worldly asceticism. 
The limitation of Weber's understpnding to goal-rationality is 
exemplified further in his study of the types of authority 
(31) 
of which 
he located three: - 
1) Legal-Rational authority 
2) Traditional authority 
3) Charismatic authority 
These types of authority correspond to three of the types of action 
Legal-rational authority is equivalent to goal-rational action, traditional 
authority is equivalent to traditional action, charismatic authority is 
equivalent to effective action. The omitted action type is value- 
rationality. This is significant because an analysis of the three types 
of action reveals that they are all based on considerations of value- 
rationality. That is, the perception of certain valued qualities in the 
charismatic leader as requiring the follower's obedience, the unquestioning 
respect for tradition or for properly enacted rules which identifies these 
as justifying the subordinate's position. Nevertheless, Weber's analysis 
of these types of authority is carried out in purely goal-rational terms 
* It is worthy of note that, although inner worldly asceticism is the 
equivalent of goal-rational action the other categories of religion have 
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involving such questions as how the authority is maintained and 
administered, what tensions it faces etc. The types of authority them- 
selves being presented as based on rules, although only in the case of 
legal rational authority are the rules, rationally and explicitly formulated. 
Further, as in the case of the sociology of religion, the non-goal-rationgl 
types of action, in this case charismatic and traditional authority are 
depicted as inferior variations of the goal-rational type . Thus Weber 
discusses at great length the internal weaknesses and potential sources 
of breakdown of charismatic and traditional authority, whereas he 
concentrates on the stability and permanence of legal-rational authority 
and its bureaucratic mode of administration. The only reference to the 
possibility of a break-down of legal-rational authority is a fleeting 
statement concerning the "unlikely" event of a complete re-orientation in 
popular values. Overlooking the possibility of such an event being more 
likely than Weber admits, the significant point here is that Weber thus 
admits the dependance of even legal-rational authority on value orientations. 
However, the nature and significance of such orientations are completely 
omitted from his analysis. 
We have noted that this concentration on goal-rational action reflects 
Weber's own value decision concerning the superiority of this orientation 
in political life. Further, if the course of Weber's personal life is 
considered 
(32) 
we would note his dedication to duty, his capacity for hard 
work, his perception of the scientific life as a vocation, his constant 
self-questioning. All these characteristics are principles of that 
* It was possibly the failure to realise the necessity to take into 
account the value basis of authority which led Weber to overlook the 
possible disastrous consequences of charismatic leadership in a modern 
state when he advocated the introduction of the office of a popularly 
elected president into the constitution of the Weimar Republic. Weber's 
denial of the relevance of values as opposed to interests to his analysis 
is clearly shown in his statement that the value difference between Christ 
and Genghis Khan does not prevent their being seen equally as charismatic 
leaders. 
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attitude which Weber termed the Protestant ethic. Indeed, we would 
argue that Weber was the personification of the Protestant ethic. Thus 
his explication of this ethic and his perception of socio-cultural 
phenomena solely in their relationship to this rationale is Weber's 
projection of his values and interests onto the situation of others. 
Therefore, in terming goal-rational behaviour as being the most rational 
and therefore the most understandable Weber cannot claim these to be 
qualities of goal-rational action for he is, unwittingly asserting no more 
than that he finds this orientation the most understandable because it is 
his attitude to experience; it is familiar to him. The category of 
value-rationality is reserved for those orientations to the world which 
differ from Weber's own. The claim that they are less rational than 
goal-rationality and therefore less understandable justifies their minor 
status as objects of sociological investigation. Indeed, as we have seen, 
such phenomena are not discussed by Weber in their own terms but as 
deviations from the norm of goal-rationality. That is as deviations from 
Weber's perspective. Thus, we see that Weber's attempt to establish 
understanding through the category of rationality, involves a vague if not 
spurious notion of rationality, and succeeds only in reifying the 
observer's ego-perspective, equating it with a position of superior 
rationality so that other's are understood solely in terms of their being 
deviations from self. Once again, we see how an attempt to understand 
others succeeds only by denying the otherness of others and by 
arbitrarily aggrandising the values and perspective of the observer. 
It could be argued that this conclusion is much ado about nothing for 
is it not the case that Weber clearly recognised and accepted this 
consequence for sociology in his demand that sociology be value-relevant? 
That iss that the sociologist's perception of his subject matter is 
informed by his values which identify that which is relevant for him and 
that this shapes his perception of the situation. 
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In answer to this defence of Weber we make the following points. 
To recognise a fault is not to remedy it; to say that Weber recognised 
this aspect of his sociology does not make the problems connected with 
it any the less. However, the strength of Weber's defence against our 
criticism lies in the claim that such egocentric perception is said to 
be inevitable and therefore it is clearly irrational to criticise someone 
for accepting that which has to be accepted as part of the nature of 
things. This argument rests on the claim by Weber that reality is 
chaotic and that any order which is seen in it is the consequence of our 
conscious acts in which our order is imposed on reality. Therefore in 
order to say anything about experience we must accept that this experience is 
necessarily a product of our ego-perspective. Therefore, on the basis 
of this claim Weber's ego-centric methodology is inevitable and, if we 
reflect on our acts, we will see that it is the method by which we make 
sense of things in everyday life, It is clear that this argument is 
relativistic in that it makes all knowledge relative to individual 
interests. Indeed, the denial of the existence of a structure immanent 
to reality is central to Weber's opposition to Natural Law theories. 
However this argument encounters the contradiction inherent in all 
relativisms in that it assumes as the basis of the argument that things- 
in-themselves are unknowable an apprehension of things in themselves. 
That iss in order for Weber's claim that reality is chaotic and therefore 
unknowable to make sense it is necessary that we accept that Weber has 
apprehended the chaotic nature of reality and if this is so, then 
reality is knowable. Further, the claim that reality is chaotic and 
that its apparent structure is illusory, being no more than our subjective 
impositions on this reality, arbitrarily defines subjective consciousness 
as structured, non-chaotic and knowable, In so far as subjective 
consciousness is part of reality there can be no justification for 
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declaring that it alone is non-chaotic. Such a declaration also 
undermines the consistency of the argument that reality as such is 
chaotic. If consciousness alone is structured and non-chaotic and 
that this is the condition of our being able to know the conscious acts 
whereby non-conscious reality is given the appearance of order, then 
this must apply to all consciousnesses. That is, "reality" is reality 
structured by consciousness. The fact that we know this to be the case 
*(i) 
shows that consciousness, the act of knowing, is knowable . If this is 
so, then all consciousnesses are knowable but other consciousnesses form 
part of the reality which is structured by my consciousness and are 
unknowable in 'themselves. 
As we have seen, Weber's acceptance of this limitation of the possibil- 
ities of cognition based on our value decisions results in an implicitly 
ago-centric and therefore solipsistic attitude to knowledge. It is there- 
fore clear that this essentially nominalistic view of cognition asserts 
the contradictory propositions that consciousness alone is structured 
and therefore knowable but that other consciousnesses, which are also 
structured and therefore knowable, are part of that reality constituted 
by my consciousness and are therefore unknowable. That is other 
consciousnesses are, as other, unknowable but contradictorily as" 
consciousness they are knowable. 
* 4inally 
there is an element of the self- 
fulfilling prophecy in the procedure of value-relevance for in defining 
phenomena in so far as they are significant to us we limit the acceptability 
of such definitions to us and those like us and, at the same time, render 
irrelevant the objections of those who perceive the phenomenon through 
different values. 
*(1) It will be noted that Husserl's later work, with its emphasis on the 
constitutive acts of consciousness is similar to this position. 
*(2) It is our intention to establish intersubjectivity phenomenologically 
by overcoming this contradiction through the concept of the Transcendental 
consciousness. We intend to show that this consciousness not only 
parallels an immanently structured reality but transcends not only 
empirical consciousness but also the self-other distinction. 
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However, it would be incorrect to infer from this that knowledge 
is necessarily linited to that which is apprehended through the ego- 
perspective for this assumes the inevitability of the procedure of value- 
relevance in acquiring knowledge. We have shown that such a belief is 
based on a contradictory view concerning the nature of the act of 
acquiring knowledge and of the consciousness-object relationship. Wo 
therefore conclude that the attempt to justify the ego-centrism of Weber's 
methodology on the grounds of the inevitability of value-relevant judgements 
in acquiring knowledge, has been shown to have failed. 
The reference to value-relevance introduces the final section in our 
consideration of the role of values as elements in understanding in 
Weber's methodology. This is the idea of ethical neutrality. The 
claim by Weber that sociological investigations are relevant for value 
refers, as we have seen, to the idea that discrete elements are selected 
out of chaotic appearances by reference to'what is of value or significance 
to the sociologist. It does not. mean pronouncing on the moral worth of 
the observed phenomena; such pronouncements would be acts of evaluation. 
Thus Weber admits value into the selection of material through value- 
relevance, but denies the propriety of evaluation in the sociological 
enterpriser. The denial of evaluation 
(33) 
is based on the belief that 
value judgements, or to be more precise moral judgements, cannot be 
established by empirical science and thus to include them in sociology 
would be to undermine its scientific status. Weber's positivistic bias 
is shown in his unquestioned identity of reliability with that which can 
be empirically established; as empirical science cgnnot establish values 
they are therefore arbitrary and unreliable and have no place within 
scientific discourse. This is not to deny that the conclusions and 
findings of the sociologist may have ethical significance for him but 
that in expounding these ethical implications he ceases to be a sociologist 
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end becomes a citizen. This argument tends to contradict the argument 
concerning value-relevance for, in arguing that value judgements, and 
we see this as applying to both ethical evaluations or judgements or 
significance, are non-scientific and thereby contradict the scientific 
integrity of sociology, Weber is denying the scientific nature of sociology 
which he wishes to preserve. This is because, although it may be possible 
to exclude value-judgements in this sense of moral evaluations from 
sociology, but it is not possible, an Weber's own account, to exclude those 
value-judgements by which relevant phenomena are selected bedause it is 
this act which, in Weber's opinion, necessarily initiates the scientific 
procedure. It could be argued that the mere selection of certain 
phenomena as interesting does not compromise the scientific validity of 
the enquiry and this is perfectly correct. However, if one accepts 
Weber's view that reality is chaotic our initial value-judgements must do 
more than select phenomena, they must also identify and classify the 
phenomena. Thus, the categories and concepts with which science operates 
are selected by non-scientific and therefore, for Weber, unreliable 
value-judgements. Therefore Weber must admit that the scientific 
enterprise is, in his terms, unreliably grounded and as its initial 
conceptions are unreliable the correct usage of scientific procedure is 
no guarantee of the reliability of the conclusions. Therefore, science 
itself is relativised. As will be seen below, Weber refuses to accept 
this conclusion. 
COMPREHENSION AND UNDERSTANDING 
This discussion shows that the term "value free" sociology takes on 
a significance other than simply meaning an ethically neutral sociology, 
because Webers re-casting of phenomena by reference to his values reveals 
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that his ideal of sociology is not simply value-free, in the sense of 
avoiding evaluation, but, with the exception of Weber's own values, it is 
value-less. That is, the only values which are comprehended by this 
method are those of the sociologist, in this case Weber. That which 
makes others distinctive is their perspective on reality as achieved in 
their value-judgements. In excluding these from the outset of the 4 
enquiry by perceiving phenomena as informed by the sociologist's values 
alone Weber excludes other subjects from sociology in so far as their value- 
judgements depart from those of the sociologist. That is he achieves 
understanding in sociology by effectively abolishing other subjects and 
all understanding is ultimately self-projection . We distinguish 
between this self-projection and a genuine grasp of the other by reference 
to the concepts of comprehension and understanding. Comprehension is 
that situation where the distinctiveness of the other is denied, where 
the other is seen as a modification of self. Thus the otherness of the 
other is literally comprehended, that is, overwhelmed by the self-projection 
of the observer. Opposed to this is the concept of understanding by 
which we mean the genuine grasp of the other in himself. It is our aim 
to show that sociology is not limited to comprehending the other but can 
achieve understanding of the other through the phenomenological method. 
Therefore we may conclude that Weber's attempt to establish under- 
standing on the basis of rationality results in ego-centrism, solipsism 
and relativism and thus cannot establish our understanding of others in 
themselves. Further, Weber's idea of rationality requires the abolition 
of values, other than those of the sociologist, from the enquiry, thus 
removing an essential element from social action and inevitably distorting 
the perception and investigation of social action, thus making the possibility 133, 
of genuine understanding even more unlikely. We also noted the confusion 
and contradictory consequences of Weber's apprehension of the role of 
* This conclusion is only implicit in Weber, it is made explicit in the work of one of his pupils, Schutz. 
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values in sociology. It is therefore necessary to consider Weber's 
alternative source of intersubjective knowledge and understanding. 
is, the use of the scientific method. 
That 
THE EMPIRICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING IN WEBER'S 
METHODOLOGY 
The consideration of rationality and values in Weber concluded that 
he compromised his belief in the reliability of the scientific procedure 
through his belief that phenomena were defined by arbitrary interests. 
Nevertheless in true Kantian fashion Weber sees the universality of 
scientific procedure as overcoming the problem caused by varying value- 
perspectives. This is shown in his famous statement that, although it 
is almost inevitable that a Chinaman and a sociologist would disagree 
over the importance of an aspect of Chinese culture, the sociologist's 
enquiry is justified if the Chinaman can acknowledge that the investigation 
has been carried out by using correct procedures. This, despite the 
fact that he and the sociologist give different evaluations to the 
conclusions of the research, It is therefore, clear that Weber sees 
scientific procedure as universal and non-controversial but he fails to 
appreciate that on his account values not only select but also identify 
phenomena. 
Undoubtedly Weber saw sociology as a science and he held a positivistic 
conception of science. Weber, as is typical of positivism, accepted the 
idea of the unity of science. His disagreement with the naturalists who 
wished to apply the methods of the natural sciences in the social sciences 
centred around his conviction that such methods could not take into account 
the phenomenon of consciousness which he saw as inseparable from the idea 
of social action. Nevertheless he urged an adaptation of the scientific 
method so that it would be appropriate to the social sciences. Thus, in 
Weber's view the social and natural sciences utilise the same scientific 
- 218 - 
method which each adopts to its own specific purposes. 
The scientific method in Weber's view consists of proper logical 
processes, induction and deduction and the use of experimentation. He 
sought to establish the adequacy of acts of sociological understanding 
through the use of these methods. The most controversial aspect of this 
programme is the use of experimentation which Weber saw as not only 
necessary but inevitable in the social sciences. He noted two such 
experiments, the negative experiment and the control experiment. 
It has been noted that Weber saw personal values as defining what is 
of interest in a situation, however in his earlier work Weber emphasised 
his beli of that the subject matter of sociological and historical enquiry 
should be shaped not solely by interest but by the relative importance of 
the various observed phenomena. The question of relative importance is 
decided by use of the negative experiment in which the social scientist 
asks what would have been the likely course of events if a particular 
event had been different or absent e. g. if the Persians and not the 
Greeks had won the battle of marathon. This question is to be answered 
by reference to a "positive knowledge of the laws of events" 
(35) 
based 
on general empirical rules, and such a method gives "objective possibility" 
to our judgement concerning the significance of the event. The standard 
objection to this procedure is that it is purely hypothetical and cannot 
give reliable knowledge but it should be noted that Weber is claiming that 
the results of this experiment are only a possibility. A more serious 
criticism is that Weber is vague about the nature of the laws of events 
and general empirical rules on which the negative experiment is based and 
it is not possible to rule out the idea that our perception of the 
importance of events is shaped not by 'laws' but by our interests. 
Also, it seems probable that the laws of events and general empirical rules, 
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assuming that they exist, are themselves the products and not just the 
basis of the negative experiment. That is, if as Weber claims we assess 
the importance of events by means of the negative experiment then the 
laws of events and general empirical rules which are presumably derived 
from the observation of events must be based on prior decisions concerning 
the significance of these events. 
However, in terms of the argument concerning the nature of sociol- 
ogical understanding, greater importance attaches to Weber's idea of 
the control experiment. This is the origin of the comparative method in 
sociology but Weber intended it as a test of the adequacy of conclusions 
which were based on an understanding of action. This experiment requires 
the identification of a situation which is as similar as possible to 
that under consideration with the exception that those factors identified 
by us as crucial in the experimental situation are absent in the control. 
Thus, Weber initially embarked on his study of world religions in order 
to test the adequacy of his conclusion that the ideas embodied in 16th 
century Calvinism were a necessary, although not sufficient, cause of the 
emergence of capitalism. Thus he identified China and India as societies 
where the purely material conditions of capitalist development were 
present. Their failure to develop indigenous capitalist economies 
could therefore be attributed to the absence of an ethic from their 
societies which was present in 16th century Europe which did develop 
capitalism. Again Weber is not claiming total reliability for this 
method, merely the establishment of a possible or probable relationship. 
If capitalism had developed in non-Calvinistic India or China, Calvinism 
could not be seen as a necessary cause of the emergence of capitalism. 
The fact* that non-Calvinistic India and China did not develop an 
indigenous capitalism does not prove that Calvinism is a necessary 
* We recognise that this "fact" is disputed. 
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cause of capitalism for there is always the possibility that other 
untested factors are responsible for this relationship, but it increases 
the likelihood of the correctness of the tested hypothesis. Thus, 
Weber would argue that this method does not prove the adequacy of our 
understanding of social action but it does test such understanding in a 
way that could reveal its inadequacy. However, as our previous 
discussion of Weber's sociology of religion has pointed out, this process 
tends to be part of a self-fulfilling prophecy in which our understanding 
of the action which is to be tested, defines what is relevant in the 
control situation. Thus the control is defined in categories derived 
from our understanding of the experimental situation regardless of the 
appropriateness of these categories. Thus we conclude that Weber's 
attempts to establish the reliability of our acts of understanding 
assume the validity of the concepts which express that understanding. 
The inadequacy of this process reveals that a genuine test of understanding 
would depend on concepts which are established in themselves, independent 
of dubitable acts of understanding. This, indicates the necessity for 
that establishment of indubitable concepts which is the goal of 
phenomenology. 
Thus, Weber's attempt to establish an objective possibility in 
relation to our acts of understanding through reliance on empirical tests 
is seen to be inadequate. The basic cause of this inadequacy is that the 
empirical enquiry is made dependant upon a categorisation of phenomena 
which is not itself scientific, which originates in the values of tho 
I 
observer. Thus, empirical observation is based on the assumption of 
the adequacy of this value -perception ands therefore, can give information 
relevant only to that perspective. More importantly, empirical observation 
thus based cannot comment upon or criticise the value-perspective which 
sets the course and conditions of such observation. 
ý4t 
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Thus Weber, like Winch, creates a sociology which is organised 
around the inviolability of the perspective of the observer; such a 
sociology comprehends, it does not understand. The problem posed by 
the possibility that social actors, being conscious subjects, may have 
perspectives which differ from that of the observer, is resolved by 
abolishing other subjects. Thus Weber states that the historian deals 
"with the explanation of events and personalities which are 'interpreted' 
and 'understood' by direct analogy with our own intellectual, spiritual 
and psychological constitution" 
(36). 
That is, for Weber, the other is 
"understood" only by assuming him to be like ego. As Schutz points out, 
in this situation what we understand is not the other but self if it 
were in the other's situation. Similarly, Weber recognises a problem 
concerning a reader's understanding of the historian's account but 
significantly, he does not see this understanding as based on analogy 
between the reader and the historian but on the "suggestive vividness" 
of the historian's account, with which the reader empathises. That is 
Weber is claiming that the actor is understood by analogy, which we have 
seen to be a comprehension of the actor, whereas the historian or 
sociologist can be understood directly, that is, genuinely, understood. 
Weber gives no reason for the difference in the quality of understanding 
between observer and actor, end observer and his audience, nor does he 
clarify what he means by suggestive vividness. This difference does, 
however, suggest that Weber was dissatisfied with "understanding"by 
analogy, but only in relation to others' interpretive understanding of 
him; there is, for instance, no discussion of the possibility of 
suggestive vividness in the actor's account. One of the aims of our 
attempt to establish genuine intersubjective understanding between actor 
and observer will be to clarify the nature of that suggestive vividness 
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which convoys such genuine understanding 
We have noted that Weber's account of the nature of understanding in 
sociology is not systematic and that his ideas on this problem have, in 
some cases, to be inferred. It is therefore appropriate to complete 
our consideration of the nominalist view of intersubjective understanding 
by considering the work of Alfred Schütz who attempted a rigorous enquiry 
into the status of intersubjective understanding within the context of 
Weberian sociology 
*'2)0 
(1) re below, "metaphor and analogy" chapter 7. 
*(2) It may be objected that our discussion of Weber is incomplete as 
we have omitted any reference to Weber's concept of the ideal type and 
the method of imputing motives. These are relevant to the problem of 
understanding but a consideration of these aspects of Weber's methodology 
will be deferred until the general discussion of models in sociology. 
Re below chapters 5 and 7. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE VERSTEHENDE TRADITION IN SOCIOLOGY: SCHUTZ 
Although Schütz is by no means the latest reprdsentative of the 
nominalist verstehende tradition in sociology his work is the fullest 
expression of this tradition in relationship to the problem of inter- 
subjective understanding. It is possible to regard Schutz's work as 
limited, repetitive and little more than an extended footnote to the 
first chapter of Weber's "Economy and Society". Such a judgement, 
although broadly correct, overlooks the significance of Schutz's "extended 
foot-notes" which raised in acute form those problems of the epistemological 
status of intersubjective understanding in sociology which Weber, as we 
have seen, tried to avoid. In so doing, Schutz took the Weberian 
tradition to its logical conclusions and the ambiguities and contradbctLons 
which litter Schutz's work are a product of and a comment upon this 
tradition. Schutz has further relevance for our discussion for he 
claimed allegiance not only to Weber's sociology but also to Husserl's 
phenomenology. Our identification of Weber's sociology as positivistic 
and relativistic indicates the great disparity between he and Husserl. 
, 
It is our contention that Schutz could not reconcile these opposed 
positions and that, as a consequence, he abandoned the more distinctive 
elements of Husserl's phenomenological method and programme. This claim 
is particularly important as most of what is claimed to be phenomenological 
sociology in Britain and America derives from Schütz. It is therefore 
necessary to consider initially Schdtz's idea of intersubjectivity in his 
critique of Husserl. 
We have noted Schütz's trenchant criticisms of Husserl's attempts to 
establish intersubjectivity . In declaring Husserl's argument a failure 
Schütz expresses the belief that intersubjectivity, as a datum of the 
* re below chapter 3. 
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life-world must be simply accepted by phenomenology because it is "the 
fundamental ontological category of human existence"(l) and he further 
claims that intersubjectivity poses insoluble problems for phenomenology's 
operative concepts 
(2). 
This argument is contradictory. If Schutz is 
correct in asserting that intersubjectivity must be simply accepted he 
can have no grounds for asserting it to be the fundamental ontological 
category of human existence because this latter statement presupposes the 
recognition and classification of intersubjectivity which cannot be 
achieved if it is merely accepted. Thus, it is necessary to ask what 
it is that we are accepting if we accept intersubjectivity as a fact, 
that is, if we admit the impossibility of a critical attitude toward it. 
Such acceptance being uncritical means adopting a naive, taken-for-granted, 
common-sense understanding of intersubjectivity*'l). Our clarification 
of the naive perception of others has shown it to be based on considerations 
of significance, that is, it is oriented to the other in respect of the 
other's relevance to the attainment of ego's goals. It has also been 
shown to be ego-centric, seeing the other as a modification of "I" which 
is the situation of practical solipsism. Thus in adopting this position 
concerning the impossibility of a critique of intersubjectivity Schutz, 
like Winch and Weber, commits himself to a solipsistic position*(2). 
Thus, although we could say that Husserl tried to establish intersubjectivity 
and failed, Schutz, because he accepted Husserl's failure as definitive, 
does not even try. Thus Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding 
in his sociological work is largely a descriptive list of the types of 
understanding, or rather comprehension, possible(3). Even here Schutz 
*(1) The nonsense of claiming to be a phenomenologist while urging dependence on naive concepts should, by now, be obvious. 
*(2) It should be emphasised that this position is not solipsistic in 
the sense of denying the existence of others but in the sense of denying 
the possibility of an understanding of others in themselves. That iss 
it denies understanding as opposed to comprehension. 
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assumes that real grasp of the other understanding in our sense, the 
possibility of which he denies. This is because he categorises the 
types of understanding according to their proximity to a norm of such 
actual understanding of the other in himself. This requires that, even 
if Schutz cannot tell us how to attain such understanding, he is claiming 
that he knows what actual understanding of the other's intentions would 
look like. That is, Schutz's account can justify the denial of the poss- 
ibility of genuine understanding only on practical grounds ie. that it is 
very difficult to achieve. He cannot consistently deny it on theoretical 
grounds, ie. that such knowledge is necessarily unavailabla, because he 
is forced to assume that he possesses such knowledge. 
THE RECIPROCITY OF PERSPECTIVES 
It is therefore necessary to consider Schutz's account of the nature 
of naive intersubjectivity which he claims to be based on the general 
thesis of the other which is accepted by all those within the naive attitude 
or Lebenswelt in order to contrast it with his idea of sociological 
understanding. This thesis is that the other exists and that his mode of 
perceptions is the same as ego's. This belief results in the assumption 
of the reciprocity of perspectives which is the belief held by ego that 
if he were in the other's situation ie. "there" he would perceive the 
situation in the same way as the other. Equally, if the other were in 
ego's situation is "here" he would perceive the situation as does ego. 
It will be seen that this idea is identidel to Husserl's notion of 
the establishment of intersubjectivity by transference of sense or 
apperceptive transfer between self and other 
*. There is one major 
difference between these ideas and this is that, unlike Husserl, Schutz 
does not see the reciprocity of perspectives'as providing reliable data. 
Thus, in his critique of Husserl, he states that the experience of "you 
* re below chapter 3. 
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can" and "you could" cannot be achieved by transferring the sense of "I 
can" and "I could". This is so because my being here and your being 
there involves necessarily, "'scan from here but you cannot from there".... 
(nor can the problem be overcome by saying) were I there then I would be 
able to do what you can from your here', since this extension by no means 
admits the converse, 'if you were here, then you could do what I can from 
here' "(4). Equally it is not possible to derive "you can" since the 
notion of everyone originates in intersubjectivity and the problem here 
is that of establishing intersubjectivity. 
It is therefore necessary to consider Schutz's attitude to the 
relationship between the reciprocity of perspectives and sociology which 
will be seen to be ambivalent 
l) 
It has been noted that Schutz criticises 
the adequacy of this idea as used by Husserl and it would be expected that 
he would demand that sociological understanding should not be based upon 
it, and this he does(5). However, Schutz also affirms that sociology uses 
the same methods as everyday life to disclose another's motives(6). 
Although this part of the analysis is couched in terms of the inter- 
relationship of "because" and "in-order-to motives"*(2) je. my in-order- 
to motives become the other's because motives, it is clearly the same 
idea of the reciprocity of perspectives, expressed in motivational language, 
with the exception that it is assumed that the knowledge required 
for 
successful reciprocation is available. However, it is not made clear 
how such knowledge is to be obtained other than by use of the assumption 
of the reciprocity of pbrspectives. It should also be noted that Schutz's 
critique of the reciprocity of perspectives contradicts his statement, 
noted above, that phenomenology, and presumably sociology, should simply 
*(1) re below, this chapter passim. 
*(2) These terms are clarified below 
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accept the fact of intersubjectiiity. If Schutz is correct in asserting 
that the reciprocity of perspectives is the basis of intersubjactive 
knowledge, consistency would require that he urge its acceptance by 
sociology. That is, in correctly rejecting the adequacy of the reciprocity i 
perspectives Schutz is implying a critique of intersubjectivity, the 
possibility of which he denied in his comments on Husserl. This raises 
the further point that Schutz, perhaps unwittingly, implies a reliable 
alternative to the reciprocity of perspectives for he presents his account 
of how naive subjects gain knowledge of each other as being true for all 
subjects. However, if the reciprocity of perspectives is the basis of 
all knowledge of others, Schutz can assert it to be so in his case alone 
because, as he admits, the reciprocity of perspectives can tell us nothing 
reliable about others including how they achieve intersubjactive understandinc 
That is, in asserting the reciprocity of perspectives to be the method used 
by all subjects, Schutz is claiming a knowledge of other subjects which 
on his terms cannot be provided by the reciprocity of perspectives. 
However, if Schutz is renouncing his denial of the possibility of a 
critique of intersubjectivity he should state the nature of this non-naive 
and reliable method of understanding and this he does not do. Indeed, 
far from this, Schutz equates the sociological mode of understanding with 
a particular type of everyday naive understanding, that of indirect social 
experience. 
(6) 
It will be seen that the distinctive nature of sociology 
for Schutz does not lie in a special and reliable method of understanding 
but in the detachment of the sociologist from the course of action and 
the peculiar nature of sociological types; both of these ideas will be con- 
sidered below. Thus Schutz asserts the necessity to avoid basing 
sociological understanding on naive procedures such as the reciprocity of 
perspectives but his failure to identify an alternative method and his 
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eventual equation of sociological and naive procedures results in the 
conclusion that despite his intentions Schutz could do no other than to 
see the reciprocity of perspectives as both inadequate and inevitable *. 
(1) 
The consequences of this are either a sociology indistinguishable from 
common-sense in the quality of its understanding or a sociology which 
studies self and abandons others, despite the fact that it expects to be 
understood by others. Both positions imply effective solipsism. It 
will be seen below that Schutz, at different points in his analysis, 
opted for both these alternatives. 
There is a further solipsistic tendency in Schutz's approach to the 
analysis of intersubjectivity. Schutz's principal sociological concepts 
are developed in relation to action in the context of the isolated 
individu9l or, occasionally, in relation to social action, the situation 
of the isolated individual oriented to anonymous and passive others. 
(7) 
However, sociology is concerned with social interaction which Schutz sees 
as merely a quantitative development of action. Thus, despite all his 
subsequent references to the we-relationship Schutz lacks the concepts to 
account for the intersubjective community; the other in the we-relationship 
is for Schutz a copy of ego. Therefore, interaction for Schutz is the 
simultaneous occurrence of a number of courses of action which, although 
he describes them as mutually oriented, he can analyse only by reference 
to, and by isolating, a particular actor, "ego". That is, Schutz attempts 
the nonsensical procedure of accounting for communality and sociation 
through concepts derived from consideration of the isolated individual(2) 
It will be seen that Schutz fails to correct his concepts and break out 
*(l) As noted above, the perception of the inadequacy of the reciprocity 
of perspectives implies a prior conception of an adequate procedure. 
That is, the recognition that the reciprocity of perspectives is inadequate 
means that it cannot be inevitable on a theoretical as opposed to practical 
level. 
*(2) The consequences of this for Schutz's idea of sociology are discussed 
below. 
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of this solipsistic position and therefore fails to study interaction 
sui enc eris. It is therefore necessary to consider Schutz's account of 
intersubjectivity and the idea of sociology which derives from it in 
order to assess its adequacy and to suggest the causes of its failure, 
some of which have been referred to above. 
THE NATURE'*TOF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING IN SCHUTZ 
The first question to be answered in a consideration of the problem 
of intersubjective understanding is what is the knowledge which we must 
acquire in order to achieve such understanding? In Winch's view this is 
knowledge of social rules, for Weber it is knowledge of subjective meaning. 
Schutz, in clarifying Weber's ideas defines this necessary knowledge as 
the knowledge of motivation. 
Schutz distinguishes two motivational phases of action, the in-order- 
to-motive and the because-motive. The in-order-to motive states the 
intention of the action in terms of the completed act; e. g. "I went out 
of my house in order to see my friend". Thus the in-order-to motive 
states the goal of the action in terms of a completed state of affairs. 
This refers to Schutz's distinction between Act and action, that is between 
a completed Act, which is always seen by Schutz as an observable state of 
affairs, and the action or process which culminates in the Act. In 
Schutz's view, sociological interpretation is directed to observable Acts. 
This distinction is inadequate because, despite Schutz's claims to the 
contrary, there is no qualitative distinction between Act and action. 
Every action can be seen as Act in relation to that which precedes it; 
every Act can be seen as action in relation to that which succeeds it. 
Thus, to take the example given above, we could say "I went out of my 
* It is true that Schutz claims that motive is not meaning but a context 
of meaning (Phenomenology of the Social World p. 216). However, due to 
his denial of the possibility of understanding intended meanings Schutz 
in practise equates meaning, objective meaning-content and Act. 
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house and visited my friend in order to discuss business matters with 
him". Here the former Act, visiting my friend, is perceived as action 
that is, part of the process of achieving the goal of discussing business. 
This indicates that the question "why? ", which elicits the response of the 
in-order-to motive, is potentially infinite. Thus, we need to ask why 
is one goal cited as the in-order-to-motive rather than another goal which 
actually precedes or follows the stated goal? The crucial point which 
Schutz fails to note is that the stated in-order-to motive is a product 
of the description of the Act, e. g. "visiting a friend" or "discussing 
business", and it is this which defines the extent of the action and 
therefore specifies the in-order-to motive. Thus, for us to know why a 
particular in-order-to motive is given it is necessary to enquire why the 
Act is described in that particular way. This, in turn, requires a 
consideration of the reasons for enquiring into the Act which Schutz 
fails to carry out. This reveals the inadequacy of discussing motives 
in relation to the solitary ego as Schutz does, for motives are made the 
subject of enquiry in a social context in which an other sees the action 
as problematic*('), and thus the questioning of motives is unreal outside. 
a cocial context in which the questioning occurs. The social context 
also provides the definition of the limits of the action because in 
responding to an enquiry about his motives the actor will seek to identify 
that aspect of the action which will satisfy the assumed interests of the 
enquirer as well as serving the actor's own interests. 
*(2) 
Take the case 
of someone reading a book. He is asked by his young child why he is 
reading and gives the answer that he is reading in order to learn what 
the book says. He is asked the same question by a colleague and gives 
*(1) The only exception to this is where ego enquires into the motives 
behind his own action, when he is surprised by that action is. when he 
sees this action as strange or alien. 
*(2) Schutz recognises that motives are made explicit by another's questionin 
but he does not realise the significance of this fact for his theory. 
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the answer that he is reading the book in order to prepareaa lecture. 
Thus two different in-order-to motives have been given in explanation of 
the same action but we could not argue that only one of them is the real 
motive because both answers are true in that they bath refer to actual 
intended results of the reading. The reason for the different statement 
of motives lies in the social context of the question. The reader gives 
answers derived from the various intended consequences of his action 
which he believes will satisfy the interests of the questioner* . Thus 
if a sociologist enquires into an actor's in-order-to motive the answer 
which he receives, assuming no deceit by the actor, will not be a statement 
of the motive of the action but an identification of an intended consequence 
of the action which the actor believes will satisfy the sociologist's 
curiosity. 
The second type of motive and the most important in terms of Schutz's 
overall theory is the because-motive. However Schutz uses this term in 
a number of different ways. The principal meanings given to this idea 
by Schutz, are, firstly the formal idea that the because-motive refers to 
the preceding conditions in which the action took place. There is also 
a second usage by Schutz of the idea of the because-motivg,. which he does 
not explicitly recognise and this is the idea of this motive as the 
justification of the action in terms of its value for the actor. We will 
clarify below why Schutz does not formally recognise this aspect of 
motivation even though he uses it. However, it is necessary to justify 
our claim concerning the various ideas of the because motive; we will do 
this by reference to Schutz's distinction between a genuine and a pseudo- 
because motive. 
According to Schutz the genuine as opposed to the pseudo- because- 
motive cannot be translated into an in-order-to motive. It is unclear 
'This does not cover the possibility of the presentation of false motives 
y *HO nn+nr. 
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whether this refers to the translatability of the idea of the motive or 
the form of words in which it is expressed. Thus the statements "I 
stole the bread in order to ease my hunger" and "I stole the bread 
because I was hungry" express the same idea in different tenses. It 
would appear that the latter is a genuine because motive for it refers 
to a post state as opposed to the former sentence which refers to a 
future goal. However Schutz would seem to disagree with this for he 
claims that the statement "I open my umbrella because it is raining" as 
a pseudo because-motive on the grounds that it can be translated into 
"I open my umbrella in order to keep from getting wet"(8). This 
argument reveals Schutz's confusion concerning the nature of the because- 
motive for the latter statement is not simply a translation of the 
former since these statements give different information. The so-called 
pseudo because-motive is a statement concerning the surrounding environ-' 
ment or context of the action whereas the in-order-to motive is a 
statement of reaction to those conditions. Also Schutz's reference to 
the hypothetical because-motive of a murderer(9) indicates an alternative 
view of the nature of the because-motive as an external force which 
creates dispositions to act in a certain way. Thus Schutz, in the idea 
of the because-motive, confuses the distinctive notions of causes of 
action and reasons for acting. We do not decide to commit murder because 
we had bad companions nor does rain necessarily create a disposition to 
umbrella raising. Further, neither of these ideas of the because-motive 
is adequate as a means of enablingwstnunderstand why the actor behaved in 
that particular way. This missing element is most clearly demonstrated 
in Schutz's instance of raising an umbrella. He takes it for granted 
that my perception that it is raining is the cause of my raising my 
umbrella. This is not so. I raise my umbrella because I dislike getting 
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wet. This reveals that element which is omitted by Schutz; that iss 
the fact that the actor judges the significance of the situation and this 
is done by reference to a general orientation towards experience in 
terms of which, situations are seen as relevant or irrelevant, goals are 
identified as appropriate or inappropriate and projects are defined. 
That is, motivated action is based on a perception of the nature of the 
situation and judgements concerning its significance which is determined 
by reference to general values held by the actor. In view of Schutz's 
omission of the value-basis of motivation it is unsurprising that he 
defines goal-rational behaviour, as understood by Weber*, as peculiarly 
sociologically significant behaviour. Therefore, in this instance it 
would be more accurate to state that the project of the Act, raising the 
umbrella, is initiated by the actor as reasonable behaviour in terms of 
the general goal of keeping dry in so far as this is seen not to frustrate 
other, higher values. Unlike the project, generalised goals or values 
are not located in a particular time, such as the part of future-perfect 
tense but are part of our permanent present, our being-in-the-world. 
It may be argued that Schutz recognises the value-basis of action 
in his notion of the meaning-context of action. However, his reference 
to meaning-context is misleading for clarification of his idea that 
meaning-context is a synthesis of discrete lived experiences results in 
an unequivocal identification of meaning-context and Act, or completed 
deed(10). That is, the Act is a meaning-context because its achievement 
unites all the preceding phases of action which culminate in the'Act. 
There is no need to repeat our dissatisfaction with the Act-action 
distinction, but it is necessary to note that in his discussion of 
intersubjectivity Schutz bases the grasp of subjective-meaning, which he 
sees as the goal of sociology, on knowledge of the meaning-context(ll). 
* re above Chapter three 
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Thus for Schutz the meaning of an action is equivalent to the purpose of 
action, this latter being understood as an objective Act, and tautologously 
meaning-context is equivalent to goal (or purpose). Thus the claim that 
motive and meaning-context coincide is a product of definition. It 
probably seems eminently reasonable that the answer to the question "why 
was this action performed? ", should be seen as being couched either in 
terms of precipitating conditions (because-motive) or desired goals 
(in order to motive), but Schutz's denial of the knowability of intended 
meaning and his identification of meaning with Act makes this question not 
worth asking. This is because in Schutz's terms, the answer to this 
question can either be, "because it was projected" or "in order to achieve 
the Act". We would suggest that when a sociologist asks why an action 
occured he is not seeking a statement of the goal of the action in terms 
of a completed deed. That is, he is not concerned with tautologous 
statements that the actor acted in order to achieve a goal because he wished 
to achieve it but he desires to know why the action is seen as reasonable 
by the actor, what values it fulfills. As we have seen, when Schutz 
gives an instance of a because-motive he surreptitiously includes within 
this account assumptions concerning the actor's values, even though he 
attempts misleadingly to identify the value and the motive statements. 
Therefore Schutz's notion of meaning-context is simply a re-expression of 
his idea of the in-order-to and because-motives and like them, seeks to 
avoid the distinctively subjective element in action of values and 
intentions, in terms of which alone, can we perceive the meaning or 
reasonable causes of an action. As a consequence this relationship 
between because and in-order-to-motives is unclarified due to the 
fact that Schutz regards the unity between the causes or conditions which 
*This statement is not only tautologous but also dubious, as it ignores 
the possibility of failure or frustration in goal-attainment. 
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precede action and the goal of action as taken for granted. He fails 
to realise that this unity is achieved through judgements concerning the 
nature and value of situations; that is, as seen above, he ignores the 
basic role of values as the source of significant action, action which is 
reasonable to the actor. 
This brief consideration of Schutz's conception of action has been 
concerned with clarifying his apprehension of the subject matter of 
interpretive sociology which has been seen to be motivated Acts. The 
adequacy of this conception has been criticised both in i ation to the 
confused meaning of motivation and the failure to recognise the crucial 
role of values and significant judgements in action. It will be seen 
below that this definition of action results in Schutz adopting a 
behaviouristic conception of sociology which he is able to reconcile with 
the demands of interpretive sociology only by limiting sociologically 
relevant action to the goal-rational form. That is, to action which 
does not require interpretation because it is value-less and because its 
meaning is contained solely in the completed, observable Act ie. to 
action which needs only to be observed in order to be understood. 
However, before commenting upon the adequacy of these ideas of Schutz it 
is necessary to consider his conception of meaning in relation to 
interpretive sociology, beginning with his perception of the respective 
relationship to meaning of actor and sociologist. We will particularly 
note the attempt to establish understanding as objective knowledge. 
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE ffEANING 
Schutz notes the basic problem of the difference between my inter- 
pretation of my acts and my interpretation of another's meaning, although 
we note the further distinction, not explicitly made by Schutz, between my 
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interpretation of another and the other's self-interpretation. This 
omission is consistent with Schutz's view that only the other's Acts 
are given to an observer, not his intentions(13)" Nevertheless, Schutz 
implies a denial of the limitation of sociology to observation. Thus he 
claims that sociology goes a step further than common-sense, which makes 
the other meaningful to the observer by placing his action in a meaning- 
context regarded as appropriate by the observer, by taking into account 
the actor's past and future in order to locate an intelligible meaning- 
context for the Act. This distinction implies that, despite his con- 
tinuous denial that sociology is concerned with the apprehension of actor's 
intentions, Schutz is attempting to locate the meaning of the action 
(1) 
for the actor' is. the other's self-interpretation. Further Schutz's 
argument is not in fact directed against reliance on observation but only 
reliance on observation of the present because our knowledge of the 
actor's past and future is equally dependant on observation. 
In insisting that sociology take the actor's past and future into 
account Schutz implicitly adopts a consistency model of action. That 
is, the idea that action over time is informed by the same motives so that 
if we take,: a sufficient time span certain meanings will emerge as the 
only ones which could have informed the observed action. Clearly, this 
view ignores the possibility of change or development in the other's 
motives, or to be more accurate, in his value-orientations. However, it 
could be argued that Schutz's reference to the need to take the future 
into account removes this objection because wo can test the adequacy of 
our meaning-context by seeing whether future action conforms to it. 
(14) 
This raises many of the points discussed in relation to Rex and Weber, 
*(2) 
*(1) Schutz's claim that intentions are inaccessible contradicts his stated 
aim to study the "invariant unique a priori structures of mind" p. 44, 
as this implies statements concerning all minds, not just Schutz's. 
*(2) re above Chapter 4. 
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and we need simply to reiterate the point that the future action is not 
self-evident and must itself be interpreted through a meaning-context, 
Thus, there is always the possibility that this predictability test is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The claimed inaccessibility of the actor's intended meaning means 
that the observer can only assume that his meaning is the same as that of 
the actor and Schutz clearly sees this as unsatisfactory, "observational 
understanding is simply the understanding we exercise in daily life in 
our direct relations with other people. Precisely for that reason, 
however, the inference from the overt behaviour to the intended meaning 
behind it is anything but a cut and dried matter! t(15). Here, Schutz is 
clearly expressing a dissatisfaction with the methods of everyday life. 
Against this naive method he proposes that sociology use the procedure of 
motivational understanding which he declares to be independent of the 
common-sense world. However, the distinctiveness of motivational 
understanding rests simply on the claim that it can have as its object 
the world of contemporaries, predecessors or successors and that it deals 
with completed Acts. Schutz is surely wrong in implying that everyday 
understanding ignores the past and the future and he also overlooks the 
fact that the objection to naive understanding is its unjustified 
assumption of the identity of self and other's meanings and this objection 
persists whether the spurious identification is made with a consociate, 
a contempory, a predecessor or a contemporary. The second distinctive 
feature of motivational understanding, its concern with completed Acts, 
is equally unsatisfactory, because it assumes what it should establish. 
That is, Schutz is wrong in believing that the completion of an Act is 
uncontroversial for the judgement that an Act is completed* is a subjective 
* There is also a contradiction between Schutz's belief in completed 
Acts and his belief that action, like consciousness in an undifferentiated 
flow. 
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judgement that an intention has or has not been fulfilled. If the 
completion of the Act is decided by the actor it implies the necessity 
of an understanding of others' intentions which Schutz declares to be 
impossible. If the observer is the judge of when an action is a com- 
pleted Act, then we are returned to the situation of observational 
understanding. Nevertheless Schutz states that objective meaning, 
presumably achieved in observational understanding, is merely an 
indication of the existence of a subjective meaning acquired in motivational 
understanding which gives a higher degree of scientific clarity and 
exactitude(16). It should be noted that although Schutz criticised 
observational understanding for its inadequate grasp of the other's 
intentions, his claim that motivational understanding gives access to 
subjective meaning is not a claim to have succeeded where observational 
understanding failed for subjective and intended meaning are not the same 
in Schutz's vocabulary. In order to clarify this point it is necessary 
to consider Schutz's distinction between subjective and objective meaning. 
In our view it is necessary to distinguish between three types of 
meaning or rather, significance-subject relationships. Firstly, the 
significance of action for the performer of the act, secondly the 
significance of an act for an observer, thirdly, the significance of an 
act for the actor as this is interpreted by an observer. Schutz uses 
the term subjective meaning to refer to both the first and third 
definitions although the term intended meaning refers to the first alone. 
Objective meaning refers to either the second definition or to the status 
of an Act as an object or thing or finally to conventional meanings which 
can be understood without reference to the person using them e. g. 2x2n4. 
As would be expected from this plethora of usages Schutz's idea of the 
relationship between objective and subjective meaning is confused. He 
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defines the objective context of meaning as indicators of consciousness 
and further claims that this realm of objective meaning is invariant 
"with respect to every consciousness which has given it meaning through 
its own intentionality"(17). This appears to be an assertion that every 
consciousness constitutes the objective world in the same way; a re- 
expression of the idea of a common culture which is made necessary by 
Schutz's claim that I can look at objective meaning ie. indicators of 
consciousness or "I can ... look over and through these external 
indications into the constituting process within the living consciousness 
of another rational being. What I am then concerned with is subjective 
meaning"(18). Thus Schutz is using the idea of objective moaning in two 
distinct fashions, firstly as data which can be understood without 
reference to actor's intentions and secondly as indicators of actor's 
conscious acts, without reconciling these uses. 
The latter statement by Schutz would seem to moan that another 
rational being's intended meaning is available to an observer, despite 
his rejection of this view. However, Schutz redefines the term subjective 
meaning so that enquiry into the subjective meaning of'. an objective 
meaning content means simply the referral of constituted objectivities 
to the consciousness of others. That is, objective meaning equals 
thing, subjective meaning is seeing the thing as a product of consciousness, 
although it is not clear how we should understand the idea of referring 
objectivities to the consciousness of others without implying our ability 
to apprehend that consciousness; that is, without implying knowledge 
of intended meaning. Equally it is not clear how we can look at the 
constitutive acts of consciousness without also being able to know the 
intended meaning which is the product of such acts. Thus Schutz would 
appear to assume a common objective world to which each constituting 
consciousness has given its own significance . We therefore note once 
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again how a supporter of the verstehende tradition falls back on the 
assumption of a common world in order to justify the plausibility of 
his programme. 
Schutz's claim that subjective meaning is an approximation of the 
actor's intended meaning, indicates that he does in fact accept a three- 
fold division of meaning into intended meaning, that is the actor's own 
meaning, subjective meaning, an observer's interpretation of intended 
meaning which is based on a perception of objective meaning, or, the 
nature of the act irrespective of subjective constitution*. 
(l) The doctrine 
of intentionality shows this idea of objective meaning, in so far as it 
implies knowledge independent of consciousness, to be misleading. 
However Schutz is not consistent in his usage of these terms especially 
in relation to subjective and intended meaning. Thus he defines the 
subjective meaning of a product (objective meaning) as the situation when 
"we have in view the meaning-context within which the product stands or 
stoodin the mind of the producer. To know the subjective meaning of 
the product means that we are able to run over in our minds in simultaneity 
or quasi-simultaneity the polythetic Acts which constituted the experience 
of the producer 1'(19) 0 This indicates an identification of subjective with 
both intended and objective meaning. The identity with objective meaning 
is based on the reference of subjective meaning to polythetic Acts, that 
is completed objectivities. The crucial term in respect of the identity 
between subjective and intended meaning is the statement that we "have in 
view" the meaning context within which the product stands in the mind of 
the producer*(2). This could mean that we perceive the other's meaning. 
However, in view of Schutz's denial of the accessibility of intended meaning 
*(l) In so far as objective meaning means necessary and therefore universal 
meaning, this is similar to our formulation of a phenomenological sociology 
but Schultz means by the term objective meaning the physical appearance 
of the Act. 
*(2) This is tautological as in Schutz's vocabulary meaning-context is 
o ii unl ant- fn nrnrlb inl- 
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it would-appear that this statement means that in achieving subjective 
meaning we are directed by the object towards the intended meaning. 
This involves the nonsensical idea that we know we are directed towards 
something about which we know nothing. If we cannot know intended 
meaning how can we know that we are being directed toward it? It should 
also be noted that Schutz's statement above implies a direct unequivocal 
relationship between intention and objective Act; that is the Act, the 
observable event, is the intention made accessible to others. This is 
the basis of Schutz's regarding objective Acts as signs for intended 
meaning, but there are a number of inadequacies in this approach** 
Firstly, even if this idea is accepted, it can tell us that an Act was 
intentionally meant but not why it was intended. Secondly, it assumes 
that there is never any failure or frustration of intentions. Thirdly 
it assumes that the observer's judgement as to when an action becomes a 
completed Act is the same as that of the actor and finally it is 
appropriate only to a goal-rational, value-less model of action, the 
deficiencies of which were noted above(2). Thus, Schutz's account of 
the relationship between intended, subjective and objective meaning reveals 
that despite his use of subjectivist, verstehende terms like understanding, 
intention, meaning etc., that his was a behaviouristic approach to 
sociology in that he believed that all that is given to the sociologist 
is objective Acts e. g. lip movements, artefacts etc. From this he 
adopted a broadly symbolic interactionist perspective seeing these Acts 
as signs of intentional processes. The aim of the sociologist is to 
interpret these signs, this interpretation being the subjective meaning. 
This however raises a further problem, for this may give the impression 
*(1) re above Chapter 4 
*(2) re also above P. 237. 
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that, as intended meaning is inaccessible, one interpretation is as likely 
as any other and therefore interpretation is arbitrary. Schutz clearly 
is not willing to accept this and his account of the understanding 
associated with the world of consociates, contemporaries, predecessors 
and successors is a classification of these areas in terms of a declining 
approximation of interpretation to intended meaning. However, the 
claim that our understanding of consociates is more genuine than our 
understanding of contemporaries assumes a knowledge of intended meaning 
which Schutz declares to be unobtainable. That is, we can only claim 
knowledge of consociates to be a closer approximation to intended 
meaning than other forms of understanding if we already know what the 
intended meaning is. If we cannot know what the intended meaning is 
then the claim to greater or lesser approximation to this meaning is 
gratuitous. It is true that Schutz bases his claim to the greater 
genuine-ness of our understanding of consociates, that is, the face to 
face situation, -in terms of the greater number of 
e. g. winks, nods etc. This argument however confuses quantity and 
quality. To say that there are a greater number of observable events 
available in the fact to face situation than in any other only means 
that we can make a greater number of interpretations. There is no 
justification for claiming that any one of these interpretations is of 
greater accuracy than an interpretation made from the position of 
contemporary or predecessor. 
This raises a further problem which is that there is nothing about 
objective Acts, or observable events, which declares them to be intentional 
products. Thus, because Schutz declares intended meaning to be 
inaccessible he can have no grounds for claiming that observable Acts 
are products of and signify intended meaning for this requires prior 
knowledge of the nature of intended meaning and its evidence. Schutz's 
solution to this problem is to declare, as a matter of princiole. that 
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all objective Acts are meaningful 20) 0 
Cl Hence 
his hostility to Weber's 
distinction between meaningful action and meaningless behaviour, for to 
accept this distinction would require that the sociologist justify why 
he sees an event as action rather than behaviour and this could be 
done only by asserting that the sociologist has perceived that the action 
is intentionally directed. However Schutz's solution is inadequate both 
because it is simply asserted and crucially, that it implies that it is 
based on knowledge which he sees as inaccessible. In order for Schutz 
to declare that all Acts are meaningful in the sense of being intentional 
products it is necessary that he have knowledge of the eviden z- in 
Husserl's sense, of intention in general, but Schutz has declared that 
an other's intentions are inaccessible. Therefore one ohly knows the 
appearance of one's own intentional acts and therefore the statement that 
another's Acts are meaningful for the other, ie. intentionally meaningful, 
is not in fact a statement about the intentional status of the Acts but 
is merely a claim that these Acts look like one's own intentional Acts. 
This is basically the method of analogical inference which Schutz 
identifies as the naive practise of the reciprocity of perspectives 
which he declares to be unreliable. We will see below that at this point, 
despite his disclaimers, Schutz does in fact adopt this naive approach. 
Indeed, Schutz's argument that all experience is meaningful is 
based on a subtle redefinition of the term meaning so that it refers not 
to significance or objective appearance but to attention, to say that an 
experience is meaningful is to say that it is an object of attention. 
Thus Schutz's criticism that Weber's separation of action or experience*(2) 
*(l) Schutz makes a distinction between meaning-endowing experiences and 
merely passive experiences only in relation to self-knowledge, (Phenom- 
enolony of the Social World p. 541 although he may on this point be 
confusing meaning and knowledge of meaning. 
*(2) It is noticeable that in this stage of the argument Schutz refers 
not to Acts or action but to experience. 
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and meaning is contradictory is a product of Schutz's identifying the 
ideas of awareness and meaning. We find this inadequate for when we 
predicate the meaning of behaviour we do not refer, as Schutz believes, 
to the way of attending to the behaviour but to why this experience 
became an object of attention, what its value was for the attending 
person. That is, attention is a means of becoming aware of meaning, 
but it is not that meaning. Thus, when Schutz states that, "action is 
only a linguistic hypostatisation of experiences of which we have become 
heedful and whose meaning ... is nothing more than the particular 'how' 
of the heeding"(21), he is overlooking the fact that this "how" is 
dependant on a prior awareness of "why". The limitation of Schutz's 
approach is revealed if we ask why the particular experience for the 
perception of significance is the reason why attention is directed to a 
attention rather than some other experience. It is this question of 
significance which is intended when we refer to the problem of interpreting 
another's meaning. Similarly, Schutz's account of attention assumes 
significance as a given, when the establishment of significance is part 
of the problem of understanding. In effect Schutz has said that the 
problem of establishing an Act's meaning is insoluble, therefore let us 
look at a different problem and call it meaning. 
The problem of why certain experiences rather than others are 
attended to cannot be avoided but Schutz attempts to resolve the problem 
of the relationship between significance, attention and his usage of 
meaning by referring to the searchlight of attention falling on conscious- 
nass as if in a haphazard manner and as if independent of subjects 
choices or decisions . Again, Schutz's solution to the problem of 
* This is similar to a further confusion in Schutz where he sees 
consciousness as an undifferentiated flow made up of distinct phases 
which flow and meet into each other while retaining their distinctiveness. 
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subjectivity is to abolish subjects. However, it must be emphasised 
that, as we have seen, this is typical of the verstehende tradition. 
The extent of Schutz's abolition of subjects can be gauged from a 
consideration of his idea of the role of reflection which he sees as the 
method of apprehending Acts. Schutz claims that we cannot rälect upon 
a personal core which is inaccessible to memory. This core consists 
not only of bodily sensations but also of "those psychic phenomena ... 
'moods' as well as 'feeling' and effects (joy, sorrow, disgust (3tc. )"(22). 
This belief is simply asserted and it certainly fails to explain the 
subjective assent which we give to the work of those such as Schaler, who 
studied such supposedly inaccessible data. Equally, how can we account 
in Schutz's terms for our remembering a mood of misery and reliving the 
experience of that mood, the experience of isolation, believing that 
the burden of misery is ours alone to bear; of seeing the evidences of 
other's happiness as. re-enforcing our misery by impressing on us that we 
cannot share that happy state. Therefore, it is necessary to ask why 
does Schutz make this claim? Schutz in effect identifies this core 
with subjective phenomena in general and states that the recollection of 
internal. perception is incomparably more difficult than the relatively 
clear recollection of experiences of the external world. In view of 
Schutz's claim that meaning is established in reflection it is clear that, 
as subjective phenomena cannot be made accessible, they cannot be seen as 
meaningful. Thus, "the limits of recall coincide with the limits of 
'rationalisability ... in the sense of giving a meaning ... Recoverability tc 
memory is ... the first pre-requisite of all rational construction. That 
which is irrecoverable ... can only be lived but never thought"(23). 
This claim is contradictory in that it asserts the unknowability of 
subjective phenomena while accepting the adequacy of our knowledge that 
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they exist . As a consequence, this view divides the human subject into 
an inaccessible subjectivity and an external appearance which is 
meaningful to an observer because it tells him about this inaccessible 
subjectivity. Also, as has been shown above, in accepting the idea of 
a universally meaningful external world Schutz has to recognise, 
contradictorily, that this meaning depends on subjects, as in his 
recognition that meaning endowing experience is an Ego-act. 
ACT AND ACTION 
The problem of asserting that an observer only perceives objective 
meaning, observable events, and yet is able to claim that these events 
signify intentional processes, reveals the reason for Schutz's insistence 
on the unity between Act (event) and action (process). The action is 
always subject-bound but the Act is a complete objectivity which belongs 
to the public domain and can therefore be considered independent from the 
acting subject. We may wish to look at the process of the constitution 
of the Act, the phases which went into it, but this does not imply a 
consideration of actor's intended meaning. Thus, Schutz attempts to 
resolve the problem of meaning in sociology by abolishing the other's 
intended meaning and declaring that meaning can be predicated only of 
completed, finished Acts or Acts which are finished in anticipation, while 
retaining-- the idea of action, or rather Act-ion, It is our contention 
that this argument is unwarranted because it is not possible to separate 
the perception of the Act from assumptions concerning intended meaning. 
For instance, if we describe an Act as A waving to B, we are assuming 
that A intended to attract B's attention, that the Act was deliberate etc. 
all statementsof the intended meaning of the Act. The only way to avoid 
this would be to devise a purely neutral behaviouristic language which, 
if such a language is possible, would go beyond Schutz and abolish 
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subjective meaning, that is, the observer's interpretation of the actor's 
meaning. In sum Schutz attempts to abolish subjects while retaining 
subjectivity. Schutz is correct in asserting that meaning, significance 
in our usage, can be predicated only of Acts seen as completed but this 
again overlooks the problem that the perception that an Act is completed 
is a subjective judgement and is therefore part of the problem of 
apprehending the other's meaning and is not a solution to this problem. 
Equally, as noted above, we cannot assume that the completed act is the 
meaning of the action, that is we cannot equate meaning and achieved 
goals unless we assume that the realised goal was the intended goal. 
More crucially, in so far as we refuse to ask why this goal was intended, 
we cannot grasp its value or significance for the actor. This latter 
question can be answered only by accepting the separation of meaning and 
goals ie. that the meaning of goals lies in their selection on the basis 
of value for the actor. Schutz cannot do this without undermining the 
adequacy of his idea of motivational understanding. However, even his 
account of motivated action assumes that the goal of the completed Act 
was desired by the actor, although in order to justify this assumption 
Schutz would have to'show why the goal was desired, what value it served. 
Thus he would have to step outside his motivational paradigm. The only 
alternative to this approach is to posit an infinite progress of Acts. 
That is, that Act A was desired because it enabled the achievement of 
Act 8 which in turn enabled the achievement of Act C. Not only is such 
a process never-ending but it undermines Schutz's distinction between 
* It will be noted that although Schutz has attempted to redefine other's 
intended meaning as a knowable datum out of existence he does not deny 
the propriety of subjective meaning in the sense of an observer's, ie. 
A. Schutz's, interpretation of this unknowable intended meaning. Yet 
this subjective meaning is Schutz's intended meaning and as such should 
be inaccessible to his audience. Schutz's very act of expecting to be 
understood by his audience, like that of Winch and Weber, undermines his 
claim that intended meaning is unknowable. 
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observable objective Act and subjective action because Act B, is an 
objective Act only in relation to Act A for in relation to Act C it is 
a subjective action. Thus we are asked to believe that a given 
phenomenon can be both action and Act, that is, it can be both subjective 
and private and objective and public. This clearly supports our 
previous argument that the Act-action distinction is not something 
inherent in the action bud as Weber recognised, is the observer's 
categorisation of the action in terms of what is of interest or value 
to him. This does not of itself invalidate the enquiry into the 
meaning of action but it does require that the study of action, if it 
is to be a genuine study of the other and not ego-aggrandisement, should 
be independant of the observer's value-perspective. This was clearly 
recognised by weber, although he failed to establish such a method of 
enquiry 
*, but Schutz fails to even recognise the existence of the problem. 
Finally, a consequence of the infinite progress of this procedure is 
that the question why was Act A desired can never be finally answered in 
motivational terms. Schutz's attempt to preserve the Act-action distinc- 
tion against this criticism only serves to underline its inadequacies. 
Thus he states that in thinking about rising from a chair and closing a 
window we phantasise only the completed Act of closing the window and 
that if we were to phantasise all the intermediate actions e. g. putting 
one foot in front of the other, then each of these phantasies would on 
fulfillment be completed Acts. This is true, but it is an admission 
that the distinction between Act and action is one of subjective 
evaluation for Schutz admits that phases of action can be regarded as 
Acts and he describes these phases as if they were Acts. It could be 
argued that it is wrong to see, e. g. putting one foot in front of the 
other, as an Act because there is no account of the purpose of this 
* re below Chapter 4. 
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action ie. that goal, which when achieved is the Act. However, Schutz's 
own example of a genuine completed Act, closing the window, is open to 
the same objection because there is no account of why the actor wanted 
to close the window. It has been seen above that it is inadequate to 
answer this question by pointing to further Acts. 
This discussion helps us to understand the nature of the idea of 
means-end relationship as it is used in everyday life and in the 
sociological notion of goal-rational action. Our criticism of Schutz's 
distinction between Act and action has shown that means are ends to 
other means, and ends are means to other ends, therefore what sense can 
we give to the idea of a means-end relationship? Schutz claims that 
only completed Acts can be reflected upon. This is, in our view an 
inversion of the true situation for it implies that completed Acts exist 
as such prior to reflection when in fact it is the act of reflection 
which completes the Act. That is, the completed act is seen as completed 
only because it has been made the object of reflection. This as noted 
above raises the acute question of why we reflect on one act rather than 
another. It is necessary to note that Schutz takes reflection for 
granted, seeing intention falling on objects in a more or less random 
manner and therefore fails to raise this question, consideration of 
which, may have caused him to revise his Act-action distinction. We 
reflect on an Act because it has value for us and we understand why we 
see a certain Act as the completion of an Action process by grasping 
the value which was the reason for the Act being made an object of 
reflectidn 
However there is a revised usage of meaning in Schutz and this is 
the idea that the meaning of experiences isthe frame of interpretation 
which sees the experience as behaviour; behaviour is experience referred 
- Z54 - 
to the Activities which produced them. This results in a tautology. 
meaning is said to be the act which apprehends behaviour as meaningfully 
interpreted experience. Thus Schutz confuses the act by which meaning 
is apprehended with the meaning which is apprehended as value or 
significance. Schutz does come close to the latter idea of meaning, 
the idea of significance, in his statement that meaning does not lie in 
experience but that experiences are meaningful ie. significant, which are 
grasped reflectively. However Schutz again confuses meaning and 
reflection, the act of apprehending meaning, when he asserts that meaning 
is the way in which Ego regards its experience. That is, as if relection 
created rather than revealed significance. Indeed our previous discussion 
has shown reflection to be dependant on prior judgements of significance. 
Thus, we can see how Schutz attempts to establish the possibility 
of understanding consequent upon his denial of the possibility of 
intentional understanding. We have shown that despite this denial 
Schutz has to assume that others' Acts are intentionally directed and 
even that knowledge of intentional understanding is possible in order to 
assess the degrees of approximation of our understanding of others and 
as a condition of the comprehensibility of his account of the denial of 
intentional understanding. It has been seen that Schutz attempts to 
establish understanding in this situation by asserting the motivational 
character of action which is always directed to completed Acts. Schutz 
sees these as observable events and which are therefore as accessible to 
the actor as to an observer; this is the objective meaning or meaning- 
context of an Act. We criticised this account for its purely instrumental 
conception of action and for its failure to take into account the value- 
basis of action. We also criticised this idea of action because of the 
misleading Act-action distinction made by Schutz which he fails to realise 
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is not a subjectively neutral phenomenon but is itself the product of 
significant judgements and is therefore part of the problem, not the 
solution, of understanding. 
We argued that Schutz supports this idea of action for it permits 
him to claim the possibility of some degree of understanding even 
though the other's intended meaning is supposedly inaccessible to us. 
Thus Schutz can claim that even though subjective meaning, the observer's 
interpretation of the action, is not as direct as the actor's own 
interpretation, it is directed towards the same object, the Act, and 
therefore there is the possibility of some degree of approximation 
between them. The observer, having grasped the Act can trace back the 
constitutive process of action which led to the Act. The advantage which 
the actor has over the observer is that he perceives his Acts in advance 
of their realisation whereas the observer must wait for the fulfillment 
of the action process in the performance of the Act. We can criticise 
this idea, on the grounds that it cannot reveal meaning. Even if 
successful, this approach can only inform the observer about the sequence 
of events, it cannot tell him why these events occurred as a 
deliberate 
act. That is, this approach cannot answer the question which must 
be 
answered if a meaningful account is to be given and that is why the 
actor saw his action as reasonable. Further, it has been shown that 
the motivational understanding advocated by Schutz can provide only 
tautological knowledge. It can avoid this only by going beyond its 
own limits by making assumptions concerning the value-orientation of 
the 
actor. 
We noted that Schutz seeks to establish understanding by identifying 
an objective world shared by observer and actor. Thus, he states, 
"The first community which exists between me and the ... Other ... is the 
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community of Nature ... There is however the difference that the Other's 
world of Nature is seen as illic from my point of view which is to say 
that the Other gets that aspect from it which I myself should get if I 
myself were not hic but illic"(25). It will be noted that this statement 
could be interpreted as an acceptance of the validity of the reciprocity 
of perspectives, despite Schutz's earlier characterisation of this process 
as an unreliable common-sense assumption, especially as in this context 
Schutz refers to this appresentation of the other as transcendental inter- 
subjectivity*. Schutz tries to justify this claim but succeeds only in 
creating confusion. Thus, he states "transcendental intersubjectivity 
exists purely in me, the meditating ego. It is constituted purely from 
the sources of my intentionality, but in such a manner that it is the 
some transcendental intersubjectivity in every single human being in his 
intentional experiences"(26). This statement expresses two opposed 
ideas; firstly that others are self writ large and secondly that there 
is a level of subjectivity common to all human beings. However, Schutz 
does not clarify this statement although his subsequent assertion, "These 
Others are not merely related (to my subjectivity) by means of associative 
pairing to my psycho-physical being ... rather it is a-question of an 
objective equalisation, a mutual inter-relatedness of my existence and 
that of all Others", inclines to the later view. However he fails to 
show how this common subjectivity can be reconciled with the idea that 
it is "purely mine". This latter idea shows that for Schutz all 
knowledge has "I" as its subject and therefore knowledge of Others means 
not knowledge of Others in themselves but knowledge of my perception of 
Others. Thus Schute sees the need for "mutual inter-relatedness" but 
is unable to establish it. However, the contradiction in Schutz's 
*It is important to note that this apparent acceptance of the reciprocity 
of perspectives ante-dates his rejection of this procedure in Husserl 
which has been noted above. 
argument reveals a paradox of everyday life. That is, how wo can 
perceive ourselves as both individuals and as constituent parts of a 
community; how we can be, at the same time, both "I" and "We". If, as 
Schutz asserts, there is a common subjectivity, how can we account for 
the experience of ourselves as individuals? Equally, if, as Schutz 
also claims, the everyday belief in common subjectivity is based upon an 
inadequate procedure, how can it be sustained, how is the experience of 
community or common subjectivity possible? The problem of intersubjectivity 
will be resolved only when an account is given which reconciles these 
apparently opposed aspects of our social being. 
It is therefore necessary to clarify Schutz's understanding of 
intersubjectivity. 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN SCHUTZ 
In considering the implications of the belief that others intended 
meanings are inaccessible Schutz comments that this means that the meaning 
I give to the other's action and the others self-interpretation will never 
precisely match(27). That, although I am unaware of the other's meaning 
contexts, I can know the meaning context into which I place my experiences 
of the other and this gives an "approximate value of the other's intended 
meaning "(28). But how approximate is approximate? A13o Schutz's 
introduction'of this term suggests that the distinction between intended 
and interpreted meaning is not particularly great but its use is 
gratuitous as no grounds are given for regarding interpreted meaning as 
an approximation of intended meaning . Further, as noted above, Schutz's 
statement that interpreted meaning approximates intended meaning if it 
is to make sense presumes prior knowledge of intended meaning. If 
intended meaning could not be known by an observer, as Schutz claims, there 
could be no way of establishing that it is approximated by interpreted 
iIt May be argued that Schutz's idea of a common world shared by actor and 
observer justifies this term but even if this world is accepted we need to 
Unnt? I mhv it Qiyes "annrnximai. A,, itnrinrrtnnriinn 
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meaning. 
Schutz regards the other's consciousness as transcendent to 
ie. outside, mine and therefore I perceive his consciousness through 
signs. Thus it is claimed that I see the other's body but assume 
that there is a consciousness within it and thus regard body movements 
as signs of other's conscious lived experiences. This would appear to 
be a circular argument of inference. I assume that the body movements 
which I see are signs of conscious activity from which assumption I 
infer that these movements are movements of a conscious being. Schutz 
denies that this is an argument by inference, in the usual sense, although 
he overlooks the circularity of the argument. He claims that in this 
process, "What is involved is a certain intentional Act which utilises 
an already established code of interpretation directing us through the 
(29) 
bodily movement to the underlying lived experience" It is not 
clear how this differs from an inference because, in terms of Schutz's 
analyses of the isolated ego, it would appear that this code originates 
in the self . Thus in interpreting the Other's body movements I use 
the same interpretive scheme as if I were reflecting on my own movements. 
This contradicts Schutz's criticism of Husserl in which he states that 
my body is given to me in a totally different way to that in which other's 
bodies are given to me, therefore the two experiences are not comparable 
or interchangeable. It is also interesting that Schutz appears to be 
claiming direct knowledge of other minds. Thus he states "my gaze goes 
right through these outward symptoms to the inner man of the person who 
is speaking to me. Whatever contact of meaning I light upon when I am 
experiencing these outward indications draws its validity from a 
corresponding context of meaning in the mind*(9f the other person". 
(30) 
*It is possible that in the idea of a code Schutz is referring to cultur- 
ally shared interpretive conventions, but the possibility of such conven- 
tions is part of the problem, not the solution, of intersubjectivity. 
*(2) Our Italics. 
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However, following this argument, there is a subtle change in Schutz's 
vocabulary. He ceases to refer to body movements and writes instead 
of experiences. That is, he assumes the perception of others' 
experiences in order to show that others' experiences can be perceived 
Thus he states that both I and Other observe our own experiences although 
they havapthe Other's lived experiences as their object, which implies 
the availability of the Other's lived experience. However, it is clear 
that by experience Schutz simply means Act. Thus by this re-definition 
of terms he assumes that which he cannot establish, that is, that Acts 
are unequivocal evidence of particular lived, conscious experience. 
Therefore, Schutz gratuitously refers to our perception of other's 
consciousness, viz "I see, then, my own stream of consciousness and 
yours in a single intentional Act which embraces them both" 
(31). 
Although the idea of the simultaneity of consciousnesses is later 
qualified as a necessary and basic assumption, even this modest proposal 
is superceded by the claim that, "Not only does each of us subjectively 
experience his own duree as an absolute reality in the Bergsonian sense, 
but the duree of each of us is given to the other in an absolute reality"(32). 4 
This simultaneity is the experience of growing old together. This 
latter idea goes beyond the claim that we believe the other's consciousness 
to be available, to the assertion that it is actually available. We can 
relate this difference to the tension between "I" and "We" in Schutz's 
work, noted above. Thus Schutz has two models of intersubjective 
understanding. They are, firstly that of analogical inference which 
makes community inexplicable, and secondly there is the idea of an 
empathic merging of consciousnesses which makes error concerning the 
other and the recognition of the Other as distinct from self inexplicable. 
* This phase of the argument shows how Schutz tends to identify perceiving 
and knowing. 
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ANALOGIC AND EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING IN SCHUTZ 
The proximity of Schutz to the analogic model of understanding 
is indicated in his statement that "everything I know about your 
conscious life is really based on my knowledge of my own lived exp©riences: 
(33)', 
and in his citing of Husserl to the effect that "From the phenomenological 
point of view, the other person is a modification of 'my' self"(34). 
In contradiction to this view Schutz states that the"Other's 
consciousness whose intentional Acts I see as occuring as other then, 
yet simultaneous with my own"(35). In these statements Schutz is 
claiming, contradictorily, that the Other is a modification of self but 
that the other's Acts are seen as distinct from those of self. 
In describing genuine intersubjective understanding, Schutz states 
that we understand the observed action by determining how we would 
carry out the action or recall a similar action of ours. We project the 
Other's goal as if it were our own. Schutz recognises that he could 
be accused of describing the process of projective empathy, but denies 
the charge on the grounds that he, unlike supporters of the empathic 
method, recognises the inaccessibility of other's consciousness and that 
empathy claims greater knowledge than does Schutz's method which ho terms 
"structural parallelism" 
(36). 
This does not prove that Schutz is not 
using the empathic method, but that he is not making the usual claims for 
its possibilities. Further, Schutz's modest claims for this method 
contradicts his statement of the nature of genuine intersubjective 
understanding, in which context he makes these remarks. He states that 
genuine understanding is concerned with what goes on in other minds and 
yet he claims that structural parallelism, the method of such understanding, 
is based on an acceptance of the inaccessibility of other minds. The 
practical distinction between empathy and structural parallelism is not 
noticeable for there are a potentially unlimited number of interpretive 
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schemes which could be used, in relation to a particular action, by both 
empathy and structural parallelism. Nor is it clear how their interpretive 
schemes differ. It has been shown above*, that attempts to test 
interpretation are inadequate as they are circular and involve a static 
conception of the other. Thus empathy believes it is always right; 
structural. parallelism cannot be shown to be wrong. Further Schutz's 
denial that he is using an empathic explanation of intersubjectivity is 
weakened by his claim that understanding self is essentially the same as 
understanding others with the proviso that self-knowledge is richer than 
37ý. (knowledge 
of others 
Thus Schutz claims, on the one hand, that our understanding of others 
is based on our own subjective experiences but also that the knowing 
subject is merely aware of the existence of others and understands them 
through his constitution of them(38). These statements are not the same. 
The first is an affirmation, tfempathic projection, the recognition of "I" 
in "Thou". The second is the "softer" claim of analogical inference, 
that "the Other" is a reconstruction of "I". Thus empathy claims some 
knowledge of the other, even if only in relation to that area where "Thou" 
is, similar to I; analogical inference claims no knowledge of the 
other, should the other be like our construction it is coincidental. 
This brief description also reveals the basic weakness of both 'these 
methods in relation to the attainment of intersubjective understanding. 
Despite their differences they both can be certain only that they provide 
knowledge of self not of the other. That is, they are both located in 
the ego-perspective and their understanding of the Other is adequate only 
in so far as he resembles ego. Thus, they can grasp all aspects of the 
Other except those that make him Other ie. distinct from self. The 
* re above Chapter 4. 
r 
ýy k 
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problem of intersubjective understanding is how to grasp the Other-nass 
of "Thou". Thus both analogical inference and empathic projection 
provide intra-subjective rather than inter-subjective knowledge. 
Schutz fails to resolve the distinction between these two approaches 
and thus the meaning of intersubjective understanding in his work is 
unclear. However, a resolution of the usage if not the adequacy of 
these models is suggested in his example of my Thou-relationship with 
one playing cards. In the situation of the direct social relationship 
(I 
guess what is going on in his mind 
39ý. 
That is, I project my 
perceptions onto his activity, a case of anralogical inference. Schutz 
recognises that this understanding is in fact only an interpretation of 
my perceptions but he claims that as I become familiar with the Other, 
as he loses his anonymity, I no longer see him as merely a man playing 
cards, because I become aware of the way he plays the game. This 
indicates that, as noted above, Schutz is claiming greater accuracy for 
understanding gained in the face to face situatioh. It would therefore 
seem that Schutz reserves his "softer" analogic understanding for the 
non face to face situation and the empathic method or structural 
parallelism for the face to face situation. However, the distinction 
between these modes of understanding as exemplified in Schutz's instance 
of card-playing is a sleight of hand. My categorisation of "man playing 
cards" is not qualitatively distinct from my categorisation of the way 
he plays cards e. g. "man who plays poker cautiously" because both are 
based on my constructions of these situations. That is, if I played 
poker in the way which the other does, I would consider myself to be 
cautious. It could be that the other see his play as sensible and 
would regard my play as reckless. Thus the reference to the others 
consciousness which is implied in the perception of cautious play is 
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not qualitatively different from the judgement that the other is playing 
cards rather than idly handling them. We therefore see that Schutz's 
attempts to account for intersubjectivity fail because'there is a 
confusion of analogic and empathic methods in his work and because 
intersubjective understanding, as variously described by Schutz, remains 
firmly rooted in the ego-perspective. This latter criticism is not a 
demand that Schutz should have attempted to achieve total certainty in 
our knowledge of others but that his idea of intersubjective understanding 
cannot account for its own assumptions. That is, Schutz's account 
cannot tell us why he believes that certain external objects are other 
selves that are nevertheless distinctive from our self. 
It has been noted above that Schutz attempted to account for our 
intersubjective existence by positing the world of completed Acts as a 
world common to all subjects. It is therefore necessary to give 
further consideration to Schutz's attempts to establish an objective, 
intersubjective world and to discuss the limits which he places on it. 
LEBENSWELT AND A COMMON WORLD 
We intend to argue that, like Husserl, Schutz's meaning of the 
term Lebenswelt is ambiguous. However it is clear that Schutz used it 
to refer to the intersubjective world; thus "the basis of meaning in every 
science is the pre-scientific life-world which is the one and unitary 
life-world of myself, of you and of us all"(40). Schutz further affirms 
the life-world to be the correlate of transcendental subjectivity but 
there is nothing in his account of this world which is not available to 
common-sense. Thus, he states, "If the life-world as viewed with the 
natural attitude remains the basis of meaning of transcendental 
Phenomenology then not only I but also you and everyone else belong to 
this life-world ... all that constitutes our own social world in its 
", ý'3 
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historical actuality and all other social worlds concerning which 
(41) 
history gives us knowledge" yg The idea, which Schutz is here 
advancing, of maintaining the natural attitude within the phenomenological 
reduction is clear nonsense, and the latter part of this statement shows 
that the knowledge of the lebenswelt is empirically, not phenomenologically, 
derived. There is also the suggestion in Schutz that the lebenswelt is 
pre-conceptual experience but this idea repeats the fallacy of the 
D, inn-an-sich, that we know that there is something which is unknowable. 
Also it is not clear how we can understand such experience without 
destroying its pre-conceptual nature. It is more likely that this 
idea of the lebenswelt means, for Schutz, our taken-forMgranted or 
common-sense existence. However, it should be noted that although 
taken-for-granted assumptions are unquestioned they are not, unquestionable 
or indubitable and, further, such assumptions are conceptual in form. 
Thus, the lebenswelt, the world for us all is the taken-for-granted 
world. However, it takes little reflection to realise that not all 
subjects adhere to the same taken-for-granted assumptions. Thus, this 
common world of the lebenswelt is common to all who share the same 
assumptions. It is, therefore, a culturally defined world. 
Schutz's equation of lebenswelt and culture is shown in his state- 
ment that this post-reduction world is intersubjectively accessible and 
that cultural objects point back to other subjects, their activities 
and conscious intentions but that "Of course, this is only true for 
everybody' who belongs to the corresponding community of culturei(42). 
We have criticised the reliance of intersubjectivity on cultural 
homogeneity above, both because it effectively limits understanding to 
ego as its overlooks the potentially minute size of the cultural group 
*This identity strongly suggests that Schutz's idea of the lebenswelt is 
not the product of a phenomenological enquiry but is an instance of 
naturalistic or naive conceptualisation. 
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and above all, because the idea of culture presupposes intersubjective 
understanding and therefore cannot be the origin of such understanding. 
One problem which is caused by the identification of lebenswelt and 
culture is the possibility of understanding subjects which belong to 
other cultures. Schutz's identification of the lebenswelt as establishing 
the possibilities of understanding would appear to make cross-cultural 
understanding impossible. However, although Schutz claims that 
understanding other cultures is difficult, it can be achieved by 
(43) 
reference to a common Nature By this he means physical nature, 
which is the object of the natural sciences. However, Schutz is not 
claiming that the natural sciences are the basis of cross-cultural 
understanding because nature in the everyday attitude is a mental con- 
struct and natural science is a system of idealisations of the lebenswelt. 
Schutz is here making the important point that nature is not alien to 
mind but in so doing he undermines his argument that nature is the basis 
of cross-cultural understanding. It is necessary, if Schutz's thesis 
is to be sustained that nature be the same for all possible subjects. 
Schutz's contention that natural science is an idealisation of the 
lebenswelt is. everyday, cultural existence and that nature is a 
mental construct, indicates that nature is a culturally approved 
construct and is, therefore, culturally specific. It could be argued 
that there is an underlying perception of nature which is implied in 
and precedes all cultural conceptions of nature but Schutz does not 
demonstrate such a level of knowledge. Indeed, given his identity 
of Lebenswelt and culture he could not do so without abandoning his 
conception of the lebenswelt as basic to all knowledge. Thus we see 
that Schutz has two major concepts of the nature of the lebenswelt or 
world for all. The first is the common-sense or taken-for-granted 
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world; the second is a world of common physical nature. To these can 
be added a less emphasised notion of the lebenswelt in Schutz's work 
and this is the idea of pre-conceptual experience. All these ideas 
have been criticised and found to be inadequate as means of accounting 
for intersubjective understanding. It is noticeable that both Gurwitsch(44) 
and Marx(45) in their commentaries on Schutz's notion of the lebenswelt, 
initially identify it with a universal, pre-conceptual world, but both 
eventually identify it with culture although, like Schutz, they fail to 
question the assumed intersubjective nature of the life-world. 
Thus, the lebenswelt, in . any of 
the senses given to this term by 
Schutz, cannot be regarded as the basis of intersubjectivity but rather 
as a product of intersubjectivity. This means that it can be investigated 
by methods based on a reliable method of intersubjective understanding 
but a condition of such a method would be the abandonment of our 
dependence upon the lebenswelt. A related idea is familiar among 
social phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists. This is the procedure 
of raising everyday life as a problem by making it anthropologically 
strange. However, there is no statement of how this is to be achieved. 
Is it not possible that in persuading ourselves that something familiar 
is strange that we have merely referred to other of our taken-for-granted 
assumptions which must themselves be questioned, ie. made anthropologically 
strange, before the initial investigation can continue? This process 
also assumes that the anthropologically strange is nevertheless 
understandable but it would seem that a quality of the genuinely strange 
is its inexplicability. In such a situation we aim at making familiar 
the strange. The normal method of achieving this is to reformulate 
that which is strange as being really identifiable with what we already 
know by reference to e. g. a common-sense or scientific theory. However 
t' 
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it is these mechanisms of constructing sense in everyday life which are 
being questioned here and it would be contradictory to use them as the 
means of providing answers to their own problematic status. That is, 
how can we question common-sense without using common-sense assumptions, 
or why should we place greater reliability on the critical perspective 
than we do on common-sense? The value of the strategy of making 
everyday action anthropologically strange is that it could identify a 
range of problems which have hitherto been overlooked. That is, a 
sociologist is surprised by people who handle poisonous snakes as part 
of a religious ritual, he is not surprised by a man handling snakes as 
part of his job as a zookeeper. He therefore sees the first situation 
as a problem requiring explanation and the second as obvious and 
unproblematic. However, assuming that we succeed in making the 
handling of snakes as part of a job anthropologically strange, it will 
be seen that this action also poses problems of sociological understanding. 
However, just as seeing the ritual snake-handlers as odd is, in itself, 
no guide as to how we can achieve understanding so making things 
anthropologically strange does not, of itself, guarantee understanding. 
That is, this procedure is a problem locator not a problem solver; it is 
methodologically naive and incomplete. 
Our conclusion that the naive questioning of common-sense attitudes 
can give no greater reliability than these attitudes themselves raises 
a number of possible strategies. We can abandon the project and decide 
to do something useful instead. We can accept that all questioning and 
knowledge is based on unquestioned assumptions and simply adopt those 
ssumptions which we find satisfactory. Thus, our conclusions will be 
acceptable only to those who share our assumptions and the growth of 
* This is basically Weber's method re below chapter 4. 
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knowledge will be restricted to like-minded persons. There can be no 
suggestion that our perception of the situation is more reliable or 
accurate or should be preferred to other perceptions. This, too, 
would tend to raise the question of why we should bother with a time- 
consuming sophisticated enquiry when our initial impressions are just 
as reliable, or unreliable. The fact that we may use scientific tools 
in our sophisticated enquiry simply means that we get a scientifically 
produced unreliability as opposed to a common-sense produced unreliability. 
The third strategy is to deny the inevitability of the infinite regress 
and unreliability by demonstrating that basic, unquestionable data 
are available and that these provide the criteria by which the adequacy 
of the course of enquiry is judged. However it is also necessary to 
demonstrate that such data is intersubjectively available, that it 
constitutes the grounds of universal rational judgements. This is the 
approach which we adopt and which we intend to justify as an application 
of the phenomenological method below 
Although we have noted that Schutz's concept of the lebenswelt 
fails to establish intersubjective understanding it is necessary to 
complete this part of our enquiry by considering Schutz's references, 
other than in the context of the lebenswelt, to the nature of a world 
common to all subjects. We have noted above Schutz's attempts to 
establish the world of completed deeds as common to all subjects and we 
have criticised its inadequacies and its behaviouristic implications. 
Nevertheless, this idea is a persistent theme in Schutz's work. Thus 
he states that the thou is "that consciousness whose intentional Acts 
I see as occurring as other than, yet simultaneous with, my own"(46) 
However, it has been shown that in terms of Schutz's account the features 
* re Chapter 7 
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of otherness and simultaneity are mutually exclusive. Thus Schutz 
states that we each see this simultaneity from our respective standpoints, 
these subjective standpoints being transcended by reference to the same 
objects which he associates with Husserl's idea of an intersubjective 
Nature. We therefore see that Schutz implicitly recognises the intriguing 
phenomenon of how we can be both individuals and also members of an 
intersubjective community. However Schutz's formulation of the problem 
preserves the priority of the individual perspective and thus leads to 
the contradictory position of asserting a simultaneity which is no 
simultaneity because each "partner" sees it in his own way. Schutz 
bases this simultaneity on a common world of objects but our previous 
criticisms have shown that the establishment of intersubjectivity depends 
on a common consciousness of objects. That is, Schutz asserts only 
common objects of knowledge but this is quite distinct from establishing 
common knowledge of objects which is what is assumed in the idea of 
intersubjective understanding. The confusion is hidden in Schutz's work 
because he uses the term experience in two distinct ways. 
(47) 
Thus he 
asserts a genuine understanding in which the centre of attention is the 
other's lived experiences as actor and raises questions concerning the 
spontaneity of action, the nature of the project and the in-order-to 
motive and the meaning-context of the experience for the actor. Such 
questions are clearly not concerned with observable events or completed 
ý: _ Y l 
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deeds. Thus Schutz uses the term experiences to mean both observable F 
events and, when in the discussion of genuine understanding, as that which 
belongs to the inner life of the subject. Therefore by not clarifying 
the fact that he is using the term experience in these two senses Schutz 
is able to regard experience, depending on the needs of the argument, 
as a component of both subjective and objective worlds. 
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Indeed Schutz goes beyond the type of community which can be 
established on the basis of a mutual orientation to the same objects. 
Thus he states that, in the face-to-face situation, "to the extent that 
you and I can mutually experience ... growing old together for a time, 
to the extent that we can live in (simultaneity) together, to that 
extent we can live in each other's subjective contexts of meaning"(48). 
This assumes the possibility of a we-consciousness, that I am attending 
"to your actual conscious experiences themselves and not merely to my 
experiences of you ... I can be aware simultaneously of what is going 
on in my mind and yours living through the two series of experiences as 
one series - what we are experiencing together"(49). It could be 
argued that this simultaneity of experience refers only to ego and 
other's attending to the same objects. More crucially the reference to 
awareness of the other's mind indicates either a rejection of Schutz's 
claim that other minds are inaccessible or, as is more likely the idea 
that Acts are evidences of intended meaning. This latter view in fact 
leads only to the banality that actor's mean to do what they do. This 
completely overlooks the possibility of varying interpretations of the 
Act, the possibility of failure or frustration and above all it cannot 
raise the question as to the value of the situation created by the 
Act 
for the actor other than by pointing to an infinite progress of future 
Acts which are achieved on the basis of the Act in question. Also this 
idea does not justify Schutz's references to a common stream of conscious- 
ness between ego and other(50)0 
We noted above that Schutz's idea of an intersubjective world can 
be equated with culture. The extent of Schutz's perception of under- 
standing as being culture-bound is indicated in his remarks that our 
understanding of predecessors is tenuous because I cannot assume, "a 
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common civilisation, a common core of knowledge between predecessors and 
myself as I can between myself and contemporaries"(51). Wo have identified, 
above, the inadequacy of relying on ideas concerning culture as a guarantee 
of intersubjective understanding, but our interest at this point is in 
the situation of understanding supposed cultural outsiders. Although 
Schutz regards the understanding of such outsiders as difficult he does 
not regard it as impossible. This undermines his implicit equation of 
lebenswelt, culture and the conditions of understanding. Schutz attempts 
to establish our understanding of predecessors, and we would extend this 
to include all cultural outsiders, by identifying the experience of such 
people as belonging to human experience in general(52), "the essence of 
human experience as (the idea of) such". To question, as we have done, 
the validity of culture as the basis of understanding is to raise the 
possibility that such human experience in general is the root of all our 
knowledge of others and this establishment of this idea will be the main 
burden of our definition of a phenomenological sociology. However, Schutz 
does not pursuu this idea of a universal human experience and it seems 
that he regards it as a residue. The nature of this experience is not 
made clear nor is the manner of our apprehending it. 
We have criticised Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding 
and his attempts to base this understanding on a common world as inadequate. 
It is therefore necessary to consider the nature of the sociology which 
Schutz derives from his account of understanding. 
SCHUTZ'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIOLOGY 
Schutz's failure to come to terms with the problems previously 
discussed is indicated in his remark that the social sciences take the 
social world, intersubjectivity, the existence of others and the life- 
world for granted( 
53) which effectively means that sociology, as perceived 
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by Schutz, is naive. Nevertheless, Schutz as noted above claims a 
distinction between the natural attitude and "scientific sociology. 
This difference would appear to rest on the following factors. Firstly 
that, unlike the natural attitude, sociology recognises that its 
interpretations of the other are constructed, that the other's intended 
meanings are inaccessible. This has been criticised above. Secondly 
that there is a major difference between the method of type-construction 
in sociology and the natural attitude; this will be discussed below. 
Finally, the importance of the reliance of sociology on reflection. 
Thus Schutz states, "For in a certain sense I am a social scientist in 
everyday life whenever I reflect upon my fellow men and their behaviour 
instead of merely experiencing them"(54). However, reflection is a" 
vague term and although it is implied that it is more rigorous than 
taken-for-granted knowledge, this is not established. In particular 
Schutz does not establish the critical capacity of reflection; that iss 
its competence in establishing a critique of the natural attitude and 
thus its ability to go beyond the natural attitude. In so far as Schutz 
sees the common-sense world as taken-for-granted by sociology, such a 
critique would seem to be unavailable. Thus, in drawing a distinction 
between reflecting on experience and more experiencing Schutz is not 
drawing a distinction between sociology and the natural attitude for it 
would appear that this reflection is naive, that is, based on natural 
attitude assumptions. Thus, such reflection is part of common-sense. 
If rdl ection is to advance beyond common-sense it can do so only by being 
rigorous, that is by being grounded in totally reliable knowledge. This 
is the goal of phenomenology and it is strange that Schutz, who claimed 
to be a phenomenologist, did not realise its potential value in this 
situation. Schutz's argument that reflection is a distinctive feature 
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of sociology as opposed to the natural attitude is tenable only if we 
regard the natural attitude as the non-thinking and non-conceptual mode 
of social being. As soon as it is realised that the natural attitude, 
or common sense, is not mere experiencing but is the application of a 
particular unclarified, range of concepts, ideas and beliefs to experience, 
Schutz's distinction between it and reflection breaks down, for how can 
these concepts be applied other than in reflective acts? 
This conclusion entails the consideration of Schutz's distinction 
between naive actor and sociological observer. This distinction is 
particularly crucial for, when the actor is passive in the course of 
social action, he is attending to that action as an observer. Schutz 
distinguishes between the passive actor and the sociological observer 
on the grounds of the latter's detachment, but this does not clarify the 
distinction between "scientific" sociologist and the ordinary non- 
participating observer. In effect Schutz denies any such difference. 
The sociologist in Schutz's view, is in the position of an indirect 
observer of social action 
(55) 
, that is, one who observes action but 
is 
not involved in it. It is not clear why this should be so although 
it may be connected with Schutz's notion of the scientific status of soc- 
iology. That is, by being detached from action the sociologist is 
being objective, thd other is seen as an anonymous "one", and objectivity 
is a quality of science. If this is so than this idea of scientific 
objectivity is quite different from any of Schutz's previous uses of 
the term, "objective". It is also possible that Schutz asserts this 
detached position of the sociologist because if the sociologist were 
to establish a face-to-face relationship, or even a direct social 
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relationship 
*, (h)e would, or could, be drawn into the course of action 
under consideration, thereby effecting its course. Thus, he could not 
be said to be observing the course of action in its "natural" state but 
only as it has been distorted by his intervention. This of course 
assumes a 'natural' state of the course of action which indirect social 
observation cannot establish. This results in a major contradiction 
in Schutz's account of a scientific, interpretive sociology. Schutz, 
in distinguishing between various types of understanding, argues that 
the we-relationship gives the greatest insight into the motives of the 
other. Thus his identity of sociology with indirect social observation 
means, in Schutz's own terms, that sociology is less reliable than a major 
form of everyday understanding. Thus, Schutz's emphasis on scientific 
objectivity has the effect of making available to sociology a second or 
third best knowledge, compared to common-sense*. 
(Z)It 
would be expected 
that the reason for demanding that sociology be scientific would be to 
guarantee the greater adequacy of its understanding, compared to common- 
sense, but, on Schutz's account, common-sense has a greater possibility 
of reliable understanding than scientific sociology. Therefore, there 
would seem to be no point in adopting such a scientific sociology. 
Schutz therefore distinguishes between naive indirect social 
observation and sociological observation on the grounds that the 
sociologist has no available direct social relationships, as social 
scientist his world is solely the world of indirect social observation. 
*(l) The difference between direct and indirect social relationships is 
unclear in Schutz, although it seems that the latter is, ideally, 
totally anonymous, whereas, in the former the other is bodily present, 
is. the distinction is geographical rather than social. Schutz's equation 
of sociology with the indirect social relationship, thus implies that the 
sociologist should have no direct experience of his subjects. 
*(2) It has been said that sociology can be either correct and irrelevant 
or relevant and wrong. Schutz appears to have produced a sociology 
whose conclusions would be probably wrong and almost certainly irrelevant. 
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The purpose of this would appear to be the need to ensure that nothing 
is accepted into the sociologist's world without criticism. 
(56) 
This 
appears to be Schutz's obeisance to phenomenology's pre-suppositionless 
ideal, but unlike Husserl Schutz does not describe the method of criticism 
to be employed. Nor is it clear how the sociologist, from the perspective 
of indirect social observer, is to criticise the data of everyday life, 
as this perspective according to Schutz, is not particularly reliable. 
That is, the identification of reliable data which are alone to be 
admitted into the sociologist's stock of knowledge cannot be achieved 
from within the sociologist's perspective as defined by Schutz. Indeed, 
Schutz frequently states that the we-relationship, to which the sociologist 
is denied access, is a means of checking interpretations derived in direct 
or indirect social observation. Indeed he contrasts the "probability" 
of understanding in direct social observation with the "certainty" of the 
(57) 
we-relationship. 
Schutz's confusion on this point can be best examined by considering 
his notion of questioning the other. Thus he states that knowledge 
concerning predecessors is inadequate compared to that of contemporaries 
(direct social observation) and consociates (face-to-face observation) 
because we can never be sure that the predecessors interpretive schemes 
coincide with mine. Whereas, in the situation of understanding 
contemporaries and consociates we can interrogate the actor, "end so settle 
the question once and for all 
*(58). Similarly, Schutz answers the 
question as to how an observer knows that a social relationship exists 
between two persons by claiming that certain indications in their 
behaviour establish a presumption that this is the case. This 
presumption can be turned into a certainty by questioning the actor's, 
* We have previously criticised reliance on questioning actors in order to understand as"such questioning, in order to be appropriate, presupposes prior understanding. Our criticisms here are aimed, not at supporting the 
adequacy of questioning, but at revealing a contradiction in Schutz's 
work. 
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but this requires entering into a relationship with the actors 
(59) 
V 
"Whatever judgement the observer may make concerning the probability, 
possibility or conceivability of the existence of any social relation. 
ship derives whatever validity it has from the possibility of thus 
questioning the person or persons who may be involved in that relation- 
ship". This Schutz sees questioning, the entering into a direct 
relationship with the actors, as part of the observer's criteria for 
the existence of a social relationship, yet as has been seen, sociologists 
are debarred from fulfilling this criteria by the demand that they retain 
the perspective of the indirect social observer. Thus, Schutz's 
"scientific" sociology, unlike common-sense, cannot, in the terms of 
Schutz's own argument, establish with certainty the existence, let alone 
the nature, of a social relationship. 
Schutz sees the goal of scientific judgement as "knowledge of the 
world with a maximum of explicit clarity and distinctiveness ... 
(and 
every social science) including interpretive sociology ... sets as its 
primary goal the greatest possible clarification about what is thought 
about the social world by those living in it"(60). It is noticeable 
that Schutz refers to "clarification" not "probability", "accuracy", 
certainty or, the ultimate unmentionable, "truth", although he uses some 
' of these terms in relation to common sense understanding. However, 
Schutz's notion of clarification stands in need of being clarified. In 
view of our overall critique of Schutz, "clarification" would seem to 
be equivalent to the idea of making others comprehensible, that is, 
fitting them into the observer's existing world-view. This is a 
product of the procedure of seeing others as manifestations of self. 
It does not understand others, it annihilates them. Such a procedure 
may give intellectual satisfaction but it can have no claims to either 
truth or relevance concerning others and yet it is clear from the latter 
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part of Schutz's statement that he expects it to tell us about others' 
perceptions of the social world in which they live. 
Thus, Schutz's attempts to distinguish between the knowledge 
available to the sociological and naive observer df action is seen to 
fail. Both sociologist and naive observer, in Schutz's view, see Acts 
as indications of the actor's mental processes. The external observer 
interprets his experiences of these signs, "in such a way as to establish 
the meaning-context in which the conscious experiences must exist in the- 
minds of the observed ersons 
(61)' 
p" However this "must", in conformity 
with the ego-centrist model of action which Schutz adopts, refers only 
to the observer's interpretation, that is he cannot or will not admit 
any alternative interpretation*. Nevertheless, the observer's inter- 
pretations are "consistent with his experience and social world and his 
knowledge of the other"(62) and this, being based on other-orientation, 
makes possible the comprehension of subjective meaning. It is important 
to note that Schutz sees knowledge of the other as relevant to interpretation 
for this indicates that, as the other is the object of the interpretive 
act, that such interpretation should tell us about the other. Also, 
knowledge of the other is lacking in the perspective of the external 
observer. On Schutz's account the observer can have no knowledge of 
the other as other. Therefore, Schutz should clarify how knowledge of 
the other, as opposed to self-projection, is possible without compromising 
the position of the external observer. This he does not do. 
The observer, in Schutz's view, seeks to interpret motives and to 
establish primary and intermediate goals but this, as noted above, raises 
the problem of the infinite progress, that is all goals can be regarded 
as intermediate therefore how does the observer establish one Act as 
* This point is developed in our notion of the postulate of obviousness 
re Chapter 6. 
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the goal of the actor's action? Equally Schutz's reference to the 
apprehension of subjective meaning, which in its formal definition would 
mean no more than observing the other's Acts or keeping in view his 
lived experiences as they occur, and this conveys merely the idea of a 
recognition of the other's completed Acts. This presumes that the Acts 
are motivated, which knowledge cannot be gained within the perspective 
of the external observer. It is also based on a false Act-action 
distinction and presupposes a knowledge of the significance of the Act 
for the actor. All these points have been made above. Thus Schutz's 
notion of comprehending the other in so far as it cannot establish 
knowledge of the other as a distinct person, that is his quality of 
otherness, tells us nothing about the other, We could just as well be 
dealing with subjective phantasies rather than with other persons for 
despite Schutz's rejection of the adequacy of the reciprocity of 
perspectives, all that can be comprehended by the external observer is 
not the other, but the observer himself if he were in the other's position. 
Schutz, as has been seen, tries to salvage the value of this 
operation by arguing that the degree of accuracy in our interpretive 
judgements is dependant on our familiarity with the other. The 
contradictions which this causes in Schutz's account have been noted 
but 
it is also important to recognise that this argument by Schutz results 
merely in the truism that the adequacy of our knowledge of the other 
depends on how well acquainted we are with his subjective states. Thus 
the problem persists of how we are to establish adequate knowledge of an 
other's subjectivity. It could be argued that Schutz's argument 
concerning familiarity does not require knowledge of the other's subjective 
states because we simply need to know that in a given situation the other 
is likely to behave in a certain way; we base this belief on the fact 
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that this is the way he has behaved in the past in similar situations. 
Two criticisms can be made concerning this argument. Firstly, it over- 
looks the distinction between everyday and sociological projects. That 
is, everyday understanding is limited by the requirements of the reason 
for understanding, the practical purpose served by understanding. There 
is therefore no need to understand the other in himself but simply to gain 
that degree of understanding which serves the purpose at hand. Everyday 
understanding is shallow because it does not need to be deep. However, 
the goal of the sociological project is no more and no less than under- 
standing the other; its adequacy is judged not by its efficiency in 
relation to an ulterior goal, or by the acceptability or coherence of the 
( 
interpretation as judged by the observer* but by its proximity to the 
mode of perception and evaluation of the actor. Schutz, as has been seen, 
recognises this point, but cannot guarantee or give meaning to the idea 
of an approximation of the actor's intended meaning. Therefore the 
criteria of adequacy must be different in everyday and sociological 
interpretations, the former being concerned with practical value, the 
latter with truth. Thus, the argument above is sociologically inadequate 
because it does not answer the question why the action is the some in 
that situation. 
The second criticism of the argument above is that it is simply 
wrong in believing that the judgement it describes is independent of 
questions concerning intended meaning. This is because the argument 
hinges on the idea of the situation being the same and it implies that 
*( 
the actor sees it as the same 
2). This does not mean simply the same 
*(l) This point will be discussed in greater detail below in relation to 
types in sociology re this chapter and chapter 7. 
*(2) We have discussed above in relation to Wich the adequacy of the 
view that similarity is determined by rules, re below chapter 4. 
280 
in terms of its appearance but also in terms of its significance for 
the actor. This is crucial because no two events are, phenomenally, the 
same, there is always some difference between them even if it is only the 
fact of the events happening in different times and places. Thus the 
judgement that the situations are the same is a qualitative judgement which 
seeks to distinguish between the essentials and the accidents of the two 
situations and, in so far as it is made by an observer, it presupposes an 
identity between the observer's and actor's judgements concerning the 
nature and significance of the situations. That is, the judgement that 
two situations are similar involves a subjective judgement of significance. 
Therefore, the argument, above, that our understanding of others can be 
established without reference to intended meaning or actor's interpretations 
is shown to be based on taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the identity 
of observer's and actor's intended meanings and significant judgements. 
We have criticised Schutz's conception of action, meaning, the nature 
of understanding and the relationship between everyday and sociological 
interpretive understanding of the other. It is therefore necessary to 
complete our discussion of Schutz by considering the nature of the 
sociological methodology which he derives from these arguments. We intend 
to concentrate upon Schutz's notion of typification because, as noted above, 
the final distinguishing feature for Schutz of "scientific" sociology as 
opposed to everyday knowledge is its special mode of organising knowledge 
in types. 
TYPES AND UNDERSTANDING 
Although the main consideration of the notion of sociological 
types will be deferred*, a consideration of this idea is relevant to the 
apprehension of Schutz's grasp of understanding in sociology. Schutz 
* re below chapter 
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asserts that typification is not simply a method of the social sciences 
but is a feature of everyday understanding. It is therefore necessary 
to clarify Schutz's grasp of everyday typification and to considor his 
claim that sociological typifications are more scientific than those of 
everyday life. Schutz associates everyday typification with the 
relationship between contemporaries. 
The subject of everyday typification is an anonymous "one", not an 
actual person and, as noted above, it is clear that Schutz sees this as 
a second-best mode of apprehending the other. The other's ego is a 
possible or supposible individuation of the type, but the ego of the 
typical actor is the creation of the type-producer and user. Schutz 
sees the type as built up out of a synthesis of the type-producer's 
interpretations of any number of his experiences. This is the synthesis 
of recognition in which the personal ideal type is constituted and thus 
the subjective meaning context has been abandoned as a tool of interpretation 
and replaced by a complex series of inter-related objective meaning 
contexts, the number and complexity of which determines the other's anony- 
mity. It is clear that this process is based upon initial direct experience 
of an instance of the type of action and thus Schutz is describing, not 
typification, but inductive generalisation which assumes the adequacy of 
direct experience and overlooks the need to justify the categories in 
terms of which the individual direct experience is apprehended. 
Schutz sees such types as being made part of the stock of knowledge 
through which the world is interpreted including the face-to-face 
situation of the we-relationship. However these types can be modified 
by the we-relationship, that is, typification precedes the we-relationship 
which is initially typically identified. This raises the problem of 
what the distinction is between the we-relationship and the anonymous they- 
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relationship with contemporaries if both are based on typical knowledge 
especially as the former alone is equated with genuine understanding. 
Schutz distinguishes between these situations in terms of the greater use 
of typification in the they-relationship. However we would argue that 
the difference between these situations is that the face-to-face relation- 
ship has a greater variety of typifications available to it than is the 
case with relationships between contemporaries. We suggest therefore 
that Schutz has inverted the relationship between typification and 
anonymity and that anonymity in social relationships is a product of the 
relative paucity of typical knowledge which is available. Schutz fails 
to appreciate this because he assumes that typical knowledge is an 
imprecise derivation of particular perception and thus he does not 
recognise that all knowledge is based on universal concepts. That is, 
the particular situation is apprehended by concepts which are not 
necessarily limited to that situation but which have a potentially 
infinite range within the ontological realm to which they belong; only 
thus is the knowledge of novel situations and comparison between situations 
possible. Schutz's view of the limited role of typification is a product 
of his perception of types as generalisations from particular instances 
and not as universals. As a consequence he confuses face-to-face and 
contemporary social relationships with the perception of an individual 
and a group respectively. This is shown in his instance of card- 
playing, cited above, where the change from the contemporary to the face- 
to-face situation was marked by a change in perception from card-players 
in general to a particular card-player. 
Schutz identifies two types which correspond to his distinction 
between objective and subjective meaning respectively, The first is the 
course of actipn type which describes the typical behaviour. Once this 
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is established it is possible to construct a personal typo, that is a 
typification of one who is motivated to perform the typical course of 
action. For instance, Schutz says it is possible to construct a 
personal type of a postman once we know the postman's job, that is the 
course of action of a postman. 
(64) 
Schutz however overlooks the fact 
that the definition of a postman is a definition of his job and thus a 
personal type can add to the course of action type only the trivial 
information that this action is performed by a person. In Schutz's view 
the distinctive feature of the personal type is that we "imagine the 
corresponding subjective meaning contexts which would be in (the actor's 
mind)" 
(63) 
, which simply means that we imagine that the actor is 
motivated to perform the action ie. that he has these Acts as his goals. 
Nevertheless we would suggest that our everyday typifications involve, 
where appropriate in terms of ego's purpose in typifying the other, a 
consideration of the actor's motive in the sense of why he performs those 
particular Acts; that is a reference to intended meaning. Schutz has 
declared intended meaning to be inaccessible and his account of 
sociological types, which are basically similar to everyday typifications, 
deliberately omits any reference to the living actors intended meanings. 
Thus Schutz, far from making sociology resemble common-sense, attempts 
to make common-sense resemble sociology. Further Schutz's account of 
the relationship between personal and course of action types makes him 
vulnerable to the criticism which he levelled against Weber of seeing 
actor's subjective or intended meaning as something which is somehow 
attached to a course of action. Thus, even for Schutz, intended 
meaning is a ghost in the machine; a necessary fiction which wo accept 
in order to explain our experiences of other persons. 
However it is possible to discern two kinds of personal types used 
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by Schutz. The first, and most commonly referred to, is the person who 
is disposed to perform a certain course of action, as in the case of the 
postman. Thus the course of action defines the personal type. The 
second personal type derives from Schutz's reference to "miser" as a 
personal ideal type and is a conceptualisation of actor's dispositions and 
attitudes, implying a general mode of orientation to the world and in 
terms of which the course of action type is identified. That is, a 
personal type which defines the nature of the course of action. It is 
this latter personal type which alone refere to reasons for the action but 
it cannot be established by simply looking at objective Acts for such 
Acts are identified as such and such by reference to the mode of orientat- 
ion. Thus the nomination of a mode of orientation e. g. 'miser' presupposes 
a grasp of the other's subjectivity whereas the "postal clerk" type, or 
objective personal type, is simply a personification of an action and 
requires no grasp of subjectivity. Only this latter type is consistent 
with Schutz's claim that intended meaning is inaccessible, but, as has 
been seen, it simply adds a superfluous ghost in the machine to what is 
already known concerning the course of action. It is clear that 
"subjective" personal types such as the miser, should not enter into 
Schutz's discourse for he sees the process of typification as beginning 
with the perception of a manifest Act, the motives of which are deduced 
by identifying the constantly achieved goal of the Act*, after which an 
agent is postulated who typically intends the typical Act. Thus the 
person of the action is, for Schutz, a mere residue and his personal 
types never leave the objective, that is observer's sphere. Schutz's 
account completely overlooks the fact that the initial iddntity of the 
Act as such and such, which presupposes the reasons for the action and 
thus the understanding contained in the personal ideal type, ignores the 
* It will be seen that this is a description of goal-rational action ie. the action is the means to the end or Act; the motive is the Act. 
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actor's dispositions and replaces them with those of the observer. It 
could be argued that Schutz is describing here only the methods of 
everyday life but as will be seen this is basically the some procedure 
which he advocates for sociology. Further Schutz claims that this 
account is based solely on the "general thesis", that is on the belief 
that the other exists, but this account assumes not only that the other 
exists but that his intentions are identical to those of the observer, 
and thus we are brought back to the reciprocity of perspectives which 
Schutz claims to be an unreliable assumption. The alternative position 
is to accept the behaviouristic implications of Schutz's account and to 
argue that we see moving shapes about which we can state only what is 
observable. Any attempts to locate meaning, motive or intention in these 
shapes must be accepted as the observer's self-projection. The problems 
associated with this approach have been discussed above, but it is clear 
that any claim that we interpret or understand these shapes cannot be 
permitted as such claims assume that there is something other than 
objective appearance and it is this which is to be understood and 
interpreted. Thus the 'objective' personal type tells us only how the 
typifier perceives and identifies the typified action*. As regards 
actors' meanings these types are ind uc tive generalisations which assume 
what they claim to reveal. The 'subjective' personal type is the only 
one which can tell us about the other, but its possibility cannot be 
established by Schutz's objectivist approach. This point is recognised 
by Schutz who states that, "the personal ideal type is itself always 
determined by the interpreter's point of view. It is a function of the 
very question it seeks to answer. It is dependant upon the objective 
* The contradiction in this idea, that it arbitrarily grants the 
observer's meanings a privileged status in accepting that they can be 
understood by an audience, has been noted above. 
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context of meaning which it merely translates into subjective terms and 
then personifies" 
(65). Nevertheless, Schutz also claims that it is nec- 
essary that the use of the ideal type be appropriate to the actor in 
question. However he does not pursue this point and it is clear that to 
do so undermines his whole theory. In posing this point Schutz is 
recognising two factors, firstly, that such types, and this includes 
sociological types, should be appropriate to the actor and yet there is 
no means compatible with Schutz's approach of establishing such appropriate- 
ness. Secondly, that in assuming that this appropriateness can be 
established it assumes that the actor's intended meaning can be grasped 
in some form so as to compare it with the typical meaning of the type 
which must itself be regarded merely as a hypothesis; to be checked by 
the test of appropriateness. A similar confusion is shown in Schutz's 
famous assertion that sociologists cons'truct constructs of actor's constructs. 
This statement implicitly assumes a direct relationship between actors, 
and sociologists' constructs, 'that the sociologists' constructs have the 
actors' constructs as their object. In view of Schutz's analysis, and 
taking into account our criticisms of the goal-rational model of action 
used by Schutz, it would be more accurate to say that the sociologist 
constructs constructs of observable events which he believes to be the 
object of the actor's constructs. 
Nevertheless, Schutz does believe that those types can have their 
adequacy checked. This is to be achieved in direct social experience 
(66). 
We have criticised above Schutz's belief that direct social experience, 
as he describes it, is reliable and we have considered the problems of 
questioning actors. We wish to simply emphasise that Schutz's belief 
that types can be checked by direct social experience makes even more 
peculiar his assertion that, in the interests of its scientific status 
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sociology should adopt only the anonymous, they-orientation of indirect 
social experience. 
*(l) Indeed Schutz refers to the knowledge of the 
contents of the other's consciousness believed to be acquired in the we- 
relationship which modifies the ideal-typical interpretive schemes, "All 
our knowledge of our follow men is in the last analysis based on personal 
experience"(67). Schutz does not explain how such personal experience 
of the other is possible if we are, as he suggests, limited to knowledge 
of our own consciousnesses. 
*(2) 
It is possible that the knowledge to 
which Schutz refers in relation to the we-relationship is derived from 
indications of the other's consciousness but he gives no reason why our 
interpretation of these indications should be more reliable than ideal 
typical constructs. Although Schutz affirms that the ideal type is 
appropriate to the understanding of contemporaries he also claims that 
even in the direct social relationship we use a stock of personal and 
course of action types which we vary in order to keep up with change in 
the other and thus "grasp him in his living reality. " This reveals a 
contradiction in Schutz's conception of the relationship between 
typification and the face-to-face relationship. He sees the faco-to- 
face relationship as a means of checking the adequacy of typification 
but, contradictorily, accepts that the face-to-face relationship is 
'3' 
itself typically apprehended. . There is a further ambiguity in that 
Schutz, at times, describes types as ind uc tive generalisations derived 
*(1) It should also be noted that, by this argument, Schutz perceives the 
personal ideal type as a hypothesis. 
*(2) This phenomenon of being effected by the other, to which Schutz 
obliquely refers will be a crucial theme in our revision of phenomenologi- 
cal sociology. 
*(3) This confusion is only increased by Schutz's suggestion that the 
direct relationship commences on the basis of typifications which are 
then abandoned and replaced by "knowledge - based on personal experience", 
and indicates Schutz's confusion of generalisations and universal concepts. 
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from direct experience, hence the persistence of subjective meaning 
contexts in the type whereas, at other times, he sees it as a hypothesis 
which is to be verified by reference to direct experience. That is, 
tautologously, the direct social relationship is both the origin and the 
test of the type and we would argue that these characteristics are 
mutually exclusive. That is, if the test is to be a genuine test the 
datum of the test should not be included in the hypothetical construct, 
for, if this is the case, the test itself is hypothetical. Also Schutz 
occasionally sees types as containing hypotheses or as hypothesis generators 
which indicates that typical understanding is merely provisional 
(68)1 
which raises the problem of how reliable understanding can be achieved 
from the sociologist's position as defined by Schutz. 
These confusions originate in Schutz's desire to assert a fit between 
types and the reality to which they refer while also asserting that this 
reality, the intended meaning, is inaccessible. Thus, he claims that the 
objective meaning contexts which I use to understand others will show the 
effects of the original subjective meaning contexts in the actor's mind. 
This claim is not supported nor is it clear why, if this is the case, it 
should be necessary to check the type against direct experience. Never- 
theless, Schutz asserts that it is necessary that the observer never forget 
that the typical actor is his construct for there is always the danger, 
as Schutz expresses it, of the observer substituting his types for those 
in the mind of the other. Thus, in order to recognise this danger we 
must know that the other is not as he is typified but this assumes a 
knowledge of the other which Schutz declares to be inaccessible. Again 
we see Schutz having to accept that we know the other is intentionally 
motivated in order to deny that we can know intentional motivations. 
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TYPES IN SOCIOLOGY 
We have claimed that there is a basic similarity between Schutz's 
conceptions of everyday types and those of interpretive sociology. 
However he claims that interpretive sociology goes beyond everyday 
understanding by "constructing personal ideal types for social actors 
(69) 
which are compatible with those constructed by the letter's partners". 
Again this suggests that the adequacy of the ideal-typical they-orientat- 
ion is dependant on its compatibility with a we-relationship. However, 
Schutz does not clarify the nature of such compatibility. When he refers 
to the requirement that the personal ideal types of the partners must be 
congruent with each other and with the ideal-typical relationship he is 
asserting no more than that the type should not be self-contradictory. 
It is difficult to see how this notion of the sociological ideal type is 
an advance on common-sense for the latter also strives for non-contradiction. 
A further difference between sociology and common-sense, in Schutz's 
view, is that, as noted above, the sociologist has no we-relationships 
as sources of knowledge. Thus sociological knowledge is based exclusively 
on, "constituted ideal objectifications, that is to say on conclusions of 
thought and never on prepredicative Acts of laying hold of the other 
person himself"(70). This raises the problem of what such a procedure 
can tell us about actors in themselves. However Schutz expresses the 
problem as how a science of subjective-meaning contexts is possible. 
These problems are not the same because, as used here, subjective meaning 
context is simply the constitution of the Act in a series of actions and 
thus does not tell us about the reasons for the enactment of the Act. 
Schutz bases his claim that sociological constructs are scientific 
as opposed to the constructs of everyday life, on the grounds that they 
accord with the established conclusions of all sciences and explain the 
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subjective experiences to which they refer in terms of motivation. The 
claim that sociological ideal types accord with the conclusions of other 
sciences assumes the relevance of these sciences for sociological 
understanding. It is necessary to justify this assumption which Schutz 
fails to do. Further, in so far as these sciences are relevant to 
sociological understanding, it is possiblb that their conclusions have 
been achieved by the same ideal typical method and therefore cannot 
constitute an independent assessment of the adequacy of this method. 
Schutz's second point overlooks the reference to motivation in everyday 
constructs. Therefore reference to motivation is not a distinguishing 
feature of sociological types. 
Schutz recognises that the meaning contained within the ideal type 
is a theoretically conceived pure type of intended meaning which is 
attributed to the hypothetical actor. Schutz himself uses meaning in 
the sense of either intended or ideal typical meaning in a random fashion 
and thus fails to consider in any depth the relationship between the two. 
That is, he does not specify whether ideal typical meaning is derived 
from intended meaning and if so how is this possible if, in his terms, 
intended meaning is inaccessible and if the sociologist cannot enter into 
a we-relationship with the actor or wh6ther ideal typical meaning is 
independant of intended meaning in which case how can it tell us about 
real actors? 
In so far as Schutz expects ideal types to be used in predicting 
action he clearly expects it to be relevant to our understanding of real 
actors. If the actual action does not correspond to the ideal type then 
another type is sought. This, in effect makes the ideal type a hypothesis 
and Schutz does not tell us how we select the appropriate hypthesis, if 
more than one ideal type fits the action. As noted above in relation 
to Rex, this approach overlooks the problem that the ideal type does not 
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simply explain, but also defines, the action. 
Schutz believes that the criteria of meaningful and causal adequacy 
ensures the relevance and probability of the ideal type, the inadequacies 
of this argument have been clarified above in relation to Rex, in particular 
how this approach converts the type into a hypothesis but in so far as the 
type is constructed according to the perceptions of the observer any 
coincidence between the type and the action is accidental, However, 
Schutz meets this objection by claiming that, "there is no distinction 
between the meaning context of the observer and that of the actor. The 
reason is simple, if there is a real person corresponding to the observer's 
postulates then he will by definition intend what the observer has in 
mind" 
(71) The problem which Schutz overlooks is that of identifying 
such a person. Further, in this declaration Schutz, far from using 
experience as a test of the type, uses the type as a test of experience. 
Thus Schutz sees sociological constructs as "objective meaning-contexts 
of subjective meaning-contexts"(72). In this context this phrase would 
seem to mean an outsider's view of insider's experience. Thus, social 
science cannot understand the actor as a real living person but only as 
one who exists within an impersonal and anonymous objective time of which 
no-one has or over can experience(73) and thus it is not the function of 
the social sciences to understand others in the sense of the inter-personal 
understanding of the we-relationship. This clearly conflicts with Schutz's 
earlier statements that sociological ideal types are compatible with those 
of the actor's partners. It is clear that, in our terminology, this is 
not understanding but comprehending the other. 
Nevertheless Schutz persists in asserting a fit between type and 
living actors when he claims that objective meaning is constructed out 
of subjective meaning in which process a sense of objectivity is given to 
- 292 - 
the actor's meaning through which it may be understood by an observer. 
However, in the context of typification, Schutz affirms that this process 
can be understood by an observer only through his own typifying model. 
Thus, we would argue, the observer understands not a living person but a 
conceptual model and therefore the actor's meaning is not given a sense 
of objectivity but is replaced by an objective, is. observer-originated, 
construct. For these reasons, Schutz claims the anonymity of the ideal 
typical actor to be total, although Schutz's notion of anonymity is 
inadequate. Thus, he states that "businessman" is less anonymous than 
"consumer" who is anyone and everyone(74) and this indicates that Schutz 
is confusing anonymity with generality. That is a type is increasingly 
anonymous in direct relation to the number of people who could be included 
in it. The idea of businessman is differont in its lack of personal 
predicates than is the idea of consumer and this is what anonymity should 
mean. 
The archetypal social sciences for Schutz are economics and jurisprud- 
(75) 
ence Both of these are based on assumptions concerning the goals " 
of actors. The economic actor is motivated by a desire to maximise 
his economic advantage, the legal actor is oriented towards legal 
institutions and their definitions. If these sciences are to serve as 
models. for interpretive sociology it is necessary to ascertain the goal 
of social action. It is probably in order to identify this definitive 
and common referent of social action that Schutz emphasises the preference 
of interpretive sociology for rational action. This is a different 
justification of rational action in sociology than that advanced by 
Weber but it is no more acceptable. Whereas economics and jurisprudence 
specify the goal of appropriate action, the idea of rational action as 
efficient action, which seems to be adopted by Schutz, specifies only the 
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means of action. In order to claim that we have understood action it 
is necessary to grasp its goal, for an action can be deemed efficient 
only by reference to its goal and the means available. Thus whereas 
economics can ignore the question as to why the individual wishes to 
maximise his economic advantage, sociology cannot ignore the question of 
the purpose served by rational calculation. 
Schutz's references to uris rudence(l) jp give the clearest indication 
of the consequences of his approach, thus, "the root of the problem is 
that the human acts which are the subject matter of jurisprudence have 
their own immanent subjective meaning which may or may not coincide with 
the objective meaning that accrues to them in the legal system to which 
they belong, and by the basic norm postulated by the theory governing the 
system"(76). This is clearly a case of judging the adequacy of actors' 
definitions of legal terms by reference to the established rules of 
jurisprudence. This argutuent is setting up an objective, ie. codified 
meaning as a yardstick for the adequacy of subjective meanings, or more 
precisely, for particular uses of terms established in jurisprudence. 
Thus, it is assumed that the actors are oriented in their behaviour by 
the categories of jurisprudence, and the investigation of the actor's 
behaviour is simply a matter of looking up the official definitions to 
see if they are using these categories correctly. The situbtion in 
relation to sociology is totally different because jurisprudence created 
the legal world and established the definitions within which legal action 
occurs. However, sociology did not create the social world, interaction 
occurs independantly from sociology, therefore sociology cannot 
establish official definitions of the social world, it cannot judge the 
adequacy of action by its conformity to a sociological type. 
(2 
Thus 
*(l) It is noticeable that Schutz, like Winch in his search for objective 
definitions of the social world, regards legal procedure as a suitable 
model for social action. This legalism has been criticised above re chap. 4. 
*(2) Even terms used by sociology frequently have a logitimate non- 
sociological usage. 
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some, but not all, the subjective meanings of legal actors can be seid to 
belong to the system of jurisprudence; the same is not true of the 
relationship between sociology and the subjective meanings of social 
actors. 
It is clear that Schutz overlooked this distinction. Thus he states 
that "Subjective meaning-contexts are apprehended by means of a process 
in which that which is scientifically relevant in them is separated from 
that which is irrelevant"(77). Our previous discussion has shown the 
reference to science to be gratuitous and in so far as Schutz sees the 
scientific status of sociology as inhering in its typifications this 
means that the sociologist accepts those subjective meanings which 
conförm to his type and rejects as unscientific those which do not. This 
I 
is a clear position of the imposition of the sociological observer's defin- 
itions onto those of the actor, justified by a spurious idea of science, 
and therefore clearly contradicts Schutz's injunction against replacing 
the social world with a fictional world constructed by the scientific 
observer(78). Thus far from social reality being the test of the 
adequacy of sociological constructs as is implied in Schutz's statement 
that the "primary task of (interpretive sociology) is to describe the 
processes of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation as they are 
carried out by individuals in the social world"(79), sociological constructs 
are made the test of social reality. 
This process is anticipated in Schutz's categorisation of the 
personna of the ideal type as a homonculus, a puppet; 
(80) 
one who has no 
history, motives or consciousness other than that given by the 
sociological observer. That is, it is in all probability a self- 
projection of the observer. * Thus the sociologist investigates only his own 
* The only real value of this type would be as a problem locator and even 
here it is not totally satisfactory as the problem is a problem for the 
observer; it need not be so for the actor. Also, although this type may 
locate our problems, it is a positive hindrance to their solution in so 
far as this is oriented towards an understanding of the other. 
- 295 - 
constructs, in view of our earlier statement that, for Schütz, the 
initial attempts to understand the other result in the effective abolition 
of the other and his replacement by a creation of the sociologist's 
imagination. It, is not possible to perceive this as merely the starting 
point of sociology because Schutz gives no indication as to how this 
puppet is to be replaced by a perception of the other in himself without 
breaking his own rules concerning sociology and also abandoning the mode 
of indirect social observatioh. Thus the supposed rationality of the 
ideal type is nothing more than the statement by the sociologist, "if 
I could reliably understand ., 
the other's action it would have to be like 
this". 
The realisation that Schutz eventually treats sociological constructs 
as real-and everyday reality as hypothetical leads us to reconsider the 
nature of Schutz's conception of everyday interaction. It is clear that 
Schutz's conception of the everyday world is modelled on his conception 
of sociology. This is not simply because he equates everyday indirect 
social observation and the sociological perspective but involves more 
fundamental reasons. The conception of everyday action adopted by 
Schutz is that of goal-rational action, which is also his ideal of 
sociologically comprehensible action. It has been seen that this model 
totally ignores the role of values and the selection of goals, concentrating 
on moans alone and thus avoids consideration of that which makes the 
other distinct from self. Further, the conception of interaction between 
actors is basically the same as the interaction batweenrnthe sociologist 
and his homonculus. This is so despite Schutz's reference to such 
phenomena as growing old together, for although he recognises the existence 
of such events he cannot account for them, largely because of his 
declaration that other's intended meaning is inaccessible. This iss 
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despite the fact that, as has been seen, Schutz does occasionally itply 
the. apprehension of intended meaning. We claim that Schutz used the 
sociological (homanculus)model as the paradigm for a model of interaction 
for two reasons. The first, and relatively minor reason is that Schutz 
describes our apprehension of the other in indirect social observation 
in exactly the same terms as he describes the nature of the homonculus(el). 
This may be justified on the grounds that Schutz explicitly adopts indirect 
social observation as the method of sociology. However our second and 
major point, although deriving from the first cannot be objected against 
in this way.. This is that throughout Schutz's description of everyday 
interaction he adopts the model of an active ego confronted by a passive 
other who simply responds in the appropriate manner to ego's initiatives. 
This is precisely the relationship between the sociologist and his 
"homonculus" and ignores the possibility of the other's initiative or dis- 
sension. The model of the everyday social actor which is adopted by 
Schutz is that of an isolated self-contained individual living in a social 
world which he has created.. The contradiction in this assertion of an 
isolated individual in a social world is only apparent for although Schutz 
states that he intends no consideration of the constitution of 'Thou' in 
the 'I', it is impossible to conduct an enquiry into intersubjectivity 
without reference to such constitution. If a rigorous analysis of this 
constitution is not undertaken it will be replaced by taken for granted, 
inadequately considered assumptions. This is what occurs in Schutz's 
consideration of intersubjective understanding in which he assumes that 
the idea of 'Thou' is totally dependant on the constituting activities of 
'II. In such a world there could be no novelty or surprise or learning; 
in short there could be no others. This is a product of the attitude 
which seeks to understand the social world by detaching itself from it. 
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Thus when Schutz affirms the inaccessibility of intended meaning he is 
simply accomplishing the self-fulfilling prophecy contained in his 
assumption that we are all isolated individuals. 
We have previously noted Schutz's dependance on the reciprocity of 
perspectives and our clarification of his model of the social world reveals 
that this reciprocity operates in one direction only. That is, in the 
reciprocity of perspectives I assume that, for all relevant purposes, the 
other is like me and also that I am like the other, but in this latter 
part of the assumption I stay the same. Thus the second half of the 
assumption is dominated by the first. The other is perceived as being 
like I, and I believe myself to be like the other, as I have perceived him, 
that is, like I. Thus the idea of the reciprocity of perspectives as 
used by Schutz resolves the problem of our knowledge of others by seeing 
'I' as the model for all others. This is the procedure of ego- 
aggrandisement which comprehends but does not understand the other. This 
situation persists not only in the they-orientation which Schutz sees as 
dealing not with real living persons but with anonymous types which have 
neither freedom or duration but also in the face-tp-face relationship. 
This relationship is said to be based on ego's in order to motives becoming 
the because motives of the other. That is it is based on the assumption 
that the other is contentlessy that his only motivations are those given 
to him by ego and that his plan is simply a delayed copy of ego's plan. 
There is no possibility in Schutz's analysis of apprehending the phenomenon 
of ego being affected by the other, of the adaptation of ego's plans to 
the intrusion of the other upon them as something outside the plan and 
not entertained within it. That is, the phenomenon of reciprocation is 
* It is significant in this context that Schutz's account of our typical 
understanding of others e. g. priests and soldiers and farmers "everywhere 
and at every time" is simply an account of role analysis(82). 
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absent from Schutz; interaction is solely ego imposing his motivations 
upon the other who is perceived as passive and totally receptive, one 
whose consciousness consists only of what ego has placed there. The 
idea of the other as an independent actor is overlooked. 
*(') 
There is however one point in Schutz's account of the we-relationship 
where the other seems to be regarded as an independent actor and this is 
in his consideration of the criteria for actor's recognition of a social 
relationship. The first two criteria refer to ego's perception of the 
other, that is his awareness of being affected by the other or of ego's 
turning his attention to the other and being aware of the other's turning 
his attention to ego. In both these cases Schutz claims that it is ego's 
act of attention which constitutes the relationship. This is inadequate 
as the idea of the relationship presupposes the other's consciousness as 
its co-constitator. Again we see the difficulty of Schutz's attempt to 
constitute social relationships from a solipsistic perspective. However, 
Schutz postulates a third mode of ego becoming aware of a social relation- 
ship which does not encounter these problems. This is the phenomenon of 
the formulation by ego of a project which requires the other's attention 
for its completion. We understand this to mean that the completion of 
the project is evidence of the other's attention, 
*(2) 
although Schutz 
emphasises that this is concerned only with how a social relationship is 
generated, but not how it iskiown. Nevertheless, Schutz considers how 
ego can become aware of the reciprocation of his other-orionted acts. 
This is crucial for it conveys the implication of an independant other 
which, if pursued, would lead to a questioning of the adequacy of the 
*(1) This also reveals a weakness in the programme of motivational 
analysis as outlined by Schutz and this is that this procedure overlooks 
the derivation of motives from contexts of relevance and evaluation and 
assumes that the action in question has the same significance for the 
other as it has for ego. 
*(2) A similar idea will be encountered in Schaler and in our notion of 
intrusion re below chapter, 6 and 7, 
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general thesis of the other as developed by Schutz which results in the 
perception of the other as a reconstruction of self. However, Schutz 
fails to come to grips with this problem. He refers vaguely to ego living 
in or contemplating the other's reciprocal acts but does not tall us how 
ego sees these acts as originating in another consciousness nor how the 
other can be seen as initiating or directing action as opposed to merely 
reciprocating ego's action. Thus Schutz refers simply to "our grasping 
the fact" of awareness which leads to intentional modifications on the 
part of actors. This idea is not only unclear but would also seem to 
be underivable from the general thesis(83). 
Thus, we see that Schutz makes his account of sociology plausible 
as a means of understanding social action by re-defining social action as 
sociological action. That is, he overlooks the different projects of soc- 
iological and everyday life, defines social action as it appears to the 
Schutzian sociologist and declares that this is how it appears to everyday 
actors. In doing so he distorts both the projects and experiences of 
everyday life, in particular the experiences of learning from others, as 
opposed to learning about them, surprise and novelty. Thus Schutz over- 
comes the divergence between everyday and sociological conceptions by 
abolishing everyday life and social actors and treating all subjects as 
if they were Schutzian sociologists. This is the reciprocity of 
perspectives with a vengeance. 
THE NOMINALIST TRADITION 
We are now in a position to indicate the principle weaknesses of the 
nominalist tradition as exemplified in the work of Weber, Winch and Schutz 
in relation to the problem of establishing intersubjective understanding. 
It has been seen that this tradition denies the immanent structure of 
interaction which it attempts to reduce to the level of action. This 
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results in the perception of social actors as being fundamentally isolated 
from each other and thus interaction is explained as a fiction created by 
such actors' taken-for-granted assumptions. Uhen applied to the 
sociological understanding of action this leads to ego-centrism and ego- 
aggrandisement in which genuinely understanding others is dependent on 
their similaritytous. This process reaches its furthest development in 
Schutz's effective abolition of the social world. Various attempts are 
made to avoid the consequences of this position and these attempts 
frequently take the form of the establishment of a world common to both 
actor and sociologist. However such a world is predicated upon the 
prior apprehension and real possibility of intersubjectiv© understanding 
and therefore cannot establish such understanding. Consequently, the 
notion of a common world tends to become an unclarified adaptation of the 
common-sense notion of culture. The second device of attaining 
intersubjective understanding in this situation is to specify the range 
of understandable action. This takes the form of presenting goal- 
rational action as the ideal action from the point of view of inter- 
subjective understanding. However, it has been shown that this involves 
a distortion of action by denying the relevance of values, modes of 
orientation-etc. all those things which define the otherness of the other. 
Thus the insistence on goal-rational action has been shown to be a device 
whereby the sociologist can impose his values, perceptions, definitions 
and modes of orientation onto the actor's situation. This simply leads 
back to the situation of ego-aggrandisement and the annihilation of others. 
Therefore, it is noticeable that the supporters of this tradition rely 
heavily on analogical inference and projective empathy. Those aspects 
of action, therefore, which do not fit this model are declared to require 
explanation rather than understanding or are dismissed as irrational. 
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The tendency in this procedure to replace the social world of others 
with the sociologist's own perceptions reaches its clearest expression 
in Schutz who makes the sociologist's constructs the object of sociological 
enquiry and who defines the social world as if it were a sociological 
model come to life. Thus, far from testing the adequacy of sociological 
constructs against the social world, the social world itself is declared 
to be adequate or inadequate according to its conformity to the sociologist's 
model. It is significant in this respect that both Schutz and Winch, the 
latter especially, rely heavily on examples taken from the field of law, 
as if sociology defines the conditions to which social action must conform 
if it is to be regarded as proper social action. This attitude is 
particularly pronounced in Schutz, as testified by his parallel between 
sociology and jurisprudence. 
Thus this tradition understands the social world by replacing it 
with the sociologist's constructs; it apprehends actors' meanings by 
abolishing the actors and replacing them with self-projections of the 
sociologist. This is not understanding but comprehension. 
It would be possible to derive from this conclusion the belief 
that sociology is necessarily limited in this way, that it cannot achieve 
an understanding of the other in himself. Thus the sociologist can only 
present an account of how he sees a situation, without making any claims 
concerning the perceptions of the actors involved in that situation and 
in the hope, nothing more, that his perceptions will be understood by 
his audience. We do not accept this conclusion and we will continue 
our consideration of the problem of intersubjective understanding by 
considering an alternative tradition in sociology which also does not 
accept this conclusion and which admits the possibility of, and which 
attempts to establish, genuine intersubjective understanding. That is, 
a tradition which does not ultimately limit all knowledge to self-knowledge. 
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This is the realist tradition. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE REALISTIC TRADITION IN SOCIOLOGY: SImFEL AND SCHELER 
In the previous two chapters we have been considering the nominalist 
tradition in sociology, as it relates to the problem of the status of 
sociological understanding of others, through the work of three of its 
major protagonists. This approach has been seen to be considtently 
inadequate as the basis for reliable understanding in sociology; indeed 
it cannot account for its own faith in the possibility of its being 
understood by an audience. It has been seen that this approach rejects 
the idea of an objective reality and accepts ego-consciousness as primary. 
This has been seen to lead firstly to the comprehension of others, rather 
than understanding, in which the distinctive otherness of the other is 
denied. This is the situation of ego-aggrandisement in which "I" becomes 
the model for all others. This is most clearly seen in Schutz who, 
despite his recognition that this procedure, termed by him the reciprocity 
of perspectives, is inadequate, has been shown to base his idea of inter- 
subjective understanding upon it. Also, this approach, accepting as 
it 
does the primacy of ego-consciousness, does not accept social interaction 
as a category sui generis but as derived from individual action. This 
view tends to the reductionism of perceiving interaction as merely a 
complex of action. As a consequence, reliable understanding, whether 
in 
everyday or sociological understanding, is hold to be limited to self- 
understanding. Understanding of others is achieved by either an 
analogic or empathic self-projection onto the situation of others. 
Neither of these approaches can establish a genuine understanding of the 
other and can express only my understanding of the other, not his under- 
standing of himself. 
However, it has also been seen that none of the previously 
* By this we mean a meaningful reality which is the some for all subjects 
and which precedes our individual perceptions. 
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considered writers is willing to accept the consequences of this 
argument but believe that our understanding of others is not just an 
arbitrary self-projection but is somehow related to or is an approximation 
of the other's self-understanding or intended moaning. Implicitly, this 
means that the sociologist can be understood by his audience in the sense 
which he intends himself to be understood. All these writers locate the 
possibility of such understanding in the existence of a world shared by 
actors and sociologists. For Winch this is the linguistic community; 
for Weber, the realm of scientific procedure and for Schutz, the world of 
objective events. However, we have seen that in all these cases, this 
shared world is indistinguishable from the idea of culture. This has 
two consequences. Firstly, cultural consociates are thoso others who 
are like I and thus there is no essential difference between understanding 
self and others. This is a potentially valuable idea but as self is 
perceived as the mundane, isolated ego this idea becomes a justification 
for the practise of ego-aggrandisement. Secondly, the idea of a common 
world, as expressed by these writers, presupposes the achievement of 
intersubjective understanding. That is, these notions of shared worlds 
cannot account for intersubjective understanding because they are dependant 
for their realisation upon the prior achievement of intersubjective 
understanding. Thus, the possibility of these worlds presupposes that 
which they should explain ie. intersubjective understanding. Therefore 
in order to demonstrate that such worlds exist, in the sense which theso 
writers believe them to exist, it is necessary to establish the independent 
being of intersubjective understanding. We therefore claim that the 
failure of the nominalist tradition to realise the necessity of inter- 
subjective understanding as a category sui generis, a failure which 
derives from its reduction of interaction to action, results in its 
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inability to establish a genuine Understanding of othcrs. As n 
consequence, this tradition fails to admit the existence of others who 
may be distinctive from self. 
THE REALIST TRADITION 
The distinguishing feature of the realist tradition in sociology is 
that it recognises the non-reducible nature of intersubjective understanding 
and interaction; that it argues for the existence of an objective reality 
whose being is not dependant upon acts of individual consciousnesses but 
which is the predicate of the acts of all conscious beings, including 
their social acts. As will be seen below, this aspect of the realist 
tradition permits the possibility of reconciling our experience of being 
both individuals and members of a community, "I" and "We", which proved 
a major stumbling block of the nominalist tradition. We intend to 
examine this realist tradition in the context of the work of Simmel and 
Schaler. However, -it must be recognised that this is the least developed 
of the two traditions and, admittedly, Simmel's allegiance to it is only 
implicit. Indeed, as will be seen, there is a tension between Simmel's 
nominalist account of everyday social perception and his realist account 
of sociological social perception. 
SIm1EL AND SOCIATION 
Similar to Schutz, Simmel makes a distinction between everyday and 
sociological knowledge. Although he implies a much sharper distinction 
botween them than does Schutz, we shall see that Simmel is unable to give 
a clear account concerning the establishment of sociological understanding 
of others. 
We have claimed that the realistic tradition is concerned to 
I 
*This should make clear that this objective reality is not to be equated 
with social facts, in the Durkheimian sense, which are the products not 
the conditions of our intersubjective being. 
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establish interaction as a category sui ceneris. This Schutz does in 
his notion of sociation which is the basic datum of social as opposed to 
individual existence. It is the unity which is created in interaction. 
To reduce interaction to discrete courses of action would therefore destroy 
that unity which is its distinguishing feature. We will consider below 
the source of this unity but it is necessary to firstly consider how the 
idea of sociation is used by Simmel to account for the perception of 
ourselves as being both members of society and at the same time, individuals. 
Simmel's account of our everyday apprehension of other's 
(1) 
is 
basically similar to that of Schutz. In the act of constituting the 
social world we perceive the other as an independant actor but although 
we see the other as independent of our representations, what we see 
is our 
representation; -of him. Therefore, how is it possible that processes of 
individual consciousnesses are also processes of sociation? According 
to Simmel we see the other as a generalised other, not as a distinct ind- 
ividual, and our recreation of the other is determined by our similarity 
to him. We use our individuality as a means of recognising and 
identifying the other. In so far as the other has a unique individuality 
he cannot be perfectly recreated by us and our relations with the other 
are determined by the degree of incompleteness. We thus orientate our 
action to our distortion of the other's individuality in this typical 
apprehension. This argument expresses the same idea of typification as 
that held by Schutz and Weber in their notion of the ideal type. As such 
it is inadequate for it cannot account for sociation, that is the 
experience of belonging to or being united with one whom we perceive as 
being other. It is clearly erroneous to believe, as Simmel does at this 
point, that we perceive others only in respect of our similarity to each 
other, for reflection on everyday experience shows that we can apprehend 
* This implies a psychologistic and relativistic reduction of sociation. 
This confusion in Simmel's work will be considered further below. 
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others in respect of their dissimilarity to us. I am not poor but 
another person's poverty is known to me; it is not a blank space in my 
perception of him. Thus, this aspect of Simmol's account of apprehending 
the other can present sociation only as a fiction. 
However, our experience of being both individual and social is most 
clearly explored in Simmel's development of the nature of such typification. 
He claims that as a consequence of the partiality of typification parts 
of the individual are not involved in sociation, even to the point where 
these non-sociated elements determine the type of sociation e. g. the mode 
of exclusion from society of the stranger, the enemy etc. Therefore no- 
one is to be totally identified with their social role, as defined by 
others. Thus Simmel claims that individuals, groups and social situations 
are differentiated by the degree to which non-socialised and sociated 
elements co-exist. Therefore, at one extreme are relations of intimacy 
or of near total identity with the social role; at the other extreme are 
relations of anonymity e. g. economic exchange where the individual 
personality is not implicated. This is basically similar to Schutz's 
distinction between "we" and "they" relptionships, although Simmel opposes 
Schutz in seeing intimacy as involving greatesttypification and anonymity 
least. That is, he, correctly, does not equate typification and 
anonymity. However Simmol draws a crucial implication from this argument. 
The presence in action of non-socialised elements of the individual means 
that the actor can at any time turn away from or dissociate himself from 
the action by returning to his individuality, that is the aspects of 
himself not implicated in sociation. Thus "society", the unity between 
actors, is not all-embracing because actors can stand both inside and 
outside it. Thus relations can be said to exist between individuals 
and society for a necessary corollary of being part of a society is the 
awareness of self as an individual separate from society(2). This is 
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the basis of our perception of ourselves as being both members of society 
and free individuals. Thus the whole content of life, which can be 
explained in terms of social antecedents can also be seen as something 
exclusively oriented to and part of the individual. 
However, there is a tension between this idea and Simmel's prior 
account of typification. We saw that in his idea of typification 
Simmel perceives individuality as a residue, that part of self which 
cannot be known by another because it is outside the "society" created 
between actors. However in discussing individuation he regards social 
identity as a variable aspect of individuality. This may support the 
idea that Simmel's distinction between sociation and individuation is 
merely one of perspective. That is, individuation is my perception of 
my self, sociation is my perception of other selves*. Simmel denies 
that these two aspects represent differing perspectives although certain 
of his statements tend to this view. There is good cause for Simmel's 
denial because the phenomenon which he is concerned with clarifying is the 
experience of each person that they are at the some time, individual and 
social, that they exist both for society and for themselves. That is, 
individuation and sociation are not related to self and other perception 
respectively but are both equally valid modes of self and other perception. 
Thus, Simmel argues that our existence is not solely individual or social 
but is a fusion of the two thus implying that sociation is a distinct 
category and not derived from individual existence. These are the basic 
elements which constitute our social being and our capacity of feeling 
ourselves to be both totally social entities and totally personal entities 
and which makes possible the distinctive form of human society. Simmel 
fails to consider in adequate depth the nature of this inter-relationship 
* This view is implicitly found in Schutz and other representatives of 
the nominalist tradition. 
- 314 - 
and, as has been seen, he tends to vary between seeing individuation as a 
product of sociation and sociation as a consequence of individuation. 
However Simmel has noted an apparent paradox*(') of our everyday 
existence which to our being, at the same time, individual and social. 
In so far as this paradox is not a contradiction, is. that wo do not see 
these aspects as mutually exclusive, we would arguo that it is a pointer 
to the integration of individuals with each other. That is, the fact 
that 'I' and 'We' are not necessarily contradictory indicates that those 
others who constitute 'We' are not alien to 'I'. This is not a re- 
statement of the nominalist idea that others are perceived simply as 'I' 
there instead of here for this could account only for our perception of 
a social world consisting of other ego's identical to mine, whereas in 
recognising our membership of a community with others we recognise that 
these others are not identical to us but are seen to be distinctive indivi- 
duals with their respective perceptions and value-orientations, but with 
whom 'I' form a unity. 
*(2) 
Simmel however pursues the implications of this paradox in relation 
to the conditions which permit the creation of a society by discrete 
individuals. It will be noted that, like the writers considered 
previously, Simmel at this point, unquestioningly accepts the priority of 
*(3) 
individuality and the derivative nature of inter-subjective existence 
Simmel derives from the fact of individual uniqueness the idea 
that society is composed of unequal elements. Equality between individuals 
does not relate to their total social existence as this would lead to the 
indistinguishable nature of their respective individualities. Thus, 
*(1) The use of paradox is a distinctive feature of all Simmel's work; re 
his essays on "The Stranger" and "The Secret". 
*(2) We are not using unity in the sense of harmony. Embattled enemies 
are engaged in a unity of interaction with each other. 
*(3) This assumption by Simmel, Schutz et al will be challenged below. 
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being the creation of differing individuals, any society contains 
irrational and imperfect elements. Nevertheless our everyday social 
cognition is based on the premise of the pre-established harmony, inter- 
relatedness and mutual dependence between our individuality and our socia- 
bility. This belief, although unfounded, is seen as self-evident and 
unchallengeable. Social conflict is seen as a frustration, not a denial, 
of this ideal which is summed up by. Simmel in the concept of "vocation", 
whereby individuals believe that they have a specific relationship to 
and role in society . It can be readily seen that this naive assumption 
provides the model on which functionalist analyses of social relationships 
are based. 
POSTULATES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
Thus we can identify two assumptions by which, it is claimed, 
individuals create a society. These are the reciprocity of perspectives 
as defined by Schutz and Simmel's idea of vocation. To these we would 
add two more assumptions which we believe to be naively accepted by the 
writers so far considered and as such belong to common-sense perceptions. 
The first of these is the postulate of consistency. That is, naive or 
ego-centric understanding of the other is based on the assumption that 
the other's behaviour is consistent in terms of our interpretation of it. 
The ego-centric approach also resolves the problem of understanding by 
the postulate of obviousness. That is, the belief that there is no 
inherent problem in the other's behaviour. This assumption retrieves 
the breakdown of the reciprocity of perspectives for it is believed that 
although the other may perform an action which is so different from mine 
* It is possible that Schutz is describing here the roots of alienation. 
That iss the condition created when this basic assumption is frustrated 
and the sense of individual uniqueness and individual value for society 
is lost. 
- 316 - 
as to appear odd or weird, there was a reason or cause for the action 
which, if made plain would be understandable to me as the obvious cause 
of the action. This postulate is the basis of the method of empathic 
projection whereby it is held that although an action is odd in the sense 
that I would not do it, if I did do it it, would be for a certain reason. 
The puzzling action is thereby made reasonable, that is, it is obvious that 
the other performs the action for the same reason because this is the only 
sensible cause of action. Thus the postulate of obviousness asserts the 
accessibility, though not the acceptability, of the other's action. 
Therefore any confusion concerning the action is temporary and can be 
resolved by e. g. the method of empathic projection which is effective 
in this situation because, for reasons cited above* 
(1) it cannot be 
falsified and because its aim, in everyday life, is not to aid under- 
standing of the other but to de-mystify his action. My actions are not 
seen as problematic so I identify the other's action with my motivations 
if the action were mine(2). Just as the. postulate of vocation leads to 
functionalism, so it can be seen that the postulates of consistency and 
obviousness lead to rationalist reductionism. 
This could be considered the end of our critique of the nominalist 
tradition for, up to this point, Simmel's analysis of social action has 
been in some parts similar to those already considered. The major 
realistic category in his account has been the idea of sociation, the 
unity of interaction, as the basic datum of social life which cannot be 
reduced to the level of individual action and it is this alone which 
permits his distinction between unity of individual and community. 
However, we have seen that in his account of everyday understanding of 
the other Simmel tends to slip into that unquestioning acceptance of the 
priority of individual over social being, which typifies the nominalist 
*(l) re chapter five. 
*(2) The significance of the idea of believing that we kw th motives of another's action even though we would not accept such motives 
In 
our own 
Artinn will be shown in our idea of intrusion, re below chapter 7. 
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position. Nevertheless in his account of sociation as the subjoct matter 
of sociology Simmel clearly adopts the realistic perspective and seeks to 
establish intersubjective knowledge on an entirely immanent basis, which 
does not require assumptions concerning, or reduction to the level of, 
individual consciousness. This purely intersubjective realm of knowlodq© 
is articulated by Schutz in his development of the distinction between 
form and content in social interaction. 
FORM AND CONTENT 
It has been noted that sociation is regarded by Simmol as the basic 
datum of social life. In defining the role of sociology he distinguishes 
between two components of sociation; these are form and content. The 
least important of these two aspects in terms of the sociological 
perspective, as defined by Simmel, is content which is made up of individual 
action systems e. g. drives, motivations, emotions and knowledge. Such 
contents are note) in themselves social. 
They are made part of the social 
world by being structured in a form. Sociology, as the study of society 
is unique among the social sciences in being concerned with form in general 
rather than with particular contents. 
It has been claimed that Simmel's notion of form is simply an unclear 
version of Weber's nominalist notion of the ideal typo ý We intend to 
show that this view is incorrect and that Simmel's idea of form is 
basically realistic and is novel in interpretive sociology. 
The nature of Simmel's distinction between form and content shows that 
form is the basis of society which cannot therefore be reduced to the 
level of separate individual action systems ie, contents. However, as 
will be seen below, Simmel's ambiguous references to psychological 
reduction could be interpreted as contradicting this view, 
Simmel is unclear on the precise nature of forms but he defines 
them in terms of two characteristics. They are the constants in sociation 
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and they are the principles of unification and organisation of contents. 
Simmel's adherence to neo-Kantianism is shown in his perception of contents 
as structureless and forms as empty. Thus the distinction botwnen thorn 
is analytic. We can only experience forms filled with contont, we can 
only experience contents structured by form. Therefore, form and content 
cannot be experienced in themselves. Thus Weingartner(4) 9 criticises the 
idea of using phenomenological analysis to grasp pure contents, "for we 
cannot know a content outside a mental act; therefore contents are only 
approached, not arrived at, by an analysis of experience". This 
criticism indicates a misunderstanding of phenomenology for mental acts, 
in the sense of intentions, are its subject-matter*('). 
We have discussed forms as if they were real and not simply arbitrary 
constructs of individuals. We would argue, that Simmol in fact sees them 
as real. We can note two features so far discussed which support this 
view. Firstly, Simmel identifies contents alone as belonging to 
individual consciousnesses and he emphasises the idea that forms persist 
when individual actors come and go. Thus, it would seem, forms are not 
products of individual consciousness. Secondly he identifies form as the 
subject matter of sociology. We have argued that nominalism regards its 
ideal types as analytic tools, although in Schutz it would appear that 
the sociologist can study only these types. Simmel however equates form 
with the objective reality of social phenomena(5). Thus he refers to 
social relations which receive of a relatively stable external form"(6). 
It is important to note that social relations roceivo, they do not create 
or achieve, form. Society exists only through the forms of interaction, 
therefore form is sociation*(2). The term society as commonly used is, 
*(1)It is interesting that Weingartner places Simmel in between Kantianism 
and phenomenology and sees this aspect of Simmel's philosophy as the point 
of separation between him and Husserl. 
*(2) There is some confusion in Simmel as to whether form is equivalent 
to sociation or whether it is the foundation of sociation. 
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from the viewpoint of formal sociology, a genoral concept referring to all 
forms. There is no society as such, there is no interaction as such, 
there are only forms of interaction. Forms are the permanent element in 
sociation. They cannot be equated with any particular, historical 
realisation and have a validity independent of their historical appearance. 
Formal structure exerts a constraint on action and transcends culture. 
Thus no culture is entirely free to define its formally typical situations. 
The difference between the idea of form and Simmel's account of everyday 
typification is obvious. 
The independence of forms from history and culture leads Simmel to 
posit the idea of the pure form. This must not be confused with Webor's 
ideal or pure type for although Simmel is not exhaustive in his consider- 
ation of the pure form certain relevant points emerge. As with the ideal 
type the pure form is grasped by exaggerating certain features of the 
historical appearance. However, the selecting principle in the 
construction of the pure type is not the interests of the observer but 
the "intrinsic evidence" of the form itself. Secondly, as has been 
seen Simmel clearly accepts that pure forms do exist. Thus it would be 
more accurate to refer to the sociologist discovering rather than 
constructing pure forms. Simmel therefore refers to the purpose of 
sociology as the cognition of typical laws referring to the necessary 
structure and relations of reciprocal orientations or forms. 
It must be admitted that Simmel no more demonstrates the real 
existence of forms than Weber demonstrates the arbitrary nature of ideal 
types and it is therefore necessary to consider the method by which the 
nature of such forms are to be revealed. However, before this subject 
is discussed it is necessary to consider a major implication of the 
argument so far for Simmel's theory as a whole. 
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Ge have noted a tension, if not a confusion, between nominalist and 
realist interpretations of sociation in Simmel's discussion of the natura 
of social reality. When considering everyday typification Simmel saw 
sociation, not as an objective category, but as achieved by actor's 
through their individual typifications. Thus we interact with our idea 
of the other. However, in discussing the phenomenon of our being both 
individuals and members of society, Simmel regards sociation as a 
category in itself which is not dependent on or derived from individual 
consciousness. Thus our social being is as real and distinct as our 
individual being. Similarly in his discussion of the sociological 
perspective on social existence Simmel maintains the realistic position 
of defining sociation as having independent and objective moaning by 
identifying it with the forms of social life which are roal, which 
constrain action and which are therefore, the origin of our social being. 
There are three possible ways of overcoming this confusion. The 
first, nominalistic position, is to argue that forms are arbitrary 
creations of consciousness, that is they do not give us definitive 
knowledge concerning things-in-themselves, but that as we all, as 
cultural consociates, think alike we use the same forms and therefore 
sociation is possible as the product of the coincidence of individual 
consciousnesses. The inadequacies of this approach have been noted 
above particularly the fact that it assumes knowledge that there is an 
extra-mentgl reality, a world of phenomena, including other persons, in 
order to prove that such, a reality is not knowable. Also this idea is 
not compatible with Simmel's idea of a real, pure form which is independent 
of its various historical and individual realisations, or with his 
assertions of the real existence of forms for, as has been seen, Simmol's 
account of the genuineness of our social being is bbsed on the real existence 
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of forms. Further the nominalist idea, while denying knowledge of other 
minds contradictorily asserts that other minds construct reality in the 
same way as I do. 
The second and purely realistic approach is to deny that the 
typifications of everyday life are inherently arbitrary or constructed 
but that they intend the objective quality of the social relationship, 
that is, the form. The problem for the actor therefore is not how he 
chooses to construct the other but how he is to ensure the fulfillment of 
the intention and a correct identification of the qualities exhibited by 
the other in the social relationship. The role of sociology in such a 
situation is to clarify and make available these objective qualities. 
This is not a satisfactory description of Simmel's position because he 
clearly sees everyday typifications-, unlike forms, as distortions which 
reveal, not the objective social relationship, but our ropresentation of 
the other, Nor can it account for the fact that knowledge of the forms 
is not part of everyday knowledge. 
The final resolution of the problem is a synthesis of these two 
positions, although it tends towards the realistic interpretation, and is 
adapted from Husserl, This is the argument that the use of the nominalist 
model is appropriate in relation to everyday perception because it reflects 
the naive ego-centrism of that perception. The realist model is appropriate 
in discussing the forms of interaction and sociation as apprehended by soc- 
iology because a radical, rigorous reflection has revealed the objective 
nature of these phenomena. This argument maintains Simmel's distinction 
between constructed 9 distorting everyday typifications and the 
sociological gpprehension of forms as real structures of sociation. 
However this argument depends on the demonstration of a method which 
establishes such forms and their role in structuring sociation, * thus 
*It is our intention to use this final position as the basis of our 
account of the nature of phenomenological sociology. 
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maintaining the integrity of the notion-of sociation. This, therefore, 
raises the question of the nature and adequacy of Simmnl's method of 
apprehending forms. It will be seen that this is the weakest part of his 
programme fot sociology. 
Simmel's neo-Kantianism is also apparent in this aspect of his work. 
Although Simmel does not doubt the real existence of pure forms they 
become the "ding-an-sich" of his theory. This is because Simmel claims 
that it is impossible to positively isolate forms because they always 
appear in a historical context. Thus wo can attempt to apprehend the 
pure form only through the inductive procedure of comparing various 
historical situations . Thus Simmel is forced into the contradiction of 
asserting that forms exist but that they can never be the object of 
reliable knowledge. In which case, it would seem to us, that there are 
no grounds for asserting their independent and necessary existence as 
against the possibility of their non-existence and their being merely 
figments of imagination. This problem results in Simmel placing the 
same restrictions on sociology which Kant placed on philosophy. That is, 
there can be no means of teaching formal analysis, in certain situations 
formal analysis is impossible and, finally the formal viewpoint can, for 
the present, be conveyed only by examples. There is also the more 
serious problem that Simmel's failure to isolate the pure form means that 
the integrity of his basic concept of sociation is compromised. 
The method which Simmel advocates for revealing forms is thus 
inductive. Tenbruck(7) notes that this process must rely on "something 
else" for the selection and exaggeration of the features of the historical 
situation. It is significant in relation to the interests of this thesis 
that Tenbruck sees the pure form as composed of essential and typical 
* Comparison of various historical situations presupposes identification 
of these situations as being of the same type. That iss it presupposes 
knowledge of the pure form. 
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features(a). Simmel himself notes that forms cannot be revealed by logical 
procedures alone and that it is necessary to adopt, at lnast temporarily, 
a procedure of intuition no matter how odious it might be. Thus, at 
least initially, Simmel bases the apprehension of forms on intuition, thus 
qualifying his dependence on inductive procedure although it is unlikely 
that he had in mind the Husserlian idea of rigorous intuition. 
A consideration of the relationship between forms reveals further 
confusions. Simmel distinguishes between different levels of forms 
ranging from the simplest, e. g. concepts, to the complex world-form, e. g 
common-sense, art, religion etc., which are in theory capable of organising 
all contents and lower-level forms into a single system. Simmel 
distinguishes between form and content on the grounds that form structures 
content and content is that which is structured or organised by forms. 
The admission that forms structure other forms reveals that the form- 
content distinction is not qualitative as Simmel infers because any 
element in sociation, with the exception of simplest contents and world- 
forms, can be both form and content. That is, if a concept is used to 
locate an experience it organises that experience and thus is form. 
However, if this same concept is part of a wider theory it is organised by 
that theory and thus is content. Thus the supposed form-content 
distinction is merely an assessment of the function of the phenomenon in 
relation to other phenomena. Thus the distinction which Simmel draw 
between form and content as the basic elements of sociation collapses into 
incoherence. 
This confusion is repeated in a crucial aspect of Simmel's analysis. 
Contents were initially defined as components of individual action systems, 
forms were defined as the inherently social aspect of sociation. 
Thus 
the social interaction of individuals is formally structured. 
This 
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raises the question of where forms originate. If the two individuals 
are not involved in interaction there is no form, but on their interacting 
a form is realised; where did it come from? Thus Simmel encounters the 
besetting problem of all realisms which is to locate the real elements. 
Simmel's answer to this question indicates the breakdown of the form- 
content distinction for he apparently locates forms in individual 
consciousness which is, as has been seen, the distinguishing feature of 
contents. This view further implies the untenability of sociation as a 
basic datum and the reduction of sociology to individual psychology, thus 
raising once again the problem of how society is possible. However, it 
is our contention that Simmel's attitude to this problem can be under- 
stood in an alternative and more fruitful fashion. Thus, it is necessary 
to considers Simmel's attitude to psychological reductionism. 
It is clear that forms are not to be understood in the sense of 
Platonic ideas which inhabit a super-human realm, Thus Uieingartner states 
that "the content of cultural products is that which is experienced by their 
creators; the formal characteristic of such objects is a function of 
the structuring power of human experience"x(10). This locates forms 
in human experience but does not rule out the possibility that, despite 
Simmel's assertions to the contrary, forms are arbitrary constructs of 
actors. Similarly, Simmel asserts that all social processes are 
based 
in minds and that sociation is therefore a psychical phenomenon. Thus 
psychic phenomena do not simply bear external relations but are their 
essence, that which, "really and solely interests us. " 
(11) 
Nevertheless Simmel refuses to accept the inevitability of the 
* This statement indicates a possible resolution of Simmel's two models 
of social understanding. That is, that actor's experience only contents. 
However, it does not make clear how sociologists are able to experience 
forms as well as contents; also it involves the contradiction of stating 
that forms are components of experience but are not experienced. 
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reduction of sociation to psychology, although tho reasoning behind the 
objection is unclear. Simmel proposes two arguments in this context, 
without distinguishing clearly between them. Firstly, that sociology 
and psychology adopt different perspectives on the same phenomena. 
Secondly, that the phenomena studied by sociology and psychology are different 
Simmel clarifies this point by citing the situation of a geometrician who 
draws a figure, on a blackboard. The object of his interest is the idea 
of the figure expressed in the drawing. It would, however, be possible 
for a physicist to describe this drawing in torms of the composition of 
the chalk marks but this in no way compromises or comments upon the 
geometrical idea. Thus, although the geometrician's and physicist's 
enquiries are represented by the same object they are different and 
independent. If Simmel is applying this argument to the relationship 
between psychology and formal sociology it is necessary that he specify 
the distinctive nature of consciousness for sociology. 
That. Simmel does make such a distinction is shown in his statement 
that when the whatness of an act has been isolated "wo obtain an objective 
mental content which is no longer anything psychological... A content is 
the objective element of a mental act which is independent of the quality 
of the acti(12) although this would appear to require the modification of 
Simmel's assertion that social phenomena are basically psychic. Thus 
Simmel seems to be arguing that formal sociology studies the social aspect 
of' , consciousness, 
that is not the social acts of individual consciousness 
but the inherently social nature of consciousness in general. This 
idea is similar to Husserl's distinction between psychological phenomena 
and consciousness. Thus, forms and objective contents of mental acts do 
not belong to individual psychology but to consciousness in general. 
Therefore, they are common to all social actors. This view is supported 
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by Tenbruck(13) who sees sociation as belonging to a special layer or 
level of consciousness 'which is not part of the individual action system. 
This would mean that for Simmel, the processes of consciousness which 
constitute sociation belong to the sphere of sociation. They are the 
possession of individuals but are possessed equally and identically by 
all individuals; they are "ours" rather than "mine". Thus, the synthesis 
in consciousness between the psychological data of different consciousnesses 
is not itself psychological but inherently social or, rather, intersubjoctivo. 
Thus the idea of sociation as a basic datum is preserved. 
In view of Simmel's adherence to neo-Kantianism it has been generally 
accepted that social forms are a priori structures of consciousness and 
are therefore distinguished from psychological data. It would appear 
that Simmel resolves the problem of how general and intersubjective forms 
can structure particular and individual contents by locating them both in 
consciousness. This is an intriguing idea but it simply changes the 
context of the problem rather than resolving it. Thus, we would need to 
know how the a priori structures of consciousness are integrated with 
mundane, individual consciousness or how consciousness can be general and 
individual . Also Simmel's assertion that pure forms cannot be reliably 
known, leads to the peculiar conclusion that the means by which we know 
are themselves unknown therefore how can we know that they are a priori 
for all subjects? This raises the problem of the reliability of formal 
structures. Simmel simply accepts that forms are in contact with the 
contents of individual action systems but fails to demonstrate that the 
a priori conveys phenomena in themselves. That is, he fails to show that 
forms do not distort content. It is our contention that these problems 
* The fact that this question can be asked suggests that Simnel shifts the 
problem of the congruity of our social and individual being from the level 
of everyday existence to that of consciousness but fails to resolve it in 
relation to this latter level. 
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can be overcome within the phenomenological framework, especially 
through a consideration of transcendental consciousness; this will be 
developed below. 
Simmel's value for a resolution of the problem of int©rsubjectivo 
understanding is that he shows thatthis problem can be overcome only on 
the level of intersubjectivity. That is, in order to account for and 
achieve reliability in intersubjective understanding it is necossary to 
demonstrate that intersubjectivity is a reliable datum in itself and not 
reducible to other phenomena"e. g. action. Hence the importance of his 
justification of the concept of sociation. Further, Simmel also demon- 
strates that this quest requires the reliability of our understanding in 
general, hence his attempts to locate intorsubjective understanding in 
a priori and universal structures of consciousness. Hence also his 
attempts to demonstrate that the categories which provide such understanding 
are themselves intersubjective. Thus we find in Simmel the reasons for 
the rejection of the primacy of individual action in the sphere of 
intersubjectivity and a recognition that our knowledge of others in 
sociology, must be a genuine grasp of the other and not our representation 
of him. This latter goal is seen as fulfilled by Simmal in the dual 
role, of the form as that which makes action social and that which is 
basic to our acts of social knowledge. That is, Simm©l seeks to establish 
sociology as a genuine study of interaction and intersubjectivity by 
demonstrating a synthesis between the foundations of social knowledge and 
social interaction; the same categories are used and are used by all in 
our thinking socially and acting socially. 
Simmel's programme is inadequate because of the incoherence of his 
key distinction between form and content, because of the problems connected 
with perceiving forms as Kantian a priori categories and crucially because 
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of his almost total neglect of mothodology. Thus even if tho form 
content distinction could be salvaged and the intersubjectivo reliability 
of formal categories demonstrated we would not know how to identify forms 
or apply them in sociological analysis. Nevertheless Simmol clearly 
demonstrates the course which must be taken in order to achieve genuine 
intersubjpctive understanding within sociology. Our attempts to realise 
this goal within the phenomenological programme will follow Simmel's 
prescriptions concerning the nature of the requirements for achieving 
this goal although not his attempts to fulfill these requirements. * 
It is our contention, as we intend to demonstrate below, that the 
realistic approach which we have discerned in Simmol can be fully utilised 
only by replacing his'Kantian approach with phenomenology. It is 
therefore appropriate at this point to consider the existing realistic 
approach to intersubjective understanding within the phenomenological 
perspective in the work of Alex Scheler. 
SCHELER AND NON-RELATIVISTIC INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING 
Whereas Simmel is primarily concerned with the structure of social 
understanding, Scheler is concerned with the problem of the epistemological 
status of our knowledge of others. In particular, and in conformity with 
the phenomenological ideal, he wishes to establish the possibility of a non- 
relativistic intersubjective understanding and thus directly opposes those 
theories which attempt to base such understanding on analogical inference 
and empathic projection. In developing his argument Scholar draws a 
crucial distinction between our knowledge of the existence of other subjects 
and our knowledge ab out their subjectivity. We will commence our analysis 
by considering Scheler's argument concerning our knowledge of the existence 
of other subjects. 
* It may be said of Simmel that his work is widely respected but little 
used. One of the few contemporary sociologists whose work could be 
considered to be in the Simmelian tradition is Goffman. 
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Scheler accepts that knowledge of self in others necessitates a prior 
awareness of self derived from one's own case but denies that this makes 
knowledge of others a product of self-consciousness. He also accepts, 
as do many phenomenologists, that our knowledge of others is directed 
towards the unity of their animated body; the ideas of an outer physical 
life and an inner consciousness is an analytic distinction based on a 
prior grasp of this unity. Finally, Schaler claims that our knowledge 
of others should be understood in relation to essential group forms, 
thus indirect knowledge presupposes direct knowledge of others. Our 
knowledge of others is stated to be limited by what cannot be construed 
(je. understood) and by the other's sphere of personal privacy*. The 
tautology in this statement is obvious, it simply rephrases but does not 
resolve the problem of how we discern the limits of intersubjoctive 
understanding. The degrees of intelligibility of understanding are 
closely connected to the relevant form of group-relationship e. g. 
friendship, ties of marriage, clan, notion otc. 
(14) 
Thus far, Schaler offers nothing new concerning our understanding of 
others, what is surprising is that Schaler, from this position, develops 
a non-relativistic conception of intersubjective knowledge. Thus, he 
criticises previous attempts to establish our intarsubj©ctive knowledge 
on the grounds that they have been appropriate only to a certain typo of 
community, viz. the community of educated North Europeans, and thus have 
only a relative validity within the particular group-structure. Therefore, 
implicit in this criticism, Schaler is asserting that our everyday 
knowledge of others is a function of our group identity with the other 
but that our knowledge of the process of gaining knowledge of others is 
not limited in this way. Such knowledge applies with equal validity, 
The idea of a purely personal sphere of the individual is related to 
our notion of typification, re below. 
- 330 - 
in our view, to all instances of group defined knowledge, as the grounds 
of the possibility of such relativistic knowledge. Thus, Schelor states 
that a recognition of the relativism inherent in previous theories "does 
nothing, of course, to imply that such relative theories are all we 
can look for. On the contrary there is certainly an absolute theory as 
well", 
(15) -X(1) Scholar's analysis also indicates that such an absolute 
grasp of intersubjective knowledge must be applicable to all social modes 
of knowing and therefore independant of and prior to these modes. Thus, 
Schaler does not deny the existence of social limitations on intorsubjectivo 
knowledge but denies the fundamental nature of such limitations. That is, 
arguing on the basis of the inherent absurdity of relativism, he perceives 
such limited knowledge as a pointer to the existence of an absolutely 
valid knowledge of others in terms of which alone, however unclearly 
perceived, we can recognise these particular modes as partial 
*(2) 
KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERS 
Scheler identifies three inadequate approaches concorning our 
knowledge of the existence of other selves, these are objectivism, 
idealism and the derivation of such knowledge from the phenomenon of 
ethical duty. Objectivism is similar to the attitude which we identified 
in Schutz, which seeks to account for our knowledge of the other's 
existence by reference to certain objective data which are seen to be 
products of other consciousnesses. As Scholar points out, this approach 
necessarily begins by assuming what it should demonstrate, that is that 
there are other minds which are accessible and communicable to us in an 
*(1) This assertion of an absolute theory probably derives from Husserl's 
demonstration of the necessary inadequacies of all relativisms re above chap. 
*(2) This parallels Scholar's sociology of knowledge in which he saw the 
social specific ideas or Weltanschauungen as "functionalisation" or 
splinterings of the absolute Weltanschauung. In Scheler's view, material 
forces are like "sluice gates" which permit certain aspect3of the absolute 
Weltanschauungen to flourish and inhibit the development of other aspocts(17, 
Thus his statementy "There are many different truths but they all spring 
from the one ultimate realm of ideas and value orderings"(16) 
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intelligible fashion. Equally, such an approach cannot justify its 
perception of certain objective phenomena, and not other data, as being 
the product of consciousness without again assuming what it should 
demonstrate. Even if this approach could justify its solectian of 
conscious data, it cannot encompass the deliberate with-holding of 
expression by subjects. This is as much a conscious act as is overt 
behaviour, and is distinct from doing nothing. 
The opposite position to objectivism is termed epistemological 
idealism by Schaler, in which category he includes Husserl. This 
approach, like objectivism, fails to account for intersubjective knowledge 
and thus its supporters must either accept intersubjectivity as an un- 
accountable. miracle (the leap from "I, $ to "Thou") or else lapse into 
solipsism or adopt the inexplicable view that within consciousness in 
general there should still be awareness of individual consciousness**(') 
The last tradition criticised by Scheler is that deriving from Kant 
and Fichte which sees the consciousness of duty as the core of the Pure 
Ego and which argues for the existence of other selves as objects of this 
duty. Schaler rejects this approach because of its fallacious identific- 
ation-of the good and the existent but it is from this tradition that 
Scheler derives his resolution of this problem. In Scheler's viow such 
moral acts demonstrate"that the community is in some sense implicit in 
every individual"(18) Je. that duty. is based on an other-directed intentional 
act. Thus the social bond is an intrinsic part of the individual and the 
existence of values is seen as evidence of our social existence, presumably, 
on the dubious grounds that value-orientations are possible only if others 
exist in a community with us. Thus Schaler redefines values as patterns 
of sympathetic attitudes. 
*(2) Developing this theme of the role of an 
*(l) The final idea criticised here is similar to that which wo will develop 
below. We intend to show that Scheler's criticism is misplaced and, indeed, 
that his account of intersubjectivity also encounters this problem. 
*(2) This is the basis of Scheler's criticism of those, such as Weber, 
rho h&]iRVf that value and existence are separable. 
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other-directed duty in intersubjective awareness, Scholar claims that 
even the totally isolated individual would be led to postulate a community 
of which he was a member by a consciousness of emptiness in respect of 
his intentional acts. This emptiness would be felt when the individual 
engaged in "intellectual or emotional acts which can only constitute an 
objective unity of meaning in conjunction with the possibility of a 
social response"(19)*. This sense of intentional non-fulfillment would 
lead him to posit a sphere of the Thou with which he is unacquainted. 
The crucial point made by Scheler is that the evidence for the existence 
of the other precedes the fulfillment of the act. Wo would qualify this 
argument by stating that the non-fulfillment of certain of the isolated 
individual's intentional acts would lead him not to posit the real 
existence of others but to posit the qualities of that which is absent 
from his experience and whose presence would fulfill these intentions. 
Schaler fails to note this distinction and as a result his argument 
is vulnerable to the knock-down objection that he confuses real and 
desired existence. However, an overhasty acceptance of this objection 
would cause us to overlook the truth in the argument. While it would 
be true to say that a starving man's desire for broad does not, directly, 
create bread, his intention is such that he knows the desired object before 
he experiences it. That is, eating bread is a fulfillment of the 
qualities of the previously intended object. Thus, the isolated 
individual's intentions which remain unfulfilled because of his isolation 
do not create other consciousnesses but establish the qualities of that 
which is necessary for the intention to be fulfilled i©. the presence of 
another consciousness. Thus fulfillment of the intention is ©vidence of 
the presence of another conscious subject. Thus, the isolated individual's 
* At this point, Scheler's argument is similar to that advanced by 
Schutz re above chapter 5. 
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experience of another conscious subject would simply be an existential 
grasp of what was already ideally known. 
It could be argued that our development of Scholar's argument makes 
the same mistake as that made by Husserl and Schutz of attempting to 
achieve intersubjectivity from the solipsistic position. However, the 
effect of Scheler's argument is to establish firstly the inherent 
incompleteness of the solipsistic situation which is completed by attain- 
ment of a community with others and secondly, the fact that the isolated 
individual is isolated existentially but not intentionally. That iss 
the idea of an intersubjective community is not achieved in the solipsistic 
situation by a projection of that situation but that the recognition of 
the necessity and evidences of a community is engendered by the incongruity 
between the individual's solipsistic situation and his intentions within 
that situation. Thus, social existence is found within the solipsistic 
situation in the intentional acts of the individual. Therefore, far from 
Schaler attempting to achieve evidence of intersubjectivity by some 
miraculous leap from the solipsistic position, our development of his 
argument shows, by separating knowing and experiencing, that evidences of 
intersubjectivity are necessarily contained within the solipsistic 
situation of a conscious, ie. intentionally-directed subject. This 
indicates the priority of intersubjectivity for Schaler, an idea which 
becomes more explicit in his consideration of the status of our knowledge 
about other minds. However, before considering this aspect of his work 
it is necessary that we make clear that Schelar is not claiming that the 
idea of community is an innate idea. We understand Scholar to be 
arguing that certain experiences lead to the recognition of community 
and that such recognition is inevitable because these experiences are 
rooted in the nature of our intentional activity. Thus, for Scholor, the 
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world of community with other subjects is an independant sphere of 
essential boing and as such it is given prior to the positing of any 
object within it. 
KNOUILEDGE ABOUT OTHER SUBJECTS 
It follows from his establishment of the incompleteness of the 
solipsistic situation that Scheler seem the problem of the status of our 
knowledge about the acts of other subjects as engendered by the assumption 
that each of us sees our own experiences as primary but that only a few 
of these experiences relate to other subjects. This raises the problem 
of how we distinguish between experiences related to self and those related 
to others and how these latter experiences succeed in making us acquainted 
with the others' existence and experiences. In this context, Scholar 
discusses and rejects theories of analogical inference and empathic 
projection for similar reasons to those given above . In developing 
his criticism of these positions Scheler declares that we grasp the other 
as a person not as a sum of experiences or a consciousness in general or 
in terms of a dualistic mind-body distinction. By uniting this claim 
with the idea that intentional experiences are evidences of the other 
self, Schaler concludes that I do not apprehend mere isolated experiences 
but, "the individual's mental character as a whole in its total expression"(20 
It is therefore necessary to consider how Schaler justifies this claim to 
direct, personal knowledge of the other. 
It has been noted that Schaler objects to the idea of consciousness 
in general but it is clear that he accepts the idea of a common conscious- 
ness. The difference between these two ideas is that the first is an 
aggregate consciousness, like Durkheim's "conscience colloctive", whereas 
the second is a universal, non-individuated mode of knowing. However, 
* re chapter 3,4 and 5, passim. 
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if reliable and basic knowledge about other conscious subjects is to be 
acquired it is necessary to demonstrate the priority of common 
consciousness and that it does not exclude the possibility of individual 
consciousness. It is clear that Scheler understands thase problems in 
a purely temporal sense. That is, the common-consciousness is, in 
Scheler's view, our first mode of knowing. However, he fails to demonstrate 
the existence or nature of this common consciousness being satisfied to 
repeatedly assert its reality*(') in the phenomenon of sympathy. About 
the only argument advanced by Schaler in this respect is his re-interpret- 
ation of child development theory and notions of the savages pre-lnnical 
mentality. That is, having understood this common-consciousness to be 
temporally prior Scheler seeks to establish its predominance ih those whose 
mental state he regards as undeveloped. 
However, the temporal identity of the common-consciousness is 
significant in that Scheler uses it to overcome the problem of how we can 
possess both common and individual consciousness, "We" and "I". That is, 
in childhood our consciousness is common, non-individuated but in the 
course of our development "stable vortices" emerge within this common 
consciousness, these are individual consciousness. There are two problems 
with this account. Firstly, Schaler identifies common-consciousness with 
our earliest stage of development. Therefore it would appear that any 
sympathetic grasp of others would be related solely to experionces of this 
stage. Therefore, it could not toll us anything about the other in respect 
of his experiences once this common consciousness had boon outgrown. 
*(l) Nevertheless, in the course of these claims, Scholar points to the 
groundlessness of the belief entertained by common-sense and the empathic 
and analogical theories that whereas our own self is given to us, only the 
other's bodily appearance is given to us. The implications of this idea 
will be pursued below. 
*(2) Scheler's temporal account of common consciousness has the effect of 
making such consciousness temporary. 
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Secondly, Scheler confuses non-individuation and communality and in oo 
doing overlooks the distinction between consciousness in general and common 
consciousness. Non-individuation is the situation of non-awareness of 
selfhood but communality is a unity of selves. That iss our non- 
individuated understanding cannot contain the idea that we understand 
other selves, as Scheler admits in his statement that this understanding 
is based on a flow of experience which is "undifferentiated as between mine 
and thine" which actually contains both our own and other's experiences, 
intermingled and without distinction from one another". 
(21) It is this 
phenomenon which is the heart of the problem of intersubjectiva understanding; 
how we can understand others and yet still perceive them as being different 
from self, that is how we can understand others without destroying their 
otherness. It is clear that Scheler's account does not distinguish 
between awareness of self and awareness of others but between an ignorance 
of self-hood as such and knowledge of our own self. Thus, making the 
opposite error to that of the nominalists, Schaler attempts to understand 
the other by abolishing self, but he does not abolish the individual self 
as such but the general phenomenon of self-hood. Thus, if a recreation 
of the state of primal innocence such as posited by Scheler is able to 
give us understanding it cannot be understanding which is seon to refer to 
other selves . Nevertheless Scheler is justified in criticising the 
procedure which we have located in the nominalist tradition of constituting 
the other's experiences from our own acts onto which we then impute 
* It could be argued, although Scheler does not do so, that understanding the 
other is a purely pragmatic problem. That is, we assume our ability to grasp 
the other's consciousness and plan our action an the basia: of thin understandint 
or in other terms, we make predictions concerning the future behaviour of the 
other. If our plans or predictions are fulfilled then our understanding of 
other can be regarded as adequate. It should be noted that this argument 
establishes only the subjective adequacy, not the inter-subjective accuracy of 
understanding. This may satisfy the projects of common-sense but it cannot 
fulfill the sociological project of understanding the other in himself. 
Further this argument overlooks the problem that the future behaviour which 
is used as a test is itself problematic and must be interpreted before it can 
comment on the accuracy of understanding. This would presumably involve 
making further predictions ad infinitum. 
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foroigness. Also, his notion of achieving und©rstsndinq of the other 
by abolishing our own self, will, with modifications, conititut© the starting 
point of our account of reliable intersubjoctive undorstanding. Thus Scholar 
notes a fundamental error of everyday understanding which is the tendency 
to see others' experiences as our own rather thön our own experiences as 
other, that is a failure to recognise that although the experience belongs 
to the other it could also belong to me. However, Schaler answers the 
question as to how we can experience other minds by merely asserting that 
inner perception embraces the other's inner life and "the whole existing 
realm of minds - initially as a still unorganised stream of experiences" 
(22). 
Scheler does not consider the possibility of a permanent intersubjectivo 
perspective although such a perspective is implied in his statement above. 
Thus he states that we apprehend our own self "against a background of an 
ever-vaguer all embracing consciousness in which our own existence and 
the existences of everyone else are presented in principle as included 
together"(23). This is termed by Schaler, the great collective stream 
of universal consciousness. Thus we discern two competing notions in Schelor 
concerning the nature of the common consciousness on which our inter- 
subjective existence is based. The first is temporally restricted to our 
first mode of knowing, and this, as has been shown above cannot explain 
how we perceive others as other selves nor what the value is of the limited 
knowledge which it can give. That is, wo wish to understand others in 
whom a sense of individuality has developed and who have grown out of the 
stage of common consciousness. The second notion is that of an over- 
present all-embracing common consciousness which, if accepted, raises 
the problem of how we distinguish between self and other in such a way 
that we can see certain experiences as originating from a self which is 
both individual and other. Scheler simply refers to a discernment 
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between what is ours and what is others but fails to establish the nature 
or reliability of such discernmont. Undoubtedly he fails to reconcile 
the possibility of this discernment with the existence of a commnn 
consciousness in the second sense. Thus Scholar's reference to discnrnment 
assumes what it seeks to demonstrate. That is, discernment is possible 
only if we accept initially that there is something which is "mine" as 
distinct from "thine" and "ours". 
Scheler criticises those theories which base knowledge of others 
on prior self-knowledge because they under-estimate the difficulties of 
self-knowledge and over-estimate the difficulties of intersubjectivo 
knowledge. Scheler bases this argument on the claim that we attend to 
both our own and other's thoughts in so far as they effect bodily states. 
The idea that self-understanding is problematic is valuable and, as 
Schaler states, commonly overlooked. However, the claim that there is 
a common origin of the questioning of our own and other's thoughts is 
irrelevant to the problem of the relative status of our understanding of 
such thoughts. Also, we attend to both our thoughts and those of others 
when such attention serves a practical purpose but there is no reason to 
limit such practical purposes to body movements. Indeed Schelor 
increasingly modifies this argument towards accepting the idea that 
observation is determined by interest, or as we would say, practical value. 
Nevertheless Schaler concludes, although his argument is unclear, that 
intro-mental self-perception is a fiction. This indicates that Schaler 
attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjoctive knowledge by declaring 
that there is no basic difference between self and other knowledge and, 
implicitly, that as self-knowledge is difficult but possible, therefore 
knowledge about others is possible. The idea of the basic similarity 
of self and intersubjective understanding will be developed below in our 
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revision of phenomenological sociology. However Scheler'a account in 
relation to this claim is inadequate becauso he fails to establish the 
priority of intersubjectivo over self undorstbnding, and also ho foils to 
account for the possibility of individuality if all consciousness is 
basically intersubjective. 
It may appear that in making understanding dependant on the apprehon- 
sinn of bodily states that Schaler is simply repoating the analogical 
theory of intersubjectivity. However, he asserts that wo can experience 
any element of an other's experiences except his experience of h1 own 
bodily states. That is, we can experience the other's sorrow but not 
his pain. This argument is related to Scholar's notion of a hierarchy 
of values(24) but it seems to be at odds with his contention that understand- 
ing is based in the apprehension of the effects of thoughts on bodily states. 
Further, Scheler's argument at this point is a non aaquitur; the fact that 
others' experiences cannot be known through bodily states does not 
require that the experience of bodily states cannot be known, and 
certainly he appears to be re-opening a body-mind dualism. However 
Schaler's development of this claim reveals that he is not discussing 
bodily states as such but significant as opposed to non-significant 
experiences. 
to a subject. 
Thus, wo as humans can experience only what is experienccoble 
Thus Scheler asserts the direct accessibility of other minds and 
denies that consciousness is private. However his attempts to justify 
this claim by reference to statements such as, "The populace was seized 
with a common joy, a common grief, a common delight"(25) and the 
existence of intersubjective phenomena such as custom, language and 
religion are inadequate. This is because he regards such statements 
as "common joy" etc. as accurate and not as more empathic interpretations 
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or as referring to an accidental coincidence of minds. Equally hin 
reference to intersubjective phenomona merely essumos that such 
phenomena are genuincly intersubjective. The problem at hand is that 
of establishing that these phenomena are, in fact, genuinely intersubjoctivo. 
We would argue that as intersubjecti"vity is a basic datum which is 
assured in acts called intersubjectiv'o that reference to these acts as proofs 
of intersubjectivity is pointless. It is batter to use the interpretnti. on 
of these phenomena as intersubjective phenomena as an indication of the 
reasonableness of the idea of intersubjactivity as their orinin. However, 
the existence, nature and mode of becoming aware of intorsubjectivity must 
be established a priori as the necessary pre-condition of the exporianc© 
of such phenomena. 
Thus Scheler seems to bo arguing that having established the 
absurdity of relativism and the failure of empathic and analogical theories 
to account for our intersubjective knowledge that his absolutist position, 
based on sympathetic perception, must be correct. Thus he fails to 
establish the adequacy of his position but simply asserts it, As a 
consequence Schaler overlooks the problem that simply because relativism 
is absurd, mere claims to absolute knowledge are thereby not necessarily 
guaranteed. Therefore, he fails to consider the possibility that his 
idea of sympathetic perception may be as unroliablc as analogy and 
empathy. That is, claiming a theory to have absolute validity does not 
guarantee such validity. 
*Schaler should have esteblished the essence 
of the absolutely valid 
* 
and than showed that his idea of sympethetic 
intersubjective understanding conforms to that essence. As it is, his 
negative approach of trying to establish the validity of Sympathy by 
showing the inadequacy of empathy and analogy cannot contradict the 
possibility of sympathy being equally invalid. Scholar's procedure is 
* We intend to do this below in our discussion of necessity. 
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rendered more dubious by the fact, as demonstrated above , that ©mpcithy 
and analogy are used in order to make others comprehensible, Thus 
Schaler states "I do not merely sae the other persona ayes ... ,i oleo 
see that 'he is looking at me' a nd even that 'he is looking at ma an 
though he wished to avoid my seeing that he is looking at mo(26), without 
considering the problem of the reliability of such conclusions which, 
incidentally, are amenable to empathic interpretation. Indeed, Scholar 
merely high-handedly dismisses the idea that everything that he describes 
in terms of sympathy can be accounted for by inference. It would appear 
that Schaler uses the notion of sympathy as a convenient label to avnid 
questions concerning the reliability of our judgemont's about other's 
experiences. 
Scheler's realistic intorpretation of intersubjectivity is valuable 
in that he shows the necessarily social mode of our becoming aware of 
others. He does this by reference to the evidences contained in the 
other directedness of intentionality. Although those evidences are 
discerned in the solipsistic situation they derive from and lead to a 
recognition of the incompleteness of that situation. Thus, Scholar 
establishes social existence as independant from, and the fulfillment of, 
individual existence. Therefore the distinction between self and other 
is not fundamental nor is it necessary to see our social identity, the 
idea of "we", as a dubious derivation from this distinction. Thu idea 
of the other-directedness of intentionality which is found in Scholar 
will be a crucial aspect of Our description of a phenomenologically- 
grounded interpretive sociology. 
Further, Scheler reveals the absurdity of relativism and solipsism 
which we have seen as typical of the nominalist tradition and he also 
* re the discussion of postulates of everyday life, above p. 315. 
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demonstrates the inadequacy of empathic projection and analogical 
inference as a means of acquiring intersubjective understanding. This 
indicates the value and necessity of locating an absolute non-rolativo 
mode of intersubjective understanding. 
However, this is the weakest aspect of Scholar's account as has 
been shown in the consideration of his ideas concerning the sympathetic 
acquisition of knowledge about other subjects as distinct from knowledge 
of their existence. Schaler inverts the nominalist tactic of abolishing 
other selves by abolishing individuality through his notion of the 
common consciousness. This may explain why he gives such consciousness 
only a temporal priority. This has been seen to limit the possibility 
of intersubjective understanding to that (hypothetical) period of life 
before individuality emerged. 
Finally, Schaler fails to estab]Ish the absolute, as opposed to 
relative, validity of sympathetic perception and as a consequence there 
seems little difference between the practise of sympathy and empathy. 
This inadequacy is due to Scheler's failure to consider the nature and 
evidence of absolutely valid cognitions. Thus although Scholar demon- 
strates the inadequacy of relativistic and solipsistic approaches*, he 
fails to establish the nature of an absolute and intersubj©ctivo mode of 
gaining knowledge about others. 
The realist tradition, as exemplified by Simmol and Scholar, has 
certain advantages over nominalism in relation to establishing inter- 
subjective understanding. It recognises that intersubjectivity cannot 
be reduced to the acts of individual persons without destroying its 
essential social character. Thus the subject matter of the realist 
tradition in sociology is interaction not action. It is not even 
concerned with any idea of interaction as the coincidence of individual 
* That is approaches which assume the priority and sole reliability of 
ego-cohsciousness. 
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courses of action, but with interaction as a category sui -generis. As 
a consequence the realist tradition is concerned with a common realm of 
experience which precedes individual subjectivity as opposed to the 
nominalist tradition which, although forced to posit such a realm, sees 
it as an enlargement of the ego-perspective. Thus the realist tradition 
sees the common realm as basic to our social existence and is not 
therefore committed, as is nominalism, of making an impossible leap from 
solipsism into intersubjectivity. This is the basis of the realistic 
tradition's assertion that we can understand others in themselves as 
opposed to projecting our self-understanding onto their situation. 
However, the realist tradition, as it exists at present, has been shown 
to be unable to give an adequate definition of this common realm, whether 
it be seen as the a priori forms of consciousness or an original state of 
non-individuation, or an adequate account of the means by which we can 
apprehend others through this realm. As such it has failed to offer a 
reliable alternative to the inadequacies of nominalism's relativism and 
solipsism. 
It is our intention to use the insights of the realist tradition 
within the context of phenomenology, in ardor to establish the nature of 
intersubjectivity and a reliable means of understanding others. 
In particular, we have noted two sources of the realist tradition in 
0 
sociology. These are Kantian formalism, as exemplified by Simm©l which 
has been shown to be inadequate, and essential realism as exemplified by 
Scheler. This aspect of Scholar's approach has not boon emphasised 
up to this point but it is clear that he more than any other proponent 
of phenomenology interpreted this method on the lines of Platonic realism. 
That is he saw essences as having real being. Thus, Lauer states that 
Scheler, "sees essences as verified in reality and discovered by an 
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essential intuition which is somehow in tune with the world of being 
wherein it operates"(27) . Thus, as opposed to Hussarl's opa qua idea of 
essences being constituted by consciousness, Scheler sees them as the 
objective structure, the quality of phenomena and as such thoy are 
recognised by consciousness. It is not our intention to consider the 
problems which Scheler encountered as a consequence of this notion of 
essence(28). However, it is our intention to resolve the problem of 
intersubjective understanding through phenomonology by developing this 
radically realistic notion of essence. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING THROUGH A 
REVISED PHENOMENOLOGY 
In the previous chapters we have established the inadequacy of major 
existing nominalist and realist attempts to achieve reliable intersubject- 
ive understanding and thus to account for a sociology which claims to 
understand others. It is our aim in this chapter to establish genuine 
intersubjective understanding through a revision of Husserl's phenomenology. 
This necessitates that we overcome Husserl's tendency to solipsism and 
demonstrate that this is not an inevitable component of phenomenology. 
Further, although our principal concern is with intersubjective understand- 
ing, we intend to consider this problem within the context of understanding 
in general because, as has been seen, considerations of the problem of 
intersubjective understanding are based upon general epistemological 
theories. It is therefore necessary to establish the possibility of 
attaining reliable, apodictic and non-relative, knowledge as such as a 
prior condition of outlining the moans of acquiring reliable intersubjective 
knowledge. This is because knowledge of others is a particular case of 
the general problem of knowledge of things external to self. Further, 
we intend to demonstrate that reliable knowledge and intersubjective 
knowledge are synonymous . It is therefore necessary that we clarify 
what-is meant. by reliable knowledge. 
NECESSITY 
Reliable, knowledge is that which demonstrates the quality of 
necessity; that is, knowledge which is required by the nature of phenomena. 
Such knowledge must be, basic and non-derivable and although the adequacy 
of our apprehension of it may be questioned the reality of necessity 
*In referring to this relationship between reliable and intersubjective 
knowledge we are not proposing the familiar arqumont that reliable knowledge 
is that which has gained the assent of various subjects but, as will be 
demonstrated below, that reliable knowledge i.; that which bnalonor, to our 
intersubjective as opposed to subjective being. 
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cannot be questioned without contradiction. An indication of this 
phenomenon to be found In everyday life is the feolinn, however unclear, 
that we should reach certain decisions or that a conclusion imposes itself 
upon us simply because it is inevitable. This idea of necessary knowledpo 
is fundamentally similar to Husserl's idea of apodictic knowledge. 
However, we must consider the problem of demonstrating the nature of 
necessity in our perception of things. 
It has frequently been the case that the idea of the necessity of our 
conceptions of phenomena is given substance by being located in a realm 
of agreed reverence outside the ever fluctuating world of appearances. 
Thus, Plato posited an ethereal realm of pure ideas or essence and Kant 
located necessity in the structures of the human mind. Such approaches 
seek to resolve the problem of necessify by locating this quality in a 
particular place but are then confronted by the problem of demonstrating 
the necessity of the location ie. why the mind should have those 
particular structures, why phenomena are apprehended through a particular 
a priori form rather than another. A further problem concerning such 
approaches is that they identify necessity by separating it from the 
phenomenal appearance to which it refers. This raises the problem of 
the reliability of the perceived relationship between necessary structures 
and phenomena. This results in the irreconcilable dichotomy between 
"things-in-themselves" and "things-as-they-appear". 
Husserl, in his more realistic writings, attempted to overcome this 
dichotomy by identifying necessity with the essonco of phenomena, that 
which is immanent to phenomena. That is he perceived phenomena as being 
given with order and form, thus necessity is identified with conformity 
to this eidetic order. This encounters the problem of the reliability 
of the contact between consciousness, which perceives this order, and the 
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phenomena which contains it. Husserl saw this contact as established in 
intentionality. However, intentionality itself is an activity of 
consciousness and thus it is necessary to consider the adequacy of this 
activity which Husserl attempted to establish by locating a pure or 
Transcendental consciousness which is directed towards the essence of 
phenomena; that is, a mode of consciousness which has necessity as its 
object. It would appear that Husserl, like Plato and Kant, attempts to 
resolve the problem of necessity by locating it in a respected realm, in 
his case that of pure consciousness. Nevertheless, this shifts the 
frame of reference of the problem but does not resolve it for it is 
possible to ask how this Transcendental consciousness, oven if wo accept 
that it has been stripped of extraneous data, can guarantee its contact 
with its objects. 
As has been seen, Husserls failure to answer this question resulted 
in his latef work in an increasing idealism in which he effectively denied 
the objectivity of phenomena, seeing all things as constituted by 
Transcendental consciousness. In this respect he came closer to 
Kantianism and abandoned his earlier realism. The inevitable consequence 
of this was the privatisation of necessity. This principle, in being 
applied to other selves as objects, resulted in solipsism . It is 
our intention to-re-establish the reciprocal relationship of inter- 
subjectivity and necessity by developing Husserl's realistic position, 
which he held prior to his development of the notion of the constituting 
function of Transcendental consciousness. Thus, wo accept the Hussorllian 
idea that necessity has to be located within phenomena, that is, necessity 
is to be equated with the essence of phenomena. Adequate discourse is 
that which has essence as its object. Essence is the ontological 
identity of phenomena, its being or quality. It is therefore a demarcation 
principle which distinguishes the phenomenon in question from other 
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phenomena. It is therefore necessary to clarify the relationship between 
essence and fact. That is, we must come to terms with the so-called reality 
problem of phenomenology in which its concentration on essence is claimed 
to lead to its irrelevance in relation to the everyday world. of facts. 
ESSENCE AND FACT 
The ideas of Essence and fact, are typically seen as opposites. The 
eternal and unchanging world of pure ideas or essence is contrasted with 
the chaotic volatility of the factual world. Thus essence is seen as 
animating facts, of translating inert matter into meaningful phenomena. 
This view reaches its clearest expression in the separation of fact and 
essence into two distinct realms, as in Plato, or in Scholar's notion of 
Being as composed of an all-encompassing but impotent Spirit (essence) and 
an all-powerful-but blind matter. In these views facts are believed to 
obscure essence and must be disregarded in eidetic apprehension. There- 
fore the quest for essential knowledge requires a turning away from the 
factual world. As well as reflecting a patrician distaste for the every- 
day world this view encounters numerous logical problems. Principally, 
although essence and fact are held to be distinct, they are not said to 
be separate since they combine with each other because the realm of essence 
is said to animate the factual world. It is not clear why fact and essence 
should combine nor how it is possible that such contradictory elements 
could combine. That is, essence is seen as necessary, eternal and static, 
facts are seen as accidental, fluid and of temporary duration. If the 
known world is said to be composed of these elements then it is clear that 
essences must cease to be essential ancj/or facts must cease to be factual. 
That is, the known world can be either fluid or static, it cannot be both, 
and if it is one or the other then either the nature of essence or fact 
has been compromised. Deriving from this is the argument that as 
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necessity inheres in essence alone it cannot be predicated of the factual 
world. Therefore necessity is an inappropriate category to be used in 
relation to our knowledge of the everyday world of facts . Wo accept 
that as a consequence of these arguments the idea of trying to identify 
essence may be seen at best, as a waste of time and at worst a deliboreto 
attempt to avoid the problems of the real world in the pursuit of metaphys- 
ical chimeras. Nevertheless, as has been seen, the abandonment of the 
idea of a necessity which inheres in phenomena themselves and in our 
apprehension of phenomena leads to self-destructive relativism and 
scepticism. 
This problem has been traditionally discussed in terms of the 
relative status of universal concepts and individual phenomena. The 
various positions in this debate polarise around two opposed standpoints(1). 
These are, in broad terms, the nominalist position which admits the 
reality ofily: tf individuals and thus sees species concepts as definitions 
only and, alternatively, the realist position which claims that essences 
alone are real and are independant of subjective thought and that 
individual objects are simply particular realisations of essence. Thus 
nominalism sees general concepts as more or less arbitrary and therefore 
tends to the denial of necessity in our conceptual acts. Realism sees 
individual phenomena as either obscuring an inner essence or as a distortion 
of the eidetic ideal. 
In so far as nominalism implies the acceptance of relativism because 
it sees concepts as arbitrary, we reject it. In so far as realism implies 
the possibility of necessary knowledge because it acknowledges the objective 
existence of fundamental data, ie. essence, to which our concepts can 
conform, we accept it. Therefore our position in relation to this problem 
could be termed essential realism. However, on a more basic level we 
* We do not wish to dwell on the contradictoriness of this particular argumen in particular that although it denies necessity its own procedure accepts the necessity of logic. 
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reject both realism and nominalism. A noticeable feature of this debate 
has been the fact that although it goes back to the dawn of philosophy 
it has never been satisfactorily resolved. Thus, even though nominalism 
is dominant in Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy, its position is not 
unchallenged. It is our contention that the failure to terminate this 
debate is due to the fact that both the contending positions are wrong. 
That is, both realism and nominalism as traditionally presented are 
unacceptable. It is noticeable that nominalism and realism, despite their 
differences, agree on one fundamental assumption. This is that facts 
(individuals) are different from essences (species); the debate between 
realism and nominalism concerns the relative priority of these distinct 
phenomena. It would seem that the assertion that fact and essence arc 
different is so obvious as to be true by definition. It is our intention 
to challenge both realism and nominalism by calling into question this 
"obvious" idea. 
Thus, the argument which we wish to advance is that facts and essence 
are not distinct in themselves. This necessitates that we qualify our 
acceptance of realism. We reject that realism which perceived essence 
as somehow embodied or realised in facts as if essence is the force 
which structures material dross or is the means of ordorinp a chaotic 
existence. This version of realism is unacceptable because it encounters 
the objection that since only essence, as the source of necessity, can be 
known reliably, it establishes a realm of unknowable existents or facts. 
The contradiction in asserting that something, in this case the factual 
world, is known to be unknowable has been noted. Further, essences are 
always referred to as being essence of a particular class of facts which 
is itself identified as such and such by being identified with an essence. 
Thus, the adequacy of the separation of fact and essence into two realms is 
compromised by the recognition, even within the terms of this realism, 
that we apprehend essences in factual appearanco and that facts are 
identified by reference to their essential attributes. 
The impossibility of maintaining a distinction between an eternal 
world of essence whether real or merely conceptual, and the flux of 
existence is shown by the realisation that if existence were totally 
separate from essence we would not recognise it as flux because we simply 
would not recognise it. This is because we cannot conceive of a non- 
essential existence since the act of conceptualisation is the act of 
adequate or inadequate eidetic identification. "Flux" is an essential 
category as much as is "redness", "beauty" etc. That is, change is 
recognisable only because we are able to identify the qualitative shifts , 
je. "it was that, it is now this". Thus the separation between essence 
and fact involves the absurd claim that existence is distinct from essence 
because its essence is flux. 
It may be argued that we are taking advantage of a particular use of 
words and that the conventional "separatist" position is acceptable if we 
refer to existence as chaos, that is, the situation of an absence of essence 
or concepts. This argument is acceptable only if wo accept the legitimacy 
of the removal of essence from existence. Such a procedure would be 
similar to the argument that if we ignore the faculty of sight, mankind 
is blind, which is true, but to then argue that mankind is actually blind 
would be absurd. Equally to argue that if we abstract essence, existence 
would be chaotic would be absurd for it deliberately overlooks that 
necessary characteristic of existence, is. essence, which permits us to 
know it as existence rather than chaos. That is, to state that existence 
is chaotic is unacceptable because in the idea of existence we are positing 
alle are not implying that we accept the idea that existencß is flux. 
Indeed we intend to challenge this idea below. 
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a definable quality, but chaos is the denial. of quality. rcýfarý+, how 7ho 
can that which possesses quality be identified with the danial of quality? 
We have criticised the view which denies oidetic neco tty in our 
critique of relativism , and also the argument that essence and fact 
inhabit separate realms. Putting these two arguments together it follows 
that we accept that essence is real and that essence is not distinct from 
fact. That is, in opposition to the view which sees ©ssonco as placed 
in inert fact we mee essence as fact. To make the association with 
phenomenology more apparent, we see essence as phenomenon. We intend to 
demonstrate that this does not mean an acceptance of phenomenalism or the 
denial of necessity which we posited of essence alone. Nor are we 
committed to accepting the absurdity of asserting the identity of such 
clear contradictions as the timelessness and stability of essonco and the 
temporality and flux of existence. We intend to show that such 
characteristics of essence and fact are based not on the respective 
perception of ideal and phenomenal objects but on a false objoctificntion 
of the distinction between adequate and inadequate perception. 
We derive this insight from Husserl who sought to mako reliable 
data available, not by'annihilating an unreliable factual world, but by 
a process of perfecting cognition. Unfortunately, Husserl maintained 
an implicit opposition between essence and existence and thus his work 
was taken, particularly'by the existentialists, as evidence that thn 
apprehension of essence required a turning away from the factual world. 
We intend to show that this view is incorrect and that grasp of essence 
reveals the full nature of phenomena through our critique of the fact- 
essence distinction. Thus, we shall demonstrate that the phenomonological 
quest for essence does not mean abandoning the world of existence but 
* re below chapter 1. 
- 353 - 
permits us to perceive it as it really is and, as we shall show below, 
as it really is not for "I" but for all cognitive oubjects. 
In denying the distinction between fact and essence, we are not 
stating that essence is to be identified with phenomenal appearance. Thu 
idea of such appearance is, as will be seen, a particular and incomplete 
apprehension of the nature of the phenomenon. Further, in our view, 
essence is not simply part of a thing but is the totality of the phenomenon. 
Thus essence and phenomena are not distinct entities. 
An immediate objection to our identity of fact and essence is that 
essence is a universal, species-identity whereas facts are individual 
and specific; therefore they cannot be identified with each other, Our 
consideration of this point will clarify what we consider to be the source 
of the inadequate fact-essence distinction in a misleading reification of 
fact. 
We have claimed that the fact-essence distinction is-really a 
distinction between inadequate and adequate cognition. We, thoreforo, 
perceive appearances as not so many facts with an essence superimposed 
upon them 'but as eidetic complexes, that is as combinations of essence. 
We have referred to the common view that essences are stable whereas facts 
are fluid. Our re-definition of fact as essential complex does not moan 
that we have to assert either the static nature of phenomena or to deny 
the possibility of change in phenomena. Essences, being qualitatively 
independent and non-contradictory, are free to combine with each other. 
Thus no essence is either required to or prevented from forming a complex 
with any other essence. Further, the independence of essences guarantees 
that in any complex an essence remains the same quality and always presents 
itself as the same in any complex appearance. 
The argument that the factual world is in a state of flux and is 
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therefore to be differentiated from the stability of essence in inadequate 
in so far as flux is held to be the absence of necessity. It is truo 
that eidetic complexes change and come into and go out of existence but 
this does not mean that they are arbitrary. That is, the stability of 
essence is not compromised by the fluidity of eidetic complexes nor is 
the freedom of essence compromised by the assertion of necessity and the 
denial of arbitrariness in eidetic complexes 
*(1). 
This is bncauso 
stability, in the sense of permanence, necessarily inheres in essences 
but not in their inter-relationships, to argue the contrary would be to 
deny the freedom and immanence of essence. Equally, although eidetic 
complexes are fluid they are not arbitrary because they are structured 
by the ontologies of the combining essences. Thus, necessity inheres in 
the fluctuating world of facts, or eidetic complexes, which is therefore 
knowable in a definitive manner. The possibilities of existence or non- 
existence of a complex, and judgements that the complex has changed ore all 
dependant upon perception of the qualities which constitute the complex 
and through which it is known. 
This argument should make it clear that wo are not arguing tho 
feasibility of an a priori reconstruction of the world. The freedom 
of essences to combine means that no particular combination is inherently 
more likely to occur than any other combination. Therefore, the 
apprehension of essence does not give us grounds to predict, a priori, 
essential inter-relationships in any field of experience. In so far 
as essence is the quality, the true nature of phenomena, and this ontolog- 
ical status of phenomena involves a system of open-ended possibilities, 
we can state only what cannot be, by reference to the principle of non- 
contradiction which is always immanent to the essence in question 
*(2), 
*(1) That is, "free" is not to be equated with "arbitrary". 
*(2) re below chapter 1. 
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not what must be. The problem of the inter-relationship of qualitatively 
distinct phenomena is an empirical problem but such empirical oppronchoa 
must be grounded in prior apprehension of the essences which are the 
object of enquiry. Thus, essence is not the basic promise from which 
we can infer all knowledge. However, essence is that which is required 
as a prior condition of empirical understanding. That is, empirical 
relationships are based on necessity because they are grounded in the 
nature of the inter-related essences. 
This is distinct from Husserl's rejection of a priori methods in 
empirical study which are based on the claim that the laws of nature, 
which are the subject matter of empirical enquiry, are founded on induction 
and therefore remain contingent and merely probable. This is said to be 
the essence of fact and therefore attempts to reduce natural laws to a 
priori laws would do violence to the essence of fact 
(2). 
This argumont 
reveals a further inadequacy in the fact-essence distinction on which it 
is based. The argument demonstrates not the separateness of the natural 
and the a priori but their independence of each other because it defines 
the natural as contingent and the a priori as necessary and contingency 
cannot be founded on necessity. The effect of this would be not only to 
make phenomenology irrelevant to the goals of empirical research but would 
also deny the possibility of harmonising the concepts of science with its 
observations. In opposition to this view we perceive the a priori not 
as imposed on an independent reality but as that reality. The 
apparently phenomenal world is, properly perceived, an essential world. 
Thus there is no distinction between fully apprehended phenomena and essence. 
We are not, therefore, positing essence as a ghost in the factual machino. 
This argument raises the question of why the idea of the brute fact 
existing in a state of flux or of the isolated particular which alone is 
- 356 - 
real, is taken for granted in discourse*(1). In everyday, uncritical 
perception when we identify that which we perceive as a fact wo really 
seek to identify one of the essences which are presented to us while 
ignoring the other available essences. This is a crude form of the 
phenomenological reduction but it is inadequate because it in oriented to 
the phenomenon in terms of its value for the person. Thu-,, the phenomr'nnn 
is not seen as it is but is identified with its utility. That is, natural 
attitude perception confuses meaning and significance 
(7). 
It is based 
on a purely egoistic perception which refuses to accept the independent 
being of the phenomenon which is equated with its value for ego. This 
not only prevents the person from apprehending the nature of the phenomenon 
sui generis but creates a barrier between his world and the world of 
others who detect different utilities in the appearing sidutic complex. 
It is precisely this mode of apprehension which leads to the fact-essence 
distinction and equally to that cognitive isolation which is the basis of 
effective solipsism. ThE arbitrarinoss of such judgements is falsely 
concretised into the belief that either reality consists of discrete 
individual facts which are conceptually ordered or that it consists of an 
eternal, essential world which stands behind the arbitrary factual world 
to which it gives order and meaning. Thus, the erroneous nature of 
everyday judgements is hidden through its transposition onto a theory of 
the nature of being. The rational inadequacy of these judgements is 
transformed into a belief in the rational inadequacy of the objects of 
* It is noticeable that the common distinction in essentialist literature 
between essence and accident maintains the opposition between fact and 
essence. If only by implication, Husserl's distinction between reliable 
immanent data and transcendencies tends to echo the imagery of a pure 
essential world and a discardable material world. 
*(2) re below chapter 1. 
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such Judgments which are equated with the whole of being, in the coso 
of nominalism or, in an attempt to preserve the idea of rational necessity, 
with part of being, in the case of realism. Thus, concretisation of 
inadequate perception results in the belief in an arbitrary, non-rational, 
fluctuating factual world. 
In everyday perception, things are recognised and accorded nature 
only if they have utility and their nature is equated with that utility. 
Phenomena which appear with the valued object are defined as having no 
utility and are therefore disregarded; their nature is denied. Thus the 
whole complex of appearing qualities or essences is incorrectly identified 
with one quality, the perception of which is itself distorted by ego- 
centric judgements. 
The social isolation which is caused by this approach, to which 
reference was made above, is frequently resolved by the attitude of 
"Nothing-But" which is a means of justifying the reduction of the complexity 
of the perceived phenomena to that of one of the assumed qualitns. Thus, 
the whole complex is, said to be "Nothing-But" that aspect which is of 
value to us as individuals. Therefore, those who claim to detect dher 
qualities can be disregarded as being in error. Should those other 
persons persist in their contrary claims we might admit that they and wo 
are simply adopting differing perspectives and that one perspective is as 
rational (or irrational) as another. Thus the claims of these persons 
can be disregarded, if not for being erroneous, for being irrelevant to us. 
In this way, the attitude of Nothing-But can lead to either dogmatic 
assertiona or relativism. Therefore, at best the whole eidetic complex 
may be identified with only one of the available qualities; at worst it 
may be identified with a valued quality which is not even present. 
The fact-essence distinction and the realism-nominalism debate are 
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based on the naive attitude which takes for granted the unity of objects 
of our experience. That is, both accept that the fact, as the object of 
naive perception, is a thing. The error contained in this assumption 
leads to a constant disjunction between the idea and our experience of it. 
Our critique'of the fact-essence distinction reveals that the separation 
between the idea of the quality of a phenomenon and our experience of 
that phenomenon is the product of the failure to make a distinction 
between the phenomenon itself and those other phenomenon with which it 
is presented. The whole presentation is thus, misleadingly seen as a 
thing which is then identified with the one valued phenomenon. Thus, 
attempts to locate the phenomenon in other experiences leads to its 
identification with distinctively different presentations of qualitative 
complexes. Hence the tendency to deny the permanence of quality and 
the assertion of an unstable, fluctuating phenomenal world, which is 
really based on a confused identity of dissimilar phenomena. This 
mistake is the basis of the nominalist argument which claims, for example, 
that our idea of red is an induction from red things in general. Such 
a position overlooks the difference between the generality of a thing, 
which is inferred from a prior identification of the thing, and the 
essence of a thing which is its quality and which is therefore that 
prior knowledge on which all subsequent acts of inference, generalisation 
etc. must be based. 
Thus, every full, adequate experience of a phenomenon is the 
same; red perceived in one setting is the some as red perceived in 
another setting. The difference between these experiences of red-ness 
must be accounted for, not by positing the instability of our idea of 
red, but by reference to the qualitative differences between the contexts 
* This use of the term "experience" will be clarified below. 
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of these experiences. Therefore, we equate phenomenon and esoencn and, 
in the method of the reductions, we perceive essence as the phenomenon. 
This argument should prevent the misconception that we are equating 
essence with individuals. That is, in our view, essence is not to be 
equated with fact in the sense of a unique individual event but that 
essence, or phenomenon, is a universal quality and can be presented in 
any number of eidetic complexes which we naively concretise end refer to 
as facts, and be recognisable as the same in every instance. Differences 
between "facts" are recognisable because of variations in the component 
qualities of eidetic complexes. The problem of the false distinction 
between essence and fact is aggravated because phenomena are apprehended 
through particular modes each of which has its own essential nature 
e. g. that of memory, imagination, sense perception etc., which is not 
that of the Presented phenomenon. Equally, every mode of apprehension is 
perceived trhough its presentation of an object which is other than the 
mode of apprehension itself. Thus, in order to avoid confusion it is 
necessary to be aware of the distinction between the apprehended phenomenon 
and the act of apprehension. Such awareness is to be found in Huoserl's 
distinction between noesis and noema. 
Thus, we always experience essence, that is fully percoivod phenomenon, 
things-as'-they-are, within a complex of other essences and through a particula 
mode of apprehension. Therefore we can have the essence as the sale object 
of attention only through a deliberate act of abstraction in consciousness 
such as the process of reduction. However this does not create a distinction 
between phenomena as they appear in eidetic complexes and phenomena as 
they are conceptually grasped as isolated essences. This is bocauso 
essences, being non-contradictory and being free to combine with any other 
essence, remains the same in all complexes. That is, the independent 
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nature of essence is not compromised by its inclusion in an aidotic 
complex. Thus, the only difference between the conceptual isolated assonco 
and the essence within a complex of other essences is that the context 
within which the essence appears, in the latter situation, is not present 
in the former, but this makes no difference to the nature of the oseenco; 
it is the same in both situations. This consideration indicates the mode 
of perception which avoids the errors which lead to the fact-essence 
distinction. 
HORIZON 
We are able to overcome the erroneous fact-essence distinction by 
applying the concept of horizon to our perceptions. It has boon noted 
that the naive attitude maintains the superstition of the fact by perceiving 
the eidetic complex as a single unit which it identifies with a valued 
quality which may or may not be present. This is as much an infringement 
of the dignity of the aggrandised essence as it is of those qualities 
whose being has been arbitrarily denied. It is true that we can attend 
to only one essence at a time and that in any eidetic complex we cannot 
contemplate all the available qualities at once. It is also true that 
we direct our theoretical attention to that which interests us. Howovot, 
this does not mean that our interests must determine the nature of what 
we perceive or that we must deny the presence of other essences. 
The application of the concept of horizon enables the distinction 
between the phenomenon which is the object of attention and thoso phonomena 
with which it appears and also our culturally derived expectations of 
the phenomenon. This is the outer horizon. The phenomenon is also 
to be distinguished from its inner horizon of phenomena which are 
generically required in the phenomenon in question e. g. as "house" requires 
* This concept is described and justified below in chapter 1. 
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the notion of building material but whose modes of appearsnco, In.. their 
own horizons, are not required*, e. g. particular building matarials sich 
as cement, plaster, brick etc. For instance, all phenomena which amn 
accessible to sight require spatial extension but no particular spatial 
extension is necessary. Thus, associatbd phenomena, whether belonging 
to the inner or outer horizon of the phenomenon in question and which in 
naive perception are not distinguished from the phenomenon, are isolated 
and placed on one side. This is achieved in the process of reduction. 
Since we are not committed to the equation of phenomenon with phenomenal 
appearance, which we have seen to be a complex, we do not need to 
annihilate or deny the independent Being of those qualities of the 
appearance which are not the object of our attention. These other 
phenomena are qualities in their own right and subsequently can become 
objects of attention. 
To summarise our view, essence is fully perceived phenomenon, it is 
the thing as it is in itself. Therefore essence is not distinct from 
phenomenon. Further, phenomena are thus revealed as universal and 
immanently structured and therefore the idea of formless, individual 
factual existence is misleading, being based on inadequate perception of 
phenomena. Therefore, necessity can be said to inhere in our experience 
of things. 
It could be argued that we have resolved one problem only to encounter 
another. We have overcome the disjunction between fact and osnonco by 
showing that it is based not on an apprehension of the nature of two 
distinct realms, but on the reification of the distinction between 
adequate and inadequate perception and that therefore essence is existence 
perceived as it really is. However, is it not the case that by this 
*This aspect of the argument is given in fuller form below in chapter 1. 
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argument we have replaced the gulf between fact and essence with a 
gulf between consciousness and phenomena? Although Hussorl's notion 
of the conscious constitution of essence maintained the fact-essence 
distinction it did have the effect of justifying the belief that 
consciousness was in real contact with its objects. That is, nssencn, 
which is constituted in consciousness, is always essence of an object 
is. essence mediates between consciousness and objects because it is 
proper to both of these. It must be-admitted that as a consequence of 
this argument objects themselves were increasingly seen by Husserl na 
constituted in consciousness and that it could be argued that Hussrirl 
overcame the problematic relationship between consciousness and objects 
by denying the essential objectivity of objects and making conscinusnes' 
all embracing. Nevertheless, it would seem that in equating esroncn and 
phenomenon we have abandoned the possibility of building upon what is 
potentially a valuable aspect of Husserl's work which is his demonstration 
that consciousness can be in direct and full contact with phenomena. 
It is therefore necessary that we establish, within the terms of our 
equation of fact and essence, that totally reliable knowledge of 
phenomena is possible. That is, we have claimed that essence is fully 
apprehended phenomenon; it is necessary that we demonstrate the possibility 
of such full, unquestionable knowledge which constitutes the basis of 
necessity in our knowledge. 
INTENTION, SELF-GIVENNESS AND EXPERIENCE 
It has been noted that Husserl accounted for a reliable contact 
between consciousness and its objects through the doctrine of the 
intentionality of consciousness, that is, the claim that consciousness is 
always directed to objects. The subsequent development of this 
argument was the establishment of a pure or Transcendental consciousness 
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which has as its object the phenomenon in itself. The weakness in 
this approach is that intentionality is a conscious activity. Thus, the 
relationship between consciousness and objects is established purely as 
a conscious phenomenon. It is but a short step from this position to 
the argument that intentional consciousness constitutes its objects and 
this was the form of Husserl's later radical idealism. Thus, the contact 
between consciousness and objects is preserved only at the expense of 
denying that objects are external to conscfousnesG, whürnas the heart of 
the problem of establishing full, adequate cognition is that intentional 
consciousness is directed towards objects other than itall'. Hence our 
conclusion that Husserl makes objects fully accessible by abolishing their 
nature as objects. 
We accept the doctrine of intentionality but we intend to show that 
it is incomplete and that by completing it wo can assure full adequate 
cognition without destroying the nature of objects. 
Intention is the act whereby consciousness reaches out to things 
other than itself. Often this is referred to as the experience of these 
things as if experience was a conscious act which is to be equated with 
intention. We wish to argue that this view is mistaken and that 
experience is a state of affairs which is not just a conscious act but is 
also a predicate of phenomena. That is, experience belongs to phenomena 
as well"as'cbnsciousness. We justify the claim that experience is a 
predicate of phenomena because of its relationship to the self-givonnoss 
of phenomena. This notion of the"self-givenness 
* 
of phenomena, involves 
a major ontological shift compared to intentional analysis. Intentional 
analysis conceives of knowledge as purely an act of consciousness; thus 
it is based on the idea of an active consciousness which reaches out to 
* This idea is found in Husserl's concept of the "evidontz" of phenomena, 
although he failed to demonstrate its inter-relationship with intentionality. 
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passive phenomena. The equation of intention and experience is a 
presupposition of this position. We have noted the consequences of 
this argument in its application to our understanding of others; that 
it leads to the ego-aggrandising belief in an active self confronted by 
passive others who are then constituted as images of the active self. 
We cannot accept the idea of passive phenomena as it is inconsistent 
with our idea of phenomena and essence being identical and thus phenomena 
is qualitatively known in itself. We conceive of the relationship 
between consciousness and Being as an inter-relationship betwuon mutually 
active consciousness and phenomena in which subject and object are 
transposed. That is, self-giving phenomena are the object of intentional 
consciousness; intentional consciousness is the object of phenomena's 
self-givennesso Thus objects and consciousness are reciprocally 
related to each other because intentionality is the reaching out of 
consciousness to things other than itself, which are given in the self- 
presentation of the phenomena to consciousness. 
The conjunction between intentionality and self-givenness is 
experience which is the conscious act of apprehending that which is 
self-given. Thus, experience is the fulfillment of the mutual 
orientation of phenomena and consciousness. Since things cannot deceive, 
that which is self-given can be only the nature or essence of phenomena. 
That is, phenomenon, literally, can present only its self. Thus, in 
experience, yconsciousness 
becomes its object. 
Only this recognition of active, self-prosonting and qualitativo 
phenomena can account for the quality of necessity in our judgements 
concerning the nature of phenomena which is our sole defence against the 
absurdities of relativism. That iss necessity in the sense that auch 
and such has to be so regardless of our wishes or the awareness of 
being compelled by the object. 
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Our notion of experience as the fulfillment of Intentional acts in 
the apprehension of self-given phenomena is not meant to undermine Husseri's 
claim that intentional acts of consciousness are the sole source of 
immanence, and therefore reliability, because his claim is made within the 
context of naive consciousness. The question which Nussgirl asked was what 
is there in the flux and unreliability of our everyday existenco which 
stands as unquestionably reliable? His answer was, and wo agree with 
this, intentional consciousness. However, it is possible that Hussorl, 
and almost certainly his followers and commentators, ignored the importance 
of the origin of this perception, for it is derived from the natural 
attitude which we have shown to be ego-centric and solipsistic. Thus 
intentionality of consciousness is that mode of reliability which fits tho 
natural attitude, that is, it does not contradict the characteristic 
solipsism of the natural attitude. Hence, our equation above of 
intentional analysis and ego-aggrandisement in our perception of others. 
Thus, intentionality gives access only to the solipsistic modes of 
cognition. The mistake which phenomenology has made is that of assuming 
that the mode of reliability proper to the natural attitude, intontionolity, 
is the sole characteristic of necessity. We have attempted to overcome 
the solipsistic tendencies of this approach, which would as a consequence 
make necessity a private concern, by demonstrating that necessity inheres 
in experience as the union of conscious intentionality and the self-givenness 
of phenomena. Further, the need for such a completion is indicated in 
the doctrine of intentionality itself which declares that consciousness 
is consciousness of something other than the conscious act itself. Thus 
intentionality is fulfilled and completed in the appr©honsion of this other 
object in the experience of its self-givonness. Thus, each intentional 
act identifies itself as partial and, further, identifies the apprehension 
of that which completes it. 
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We refer to the self-evidence or seif-givonness of phenomena as 
their distinctiveness; that which in being presented reveols the natura 
pf phenomena. It is evidence because it reveals phenomena to consciousness! 
it is self because it is the nature of phenomena. It thorafor©, liko 
the acts of intentional consciousness, is immanent. As intentional 
acts of consciousness are indubitable expressions of ego, the presentation 
of self-evidence is indubitable expression of phenomena. This would seam 
to raise an insoluble problem because that which is immanent, and there- 
fore indubitable, refers to itself and nothing else. Thus, it may 
appear that we have succeeded only in re-asserting our intiial problem of 
the distinction between what is and what we think iss because have we not 
established the distinct immanent existence of the realms of consciousness 
and phenomena? That is, the reliability of evidence concerning those 
two realms is purely immanent to each realm and therefore, it would appear, 
cannot be transferred into a reliable datum of the other realm, Wo have 
asserted that experience is the integration of these two realms, it is 
therefore necessary to demonstrate that despite the immanent reliability 
of consciousness and phenomena that experience is possible. 
It is our contention that consciousness and phenomona are, by thoir 
nature, directed towards each other because they require each other. It 
has been noted that consciousness is consciousness of and equally 
phenomena's self-evidence is evidence for that which apprehends evidence. 
This is 'what is meant by the statement that the self-ovidonce of objects 
is presentational. That which has the quality of appreh©nsion in its 
nature is consciousness. This is the positing quality of consciousness 
which is based on the intentional nature of consciousness, that is, 
conscious acts necessarily involve the positing of an object. Therefore, 
the presentation of an object's self-evidence is presentation to an 
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object-dirocted consciousness, and that which is intended in conscious 
acts is the self-evidence of phenomena. 
must accompany all our presentations. 
Kant stated that tho "I think" 
This is a solipsistic, io. naive, 
distortion of the basic transcendental truth which is expressed as "it can 
be thought accompanies every phenomenon's self-evident presentations", 
Thus we have demonstrated not just the immanent relationship of 
intentionality and consciousness and the immanent relationship of 
presentation and the self-evidence of phenomena but also the immanent 
inter-relationship, the necessary belonging, of each of these pairs for 
the other. Therefore, intentional consciousness and presentational 
self-evidence are of themselves, for each other. Thus, there are two 
inter-related spheres which are directed towards each other and which 
are fulfilled by each other. Consciousness intends qualities or 
phenomena; phenomena are self-evidently presented to consciousness. 
Without the self-evidence of phenomena the intentional acts of conscious- 
ness could not be fulfilled; without the intentional being of conscious- 
ness, objects could not be realised. Thus consciousness is consciousness 
of objects, and objects are objects for consciousness. Only if the 
truth of this statement is recognised can wo know that our perceptions 
are perceptions of something rather than nothing, 
The fulfillment of consciousness and object in each other is the 
experience of the being of the phenomena in which this being is realised 
as a content of consciousness. Thus consciousness lives in the being of 
the object; in Schutz's terminology they grow old togethor. In this 
experience the object is qualitatively grasped, and its qualities are 
thus open to conceptualisation and presentation as ideas. Thus, 
experience is the situation of the conscious realisation of an object's 
self-givenness; object being understood in the sense of essence or fully 
apprehended phenomenon. 
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An obvious question in relation to this account of the inter- 
relationship of consciousness, and phenomena is why the experience, the 
conscious grasp of essence, is not an everyday matter. That is, how is 
error or doubt possible, how is it that this inter-relationship is 
frustrated and experience not attained? This topic has been discussod 
above*, is relation to the effects of interests, presuppositions etc. on 
our cognition but one final point requires clarification. Phenomena 
can present only their selves, they do not deceive, therefore there is 
no need for a new set of reductions of the object to parallel the 
reduction of consciousness. It is necessary that we understand that the 
aim of the reductions of consciousness is a grasp of the soll-ovident, 
which is achieved in unhindered perception. If we are deceived concerninc 
the nature of phenomena it is because we deceive ourselves by failing to 
realise those conditions in which our intentions can be fulfilled, These 
are the conditions of transcendental consciousness. 
We have established the epistemological grounds of our quert for 
reliable intersubjectiv© knowledge by overcoming the dichotomy between 
essence and fact and by demonstrating the necessary inter-relationship of 
consciousness and phenomena. In so doing we have also clarified our 
position on the ontological status of consciousness, phenomena and ecnonce. 
It is therefore necessary that we deal directly with our main problem 
which is the establishment of the possibility of reliable knowledge of 
others. In so doing we intend to demonstrate the intimate relationship 
between reliability and intersubjectivity and to establish the opistemol- 
ogical status of intersubjectivity as fundamental knowledge. The first 
step in this argument is a clarification of the means by which experience 
is to be assured. 
re Chapter 1. 
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A REVISION OF THE METHOD OF REDUCTION 
Our argument that the attainment of experienco, the indubitable, 
conscious grasp of self-evidence,, is dependant upon a critiquo of 
consciousness is basically similar to Husserl's position. We thorofnre 
accept the inevitability of the method of reduction. However, in the 
previous sections of this discussion we havo criticised Hussorl for 
maintaining naive assumptions which prevented him from realising the 
full value of the phenomenological theory and method; his notion ý)r the 
reductions is no exception. It is the reductions and, above all, their 
culmination in Transcendental consciousness which is held responsible for 
Husserl's solipsism. This view is correct, but wo wish to demonstrate 
that Husserl's decline into solipsism was a consequence of his mis- 
understanding the nature of the reductions and Transcendental consciousno:, n. 
It is our contention that, far from being inevitably solipsistic, the 
reductions and Transcendental consciousness, if fully understood, are 
the means of establishing intersubjectivity as a reliable datum. 
The naive assumption contained in Husserl's notion of the reductions 
concerns not their operation but their ontological status. Husserl 
recognises that conscious acts, including the reductions, not only haue 
objects but also subjects, that is, consciousness itself. However, 
Husserl does not apply the same searching examination to the subject of 
the reductions as he does to their objects. Thus he naively assumes 
that the subject of the reductions is consciousness and that consciousness 
is individual. That is, consciousness is the consciousness belonging to 
ego, an isolated individual such as "you" or "I". This naive assumption 
is the source of Husserl's solipsism. 
As in previous considerations this naive assumption may seam to be 
the merest common-sense. Is it not the case that consciousncss is aliuayO 
Q 
my consciousness and that I am an individual, albeit living in a wnrl, d 
of other conscious individuals whom I understand by projerti. no my connciou-- 
ness onto their acts? Therefore consciousness belongs to an individunl 
subject. This belief is commonsense and that is why it is novor questioned 
within the natural attitude and therein lies the danger of our bning 
misled by it. It is true that within the natural attitude consciousnons 
is perceived as individual and this is a consequence of the practicol 
orientation of the natural attitude which recognises phenomena in terms 
of its utility or value for self. However, we wish to argue that 
consciousness is not necessarily individual and that, indeed, consciousness 
is not even primarily individual. 
We propose to justify this claim by considering the objects of the 
reductions, that is, the nature of those things which are bracketed. We 
have identified the objects of the reductions as the unq uestionod 
assumptions which we hold concerning the nature of the phenomenon. 
Further, the reductions also aim at bracketing the phenomenon's outer 
horizon of qualities which appear with it in the eidetic complex or which 
are commonly associated with it, and the inner horizon of specific 
instances of the appearance of the phenomenon. The one thing which 
these bracketed phenomena have in common is that they are oll predicated 
of self. Thus, the bracketed unquestioned assumptions are mine, they 
belong to my identification of the phenomenon. Their unquestioned 
status, the absence of the confirmation of their necessity, identifies 
them as being reliably only mine. I cannot posit that they are hold by 
others. Indeed, these assumptions identify the phenomenon as phonomonon 
as it is perceived by me. Similarly, the outer horizon of the eidetic 
complex, excluding the phenomenon which is the object of enquiry, is a 
particular, perhaps even unique appearance of the phenomenon. That i3, 
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because essences are free to combine, the phenomenon in question could 
appear to others within a totally different eid©tic complex. Thus the 
reduction of the outer horizon is the reduction of the particular context 
of the appearance of the phenomenon to me. There is no necessity thnt 
this context be present in the appearance of the phenomenon to others. 
Thus, the only reliable assertion concerning the connection between the 
eidetic complex and the phenomenon is that this was the context to which 
the phenomenon appeared to me. Finally, the reduction of the inner 
horizon is the reduction of the particularisations of qualities which am 
generically required in the ontological status of the phenomenon. Thus, 
these particularisations are peculiar to my perception of the phonompnon, 
they cannot be posited as necessary for all perneptions of the phenomenon. 
Once again, the only reliable assertion concerning tho relationship between 
the particularisations and the phenomenon is that this is how the phenomenon 
appeared to me. 
Thus, the effect of the reductions is to oliminate thoco aspoct^ of 
the appearance of the phenomenon which pertain to my perception as the 
distinctive act of an individual consciousness. That is, anything which 
reliably belongs to the sphere of "I" is to be excluded. Thus the 
reductions are a removal of commitment to and reliance upon the idea of 
a self-here and the false identification of the phenomenon with tho modo 
of its appearance to a self-here. Therefore, only through this process 
of a reduction of this commitment to a self-hora can wo distinguish 
between the experience of the object itself and the experience of a 
subjective projection onto the appearance of the object. 
Thus the reductions bracket self-consciousness ie. the consciousness 
which belongs to self. We will call the consciousness which remains 
after this process Transcendental consciousness, following Husserl'c 
terminology. It is therefore necessary that we clarify the natura of 
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this consciousness and in particular that we expound the subject of 
Transcendental consciousness which we will show to be nothing other than 
all rational beings and thus establish Transcendental consciousness as 
the ground of intersubjectivity. This is in marked contrast to Hu sorl 
for whom Transcendental consciousness was a clarified naive consciousness 
and the Transcendental Ego was the contemplative individual who was the 
subject of Transcendental consciousness. Thus there was a multiplicity 
of individual, distinct Transcendental Ego's. Thus Husserl states that 
the aim of transcendental knowledge is the explanation of structural 
typicality by analysing, "the system of possible objectivities and their 
inner and outer horizon. Eidetic universals recnd© all conceptualisations 
e. g. factual ego is only a possible modification of the ©idos Transcendental 
Ego"(4). If this is taken to mean that the Transcendental Ego is the 
essence of factual ego then it implies, that the Transcendental Ego is 
universal because the factual ego is only one possible appearance of the 
Transcendental Ego. That is, my ego is only one possibility among an 
infinity of egos, each of which is a modification of, and thereby contained 
within, the Transcendental Ego. Thus, the Transcendental Ego is the basis 
of all possible ego's and therefore to speak of my Transcendental Ego, as 
Husserl frequently does, is a nonsense. Again, this is evidence of 
Husserl's failure to grasp the full meaning of the phenomenological method. 
TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
Transcendental consciousness is that which has necessity as its 
object; that is, it is that which is intentionally directed to essence or 
phenomena-in-themselves. We must therefore consider the ontological 
status j, -of the Transcendental Ego, the subject of Transcendental conscious- 
ness. We propose to establish Transcendental consciousness as inter- 
subjective consciousness and the Transcendental Ego as the specias-id©ntity 
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of all rational beings. We do not propose to achiovo this by claiming 
that as the reductions bracket self-consciousness, the only consciousness 
which can remain must be not-self, that is intersubjective. This 
conclusion would not prevent us from equating the Transcendental Ego with 
culture or other social groups and the problems associated with such n 
position have been noted above*. Equally, we do not propose to rest our 
argument on the justifiable claim that the acceptance of the intersubjectivo 
nature of transcendental consciousness would avoid Husserl's decline into 
solipsism because we must firstly establish the reasonableness of 
accepting such a claim. The fact that solipsism is unacceptable does 
not guarantee the reliability of any particular anti-solipsistic argument. 
Nevertheless these two arguments have some value. The avoidance of 
solipsism. j ustifies the attempt to establish the identity of genuine 
intersubjectivity and transcendental consciousness with each other. 
Equally, the recognition that the reductions bracket self-consciousness 
raises the possibility that the residual Transcendental consciousness 
could be intersubjective. That is, these arguments establish the 
desirability of the identity between Transcendental consciousness and 
intersubjectivity and that such an identity is possible. 
We base the justification of our equation of intersubjectivity and 
transcendental consciousness on a consideration of the meaning of necessity. 
We have affirmed that necessary knowledge is knowledge which is required 
by the nature of the phenomenon; that necessity is immanent to phenomena. 
This means that necessary knowledge is fixed and invariable. Thus, there 
can be no sense in the idea that there is rn. necessary knowledge as opposed 
to your necessary knowledge. There is simply necessary knowledge for us 
all. We have previously described the inter-relationship of consciousness 
* re especially below chapter 4. 
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and phenomena, ie that consciousness is of phonomono and phenomena are 
for consciousness. It is therefore clear that as necessity is always 
the same that it can be grasped only by a consciousness which is not 
one among alternative consciousnesses. That iss there can be no individual 
differences in the apprehension of necessity. Thus, my apprehension of 
necessity must be in every way identical to your apprehension of necessity. 
Therefore, in grasping necessity the distinction between me and you is 
transcended. As a consequence, there can be no possibility of positing 
distinct individual consciousnesses in the apprehension of necessity. 
Thus, transcendental consciousness, ie. the consciousness of necessity, 
is intersubjective consciousness. 
It could be objected that this argument is inadequate because it 
uses the vague term "us all" to refer to the inter-subjective community 
of Transcendental consciousness. In clarifying this term we will be 
clarifying the nature of the Transcendental Ego. 
Thus, 
the Transcendental Ego is the community of those who can apprehend necessity. 
Necessity is apprehended in theoretical contemplation, in a rational 
intuition. Therefore, the Transcendental Ego is the community*(') of 
(rational 
beings 2ý. This reveals Transcendental consciousness as the 
*(1) We use the term "community to refer to that intorsubjectivity which 
cannot be reduced to a complex of differentiated subjoctiviti©s. The 
term "association" is reserved for the common idea of intersubjectivity as 
that which proceeds from and is a sum of, differentiated subjoctivitios. 
*(2) It could be argued that our equation of intersubjectiva and rational 
is not new or satisfactory because much of human action is irrational. 
Therefore, we are limiting understanding to the rational. This criticism 
confuses my use of "rational" with that found in the rationality debate 
in sociology and anthropology in which rationality is taken to [sean either 
the use of efficient means or as the outcome of correct logical or empirical 
processes. Rationality, as we have defined it, precedes all of thoso 
being the recognition of necessity in my perception, the apprehension of 
essence on which all these other notions of rationality arcs prodicn#. ed. 
It is true that not all our perceptions are rational bncauwe they mry be 
distorted by naive assumptions. This, however, does not make rationality, 
as we have defined it, any less universal because a) all intentional acts 
seek the status of necessity, they all have eidetic apprehension as their 
object. Including those acts in which actors contemplate their action, 
either in prospect or retrospect, (b) the rational world of eidetic necessity 
not peculiar to particular consciousnesses but is freely avai able to all. 
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ground of all rational positing and therefore as universal rationality. 
The Transcendental Ego is therefore the undifferentiated community of 
rational beings in their rational positings. 
Thus, the intersubjective community consists of all those who can 
apprehend necessity that is, all rational beings. We term this "genuine" 
intersubjectivity because it is not a temporary and incompleto sharing 
or coincidence of individual consciousnosses but is originiry inter- 
subjectivity. That is, because of the priority of necessity, this 
intersubjectivity which has necessity as its object is prior to and the 
condition of individual subjectivity and those associations of individual 
subjects which are commonly referred to as intorsubjective. 
Thus, we equate genuine intersubjectivity with the universal rationality 
of the apprehension of necessity. This is the cognitive parallel of our 
clarification of the inter-relationship of consciousness experience and 
the self-presentation of phenomena. That is, the consciousness referred 
to is transcendental consciousness which has the genuine intersubjectivo 
community as its subject or Ego; the experience of phenomena is a rational 
apprehension of phenomena which present themselves, that is, thoy present 
their necessary qualities, their self. Thus objective knowledge, that 
is knowledge of phenomena in themselves, is identified with genuinely 
intersubjective, and therefore universally availablo, knowlodgo. 
Further, the problems of solipsism and error are both rosolved in 
Transcendental consciousness. We have identified the genuine intorsubjoctiv© 
nature of Transcendental consciousness, therefore error, in the sense of 
the inadequate apprehension of necessity, the unfulfilled experience of 
phenomena, is the failure to achieve the intersubjective grounds of reliable 
knowledge. Thus the judgement of the truth or error of our grasp of the 
nature of things is grounded in intersubjectivity. 
*It should be clear by now that Transcendental consciousness is not to be 
equated with common consciousness or group mind, in the sense of a conscious- 
ness which replaces individual consciousness. 
- 376 - 
INTRUSION AND LEARNING 
It should be noted that our own and other subjects' conscious note 
are included in the category of objects and which therefore are apprehended 
in their self-presentation. The significance of this is not simply that 
it establishes the accessibility of other subjects. As noted above, 
experience seizes the object in its necessary qualities, in its species- 
being ie. that which identifies the phenomenon as such and such. Thus, 
the eidetic grasp of other subjects' conscious acts is the specios-contem- 
plation of rational self-conscious being because this reveals the various 
modes of being of rational contemplative subjects as a species, including 
both the subject and object of the eidetic apprehension. Thus, in 
apprehending the other's mode of being as a rational subject we also 
realise the possibilities of our own being; that is I perceive that this 
mode of being is available to and possible for me. Therefore, the 
eidetic apprehension of other subjects is unique in that the position of 
subject and object of this act of transcendental consciousness is inter- 
changeable; he could apprehend in me the same self-presentation which I 
apprehend in him. This provides the self-evidence of both the existence 
because in the eidetic apprehension of other subjects 
and apprehension of other subjects/we also apprehend our selves as we could 
be. That is, we learn about the possibilities of our mode of being; 
what they are, we could be. A supposed apprehension of other subjects' 
mode of being which has no consequence für the growth of our self- 
knowledgeflis inadequate because either the subject is no subject in. is 
not capable of rational contemplation or our apprehension is inadequate 
and the self-evidence of the other subject has been overlooked and thus 
what we apprehend is our self-projection onto the other's acts. 
Thus, it could be possible to follow Schaler and argue that our 
knowledge of others is primordial because the grasp of the species mode 
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of being presented in the other subject's acts conveys its immediately 
available self-evidence. Thus, the adequacy of our grasp of essence 
could be guaranteed by considering the possibility of the perception of 
the object by other subjects. This does not moan simply reaching an '. 
agreement with others but establishing that the perceived essence or mode 
of being of the object is intersubjectively available ie. establishing 
that our perception of the object is eidetic and is an instance of 
rational apprehension as such. This is relevant to our contention, in 
relation to our critique of relativism and of existing methods of attaining 
intersubjective knowledge within sociology, that the crisis of knowledge 
is the crisis of establishing the intersubjective availability of what is 
naively seen as private knowledge. That is, we have shown that 
Transcendental consciousness, the consciousness which has genuine inter- 
subjectivity as its subject, is prior to individual consciousness in that 
it establishes the basis of all the positing acts of individual consciousness. 
in the same way in which meaning is prior to significance. 
This procedure enables us to achieve intersubjectiv© understanding 
as the process of revealing the "I" in "Thou". This indicates our 
basic disagreement with empathic theories of our knowledge of others which 
because of their solipsistic assumptions invert the self-evident rolation- 
ship between self and species; "I" and "We". That is, empathic theories 
see self as primordial, others as derived, therefore the other is self 
writ large. The possibility of the growth of self-knowledge is deniod 
because if self is basic there is no source from which self can learn 
about itself. Equally, the empathic approach cannot account for the 
other-ness of the other, that is why we do in fact perceive him to be not 
I although, within the natural attitude, we may be forced to assume that 
the quality of otherness is irrelevant. That is, the empathic approach 
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has to deny the otherness of the other which it assumes in initially 
identifying the other as not being self. 
This indicates an evidence for both the otherness of the other and 
the possibility of genuine intersubjective understanding in a phonomonon 
for which empathic theories find it difficult to account. This is the 
experience of intrusion, that is the experience of being effected by nn 
other. Examples of this experience are surprise, the recognition of 
novelty, "news". That is, these are phenomena which present themselves 
as foreign to ego's knowledge or expectations and whose presence cannot 
be accounted for by ego in terms of his intentions. Thus, the person who 
sees a tramp and feels pity does so because he believes that he knows what 
it is like to be destitute even though he may never have been destitute 
himself. Therefore, the recognition of intrusion convinces ego that he 
is not the only possible subject and further that other subjects cannot 
be regarded merely as "ego-there" as opposed to "ego-here". Ho+unver, it 
could be argued that intrusion alone cannot provide evidence of inter- 
subjectivity because is it not the case that the surprising, the naval ntc. 
are made comprehensible by being defined as a particular instance of an 
alr, eady familiar type of knowledge. We accept that this is possible and 
that, indeed, this is the method of empathic understanding. However, 
against this we set the phenomenon of learning, that is, the addition to 
knowledge as opposed to the expansion of existing knowledge. In the 
case cited above, the person perceiving the destitute tranp gains knowledge 
which contemplation on his own experiences could not provide. This is 
confirmed in contemplation when we recognise a new understanding, o mode 
of apprehension which had previously not been available to us. If all 
our understanding was empathic there could not be any possibility of such 
learning. It will be one aim of our subsequent discussion to clarify how 
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such learning is possible; how we can learn from othors, that is how wo 
can acquire as part of our own knowledge, experience which belongs to 
another person. Thus, the phenomena of intrusion and learning contradict 
the views that either others are simply projections of self or that 
knowledge of others as distinct from self is not possible. 
Thus, genuine understanding is to be achieved in a situation of 
participation with the other, in which we place ourselves in the situation 
of learning from the other by permitting his experiences to intrude onto 
us. We therefore reject the validity of the idea of the disinterested 
spectator as expressed by Schutz and Husserl. It is clear that learning 
can be achieved only by a denial of the priority or all-inclusiveness of 
our ego-perspective and by the attainment of a basic communality which 
unites self and other. This situation is guaranteed by the elimination 
of reliance upon our ego-perspective in the reductions and by the adoption 
of the universally rational perspective of the Transcendental Ego. 
Therefore, there is a sense in which claims to have apprehended 
primordial data are intersubjectively verifiable. We do not moan by this 
the process of persuading others bf the truth of something outside their 
experience by showing that our procedures have conformed to rules which 
we all accept. In this type of verification we are telling our audience 
that if they had investigated the phenomenon they would have reached the 
same conclusions because they would have used those procedures which wo 
used; the fact of our different personalities is therefore irrelevant. 
Such a notion of verification is inappropriate to phenomenology because 
more rule-following cannot reveal essence. It is true that there are 
procedural rules in phenomenology e. g. the reductions, but these are 
intended only to create the donditions in which eidetic intuition can 
take place. The priority of Transcendental consciousness and its 
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affinity with intersubjectivity indicates that the appropriate mothod of 
intersubjective verification in phenomenology is not thot of persuading 
someone of the truth of an alien experience but, based on the fact that 
primordial data are intersubjectively accessible, of persuading others to 
identify the essence within the possibilities of their own experience. 
That is, we seek to intrude the primordial knowledge into their uxporienco. 
Thus, intersubjective verification is guaranteed when the other recognises 
his experience of the primordial datum. The failure to produce this 
response is not evidence of the inadequacy of the initial eidetic 
perception but does require that this perception be closely examined*(1) 
The means of achieving such intrusion and verification will be clarified 
below. 
*(2) 
Our account of intersubjectivity, by revealing universal rationality 
and therefore the accessibility of other's mode of being ns that which is 
not ours but which could be ours, permits us to maintain the otherness 
of other subjects but prevents this otherness from being regarded as 
alien to self, that is, as being inexplicable in terms other than self- 
projection. Thus, our accojnt of genuine intersuhjectivity does not 
destroy the distinctiveness of the other but makes this quality ar_ce^sihle 
to us; we preserve the otherness of the other without making it alien to 
our understanding. Thus, it should be clear that in denying the necessity 
of the approach to intersubjectivity which'seekc to understand the other 
by self-projection ie. affirming that he is like I, we . ire not simply 
inverting this position by attempting to reduce self to other i©. affirming 
that I am like him. Our aim in establishing tho realm of intorsubjectivity 
in universal rationality is to establish intersubjoctivity ao prior to 
*(1) re below section on error in chapter 2. 
*(2) re the discussion of models and metarhors below p. 408. 
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subjectivity. Thus our idea of genuine intersubjectivity is basnd on 
the affirmation that we can be like each othar. 
It could be objected that our idea of genuine intersubjectivity dou3s 
in fact destroy the other's distinctiveness, That is, in understanding 
the other by reference to universal rationality, wo must destroy the fact 
that there is an other because the only possible subject of universal 
rationality is "we", therefore any sense of "you" must be excluded. 
There is some measure of truth in this argument, but it fails because 
it is based on an inadequate apprehension of the relationship betwoen "I", 
"you" and "we". That is, in asserting the mutual exclusion of "you" and 
"we" it infers from the recognition of the distinctiveness of "you" the 
belief that such distinctiveness is to be equated with alien-ness or 
inadcessibility. This is clearly false and is a version of the general 
belief in the existence of unknowable phenomena, because in asserting 
the other to be distinct we are claiming to have apprehended qualities of 
the other which are not found in self. That is, the recognition of the 
other as being distinct from self necessarily implies the recognition of 
qualities specific to the other and therefore is based upon an implicit 
recognition of the accessibility of the other. Indeed the approach which 
does annihilate others is that, typical of empathy and the naive attitude, 
which fails to recognise the distinctiveness of others from self. 
Similarly, this objection to our argument is based on this idea of an 
intersubjective community, "we", which consists of a multiplication of 
my particular "I". As opposed to this we have established genuine 
intersubjectivity as the communality of different "I"s. Further, apart 
from overlooking the fact of the distinctive horizon in which the other 
is presented, the objection fails to recognise the significance of our 
learning from others as a conseq. _. uonce of the apprehension of others in 
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Transcendental consciousness. If we were as isolated from others as 
the objection suggests there could bo no possibility of learning; that is, 
of acquiring a development in self which originates outsido calf. It 
must be remembered that learning is always learning from a source oxtornal 
to self. Only in this sense can we speak of a self which develops and 
changes. That is, the idea that what the other is, I could be, which is 
consequent upon transcendental appthension, is possible only if the other 
is seen as not "I". Thus, in our view "we"-nass does not refer to 
identity but to the common basis of all individual subjectivity, to the 
common possession of possible modes of being. That is "we" includes but 
does not destroy "I" and "you". 
It is possible that this objection to our argument is based on the 
belief that since the apprehension of "we" is gained within transcendental 
consciousness, we cannot derive knowledge concorning "I" or "you" from 
such apprehension because these categories belong to naive consciousness. 
Such an objection overlooks the fact that the phenomenological reductions 
bracket but do not destroy naive consciousness but it does raise the 
important question of the relationship between naive and transcendental 
consciousness. 
TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NAIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
It must be emphasised that we are not urging the replacement of the 
natural attitude by transcendental consciousness; we do not see naive 
subjectivity and the Transcendental Ego as opposed or contradictory. 
Such a view would be ridiculous because naive and transcendental conscious- 
ness have their own distinct but not unrelated spheres. The natural 
attitude is practical and ego-centric, it is concerned with the self 
living in the world. Transcendental consciousness is theoretical, 
intersubjective and is concerned with knowing the world. Thus trenscendenti 
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and naive consciousness cannot replace each other. The relationship 
between these modes of consciousness is complementary. Naivn conscious- 
ness selects phenomena on the grounds of interest and thus the transcendental 
apprehension of the phenomena is relevant to practical valuos. 
Transcendental consciousness clarifies the natural attitude world of 
objects and thus provides that reliable knowledge which is presupposed 
in naive, practical activity. However, it must be noted that this does 
not abolish the precariousness of everyday life because precariousness 
is the quality of this life, it is a necessary aspect of our practical 
living in the world which is an imposing of self on the world. Our 
goals, values, interests etc. by which we orientate the world to our 
selves are not immanent to world-phenomena. Thus, we do not deal with 
the world just as it is, this is the realm of reliability, but as it has 
significance for us. It is this distinction between meaning and 
significance which creates precariousness, which opens up the possibilities 
of change. However, it is the fact that meaning is implied, however 
unclearly, as prior in significant judgements which permits us to make 
sense of-our precarious, though not chaotic, existence and to feel secure 
within it. 
We must take this argument further. Transcendental consciousness 
is intersubjective, naive consciousness is individual. Transc©ndontal 
consciousness is the realm of meaning and reliability, naive consciousness 
at 
is the realm of significance and precariousness . We have established 
that genuine intersubjectivity is prior to individuality and that, 
therefore, intersubjective understanding is possible in the same wuiy in 
which meaning precedes sionificanoe. Thus, our naive consciousness 3s 
one of the possibilities contained within Transcendental 
* The failure of empathy, and similar theories, is that they try to 
make the natural attitude attempt theoretical speculation to which it 
is not suited. 
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consciousness. 
(1) 
This is why self, the naive ego, changes but self, 
Transcendental Ego, always remains the same in. this is why wry can 
recognise changes in our self but recognise also that these wdro nimoys 
changes in the same self. That iss changes in our individual boing are 
always within the possibilities of our species being which latter is 
always part of our self-identity. 
It could be objected that we have created a dualism within the 
individual who contradictorily possesses two consciousnosses, one of 
which is individual and unreliable, -*(2) the other of which is inter- 
subjective and reliable. We admit the general accuracy of this statement 
but we deny that our position is contradictory. In order to clarify our 
position in relation to this problem, it is necessary to consider our 
concept of the person. 
THE PERSON*(3) 
In this section we intend to develop the preceding arquinent in such 
a way as to offer a solution to the problem of our individual and social 
nature. That is, the problem of how we are, at the same time, "I" and 
"We" and the nature of the relationship between these identities. 
There is a tendency to equate the human person with the notion of the 
individual. This, as will be seen, is naiv© and reflects the solipsistic 
assumptions of the natural attitude. Wo do not intend to claim that 
*(l) It could be objected that, in fact, we cannot understand the other, 
because his actions are oriented to precarious, individual significance 
and not to intersubjective, reliable meaning. This argument 1) over- 
looks the fact that actors contemplate their actions and therefore 
intend meaning, 2) projects the unreliability of knowledge based on 
significance onto the reliability of knowledge of (ie. about) significance. 
That is, all significant acts are phenomena and therefore have their own 
distinctive self-evidence through which it can be apprehended as such and 
such. Once again we see the dangers in the ambiguity of the term "of". 
*(2) We must emphasise that the unreliability of the natural attitude 
refers only to attempts to have it usurp the theoretical role of 
Transcendental consciousness. 
(3) This notion derives, initially, from the concept of Person in 
rARITAIN "THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD" UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DA1,1E PRESS, 
1966. 
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this view is wrong but that it is one-sided and incomplato bocau ni it 
ignores the intersubjective dimension of our existence with which the 
natural attitude cannot cope. 
Our re-appraisal of the reductions has rnvoalod two levels of 
intentional consciousness and, correspondingly, two levels of subjectivity. 
These are, firstly, that which is consciousness of something as it has 
significance for me; this is the mode of consciousness of the natural 
attitude. Secondly, that which is consciousness or something in itself 
for all rational beings (the Transcendental Ego); this is the mode of 
transcendental consciousness. We tend to assume that there is only one 
mode of consciousness because consciousness is my consciousness, and 
as there is only one "me" there can only be one consciousness, that of 
mundane life. This is an important point because consciousness has not 
only an object, but also a subject ie. the knower. Are we then to believe 
that one subject, "me" has two modes of consciousness and thoroforo two 
egos and if so which is the real ego? 
We accept this argument but not its absurd implications because wo 
perceive these two ego's as not distinct, but as complomontary and 
interlocking and which together constitute the Person. 
The attainment of genuine intersubjoctivity, the apprehension of 
modes of possible being for all rational subjects in transcendental 
consciousness, is an act of the Person in which the individual identity 
of the Person is literally transcended, that is contained in and risen 
above, by the intersubjective identity of the Person; that is, the 
Person's species identity as a rational contemplative being. Thus 'I' 
is not opposed by but is contained in the ir! eo of 'Wo'. Hence we refer 
to the individual and the intersubjectivo as two modes of consciousness 
of the Person, rather than as two distinct consciousnnssos. Thus the 
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Person can perceive phenomena in either of these modes although, as 
established above, the individual mode is dependant upon the mode of 
transcendental consciousness. The crisis of knowledge to which Hussarl 
frequently referred originates in the failure to recognise the transcend- 
ental mode of consciousness and the complementerity between it and the 
mundane consciousness of the Person in its individual aspect. This 
complementarity is based on the fact that genuine intersubjoctivn 
consciousness, in transcending the individual contains it. Thus, "I", 
the individual aspect, is a realisation or particular application of "We", 
the intersubjective mode of the Person Therefore "We" is not derived 
from, but is prior to, 'I" and is immanent in the Person. Also "We", as 
the subject of transcendental consciousnass, is universal and stabl©. 
Thus, the notion of self which persists in all our contemplations is the 
intersubjective being of "We", whereas the notion of self which we 
recognise as constantly changing is the individual being of "I". The 
notion of the reality of our individual being, although constantly 
changing, does not disintegrate because each phase of the "I" is a 
particular application of a universally intorsubjoctive mode of rational 
being which is prior to "I" and which is contained in the Person as "Wo". 
Thus the unity between the individual and intersubjective aspects of the 
Person can be expressed in the idea that every action performed by any 
Person is to be conceived of as the situation of "We-here", that is, as 
a mode of universal intersubjectivity in this particular situation. 
Thus, a sociology which seeks to understand others must direct its 
enquiries towards the other as Person, initially in its intersubjoctivo 
mode as the common ground between the observer and the actor as Persons. 
Thus, the action must be understood as a particular instanco of a 
universal possibility which the observer shares with the actor. This 
is not a distortion or generalisation of the actor's s©lf-understanding 
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because he understands his action in the some way in which an observer 
understands it, that is by identifying its universal species identity. 
That is, the actor like the observer seeks to understand his notion by 
identifying the mode of universal possibility to which it holongs. Thus, 
like Wittgenstein, although for different reasons, wo deny the possibility 
of a genuinely private language. This is because in contemplation the 
actor perceives his action as he would perceive another actor's action or 
as the observer perceives the action, that is, as an object. Thus, we 
do not rule out the possibility that the observer's understanding may be 
superior to the actor's own understanding, although such a judgement must 
be based on the guarantee that both actor and observer are seeking to 
understand the same presented quality in the action. Wo respect the 
view held by many interpretive sociologists that for the sociologist to 
claim the superiority of his understanding of the action is in fact an 
arrogant imposition of his perspective onto that of the actor. However, 
such a position is tenable only if the sociologist cannot guarantee the 
reliability of his understanding. That is, this humble sociology is 
appropriate only to sociology which relies upon the natural attitude. 
A sociology which is founded upon reliable transcendental apprehension 
would be guilty of bad faith if it distorted the possibilities of its 
method by accepting such limitations. Further, such transcendentally 
grounded or phenomenological sociology would offer the possibility of 
advancing beyond the sterile descriptiveness which seems to be the hall- 
mark of much interpretive sociology, to a genuinely critical sociology. 
That is to a sociology which does not crudely tell the actor he is wrong 
*Of course, the action is an eidetic complex and thus actor and observer 
may select different, presented qualities as the object of contnmplotion 
but it would be mistaken to infer from this that ono or other has to be 
wrong, to do so is to confuse difference and error. re below ALTLRPIATIVISm 
v RELATIVISM chapter 1. 
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because he does not accept the prejudices on which the sociologist bases 
this judgement, but whichrreates the possibility of sociologist and actor 
learning from each other; the possibility for both of them of advancing 
beyond their present level of understanding. 
This clarification of our understanding of the concept of the 
Person and its implications for sociology should make apparent our 
objection to the methodological individualist approach to sociological 
understanding which is posited on the uniqueness of individuals. 
Thus, we see the principal obstacle to the attainment of understanding 
in sociology, as not simply the growth of relativism occasioned by the 
application of Wittegensteinian principles or the agnostic approach of 
ethnomethodology but the individualist work of Schutz* who attempted to 
base understanding on solipsistic premises based on the assumption of the 
priority of "I". The effect of this was to substitute understanding 
with comprehension, thus making knowledge of others in themselves 
unreliable. Such an approach is appropriate to the practical natural 
attitude but a sociology which claims to uflderstand others and which 
expects to be understood by others must adopt the transcendental method. 
Our discussion shows that it is possible to conceive of the notion 
of "we" in two senses. The first sense, that of the natural attitude, 
is of "we" as a collection of "I"ts who happen to be in spatio-temporal 
proximity or who share each others'ideas, interests and perspectives. 
In this notion "we" is derivative and the idea of "wo" as an entity in 
itself is regarded as spurious or artificial. The second idea of "wo", 
that of transcendental consciousness, is of a community in itself; the 
universal modes of rational being of which particular modes of being are 
possibilities. We support this latter idea because, as well as 
* re below chapter 5. 
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partaking in the reliability of transcendental data, it establishes the 
pre-condition of our recognition of other "I"s in thomselvos by making 
accessible a community which is common and basic for all our individualities. 
The implication of this idea is that anyone who wishes to understand "I", 
must first of all grasp "we", whether or not the "I" under consideration 
is one's self or an other self. This process is unclearly attempted In 
the everyday contemplation of our own actions but in so far as it remains 
committed to the priority of the individual perspective and the belief 
that "I" is the paradigm for all other "I"s, it attains practical, not 
rational, knowledge. Thus, intersubjective consciousness is not only 
possible but is the condition forr the full apprehension of individual 
consciousness, including our own. It is not a group mind but is the 
mode of species-consciousness in relation to which individual conscious- 
nesses are not more reflections, but equal possibilities. Finally, we 
have shown the identity of transcendental and intersubjective consciousness. 
It was the major failing of Husserl's work that he never rnconnised this 
relationship and unquestioningly assumed that all consciousness Is 
individual. That is, he failed to realise that the transcendental 
reduction, transcends and fulfills not only the individual object of the 
reduction but also the individual subject which performs the reduction. 
Thus we can conceive of the Person not as an individual rational being but 
as a rational individual, that is, our rational being, our communal life, 
is prior to, and the condition of, our individual existence. 
We have located in the universal rationality of the Transcnnd©ntal 
Ego that intersubjective mode of being which Husserl identified with the 
Lebenswelt, or life-world of us all. However our notion of universal 
* In accepting the idea of sucha community, our position is similar to 
that of Schaler, re above chapter 6. However, he perceived this community 
as being eventually supercedod by individuality, whereas we have argued 
that the community is always available and is the permanent ground of 
individuality. 
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rationality does not suffer from the cultural relativism and ago- 
aggrandisement which we have seen to be implied in Husserl's notion. 
As a consequence we can affirm that, unlike the Lnbensuwnlt, the world 
of universal rationality is both intersubjective and primordial and, 
indeed, that these terms are intimately connected as they are united in 
the idea of transcendental consciousness. That is, primordial data can 
be apprehended only in Transcendental consciousness which is the genuinely 
intersubjective mode of cognition, and that the only possible objects of 
genuinely intersubjective cognition are the primordial data of transcend- 
ental consciousness. We can express this inter-relationship in the idea 
that intersubjectivity (the Transcendental Ego) and primordial data (essence) 
are the subject and object respectively of Transcendental consciousness; 
that the universal quality of the rationality of Transcendental conscious- 
ness refers to the universality of both its subject and object. 
Our objection to identifying universal rationality with culture 
extends to Scheler's idea of a communal world which is gradually replaced 
by individual worlds and to the idea of an historically located primitive 
culture from which all distinct cultures have emerged. The world of 
universal rationality is, in distinction from these ideas, the persisting 
ground and condition of all subjectivities and all cultures; it is not 
outgrown by these phenomena but is the prior condition of, their 
possibility. 
We have therefore achieved the principal purpose of our enquiry. 
We have shown how a reconstituted phenomenology can guarantee our 
understanding of others. As a consequence the programme of revised 
phenomenology replaces those inadequate extant methods of interpretive 
sociology, both nominalist and realist which fail to guarantee either 
* re above chapter 6. 
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intersubjective understanding or their belief in the accessibility of 
their findings to an audience, and which replace perception of the other 
with ego-aggrandisdmentland understanding with comprehension. 
The value of phenomenology as the foundation of an interpretive 
sociology which is grounded in the attainment of true intursubjoctivo 
understanding is beyond doubt. We wish now to indicate briefly some 
further consequences, than those already noted, for the status and methods 
of sociology which are to be found in revised phenomenology. 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF REVISED PHENOMENOLOGY FOR SOCIOLOGY 
Our discussion has shown the inter-relationship of intersubjectivity 
and primordial knowledge. If we define sociology as the study of 
intersubjective being*(1), the clarification of our species existence 
as rational, conscious subjects, then sociology is studying that which is 
the necessary condition for apprehending all other modes of our being. 
Thus, as a source of knowledge, revised phenomenological sociology is 
primary for its object is the condition of fundamental knowledge. Wo 
are not arguing in support of the imperialistic, relativistic conception 
of the sociology of knowledge which holds that since all knowledge is 
acquired within a social context it is a product of that context. Our 
position is rather that sociology deals directly with the source of 
reliable knowledge and therefore it has as its object that which is 
presupposed in all other enquiry and which makes possible rational 
enquiry in general. Therefore the knowledge acquired in sociology is 
prior to other knowledge. 
*(2) 
*(l) We are not claiming that current sociology is the study of inter- 
subjectivity but only that we are offering the outline of a programme in 
which it could achieve this end. 
*(2) In a rather roundabout way we seem to have discovered Simmol's(S) 
idea of the fundamental nature of sociology, although he limited this to 
the social sciences and probably his idea of this fundamental quality is 
not identioal to that which is outlined here. 
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It may be claimed that this view of the role of sociology effectively 
denies any autonomy to other forms of study and thus we would oncountor 
one of two problems. Either sociology as a term would be so embracing 
as to be meaningless, we would have to make distinctions between various 
spheres of study within "sociology" and, in fact, to regard them as 
autonomous. Alternatively, all other phenomena could be reduced to 
expressions of social phenomena. This would be a clear case of the 
"nothing-but" approach to phenomena which has been criticised above, and 
which would be an arbitrary denial of non-social quality in phenomena. 
Against this view we argue that the aim of our programme of 
phenomenological sociology is to lay the conceptual foundations for 
empirical.. enquiry. This has a beneficial consequence for other areas of 
enquiry. We have discussed Husserl's idea that knowledge in general is 
suffering a crisis of human relevance. The crisis lies in the fact that 
even though our statements are true they have no human relevance; wo 
believe them without understanding them. The recognition of the inter- 
subjective character of basic, reliable knowledge gives us the moans of 
resolving this problem without denying the validity of knowlndge. Inter- 
subjective knowledge is that which is available to all as the expression 
of species-experience. It is therefore necessary for the sciencos, 
including empirical sociology, to overcome this crisis by presenting their 
investigations as encounters with the phenomenon in which all can participate. 
Thus, developing our notion of participation, the sciences must abandon 
the ideal of detachment and become involved in the phenomena in transcendental 
experience. The true ideal of detachment should be separated from the 
notion of de-humanising with which it is often confused because the common 
notion of detachment frustrates the attainment of intersubj©ctively 
grounded knowledge, This is because the common idea of detachment implies 
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the non-involvement of the researcher in his subject matter. The aim 
of this is to avoid the eventual presentation of the subject matter in a 
manner which is acceptable to the researcher alone, reflecting his values, 
interests and presuppositions and therefore being unacceptable as valid 
knowledge for others. The weakness of this idea is that it assumes that 
what is not individually relevant must be universally relevant; that is, 
if the researcher's values and interests are do-activated his research is 
available and relevant to all . There is, however, an alternative to 
the opposition of particular and universal relevance and that is 
particular and universal irrelevance. The common ideal of detachment 
intends universal relevance but achieves general irrelevance. This is 
because the requirement that the researcher be totally detached means that 
he does not approach it as a person but as a monitor of measuring 
equipment, a calculating machine, an appendage to a tape-recorder. 
Relevance is a quality which can be found only in rational beings; in 
denying this quality of their rational being scientists create the 
conditions of irrelevance or, better, non-relevance. 
We understand the term relevance in two ways, corresponding to the 
distinction between meaning and significance. Firstly, in common usage, 
as that which has significance for ms or us as a particular social group. 
Secondly, that which is self-apparent, that which is the basis of 
knowledge and is therefore relevant to any understanding of phenomena, 
that is, relevant for knowledge. 
Defining relevance in the first sense makes it depondant on prior 
perspectives, values, goals etc. and therefore no thing is generally 
relevant unless we happen to share the same apprehension of the significance 
of the thing; that is, unless it stands in the some position in respect to 
It is possible that Husserl's pre-suppositionless ideal makes this 
error, re above chapter 1. 
- 394 - 
every individual's non theoretical purposes. Even such ponornl 
significance is unreliable because it is conceivable that our judgomants 
of relevance could change. It is commonly this view of relevance which 
is accepted and from it derives the notion of the scientific community 
as the community of those who share a relevance pattern based on those 
taken for granted theoretical assumptions which define the community. 
Kuhn's(6) scientific revolution can be seen as the re-structuring of the 
scientific community's taken for granted assumptions and therefore its 
very community being. Such revolutions are possible because of the un- 
reliability of the assumptions which define the community. Their 
unreliability is due to their relationship to phenomena being based an 
significance. Thus the scientific mode of understanding is that which 
has relevance for the members of the particular scientific community, and 
then only in their position as members of that community. Once outside 
the community, the relevance of science is as problematic for the scientist 
as it is for anyone else 
The second meaning of relevance, that which identifies it with moaning, 
as relevance for knowledge, the self-presentation of phenomena, is quite 
different from this. It has been established that the perception of pheno- 
mena in themselves is achieved in Transcendental consciousness which is 
intersubjective because its subject is rational being. Thus the moaning 
of transcendentally apprehended phenomena is meaning for all rational 
beings. This is the quality of universal relovance as opposed to general 
relevance. It has been noted that the apprehension of the quality of 
an object is achieved in lived experience in which we as rational beings 
* The shortcomings of "pop" sociology are well known but it would be 
accurate to see such work as the product of the inadequacy end the 
relevance crisis of sociology, and as attempts, however inpdaquato, to 
make sociology relevant to non-members of the sociological community. 
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encounter phenomena. Thus, in order for science to achieve universal 
relevance, transcending the precarious unity of the scientific community, 
it is necessary that the objects of science be apprehended in lived 
experience of the interplay of learning and intrusion. This requires 
that the scientist be not detached from his subject matter but grasp it 
at the level of universal rationality, that is, transcendental consciousness, 
which, in the case of sociology, is equally available to the object of 
enquiry. Thus, the immediate perception of the object is the perception 
which is available to us all in our necessary mode of rational being. 
At the risk of seeming grandiose it could be stated that in apprehending 
phenomena in this way, the scientist experiences the object not from the 
position of a duplicating machine, or as an individual, nor even as a 
member of the scientific community, but as a rational being. Thus, the 
phenomenon as apprehended is accessible to all not just to the scientist 
himself, or to the partisan community to which he belongs. Of course, 
this universal perception will be put to different uses by different 
communities, but, in transcendental perception, these are seen as 
variations on a universal theme. Thus the different communities, 
including the communities of sociologists and actors, are not divorced 
from and mutually incomprehensible to each other but are united in the 
availability to them all of the basic grounds of knowledge. Thus, the 
nature of transcendental apprehension is a denial of the adequacy of the 
ideal of detachment and of the inviolability of the distinctions between 
communities. The method of attaining reliable knowledge through 
transcendental apprehension enables an openness to phenomena, the ability 
to learn from phenomena; in the case of sociology, the ability to learn 
from other subjects. Above all, it enables us to transcend our shifting 
individual and community identities in the attainment of universal 
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rationality which we share with all rational beings. Wo cannot under- 
stand others by maintaining a detachment from them or by imposing our 
perspective upon them but by learning from them, becoming intimntoly 
involved in their situation by apprehending tho self -presentation of that 
situation in transcendental consciousness which unites us as persons. 
We would deduce from this a crucial and particularly appropriato 
task for sociology. The natural attitude should not be confused with 
everyday experience because it is a particular interpretation of that 
experience which is organised, around the achievement of the individual's 
practical goals. Thus, we urge the bracketing of the natural attitude 
in order that we may grasp everyday experience, as it is. Further, 
only by bracketing the natural attitudo, by abandoning our commitment 
to it, can we raise it to the level of a problem as opposed to naively 
accepting its taken for granted status*. In this context tho natural 
attitude can be regarded as false consciousness, that is the false 
application of practical consciousness to theoretical problems. The 
intentional acts of everyday life are directed to the object itself but 
the practical interests which direct attention to the object art not 
reduced and therefore cognition is based on the natural attitude of taken 
for granted assumptions and effective solipsism. Thus, in everyday life 
we confuse knowing and using, universal and individurnl, we and I. 
Therefore our intentions are liable to frustration and non-fulfilment in 
the natural attitude; indeed it is these qualities which constitute the 
self-evidence of the natural attitude. A consequenc© of this is the 
*It should be clear by now that bracketing the natural aattitudo doos not 
imply destroying either it or our everyday oxperience, although this 
view is sometimes asserted. (? ) 
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precariousness of our naive existence which is based upon the knowlsdgo 
that other modes of existence are possible, that actions cannot bear too 
close inspection otherwise their problematic status bocomos apparent and,, 
within the natural attitude, irresolvablo. 
Therefore, one task for soc. iology is the study of this precarious 
existence. The demonstration of the way in which ideas of reliability 
are achieved, the techniques by which precariousness is effectively 
denied and in which potentially disruptive aspects of existence which are 
incompatible with our taken for granted assumptions, are avoided or 
disarmed of their threat. It would be possible to examine the ways in 
which rules of social action define the group of rule followers whose 
behaviour towards each other, for that reason, seems stable, secure, 
predictable and, above all, obvious so that any questioning of the obvious 
is taken as an indication of irrationality, trickery, stupidity etc. 
It is true that this task has been long recognised in sociolony. 
We need think only of Goffmannts rituals of behaviour or Garfinkel' 
device of "making trouble" in order to observe the recreation of the 
appearance of a stable reality, and of ethnomothodology and social 
phenomenology in general. However, all these approaches gare themselves 
naive and inadequate because they are part of their own problem. Ethno- 
methodology, social phenomenology etc, are no less precarious than the 
social behaviour which they observe. There is in all these approachas 
a distinct theoretical naivete based on the fact that they cannot account 
for their own techniques and yet claim to be studying such techniques 
in others. We may accept what they say without knowing why we accept it, 
Perhaps the conclusions make sense to us, but do they make sense to others? 
For instance, Garfinkel's device only makes trouble for others. He seas 
himself as in command of the situation with actor's unwittingly responding 
to the stimulus which he provides. The absurdity of tho situation is 
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false, it is a trick played on the actor by the sociologist who knows 
what is really happening. He is being devious but assumes that actors 
are being open, but it it possible that actors, boing tocticiano, may 
be creating trouble for Garfinkel? This idea of making trouble achieves 
a spurious air of reliability by distinguishing between the controlling 
sociologist and controlled actors who resemble nothing so much as 
performing dogs. There is no possibility of learning in such a situation; 
actors always remain "they" as opposed to the "we"-community of 
omnipotent trouble-making sociologists. What the actors do has no 
relevance for the sociologist, other than as data. Were the sociologist 
to admit the relevance to him of the techniques which actors use to 
create stability out of trouble he would be led to question the techniques 
which he used to create stable conceptions out of the actors' reactions 
to his trouble-making. That is, he would be led to recognise that th©so 
reactions are a kind of trouble for him which he neutralises through the 
use of devices and techniques which are acceptable to the sociological 
community. Thus, would we not require a Garfinkelising of Garfinkel, 
a trouble-making for the sociologists, ad infinitum? 
It is, therefore, no surprise that those approaches have shown marked 
tendencies to relativism and naive descriptiveness and the maint©nanco 
of a spurious detachment of the sociologist from the actor. How can 
precariousness be recognised as such except from a non-precarious, rnliablo 
position which is able to account for itself and which is not to bo 
found in these approaches? Thus the claim that social life is 
precarious implies a position of epistemological reliability. The 
burden of our argument has been that such reliability is to be found in 
the eidetic intuitions of transcendental consciousness and that, therefore, 
only transcendental sociology can fulfill the task outlined above. 
* "If the blind lead the blind, shall they not both fall into the ditch". 
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We have shown that the goal of phenomenology is the approhunsion of 
essence or phenomena in themselves. As a final consideration of the 
value of phenomenology for sociology we intend to demonstrate the role of 
essence in sociology by contrasting it with the ideal typo. 
IDEAL TYPE AND ESSENCE 
The concept of the ideal type has been considered above in relation 
to Schutz , However, we wish to clarify the role of essenco by 
contrasting it with the ideal type as it is most familiarly known, that 
is, in the work of Weber. 
The ideal type, as initially intended by Weber, was a ronntruct of 
that particular aspect of the world which was the object of thn 
sociologist's enquiry(8). Thus it defined the enquiry's subject matter. 
Weber's conception of the ideal type is clearly nominalistic. It is n 
pragmatic construction, its adequacy boing assessed by the value or utility 
of the knowledge which is gained from its use. The ideal typo is 
dependant on our interests in the selection of those bmpirically observed 
traits which are to be included in it. Thus although the ideal typo 
must be internally consistent, it is so from our particular point of 
view(9). As a consequence the ideal type is one-sidod. 
This conception of sociological models, and its relationship to our 
essentialism, is expressed in Popper's statement that the use of these 
models explain and destroy essentialism, "It explains them for the model 
is of an abstract or theoretical character, and wo are liable to boliov© 
that we see it, either within or behind the charging observable events, 
as a kind of observable ghost or essence. And it destroys them bocause 
our task is to analyse our sociological models carefully in descriptive 
or nominalist terms viz. in terms of individuals, their attitudes, 
* re above Chapter 5. 
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expectations, relations etc., a postulate which may be called 
'methodological individualism "'(10). It is clear that this statement 
contains numerous erroneous assumptions concerning the nature of 
essentialism as we have defined it. Firstly, Popper assumes that 
reality is in flux as opposed to our fixed concepts; we have shown this 
to be a false idea. Further, he equates the relationship between essence 
and phenomena as that of a ghost in the machine and we have shown, in our 
identity of essence and phenomena that this is not required of essentialism. 
Finally, he assumes that the nominalist position is unique in being able 
to-take individuals into account. As our notion of the Person has 
shown, essentialism does not have to overlook individuals nor does it 
encounter the solipsistic implications of methodological individualism. 
However, wo wish to go beyond this and show that the nominalist 
conception of ideal types is internally unsatisfactory and that, despite 
Popper, essentialism can overcome these deficiencies. The principal 
problems which beset the notion of the ideal type are its relationship 
to the reality to which it refers, Popper's statement above indicates the 
unreliability of this relationship, and the status of different 
typological apprehensions of the same phenomenon e. g. the materialist and 
idealist typifications of the development of capitalism. 
The uncertainty and ambiguity of Weber's notion of ideal types is 
shown in his clearest statement of the nature of the ideal type in which 
he deals with the first of these problems, that of the relationship 
between the type and the events to which it refers. Thus he states "Wo 
can make the characteristic features of this relationship pragmatically 
clear and understandable by reference to an ideal type ... The ideal 
type concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research; 
it is no hypothesis but it offers guidance to the construction of 
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hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give 
unambiguous expression to such a description ... An ideal typo is formed 
by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse discreet, more or lass present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct ... When carefully applied these concepts are 
particularly useful in research and exposition. In very much the some 
way one can work the "idea" of handicraft into a utopia by arranging 
certain. traits actually found in an unclear state in the industrial 
enterprises of the most diverse epochs and countries into a consistent 
ideal-construct by an accentuation of their essential tendencies *. 
Inasmuch as the 'points of view' from which (phenomena) can become 
significant for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria can be 
applied to the selection of traits which are to enter into the construction 
of an ideal type view of a particular culture", but Weber claims these 
traits to be, "meaningful in their essential features"(10). 
There are two competing ideas concerning the nature of the 
relationship between ideal type and observed event contained in this 
statements There is a clearly nominalist view, reflected in such notions 
as the one-sided accentuation of phenomena and the great variety of points 
of view in terms of which traits are selected for inclusion in the ideal 
type. It is also clear that types are constructed not discovered, 
However, against this there is Weber's use of such terms as "characteristic" 
and "essential". Nor is such terminology unusual in Webor. Thus, on 
another occasion, he defines the 'state' as an idea which binds together 
discrete phenomena which are united in a common belief concerning 
* Our Italics. 
- 402 - 
legitimate authority, not as something imposed on the data, and rnfers to 
the "conceptually essential olements", 
(12) 
of the ideal type. However, 
even on this occasion it is stated that the ideal type must be 
distinguished from reality. 
We do not regard the use of these essentialist terms as a slip of 
the pen because Weber is using them to refer to the contents of the 
ideal type as if to avoid the charge of arbitrariness in type construction. 
That is, this initial formulation of the ideal typo leaves it open to 
the charge that when weconstruct a type, we can d6cide what is or is not 
included, by any criterion which we choose. Thus, the events to which 
the type refers are simply storehouses of data which we raid in a random 
manner in order to construct our types. As Weber's use of the term 
"significance" suggests, such types are of interest to the person who 
constructs them, nor do they permit the development of knowledge. Such 
hypotheses as they generate may well be of interest to the type-user alone. 
Weber uses essentialist terms in order to imply that there is some 
necessary connection between the type and the events to which it refers; 
that the connection between the two is not private and arbitrary. 
Further, Weber explicitly recognises a role for essence in sociology. 
Thus, "we can state on the basis of our previous discussion that the 
construction of type concepts, in the sense of the exclusion of the 
accidental, also has a place in the analysis of historically individual 
phenomena(13 and "The goal of ideal type concept construction is always 
to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather the 
unique and individual character of cultural phenomena" 
(14). 
However, 
Weber's discussion of this point makes it clear that he misunderstands the 
nature of essence and eidetic apprehension. Thus, he mistakenly royards 
the discovery and description of essence as dependant on subjective views. 
I 
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Further, he regards essences as ideal typos of only relative validity, 
that as historical circumstances change so will the essential structure 
of e. g. Christianity. This is a clear failure to distinguish between 
phenomena and their horizon. The changing of historical circumstances 
is a change of context not of essenc©g as Weber recognises in his implicit 
view that one can still refer to. Christianity as such despite changing 
historical circumstances. 
This essentialist aspect of Weber's notion of types is overlooked 
in the literature. This is not surprising because Weber failnd to ground 
these essentialist terms and when he came to develop his ideas concerning 
the means of assuring the reliability of ideal typos he, true to his nomin- 
alism, conceived of this problem in positivistic terms. We therefore 
agree with Rex 
(15) 
that Weber's ideal types became increasingly positivistic, 
although we do not accept his implicit approval of this trend6), . There 
1l 
is a current mindless opposition to positivism in sociology where the more 
mention of the term is enough to damn. Our objection to Weber's 
development of the ideal type is not based on dogmatic anti-positivism 
but on the belief, which we will justify below, that this dovelopment 
made redundant the ideal type. Thus, those like Hempel(17) who claim 
that the ideal type must be subjected to tests of verification and 
falsification are not distorting this notioh but are merely drawing out 
the consequences of Weber's development of it. 
The additions which Weber made to the ideal type in order to make it 
more rigorous fall into two Cate§ories. The first of those is the demand 
that the ideal type be internally consistent and produce fruitful 
hypotheses. These aspects do not imply a positivistic development of 
the ideal type, but neither do they help to resolve the problems noted 
above. The demand for internal consistency is reasonable because the 
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ideal type must be an object of thought, it should mako sense in ordor to 
aid enquiry and it must be, in principle, capable of oxiotonce. Thora- 
fore, the ideal type must not be internally contradictory for if it worn, 
none of these conditions could be met. However, consistency pertains 
only to the structure of that particular ideal type. In the absence of 
an overall ontology, it does not tell us anything about the adequacy of 
the relationship between the type and its objective referents nor does it 
exclude the possibility of other types of the some events which may not 
be consistent with the original type but which are also internally 
consistent. Similarly the criterion of the production of fruitful 
hypotheses may establish the utility of the type but not its reliability. 
That is, the type constructor may define the results of the hypotheses 
gemerated by the ideal typo as fruitful, that is as useful for him, but 
such judgements do not imply a necessity binding upon others. Thus, 
these criteria are essentially solipsistic and do not validate the 
necessity or non-ambiguity of the type. 
The second category of additions which Weber made to the ideal typo 
do deal directly with these problems and also result in a positivist 
definition of the type. These are the criteria of causal and meaningful 
adequacy. 
The notion of meaningful adequacy, as has been seen above , avoids 
the question of whose meaning is located in the typo, Weber's attempts 
to clarify this idea through the notion of rationality, which although 
presented as an intersubjective concept, is based on a spurious notion of 
efficiency, and by ignoring the problem of values permits the substitution 
of actor's values by those of the type-constructor. Thus, the typo is 
basically a self-projection of its constructor onto the situation of others. 
* re above chapter 4. 
IJU5 
As such it is ego-aggrandising, and in so far as it can pn, rcoivo only the 
self-identity of its constructor, it is effectively solipsistic. 
The claim that types must be causally adoquate means that they are 
to be justified as reliable by being subjected to empirical tost. That 
iss whether or not the situations and events depictod in the typo dog or 
did, exist or whether, as Rex emphasises, predictions made on the basis 
of the type are or are not falsified. This clearly transforms the typo 
into a hypothesis to be applied according to the rules of positivist 
(18) 
procedure. 
Wo do not object to the idea that hypotheses are to be tested. Indeed 
we accept the demand that hypotheses should be tested and that if an 
ideal type is a hypothesis then every claim made in it must be examined 
and verified or falsified. However, our dissatisfaction with this 
re-definition of the ideal type lies in the fact that calling a hypothesis 
an ideal type adds nothing and calling an ideal type a hypothesis loses 
the crucial element in enquiry. The initial concept of the ideal type 
identified it with that which guides and gives moaning to empirical 
research by identifying that aspect of reality which is to be the object 
of research. However, Weber's positivist conception of knowledge leads 
him to justify the reliability of the ideal typo in this role by reversing 
the relationship between it and empirical enquiry. That is, the ideal 
type is no longer the ground and origin of empirical enquiry but is its 
outcome. This means that the unique value in research of the ideal 
type, its ability to define the reality which is to be examined and 
thereby its role of determining the course of onquiry, is lost. This is 
because the ideal type cannot be, at the same time, the origin of 
empirical enquiry and yet dependant on such enquiry for its contents. 
The positivist revision of the 'ideal type, at most, turns the ideal 
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typo into an inductive model and in so doing undermines its own origins. 
This revised ideal type can be nothing more than a summation of rosnarch, 
similar to Durkheim's average typo. The problem of grounding empirical 
enquiry persists, but the positivist revision of the ideal typo make it 
irrelevant to a solution of this problem. Thus, the revised ideal typo 
has no explanatory value, as Rex claims; it is only a compression of what 
is already known. 
It is intriguing that Rex(19) argues that Weber's positivistic 
conception of the ideal type was not the final stage in the career of 
this concept but that, in his later work, Weber seems to have been close 
to using a version of Simmel's idea of social forms. If this is so then, 
as our previous discussion has shown, this transition from a positivist 
nominalist conception of models to the a priori realism of Simmel's forms 
was a remarkable about turn. However, it is noticeable that Weber never 
formulated the ideal type in Simmelian formal terms. Rex's argument 
concerning this last phase of the ideal typo is based not on what Wobor 
said but on what he did in his comparative studios. It could thoreforo 
be argued that, if he abandoned the positivist idoal typo in hin 
comparative studies, Weber acknowledged its inadequacy without being 
able to articulate a reliable alternative. 
* 
Further, Weber's failure to overcome the problem posed by the 
possibility of a multiplicity of internally coherent typifications of 
one phenomenon leads to relativism, and the acceptance of the view that 
all such types are equally legitimate; we simply choose whichever 'point 
of view' is most acceptable to us. This loads to the acceptance of the 
nonsensical belief that the same phenomenon can be identified with 
opposing types, that the claims that the phenomenon is both A and not-A 
* re our comments on Weber's comparative studios ©bov©, chapter 4 which 
argues that Weber did not abandon the solipsistic and ago-aggrandising 
consequences of his nominalism and positivism. 
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cannot be challenged. Thus, although types conetructr'd by difforunt 
people may be internally coherent, in relationship to nach othor they nra 
plainly inconsistent, but on Weber's analysis, nothing can be done about 
this. As in the political field, we are supposed to choose our own God 
or devil and fight for it as if it were the only acceptable choice, even 
though we cannot justify such exclusivity to ourselves as anything but 
arbitrary. 
The use of essence, instead of the ideal typo, would avoid all those 
problems. Firstly, the identity of sociological models with that which 
is necessary in our cognition of phenomena, phenomena in itself, avoids 
the relativistic and sceptical consequences of Waberian ideal types. 
Further, the use of essence overcomes the problem of the possibility of 
multiple types through the application of the concept of horizon. This 
permits us to distinguish between ontologically independent phenomena 
which are presented together, to identify our naive associations of 
phenomena with each other, and particular instances of generically required 
phenomena. Thus, because essence is identified with phenomena in itself 
there can be only one essential type of the phenomenon. If there appoarc 
to be more than one such type of the phenomenon we are able to determine 
whether in fact the types do refer to the same phenomenon or whether one 
or both retain the self-evidence of inadequate perception 
». Also, the 
problem of varying perspectives and of each ideal typo being constructed 
in accordance with the particular perspective of the typo constructor is 
overcome through our distinction between meaning and significance. 
Significant judgements do refer to the particular value of the phenomenon 
for an individual but such judgements presuppose perception of the 
phenomenon in itself, that is, perception of the meaning of the phenomenon. 
Thus our eidetic categorisations of phenomena will nbt be limited to our 
* re below, this chapter. Also "error" in chapter 2. 
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particular perspectives because they are based on the menninr, of phenomrina 
which is prior to all perspective limited judgements. Further, as the 
essence of phenomena is not only intersubjectively available but is the 
object of the intersubjective mode of apprehension, ossentiai typen are 
not private and therefore there can be no question of either presenting 
them to others on a take it or leave it basis or of limiting the range of 
persons with whom we can enter into a dialogue, based on the typification, 
to those who share our value-judgements. 
The perception of essence is necessary perception concerning the 
nature of things. Thus, the essential type can fulfill that function of 
the ideal type which was abandoned in Weber's search for positivistic 
reliability in relation to the type. That is, the essential type defines 
the nature of that which is the object of empirical research. As a 
result, the essential type grounds empirical research in necessity. 
Above all,, the essential type overcomes the Weberinn dilemma of attempting 
to justify the ideal type in terms of that which it is supposed to ground. 
This is because the perception of essence, being based an the rational 
intuition of self-evident phenomena, is completely indepondant of the 
positivist procedures of verification and falsification which are used 
in empirical research. Thus the reliability of essence is not entahlishod 
by those empirical procedures which it seeks to ground. 
It is necessary to complete this consideration of the opposition 
between essence and ideal type by briefly indicating a further role for 
the essential type in sociology. 
MODELS, METAPHORS AND ANALOGIES 
We base this part of the discussion on Romseyls(20) distinction 
between two kinds of model. The first is the picturing or scale modal 
which aims at the manipulable reproduction of the phenomenon or its 
4U: 1 - 
relevant features. The aim of this model is to remain faithful to the 
structure of the phenomenon in relation to the purposo at hand, The 
scale model aids understanding by placing the phenomenon in a morn 
familiar context, reducing it to conueniont proportions or by rcilattnq it to 
an already familiar phenomenon. This mod©l is descriptive but distorting. 
The second model is the analogue or disclosure model which, "duals in 
(21) 
hints rather than identities". This model retains n structural simil- 
arity with the phenomenon but according to Ramsey is not a comrlotn 
reproduction of it, although, strangely, he claims that thorn in an 
isomorphic identity between model and phenomenon. further the disclosure 
model is said to be generated in a sense of participation or insight and 
crucially, this model does not reproduce our knowledge but adds to it. 
In our view the disclosure model is basod upon a vague understnnding 
of essence. Undoubtedly Ramsey would deny this but his understanding 
of essentialism is based on Popper whose inadequate conception of this 
subject has been demonstrated above. Further, like Uober, Romsoy 
initially sees the disclosure model as justified by empirical investigation 
but on this topic he is extremely vague, referring to "empirical fit" and 
the need of the model to "chime-in" with the phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
Ramsey's notion of the model which deals in hints and, olthough not 
identical to phenomenon is isomorphically identified with it, indicates 
a grasp of essence which is compromised by the failure to distinguish 
between horizon and essence. As such Ramsey's discbsuro model, despite 
his endorsement of Popper, is in the position of positing something which 
is the object of the model and which stands behind the phonomcnon. That 
iss Ramsey's notion of a disclosure model implies the notion of essence 
but since Ramsey's notion of essence is crude and unclear it cannot be 
made explicit. Further, Ramsey"s notion that the model adds something 
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to our knowledge of the phenomenon can be clarified by equating it with 
essence which adds to our mundane knowledge of the phenomenon, an 
awareness of the nature of the thing itself, its species identity and 
its possibilities. It is the fact that such knowledge is not apprehended 
in mundane perception which leads to the mistaken idea that such knowledge 
distorts the phenomenon. In fact it distorts ie. corrects our naive 
apprehension of the phenomenon. Such knowledge is fundamental to all our 
positings concerning the phenomenon. 
This last point is crucially important when we consider the 
development of Ramsey's argument in which he describes the respective 
role of these models in language. The scale model is identified with the 
simile because they both have a limited descriptive role in relation to 
a relevant feature of that which they model, e. g. "he is as strong as an 
oak". The crucial point is that there is only a minimal possibility of 
developing discourse from this model. For example, it is no use asking 
what the man in the above example does when his leaves fall off. It is 
therefore hazardous to draw further inferences frnm this model because the 
relationship between the two phenomena which are being compared is not 
required. That is, strength is not rgquired of either man or oaks, it 
is not a necessary aspect of their being but is part of their familiar 
horizon. 
The disclosure model is identified with the metaphor. Ramsey is 
not particularly clear on the distinctive features of the metaphor; much 
of what he says about it applies equally to the simile. However, he 
argues that the metaphor is distincitve in that, like the disclosure 
model, it is born in insight, reveals novel aspects and enables further 
discourse and is typically used when words fail us. The clearest 
definition of metaphor given by Ramsey is that, "metaphorical expressions 
- 411 - 
occur when two situations strike us in such a way as to reveal what includes 
them but is no more combination of them both"(22). Thera is certainly 
a strong hint of essence in this statement. However, Romney finally 
bases his distinction between metaphor and simile on grammatical structure; 
the former is the statement A is B, the latter is the statement A is 
like B. We reject this argument. There is no difference in terms of 
enabling further discourse between saying "Old ago is the autumn of life" 
and "Old age is like autumn". The true difference between simile and 
metaphor is that only in the case of the letter is there an essential 
relationship between the compared phenomena. That is, only in the case 
of the true metaphor do these phenomena belong to each other's inner 
horizon. 
Thus, the true metaphor is a linguistic expression of eidetic 
insight. This reveals the form of communication of transcendental 
sociology. Every essence has a range of possibilities; in metaphor wo 
seek to convey the nature of essence by describing realisations of its 
possibilities. That is, we express the essence as it appears in varying 
contexts. In this way we seek to lead our audience to a recognition of 
essence, as a possibility of their own acts of experience. Wo enable 
them to discover essence for themselves. Thus the linguistic form in 
which the findings of transcendental sociology are expressed is that of 
metaphor. 
We can therefore summarise the role of the essential typo in sociology. 
Firstly, it is reliable knowledge concerning the nature of things, thus 
it defines the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. Deriving 
from this, the essence is a description of the ontological structure of 
phenomena and therefore establishes the course of empirical enquiry, 
that iss which questions and procedures are or are not appropriate. 
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Eidetic insight is based on the self-evidence of phenomena, therefore 
it avoids the contradiction of the Weborian ideal typo of both grounding 
and being dependant upon empirical research, As a consequence, the 
essential type is a model for reality as opposed to being abstracted 
from reality. Finally, essence, as the object of intorsubjective 
consciousness is available to all. The conclusions of research based on 
the nature of things is expressed metaphorically, as realisations of the 
possibilities of essence, Thus, essential typos are the beginning and 
end of investigation; they define the nature of the object of research 
and are the means of conveying our understanding to an audience. Thus, 
all understanding between an actor and a researcher, between a researcher 
and an audience is rooted in, begins in and ends in, universal 
rationality as the apprehension of necessity in transcendental 
consciousness. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this thesis we have shown the necessity of reliable knowledge, 
the methods by which such knowledge is to be acquired and, abovo all, 
the inter-relationship between such knowledge and genuine intersubjectiva 
knowledge. In so doing, we have clarified the nature of the inadequacies 
of current work on intersubjective understanding in sociology and shown 
how the method of revised phenomenology replaces the solipsistic ego- 
aggrandising consequences of such approaches with genuine understanding 
of the other. We have shown that this understanding, expressed in 
eidetic form as the basis of all knowledge, is the basis of communication 
not only between social actors and the sociologist but also between the 
sociologist and his audience. 
It should therefore be clear that in order for phenomenology to 
fulfill its value for sociology it must be more narrowly defined than 
has previously been the case. The tendency to identify phenomenology 
with interpretive sociology in general, must be resisted. This is because 
such identification makes phenomenology so general as to be useless. 
Further, we have shown the sociological value of phenomenology to lie 
precisely in an application of its distinctive methods and theories, such 
as the reductions and Transcendental consciousness, to problems of 
sociology. A broadening of phenomenology to include such theorists as 
Winch and Weber must inevitably result in the loss of those distinctively 
phenomenological aspects which are of prime value to sociology. 
It is necessary to emphasise that in advocating a phenomenological 
sociology we are not urging the replacement of empirical enquiry by 
purely theoretical questioning. In conformity with the foundation- 
building goal of phenomenology, we see a phenomenological sociology as 
In addition to the cases already cited, this attitude is found in Roche 
"Phenomenology, Language and the Social Sciences". 
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establishing the nature of the object of empirical enquiry and the 
proper course of such enquiry. That iss the application of phenomenology 
in sociology establishes but does not replace empirical enquiry, it 
enables us to understand others it does not claim to be able to predict 
what the content of such understanding will be. 
This indicates that our account of a phenomenological sociology is 
partial in that it does not include instances of empirical enquiry based 
upon what we regard as proper phenomenological procedures. This is true, 
and this is the next task which our phenomenological sociology, having 
established its own reasonableness, must set itself. 
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